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Il~TRODUCTION 
The history of teacher politics in South Africa since the onset of Bantu Education has been 
riven with contlict. The conflict, in its broadest sense, has focussed on the ideologically-
loaded concept of "professionalism". What is "professionalism"? Who defines it? Does it 
exist in some static, abstract way, or does it change over time? This dissertation argues that 
"professionalism" does. indeed change over time, and has been used by the state to contain 
teachers and teachers' behaviour. Cont1ict arises within teacher politics when traditional 
"professional" attitudes and behaviour are challenged by groups, including groups situated 
within the ranks of teachers, in opposition to the state's "professional" construct. 
South African teachers live in a socially-divided society, with firmly entrenched 
ethnic and class divisions which effect teachers, their organisations and their ideologies of 
"professionalism". The state, implementing its apartheid policies, has organised teachers, 
and education, into distinct, ethnically-defined departments, creating fundamental lines of 
division. Tensions arise in teacher politics when social and political forces both demand the 
assertion of "professional" ethnic identities and seek to reject and overcome ethnic 
divisions. 
Teachers' class location, another aspect of "professionalism", also creates tensions 
within teacher politics. Teachers' class location is ambiguous at best, with teachers falling 
comfortably into neither the working class nor the middle class to which many teachers 
have aspired. Rather, tensions arise as both the middle and working-classes demand 
loyalty. At times of heightened political cont1ict, social and political forces both engender 
desire for middle-class status, and demand allegiance with working-class values and 
attitudes. 
"Professionalism" proved a useful mechanism for various groups-- state and those in 
opposition to the state-- seeking to maintain or overcome these ethnic and class divides. 
To be a "professional" meant, to some, to be middle-class, and to be respected within the 
confines of a particular "population group". The South African government's "own affairs" 
strategy compartmentalized social mobility and status. On the other hand, the liberation 
movement of the 1980s engendered cont1ict by espousing non-racialism, and the "leadership 
of the working-class". 
The nature of schooling also situates teachers in conflicted terrain. Schools are 
contradictory places, both offering space for democratic articulation of initiative and 
requiring obedience to hierarchical, authoritarian bureaucracy. Teachers, caught within 
such a contradiction, and feeling the disparity between the fundamental purpose of their 
work and its practical outcome, have reacted in a variety of ways, from quiescence to 
protest. 
J 
At times of political contlict, retlected in schools, sections of society, such as 
students, challenge the race and class assumptions which allow teachers to uphold 
"professionalism". Teachers are held accountable by two authorities: their employer, the· 
state; and the communities and students for whom they purportedly work. When contlict 
arises between these two authorities, the basis for teacher "professionalism", for teachers' 
race and class location, is challenged. 
This dissertation attempts to describe such a moment of challenge, and transition, 
within teacher politics in South Africa. Focussing primarily on black teacher groups, this 
dissertation will describe the remarkable events within teacher politics in the Western Cape 
in the 1980s, following from the Soweto uprising of 1976. 
The decade of the eighties marked massive changes in the political and educational 
context within which teachers worked. After 1976, schools became the focus of opposition 
to the apartheid state. The atmosphere within schools changed as many students rejected 
the SG.hooling proffered them by the state, and the "professional" implementation of state-
schooling by teachers. The liberation movement grew as the decade progressed, bolstered 
by a militant black trade union movement. The liberation struggle expanded and 
community-based protest drew schools into a broader, societal opposition to the state. The 
nature of schooling changed, as students and other elements of the liberation movement 
rejected apartheid education, and began fostering alternative education. Most notably, 
People's Education articulated both a rejection of state education and a desire for relevant, 
democratic schooling. 
For most teachers, the contlictual atmosphere at schools and the rejection by their 
students created crises of identity. Teachers and their organisations had to find new, 
legitimate places within schooling plagued by dissatisfaction and confrontation. It was a 
time of great ambiguity and questioning. Conventional "professionalism" was being 
challenged from both inside and outside the ranks of teachers. 
Within this context, teacher organisations underwent transitions away from traditional 
"professionalism", towards a new way of defining their work and their locations in society. 
At the end of the 1970s, established teacher groups I operated within each department of 
education. Upholding "professional" ideals, these ethnically-defined groups cooperated 
with the state, aspired to an elite status, and remained antagonistic to "political" 
involvement. During the 1980s, however, such ideals became unacceptable to many 
elements of the liberation movement. Established "professional" associations were 
challenged by their students and the liberation movement to work for change and redress, 
rather than uphold a "professional" status quo. 
A central catalyst for change within teacher politics grew from within the ranks of 
teachers. During the 1980s, new teacher organisations formed. These "emergent" bodies, 
1 Throughout this dissertation, the term "estahlisheJ" will refer to those estahlishment teacher associations 
recogniseJ by the:: various dcpartmc::nts of c::Jucation. 
4 
as they came to be known,2 espoused an "anti-professional" ideology. Aligning teachers 
with the working-class, engaging in political activity in opposition to the state and its 
education departments, these groups confronted the established teacher associations with the 
greatest challenge to their "professional" foundations. Allied with powerful elements of the 
liberation movement, the emergent teacher unions fostered a new, legitimate teacher 
"professionalism" based on non-racial allegiance to the working class in an overtly political 
context. 
The various elements of the conflicts within teacher politics have been embodied in 
different teacher organisations. The organisations reflect certain ideological positions in 
relation to teachers' race, class and "professional" locations. Organised teachers' attempts 
to overcome contlict and contradiction within their ranks has thus taken the form of teacher 
unity. Teacher unity played a central role in teacher politics, especially in the 1980s, and 
reflected the changing discourse of "professionalism" as attempts were made to overcome 
divisions in race, class and "professional" locations. 
In examining the unity process and teacher politics, this dissertation seeks to rebut 
facile ideas about teachers as lackeys, sycophants, or "anarchists" .3 It hopes to. dispel such 
popular and crude myths, and to take cognizance of action, not just reaction, at a particular 
historical moment. In this way, it hopes to set about altering popular misconceptions about 
"apathetic" teachers. As Baruch Hirson has written in the forward to his book on the 
Soweto uprising: "To tell the story, is little enough. Events do not occur fortuitously, nor 
are they preordained. Real live people have made the history recounted here, and ... it is 
their actions which have to be understood. "4 
Teacher unity as a challenge to conventional "professionalism" 
Teacher unity has a long and complex history in South Africa. Separate organisations have 
constantly perceived a need to establish relations among themselves. Leo Sihlali, president 
of the Cape African Teachers Association (CATA), reflected the divisions when he said that 
"separate teachers' organisations are still with us .... [It is] high time these artificial barriers 
· were knocked down ... "5 Similar sentiments were evident when Randall Peteni, president of 
the African Teachers' Association of South Africa (ATASA), asked, "Why are teachers so 
racially oriented in outlook and so rigid in attitude towards other teachers' associations?"6 
The fact that Sihlali spoke in 1952, and Peteni spoke in 1985, demonstrates historical 
2 Throughout this dissertation, the term "emergent" will be used to refer to democratically-alligned teacher 
unions formed in the 1980s. 
3 This last term was used to describe "adivist" teachers in "unions" by Mr. Mtshali, the KwaZulu Minister of 
Education and Culture. Mtshali, address, Graduation Ceremony, Esikawini College of Education, Esikawani, 
18 May 1991. 
4 Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire, Yl'ar of A.1h (London: Zed Press. 1979) 1. 
5 Michad James Cameron, "The Introduction of Bantu Education and the Question of Resistance: Co-
operation, Non-Collaboration or Ddiance'! The Struggle for African Schooling with Special Reference to Cape 
Town, 1945-1960," M.Ed. thesis,UniversityofCapeTown, 1986,194. 
6 Educatio 3rd Quarter (1985): 21. 
5 
continuity and lends historical depth to the teaching community's fractures, and to the 
desires of teacher organisations' leadership to repair them. 
There has been cooperation, but attempts at merging organisations based on 
ethnically-detined education departments have time and again proved unsuccessful due to a 
political context which actively encouraged division. In 1946, the Cape-based, white South 
African Teachers' Association (SA TA) printed an article entitled "A National Association 
of South African Teachers" in its organ, The Educarion Journal. The author perceived 
important benefits in unity. He believed: " ... there would be much benetit for all ... in the 
creation of a professional spirit which would help us rise above parochialism and the 
pettiness of racial antagonisms .... "7 
Six years later, after two years of planning, CATA and the predominantly Coloured-
intellectual Teachers' League of South Africa (TLSA) met together for one day. The 590-
person meeting, at which Sihlali spoke, aimed for political and educational unity.s But 
Sihlali' s "artificial barriers" remained standing; separate organisations remained intact 
largely because of state-constructed obstacles to unity. 
In fact, these divisions remained in place during the following two decades of the 
South African Federation of Teachers' Associations (SAFT A), an organisation founded in 
1958 by Coloured and Indian teachers' associations. 9 In the seventies, the white Transvaal 
Teachers' Association (TT A) joined, 10 as did the Cape-based SATA.II But SAFTA was not 
to survive the decade, for the political winds were shifting. Despite the fact that the Cape 
Teachers' Professional Association (CTPA), a Coloured participant, could in 1977 laud the 
"genuine desire towards inter-racial contact" expressed by different teachers' 
organisations,12 two years later the CTPA withdrew from SAFTA. A resolution from the 
1979 CTPA conference explained: "Conference held the view that a body federally 
constituted along racial lines the way SAFTA is, may quite easily serve to endorse racial 
notions and divisions in South Africa rather than to counteract them. "13 As Peteni said at 
the 1979 CTPA conference, talking of the possibility of forming a single, united teachers', 
association, "There are many hurdles to clear: we fall under different departments of 
education, we live in segregated ghettoes, and our children attend different schools." 14 This 
commentary suggested a crucial issue for South African teacher unity: whether a federal 
organisation would clear such hurdles, or would perpetuate them. 
7 The Education Journal January 1946: 3-4. Interestingly, in the February issue of that year, a front page 
editorial appeared to clarify "knotty points" raised hy the unity article for members' discussion. 
8 Cameron, 194. 
9 Randall van den Heever; "The SAFTA and the UT ASA: A Historical (sic) Appraisal," Educatio 4th Quarter 
( 1978): 24-25 . 
. 10 Argus, 21 June 1976. 
II Mike Reeler, SATA organiser, telephone interview, 5 April!993. 
12 Randall van den Heever. "A Step Towards Nonnalizing Education in South Africa: CTPA and SAT A 
Meet," Educatio 4th Quarter ( !977): l 0. 
13 Educatio Conference Edition (1979): 2. 
14 Educatio Conference Edition ( 1979): 7. 
6 
In December 1979, at a Southern African regional conference organised by the World 
Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP), held in Mauritius, 
the "black R.S.A. delegation" discussed the formation of a single South African teacher 
body. "It was felt," reported the CTPA. "that a start should be made with a common 
interior secretariat as a forerunner to a single teachers union .... " 1s Over the Easter 
weekend in 1980, then, the Joint Council of Teachers' Associations of South Africa 
(JOCTASA) was created at Jan Smuts Airport. This council -- initially composed of the 
"Coloured" Union of Teachers' Associations of South Africa (UTASA) and ATASA, both 
federally-constituted national bodies-- sought to end "all discriminatory measures in 
education," among other things. 16 JOCT ASA met on and off during the first half of the 
eighties. 
In 1983, ATASA and UTASA composed a Charter for Teacher Unity, but 
disagreement within JOCTASA ensued. ATASA, UTASA, the "Indian" Teachers' 
Association of South Africa (T ASA) and both English and Afrikaans white organisations 
met on 14 April 1984; Educatio, the CTPA organ, reported that, "Many diametrically 
opposed views were aired."11 Petini, reporting on the meeting over a year later, claimed 
that "JOCT ASA affairs seem to be at a standstill." 18 It did survive the 1985 e·mergency to 
hold a meeting in 1986. But the participants-- the CTPA, the Peninsula African Teachers' 
Association (PENATA -a Cape Town ATASA affiliate), and TASA --decided somewhat 
vaguely to organise at "grassroots" leve\.19 JOCTASA was for all intents and purposes 
abandoned to the maelstrom of 1985. 
Clearly, there had been some movement away from the strictly racialistic thinking of 
the 1950s, 60s and 70s. But powerful tensions between racially-organised groups still 
existed. In 1985, three "progressive" teachers' organisations-- the Western Cape Teachers' 
Union (WECTU), the Democratic Teachers' Union (DETU), and Education for an Aware 
South Africa (EDASA) -- formed in Cape Town and set themselves up directly in 
opposition to the "apartheid thinking" of the established organisations.2o The differences in 
approach were highlighted in 1987, when two separate unity initiatives were begun within a 
week of each other, one for the large established organisations, the other for the newer, 
more militant "progressive" unions. 
Then, in April 1988, the African National Congress (ANC) and WCOTP, amongst 
others, invited all but the established white organisations to Harare for a watershed 
conference. What emerged were a series of guidelines for unity, a commitment on the part 
15 Educatio 1st Quarter (1980): 3. 
l6 Educatio 2nd Quarter ( 1980): 8. 
17 Educatio 2nd Quarter (1984): 7. Interestingly, "A proposal that a loose federation be established with all 
members retaining full autonomy and their own ~haracter, was defeated." 
18 Educatio 3rd Quarter (1985): 21. 
19 Sunday Times, 27 April 1986. 
20 The Western Cape emergent organisations had been preceded in this by the establishment of the 
"progressive" National Union of South African Educators (NEUSA), which operated mainly in DET schools 
in the Transvaal from 1980. 
7 
of all organisations to participate exclusively in this new initiative, and, importantly, an 
external facilitator in the form of COSATU. This initiative led to the formation of the 
interim National Teacher Unity Forum (NTUF), and then to the creation of the South 
African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) in October 1990. 
Through all recent attempts to unify teachers, three contentious issues have emerged: 
should the structure of any combined organisation be federally-based on the existing 
structures of teachers groups, or completely unitary; should the proposed body be 
committed to a "professional" or a "trade union" ideology; and how should the vastly 
differing resources brought by different organisations be re-distributed?2I These are 
important and, one might argue, intractable issues. It would take a peculiar set of 
circumstances to overcome, or subsume them. 
In 1990, with the launch of SADTU on the immediate agenda, many teachers and 
other interested groups believed such circumstances had, at long last, arrived. Reporting on 
comments made by COSATU General Secretary Jay Naidoo before the launch, The Weekly 
Mail stated that SADTU " ... could evolve into South Africa's first truly non-racial national 
union. "22 Estimates of its starting membership ranged above 100,000.23 But even prior to 
the launch, which warranted no less a speaker than Nelson Mandela, tensions emerged from 
beneath the carpet where a most diligent, if hurried, process had swept them. The 
Transvaal United African Teachers Association (TUATA), an ATASA affiliate, decided not 
to participate, and both the Cape African Teachers' Union (CATU) and the Natal African 
Teachers' Union (NATU) "asked for more time to decide on their future." Also, the Natal 
Teachers' Society (NTS), the only established white organisation granted observer status at 
the launch, decided to pull out.24 The overt opposition to SADTU grew into the creation of 
a rival national body, the National Association of Professional Teachers' Organisations of 
South Africa (NAPTOSA), which espoused both federalism and "professionalism". The 
saga of teacher unity, in other words, continued in remarkably the same, disunited vein. 
Why did SADTU fail to fulfill the ideal of a single, non-racial, national union of 
teachers envisaged by its initial organisers? Or, articulated more broadly, why has teacher 
disunity proved so resilient in South African history? In attempting to answer this question, 
this dissertation -- focussing on one region, the Western Cape-- will argue that the history 
of teacher unity has been a search for a new "professional" identity, and for empowerment. 
This search has been int1uenced by a variety of groups with vested interests in schooling. 
The groups comprised the state, students, communities and a variety of "liberation" 
organisations. 
Why, ultimately, did these interest groups want to int1uence teacher politics? The 
answer, within the context of teacher unity, concerns public identity and behaviour. How 
21 These three areas were outlined by Peter Kallaway in a talk to a Western Cape Teacher Unity Forum 
workshop at UCT on 18 February 1990. 
22 The Weekly Mail, 5-11 October 1990. 
23 The Weekly Mail, 5-11 October 1990; South, 4-10 October 1990. 
24 South, 4-10 October 1990. 
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teachers' groups chose to detine themselves indicated an ideological context. a way of 
perceiving their educational and social world. The different interest groups, such as the 
state and the liberation movement, operated from fundamentally different ideological 
positions, and teachers' self-perceived identities put them on a scale between one or another 
of these positions. Teachers' self-perceived ideological foundations dictated behaviour. 
This had crucial implications for teacher unity. Differing ideological positions considered 
the style and necessity of teacher unity in different ways. The state, for example, enjoyed a 
disunited profession organised within the parameters of state-constructed departments of 
education. Elements of the liberation movement, on the other hand, sought a single, 
unified profession espousing the need for political change. Teacher organisations adopted 
positions between these two poles. 
These groups wanted to dictate "appropriate" teacher behaviour. There were vast 
differences between interest groups concerning what should be taught in schools and how it 
shoul~ be taught. Also, these groups wanted teachers to behave in more or less overtly 
"political" ways. Should teachers engage in popular protest? Should they support their 
students' demands? Or should they work in allegiance with state forces to punish and 
control students? 
The issues of identity and behaviour are captured within the ideologically-loaded 
concept of "professionalism", which has been of central importance in the process of 
teacher unity. If teachers aspire to "professional" heights, then the defining characteristics 
of "professionalism", in terms of identity and acceptable behaviour, have a large intluence 
over teachers. The state, it will be shown, has defined "professionalism" for its own 
purpos.es. This definition was challenged in the mid-eighties, and the whole notion of 
"professionalism" underwent a period of transition among some sectors of the teaching 
profession as the decade drew to a militant close. 
This history of teacher politics -- involving teachers' identity, behaviour and 
"professional" position -- is clearly a history of opposition in South Africa. The terrain of 
teachers contained contradictions -- apart from those inherent in race and class locations --
as a direct result of the oppositional nature of the interest groups influencing teacher 
politics. Generally, this can be perceived as the battle between the state and the forces of 
liberation working within South Africa, and working specitically within schools. More 
subtly, tensions operated among elements within both the state and the liberation movement 
in the 1980s. These elements, defining "professional" behaviour differently, demanding 
different action and understanding from teachers, and thus created contradictions. This is 
to a large degree why so many teachers' organisations have existed in South Africa, as 
different teachers have responded to such pressures differently and utilized their available 
political and educational space in different ways.ZThe world of teachers has thus been a 
microcosm of the broad forces operating antagonistically during a tumultuous decade. 
Why, then, have teachers' organisations in the Western Cape remained disunited? 
Why has unity proven so elusive? Because each group of teachers represents the organised 
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articulation of a set of values and ideologies. Due to the contradictory nature of social 
forces in apanheid society, the realm of teachers allows room for these values and 
ideologies to be vastly different. The interest groups seeking influence over teachers add 
particular weight to one or another of these ideologies. While at different historical 
moments one interest group, like the state, might be powerful enough to quiet its 
opponents, this was not the case during the 1980s. Instead, the social and political battles 
plaguing the country affected the ranks of teachers. The opposed interest groups played 
upon the structural contradictions, and utilized differing notions of "professionalism", to 
define teachers' identity, location and behavioural limitations. The history of teacher 
disunity in the Western Cape is therefore about power and "professionalism". 
This dissertation attempts to understand the contradictions within the realm of 
teachers, and how these have worked to maintain disunity. It will trace the history of 
organised teachers in the Western Cape from 1976 to 1990 as they attempted to move 
towards unity. It will follow the varying pressures applied by interest groups during these 
years, as well as the changing understandings of "professionalism". The pressures changed 
over time. So did the organised teachers, as established associations shifted public positions 
and aspects of their identities, and as new organisations came into being to challenge the 
old, to utilize the space provided by changing political and educational climates. 
Chapter One will provide the essential, thematic framework for an analysis of 
teachers' organisations in South Africa. It will explore the layers of contradictions --
social, school-based, and those created by interest groups -- as well as the ideological nature 
of "professionalism". Also, Chapter One will define the interest groups impinging on 
organised teachers during the eighties, and analyse their relationships with teachers and with 
schooling. 
The history of disunity will begin with the 1976 student uprising in Chapter Two. 
The importance of this watershed event for schooling, for the liberation movement, and for 
teachers will be outlined. Also, this chapter will examine the established teachers' 
organisations in the Western Cape at that time. These organisations were highly 
"professional", firmly ensconced in the ethnicly-divided departments of education, and 
completely unprepared for the shift in the balance of power caused by students. This 
chapter will then look at teachers' tentative responses to the events from 1976 to 1979. 
Chapter Three will explore teachers' reactions in the face of the second wave of 
student revolt in the Western Cape, starting in 1980. With the resurgence of "liberatory" 
activity, including a growing trade-union movement, and more highly-organised student 
protests, teachers felt a greater need and an enhanced opportunity to respond actively, and 
began to challenge the assumptions of their "professional" locations. A new, short-lived 
teachers' crisis organisation formed in Cape Town, illustrating the growing discontent with 
the established bodies and their ways of perceiving teachers' "professional" location. The 
emphasis, however, at the beginning of the decade was still on ethnic divisions in the ranks 
of teachers. 
lO 
This situation had fundamentally changed by 1985 -- dealt with in Chapters Four and 
Five -- when teachers, organisationally, challenged the ideological foundations of schooling 
and of their race, class and "professional" locations. As these contradictions heightened, as 
the liberation movement gained momentum, the three "progressive" teachers' organisations 
formed in the Western Cape, one in each of the African, Coloured and white departments. 
These organisations, responding in part to heightened contradictions, challenged not only 
the ethnic detinitions and "professionalism" of their established counter-parts, but raised the 
issue of class. The crucial question of teacher unionism, central in debates around teacher 
unity, emerged strongly from the chaotic years of 1985 and 1986. 
The following two years, as discussed in Chapter Six, were years of repressed 
political activity. The state asserted mighty and destructive pressure on its foes, and this 
effected organised teachers. Some form of teacher unity was still on organisational 
agendas, but the rift between established and newly-emergent groupings could not be 
overcome. 
The desirability and importance of a unitied profession, in the eyes of the liberation 
movement, became more apparent as the decade matured. Thus in April 1988, the ANC, 
WCOTP and others began a process of teacher unity facilitated by COSA TU. Chapter 
Seven deals with these tina! two years of the 1980s. The process begun in April 1988 
involved all the black organisations, and a few white ones. Over the two-and-a-half years 
b~fore this process led to the launch of SADTU, the debates about "professionalism", and 
race and class identity, raged. The newly-claimed authority of students, trade-unionists and 
liberation activists created the space for the articulation of a challenge to state-constructed 
"professionalism". Established organisations shifted -- in one case dramatically -- to fall 
more firmly in line with the liberation movement, in opposition to the state. 
The end of the decade, with its heightened social and political contradictions, created 
and allowed room for increased teacher militancy. This served to exacerbate the challenge 
to existing definitions of "professionalism". As the decade closed, and SADTU was 
launched, many organisers were disappointed that it was not the all-inclusive body it set out 
to become. But the challenge to traditional conceptions of teachers' locations existed in 
new forms. Alternative ideologies, alternative ways of perceiving their locations demanded 
alternative methods of organising. Many teachers chose to remain organised in familiar 
patterns, unwilling to give up their ethnically-defined identities, or their "professional", 
middle-class modus operandi. But teacher politics had been fundamentally altered and, 
through conflict, teachers had begun to empower themselves and assert a more legitimate 
"professional" ideology. 
A voiding facile views 
'feachers have been perceived by many different observers in overly-simplified ways, which 
serve to divest teachers of their credibility. In the battle for control of schools, which 
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began in earnest in the 1980s, they were seen as siding with one camp or another, or as 
completely lacking in notions of "responsibiliti', however that was defined. 
·Attacks on the credibility of teachers, with sometimes violent repercussions, were a 
damaging form of harassment during the early period under study. The various interest 
groups described in detail in Chapter One include the state, students, liberation 
organisations, trade unions, and, of course, teachers themselves. Each, for their own 
reasons, utilizes generalisations and narrow perceptions to embrace the teaching corps. The 
state, for example, through its education departments and inspectors,2s seemed wholly 
unable to recognize the human condition of teachers during times of tension at schools, to 
see teachers as more than pawns. The Weekly Mail reported in 1986 that circuit inspectors 
simply expected teachers and principals to carry out their decisions.26 More concretely, in 
1988 the Department of Education and Training (DET) sent a circular to the principals of 
its schools asking for the names of "radical" teachers. 27 By deciding that teachers must be 
"professionals" -- a state-of-being neatly coditied in rigid codes of conduct -- and that, 
conversely, any deviation from this rendered a teacher "communistic" or "criminal" ,2s the 
state's narrow vision has sought to damage the public image of teachers. This has had a 
range of negative impacts on t.he people themselves. 
A second example of the harmful effects of facile perceptions concerns students. 
Students have often perceived their teachers as collaborators, rejecting their teachers as 
symbols of state control. This condition has changed over time from a militant rejection of 
teachers in 1976 and 1980 to a ready acceptance of those comradely educators who joined 
progressive unions and were harassed and detained alongside their students. But the term 
"collaborator" stripped teachers of credibility, created emotional stress, and, in some cases 
led to physical threats and violence. 
Relations between teachers and students are relations of power, and are thus fraught 
with much greater complexity than some students would have us believe, especially at the 
point where the subordinate students rebel. Political scientist James Scott offers a useful 
understanding of such rebellion in his ground-breaking study of "hidden transcripts", the 
true thoughts, feelings and attitudes of subordinate peoples which must remain "hidden" in 
the face of domination. "The first open statement of a hidden transcript," writes Scott, "a 
declaration that breeches the etiquette of power relations, that breaks an apparently calm 
surface of silence and consent, carries the force of a symbolic declaration of war. "29 And 
all is fair in war, especially overly-facile constructions of the enemy. Students rebelled 
25 Here it is important to recognize the ambiguous and often difticult role played by school principals who are 
put under immense pressure to bridge the gap between education departments and restive teachers at times of 
political cont1ict.. 
26 The Weekly Mail, 27 March-3 April 1986. 
27 Argus, lO September 1988. 
28 Three teachers, for examp!e, lost their jobs for being present at a meeting of students in 1980 at which the 
possibility of a boycott was discussed. Elizabeth Everett, "Teachers and the Boycott," South African Outlook 
110 (August 1980): 120. 
29 James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1990) 8. 
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against teachers as ideological lackeys of the state. a term which neatly subsumed the 
various other reasons for rebellion against a dominant authority. At times of open 
rebellion, students learned to articulate their many subtle grievances about teachers in 
generalised, simple ways. 
This thesis seeks to counteract the simplistic versions of teachers' roles. The tensions 
forced upon teachers are myriad. As Scott has argued, 
A view of politics focused either on what may be command performances 
of consent or open rebellion represents a far too narrow concept of 
political life -- especially under conditions of tyranny or near-tyranny in 
which much of the world lives.Jo 
Many South African teachers would accept that they have lived, at times, under near~ 
tyrannical conditions. It would be fallacious, therefore, to accept their "command 
performances of consent". To avoid a facile focus on performances commanded by 
departments or by students, among others, this dissertation will attempt to interrogate the 
ideological domain of teachers and render it problematic. 
Teachers and a historian's dilemmas 
The various ways of influencing teachers could be divided into two categories: ways m 
which all teachers are intluenced, and ways in which organised teachers are intluenced. 
The former might refer to departmental codes, while the latter could include claims against 
the reputation of a particular organisation. 
This division indicates an important dilemma for historians. While organisations 
provide some teachers with a voice, what of the majority of teachers who remain voiceless, 
who do not belong to organisations, or who belong in name only? Although formal 
organising is but one of many avenues open to teachers who wish to express dissatisfaction, 
it is the most accessible to analysts. Therefore, this thesis will focus on organised teachers 
while recognising the partial picture this offers of teacher politics generally. 
A second analytical choice which has been made is to focus on the Western Cape, 
while placing teacher politics in a national context. In a relatively short project of this 
nature, it is important to be regionally specific, for situations within both the educational 
and political arenas vary greatly from place to place. The Western Cape saw the birth of 
three new organisations in 1985, including the only progressive white grouping in the 
country. The other two organisations worked neatly in opposition to their established 
counter-parts. Finally, too, the Western Cape Teacher Unity Forum (WCTUF) was 
arguably the most active region in the country, ultimately providing a president and a 
secretary for SADTU. 
But politics in the Western Cape contains a set of ideological divisions quite apart 
from the fractures between teachers' organisations. There are regional aspects of the 
nation-wide divides between Charterist and Africanist and Black Consciousness groupings. 
30 Scott, 20. 
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This thesis runs the risk of favouring the former since the recent politics of teacher unity 
falls squarely into the Charterist camp; the SADTU initiative has been ANC promoted, and 
was COSATU-facilitated. At Harare in April 1988, in fact, there were no representatives 
from the other two traditions.3I 
The more troublesome ideological terrain is that of the Unity Movement and its 
Western Cape legacy, troublesome because its organisation and its effects are difficult to 
penetrate. Historian Bill Nasson contends that, " ... the earlier conspiratorial texture of 
Unity Movement social practice has continued to intluence the form and content of this 
essentially close-knit, self-enclosed political tendency. "32 In the 1940s and 50s, a majority 
of Non-European Unity Movement (NEUM) members were teachers,33 an indication that 
teacher-politics were affected by the NEUM. Nasson, while admitting that now, "It is an 
organisationally tiny grouping," claims that, "The old Non-European Unity Movement has 
left a palpable 'Unity Movement' identity as a significant cerebral element in Western Cape 
political life and consciousness. "34 Educationist Linda Chisholm concurs.35 Neville ~ 
Alexander, educationist and Western Cape political activist, is more severe: "It [the 
NEUM] painted itself into a corner and dragged at least two generations of young people in 
the Western Cape into a political cul-de-sac. "36 For Chisholm, too, the Unity Movement 
.legacy had limitations in the period under study here: "For the new generation, eager to 
organise and get to grips analytically with the new movements and forces shaping South 
Africa, the Unity Movement had few answers. "3.7 
The "identity" described by Nasson has been maintained amongst some teachers 
through the TLSA, a Unity Movement organisation. While educational sociologist Frank 
Molte~o claims that the TLSA was unpopular in 1980,38 it has continued to exist, albeit on 
a very small scale. The Sunday Times wrote in 1985 that the TLSA often attacked its 
"traditional" opponent, the CTPA.39 The state detained Helen Kies, the long-time editor of 
the TLSA organ, in 1985.40 But the intluence of the TLSA on the process of teacher unity 
was nominal, though WECTU sprang partially from the Unity Movement tradition. 
31 Merry Dewar, "The Long Road to Unity," Sash: Special Education Focus 3l.2 (September 1988): 18. 
32 Bill Nasson, "Opposition Politics and Ideology in the Western Cape," in eds. Glenn Moss and Ingrid 
Obery, South African Review 5 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1989) 94. 
33 Cameron, 60. 
34 Nasson, 93, 104. 
35 Linda Chisholm, "Education, Politics and Organisation: The Educational Traditions and Legacies of the 
Non-European Unity Movement, 1943-1986," Tra11.1jormation 15 (1991): l. She writes that the Unity 
Movement " ... must go some way towards accounting for the particular character associated with Western 
Cape politics." 
36 Neville Alexander, "Non-collaboration in the Western Cape, 1943-1963," in eds. Wilmot James and Mary 
Simons, The Angry Divide (Cape Town: David Philip, 1989) 187. 
37 Chisholm, 17. 
38 Frank Molteno, 1980: Studems Struggle for T71eir Sc!woLf (Cape Town: Centre for African Studies, UCT, 
1987) 88. 
39 Sunday Times, 19 May 1985. 
40 Cape Times, 23 November 1985. 
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Its conspiratorial nature, its self-enclosed style, its size, its ideology may all have 
excluded the TLSA from unity talks. These will also exclude it from the scope of this 
thesis. 
Also, as with elsewhere in South Africa, this study must contend with ethnic divisions 
which have been historically imposed from above. "Within the deeply seamed factionalism 
of Western Cape politics," writes Colin Bundy, "ethnic divisions have been an important 
axis of division. "41 
This thesis will discuss people who have chosen to organise within particular, 
ethnically-defined departments of education. Though their terms of reference may be 
ideologically "non-racial", for practical or ideological reasons the teacher organisations 
have been born and bred in separate ethnic arenas. For example, in 1984 T ASA affirmed 
its commitment to "high ·quality formal education to promote upward mobility of the Indian 
community. "42 
Such divisions are troublesome to the historian, for in utilizing categories imposed by 
the state, one runs the risk of perpetuating an unacceptable status quo. Ian Goldin, in a 
history of "coloured" identity, argues that the white ruling class fostered "colol}red" identity 
to prevent an alliance with other black "enemies" .43 However, Gavin Lewis, author of a 
history of ''coloured" people in the Western Cape, suggests that, "The solution to this 
dilemma ... is to accept that Coloured identity is a white-imposed categorisation. But it is 
one that for a variety of reasons came to be adopted by sections of the people so 
described. "44 Or, as Goldin has pointed out, "The survival of Coloured identity, however 
muted, has depended on the continued support of the working class and petty 
bourgeoisie. "45 
The historian of contemporary South African events faces different sorts of problems, 
too. While still caught up in the throes of a popular struggle, it is difficult to tease out 
cause and reason. Much information comes to light only later when people are willing to 
speak more frankly outside a time and a place steeped in the possibility of repressive action .. 
Time affords a certain beneficial distance. This study can therefore offer tentative first 
attempts at understanding the broad sweep of teacher politics in the 1980s. 
Literature and methodology 
Perhaps for some of the above reasons, secondary sources concerned with teachers of this 
period are scarce. This thesis will begin to fill a large gap in the literature, since little 
41 Colin Bundy, '"Action, comrades, action!': The politics of youth-student resistance in the Western Cape, 
1985," in eds. James and Simons, 211 
42 Herald, 16 February 1984. · · 
43 Ian Goldin, "The Reconstitution of the Coloured Identity in' the Western Cape," in eds. Shula Marks and 
Stanley Trapido, The Politics of Race, Class and Nationalism in Twentieth Cemury South Africa (London: 
Longman, 1987) 163-165. 
44 Gavin Lewis, Between the Wire and the Wall: A History of South African 'Coloured' Politics (Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1987) 4-5. 
45 Goldin, 156. 
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substantial historical work has been done on teacher unity. Monica Bot's recent article on 
the politics of teacher unity is a notable, albeit conservative, exception.46 Ian Moll's article 
on the SADTU initiative adds. to the academic literature, but remains little more than an 
abbreviated over-view and suffers from a SADTU bias. 47 There have not been any 
organisational histories done of the groups under study here, apart from in-house 
documents. 48 The work on teachers generally is negligible. Ken Hartshorne has produced 
an excellent chapter on teachers in his book Crisis and Challenge, 49 and Jonathan Hyslop is 
a notable exception, having produced a long paper on teacher resistance5o and a discussion 
of "Teachers and Trade Unions".5I There have been, too, a number of short articles 
written about the plight of teachers at certain historical moments.52 South African 
education studies would benefit greatly from specific organisational histories as well as 
theoretical analyses of teachers' locations within South African schools. 
More prodigious have been writings on educational struggles and student movements. 
There are good books available on the 1976 uprising, which set the stage for the 
developments discussed here.sJ Hyslop, too, provides a useful overview of "school student 
movements" from 1972 to 1987;54 People's Education has been widely debated;s5 and 
school-based struggles in the Western Cape have been analyzed by Molteno in his important 
documentary book,-"6 and by Colin Bundy in a subtle article focussing on 1985.57 Activist 
Graeme Bloch has provided an overview of Western Cape school struggles from 1986-1988 
from a Charterist perspective.ss And two recent edited collections contain much that is 
useful for understanding recent schooling and teachers in South Africa.59 
46 Monica Bot, "The Politics of Teacher Unity," SAIRR Spotlight 1192 (April 1992). 
47 Ian Moll, "The South African Democratic Teachers' Union and the politics of teacher unity in South 
Africa, 1985-1990," in eds. U nterhalter, et al, Apartheid Education and Popular Struggles (Johannesburg: 
Ravan Press, 1991) 185-202. 
48 An example of such an in-house history is Gareth Rossiter, "Developing, in a Selection of 'white' and 
private schools in the Cape Peninsula (sic), a facet of a counter hegemonic project?" B.Ed. thesis, UCT, 
November 1989. 
49 Ken Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge: Black Education 1910-1990 (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 
1992). 
SO Jonathan Hyslop, "Teacher Resistance in African Education from the 1940s to the 1980s," ASSA 
conference paper, University of the Witwatersrand, June 1989. 
51 Jonathan Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade Unions," South African Labour Bulletin II.6 (June-July 1986): 90-
97. 
52 See, for example, Monica Bot, "Bla~.:k Teachers: Caught in the middle," Indicator South Africa 2. 1 (March 
1984): Urban Monitor, 10-11. 
53 Notably, see Hirson. 
54 Jonathan Hyslop, "School Student Movements and State Education Policy: 1972-1987," in eds. William 
Cobbett and Robin Cohen, Popular Struggles in South Africa (London: James Currey Ltd., 1988). This is the 
revised, published version of the paper cited under the same name elsewhere in this study. ' 
55 See, for example, Helen Zille, "People's Education: the irony"and the tragedy," Sash 30.4 (February 
1987): 3-8; and eds. Unterhalter, et al. 
56 Molteno. 
57 Bundy, 206-217. 
58 Graeme Bloch, "Organisation as Education: The Struggle in Western Cape Schools 1986-1988," in ed. 
Salie Abrahams, Education in the Eighties: the proceedings of the Kenton Conference 1988 (October 1988). 
59 Unterhalter, et al, eds.; Mokubung Nkomo, ed. Pedagogy of Dominatiorz: Toward a Democratic Education 
in South Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 1990). 
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There has also been substantial work done on Western Cape politics. Wilmot James 
and Mary Simons have edited a book,60 while other articles include those written by Nasson 
and Glenda Kruss.6I Gavin Lewis' work on "coloured" politics is seminal and sensitive; 
Ian Goldin has written on a similar theme.62 A recent book by historian Tom Lodge, and 
others, contains sections on the region and its ideologies.63 
The international literature on teachers is essential for anyone writing about teachers 
in South Africa, for the theoreticaldebates in England and the United States are absent 
from the literature here. Nee-marxist writers in England offer valuable insight into the 
concept of "professionalism" as well as the work and class location of teachers.64 On 
education in the United States, Marjorie Murphy has written an elegant, detailed study of 
the American Federation of Teachers and the National Education Association from 1900 to 
1980 which examines many of the issues addressed in this dissertation.65 Kerchner and 
Mitchell offer a study of The Changing Idea of a Teachers' Union,66 and Carney and Levin 
situate teachers and schooling in a contradictory location within the American democratic 
state.67 
I have relied heavily on primary sources. Organisations have, unfortunately, been 
loath to allow a contemporary .researcher access to in-house organisational documents, such 
as minutes. And the emergent organisations have suffered a series of raids and bannings 
which have deprived them of much organisational material. So the vast bulk of material is 
available from the wealthier established organisations. Still, newsletters and pamphlets do 
exist for all of the organisations under study here, and I was able to obtain access to some 
"progressive" in-house documents. And TASA provided me with invaluable notes and 
minutes from all the National Teacher Unity Forum meetings from Harare to SADTU. 
Also, papers presented by most of the key teacher-organisation players at a conference in 
1985 have been collected, and offer a valuable insight into organisational thinking at that 
moment.68 
I have also relied on newspaper accounts of the events recorded here, especially from 
The Weekly Mail, South, the Argus, and the Cape Times during the period under study. 
60 James and Simons, eds. 
61 Glenda Kruss, "The 1986 State of Emergency in the Western Cape," in eds. Glenn Moss and Ingrid Obery, 
South African Review 4 (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1987) 173-186. 
62 Lewis; Goldin. 
63 Tom Lodge, et at, All, Here, and Mnv: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s (Cape Town: Ford 
Foundation, David Philip, 1991 ). 
64 Jennifer Ozga and Martin Lawn, Teachers, Professionalism and Class: A Study of Organized Teachers 
(London: The Falmer Press, 1981 ); Martin Lawn and Gerald Grace, eds. Teachers: 17w Culture and Politics 
of Work (London: The Falmer Press. 1987). 
65 Marjorie Murphy, Blackboard Unions: The AFT & the NEA.~J900-!980 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1990). 
66 Charles Taylor Kerchner and Douglas E. Mitchell, 77w Changing Idea of a Teachers' Union (Philadelphia: 
The Falmer Press, 1988). 
67 Martin Carnoy and Henry M. Levin, Schooling and Work in the Democratic State (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1985). 
68 M.J. Ashley, ed. Teachers in a Divided Society (Cape Town: Department of Education, UCT, 1985). 
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I also conducted twenty-two interviews during 1990. I did not attempt to obtain a 
sampling of larger teacher opinion; rather, I focused my interviews on those teachers who 
were either organisational leaders during the period under study, or had direct dealings with 
the process of teacher unity. Therefore, I interviewed most of the participants of the 
Western Cape Teacher Unity Forum, for example (without ever receiving official sanction 
or censure from that body). I used the interviews to obtain information about 
undocumented meetings and events, among other things, and, in particular, about the 
relations between organisations in the Western Cape. The interviews proved to be most 
interesting, informative and, in some instances of fact, unreliable. Specific information 
given, such as dates, sometimes proved incorrect. More significantly, for reasons that will 
be explored in this thesis, in 1990 some interviewees were guilty of revising their personal 
and organisational history. Where possible, I cross-checked interview material with 
newspaper accounts or with other interviewees. If a single informant's statement stands 
unsubstantiated, this is reflected in the text and footnotes of the dissertation. During 1989 
and 1990 I also attended a series of organisational meetings, for which I rely on my 
personal notes for accounts of what transpired. 
Overall, information and written material on teachers in African townships proved 
much more elusive than for the other groups under study. To a remarkable degree, 
newspapers dealt more extensively with Coloured and white education affairs than with 
African. Future research will hopefully begin to rectify the glaring absence of specific, 
detailed work on education struggles in Cape Town's African communities. 
Finally, this project can be said to have failed methodologically in the fragile realm of 
democratic research procedure. Ideally, one's academic research should be of some use to 
the people whom one· is writing about; what is taken out should be put back. Academic 
exercises should not result in the "word-ballets" removed from reality so aptly described by 
Paulo Friere.69 But a project can also prove useful to people who have not participated in 
the process, if the project is relevant. This project, unfortunately, failed to win the co-
operation or earn the censure of the Western Cape Teacher Unity Forum (WCTUF) -- the 
regional NTUF affiliate operating in Cape Town in 1990 -- though this was not for want of 
trying. A formal application was not responded to, tens of phone calls were not returned, 
and the mechanism of an interview of the researcher, though agreed to in principle. was 
never organised. Largely, I suspect, this was due to the overwhelming amount of work 
piled atop the WCTUF during the months leading up to the launch of SADTU. My choice 
was to abandon the work, or to continue without the desired formal cooperation. I hope 
some benefit will be derived from my choosing the latter option. 
69 Ira Shor and Paulo Friere, A Pedagogy for Liberation (Massachusetts: Bergin and Garvey, 1987) 181. 
CHAPTER ONE 
PLAYERS AND PAWNS: 
THE CONTRADICTORY WORLD OF TEACHERS 
The climax of the process of teacher unity in the 1980s occurred at the end of the decade. 
Officially-recognized, "established" teachers' associations considered dissolving into a new, 
unified body whose ideology would reflect a marked change from their ethnic and petite 
bourgeois backgrounds. An array of much smaller, "emergent" teacher unions asserting a 
militant, anti-government style were poised to merge with the established groups. The 
resulting South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU) would espouse non-
racialism, non-sexism and an ideology defining teachers as workers. In 1989, the year 
prior to its launch, the emergent and established organisations cooperated in a number of 
ways which included teacher forums and joint protest actions in opposition to apartheid. 
The complex process of teacher unity, it seemed, was about to draw to a successful close. 
But it did not happen. Several of the established organisations pulled out.of the 
process. The crucial issues of appropriate teacher behaviour, of teachers' class location, 
and of teachers' "professionalism" were largely resolved for SADTU, but not for teachers 
generally. The contradictory nature of teachers' locations precluded unity. 
What creates the tensions which render teacher unity so elusive? In other words, 
what are the political and social forces which int1uence teacher politics -- specifically 
teacher unity -- in South Africa? This chapter will attempt to answer this question. First, a 
structural background will be provided. Teachers will be situated within their place of 
work,- and the tensions which exist within schooling will be discussed. This discussion will 
include a section placing teacher "professionalism" in international perspective. Then, the 
structural contradictions of teachers' race, class and "professional" location will be 
analyzed. This will be followed by a discussion of specific "interest groups" which seek to 
influence teacher politics in South Africa. Many of the "interest groups" vying to influence 
teachers' ideology and behaviour align themselves with social and political forces. 
This overview of the social and political position of organised teachers will provide an 
essential context for understanding the history of teacher unity, from 1976 to 1990, which 
comprises the remaining chapters of this study. 
An Introduction to the Tensions Within Teacher Politics 
In order to understand the location of teachers in the social order -- articulated here in 
terms or race, class and an ideology of "professionalism" -- an analysis of the "place" of 
teachers and their organisations must recognize that the nature of this location is 
transformed in the context of changing historical circumstances. Social, political and 
economic forces pressure teachers to think and behave in certain ways. Groups, such as the 
state and the students, operating in conjunction with such forces influence the direction of 
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teacher politics. Since the groups are in competition, and the forces are often contlictual, 
the teachers' realm is seamed with lines of tension, which change over time. 
Ideologies and "common sense" notions of behaviour necessarily become entrenched, 
so shifts in teachers' understandings of their race, class and "professional" locations usually 
occur gradually. During times of crisis, however, the tensions become particularly 
contlictual, and change occurs more quickly. South Africa experienced social and political 
crisis during the 1980s, and the crisis-- in many instances focussed on schools-- greatly 
affected teachers. The historical dominance of the state was challenged as students, and a 
broader liberation movement, asserted a new authority within teacher politics. This 
heightened the tensions inherent in the teachers' realm and removed the tensions from the 
shadows of assumed understandings. Historical assumptions of appropriate behaviour and 
"proper" ideological positions -- "professional" positions, in particular -- were challenged 
by a variety of opposing groups. 
Teachers' organisations are an essential tool for understanding and grappling with 
both the challenges and the heightened tensions. Teachers' organisations embody different 
elements of societal tensions, and are more or less affected by the variety of forces and 
interest groups working to influence teachers. Divergent organisations reflect important 
ideological differences within the ranks of teachers. They reflect elements of contradiction; 
they are a mechanism utilized by groups in opposition, amongst which teachers themselves 
count very strongly. While any analysis of organised teachers necessarily ignores the high 
percentage of teachers outside such professional groups -- about fifty percent in South 
Africa -- teachers' organisations provide a valuable index to shifting tensions. 
Teachers define their public identity by joining particular teachers' organisations, be 
they "professional" associations or trade unions. These organisations can be regarded as 
instances of teachers' assertions of their own strengths, of their own attempts to influence 
teacher politics. As their public identity is detined by their organisational assumptions and 
actions, so the variety of oppositional interest groups seek to define and redefine that 
identity by situating organisations within given parameters. In the past, the state has 
situated teachers in a "non-political" realm, fostering the organisations it officially 
recognized. Some students, on the other hand, demanded militant action of teacher groups, 
situating them within the liberation movement. 
Teachers do not always respond to such prescriptions. The inner dynamics of the 
teachers' realm is largely determined by teachers acting as agents of their own world. Any 
understanding of teachers and their organisations must recognise their power, as well as the 
limitations of their power. 
The Contradictions of Teachers' Power 
One of the many tensions running through teacher politics concerns the structural power of 
teachers. This power makes it essential for the state to apply great pressure to ensure that 
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the power is channelled in "appropriate" ways. On the other hand, forces in opposition to 
the state also want teachers to use their power to affect political change in schools. 
Teachers, therefore, often feel contradictory tensions. Teachers' power explains why the 
interest groups outlined below strive to intluence teacher politics. 
Teachers are placed within a structurally powerful position.because of both the 
importance of schooling in modern society and the primacy of their work within the 
schooling system. Much has been written about the significance of schools as social 
institutions. Viewed from the perspective of students, schools are vehicles for social and 
economic mobility. Aronowitz and Giroux, in discussing school reform in the United 
States, claim: "As the twentieth century matured it became increasingly apparent that the 
schools, more than other institutions, had become the wish mechanism for Americans: that 
more citizens placed hope for their children in them, and that those who worked in schools 
were charged with the awesome task of fulfilling the American dream." 1 While many 
theorists argue that school perpetuates inequality -- and here Ivan Illich stands out boldly2 --
none deny its intrinsic and far-reaching effects. Paulo Freire, Ira Shor, Maxine Greene and 
Henry Giroux, amongst a host of other educational theorists, argue that formal schooling 
abounds with possibilities for liberation, moral "wide-awakeness", personal empowerment 
and true democratic practice.J 
The possibilities of schools as mechanisms of social reconstruction, however, do not 
negate the opposite interpretation of their role, as instruments for the status quo. French 
philosopher Michel Foucault has written that, "Any system of education is a political way 
of maintaining or modifying the appropriation of discourses, along with the knowledges and 
powers which they carry. "4 Schools perpetuate the governing ideologies of the day, and are 
thus important in that they "educate" students into existing racials, class6 and, ultimately, 
capitalist ways of perceiving their world. Schools are state institutions, and are used by the 
state to justify and entrench its hegemonic position. Michael Ashley provides a useful 
overview of the relationships between state ideology -- Christian National Education, for 
example -- and schooling in South Africa. 7 Thus, whether lauded for their potential for 
promoting equality and democratic values or disparaged for their entrenchment of 
inequities, schools are crucial mechanisms for -- contradictorily -- both social control and 
empowerment. 8 
1 Stanley Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, Education Under Siege (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985) 
IX. 
2 Ivan Illich, Deschoolfn~ Society (London: Pelican Books, 1976). 
3 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (New York: Continuum, 1990); Shor and Freire; Maxine Greene, 
Landscapes of Learning (New York: Teachers College Press, c 1978); Henry A. Giroux, Schooling for 
Democracy (London: Routledge, 1988). 
4 Quoted in Penny Enslin, "Science anJ Doctrine: Theoretical Discourse in South African Teacher 
Education," in ed. Nkomo, 79. 
5 See, for example, Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America's Schools (New York: Crown 
Publishers, 1991 ). 
6 See, for example, Camoy and Levin. 
7 Michael Ashley, Ideologies mui Schooling in South Africa (Rondebosch: S.A.T.A., 1989). 
8 This idea provides one basis for Camoy and Levin's thesis. 
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Teachers' power tlows direct! y from the powerful place of schools in society. 
Teachers implement educational policy as it affects the content of schooling. Policy most 
obviously affects taught curricula. State policy moves far beyond taught curricula, 
however, into the realms of school structures, governance and methodology. Teachers play 
a crucial role in each of these areas. They implement curricula; and they serve as a crucial 
link in usually-rigid school hierarchies. Their methods, further, demand anti-educational, 
undemocratic obedience from students, or foster critical thinking. 9 In this way, teachers 
help to engender social values in generation after generation of young people. The current 
wave of educational reform in America, centred on "restructuring", overtly recognizes the 
importance of empowering teachers for the successful improvement of schools. 10 
In South Africa, as opposed to America, the lines are more clearly drawn between 
state and anti-state forces in education, and the important role of teachers as implementors 
of apartheid education or as protagonists of an alternative order. The essential role of 
teachers in presenting an ideology other than the state's is inherent in discussions of 
People's Education, an alternative educational philosophy which emerged from the 
education crisis of 1985. In such a discussion, focussing on action research, Melanie 
Walker points out that " ... teachers may potentially subvert state ideology." 11 Whether the 
ideology belongs to the state or the state's foes, teachers must implement its practical 
articulation in schools. Teachers are the crucial link between those who dictate school 
policy and those who are educated within it. 
Outside of schooling, teachers are also powerful. They comprise a large number of 
civil servants bound together by their work. Because they live and work throughout any 
given country, a combined voice could reach into every corner. Many Filipino teachers, 
for example, added their combined weight to successful popular protest in the early 1980s 
to win political victories outside the sphere of education.12 The same can be said of South 
African teachers in the same decade. Even earlier, teachers demonstrated their political 
importance outside of schools. In the late 1940s, it has been suggested, CAT A was the 
Unity Movement's link to rural areas.IJ Teachers are well-placed to affect change both 
within and beyond schools. 
Teachers' organisations are one way of institutionalising teachers' power. 
Organisations, governed by particular ideologies, express teachers' beliefs and public 
identities. They allow solidarity among colleagues; they provide strength in numbers. In 
an overview of literature about voluntary organisations, Matiwana, Walters and Groener 
9 Freire; Shor and Freire; Giroux. 
1° For a good overview of current reform initiatives in the United States, see "Reinventing America's Schools: 
A guide to the ideas and programs that are driving education reforms," Teacher Magazine May/June 1992. 
11 Melanie Walker, "Action research and teaching for people's education," in eds. Unterhalter, d al, 161. 
l2 Enrique D. Torres, "History of the Filipino Teachers' Movement," Education Forum TAP VIII ( 15-30 
September 1988); Alliance of Concerned Teachers, "Years of Struggle: Years of Awakening: 1982-1988," 
Teachers' Journa/1.1-2 (January-June 1989): 39-46. 
13 Hyslop, "Teacher Resistance," 13-14. 
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define three incentives for joining organisations: material, "solidary" and purposive.t4 · 
Members of traditional, established teacher groups in South Africa have derived material 
benefits from belonging to such groups. The CTPA, for example, offers certain group 
insurance schemes and discounts on goods, such as car tyres. "Solidary" provides reason 
for belonging to both emergent and established bodies in that teachers' organisations can 
foster respect and prestige for teachers. The third incentive is the most powerful, for it 
concerns the expression and fulfillment of values. Teachers with similar values group 
together to project a more powerful rendering of their values, be they race, class or 
"professionally" based. Organisations offer havens for teachers with specific values, and 
can thus foster and enhance particular beliefs. Teachers' organisations constitute a 
powerful embodiment of group values and identities. 
Despite their structural strength and the potential power of their organisations, 
teachers in South Africa often feel powerless. This is crucial for any understanding of the 
realm~ of teachers. Ironically, it is the potential power of teachers which renders them 
vulnerable. Teachers are vulnerable precisely because of the ideological content of their 
work, and their implementation of ideologically-based policy. Many forces and groups, 
outlined below, seek to intluence teachers through a variety of means. The resulting 
contlicts and contradictions, the vulnerability of teachers in the face of immense controlling 
pressures, serve to make their position problematic. Further, teachers work within the 
public eye, and are seen to be safeguarding a nation's youth. This public position, as well 
as the "morality" of their task, was at the root of the McCarthy era loyalty oaths required of 
teachers in the United States in the 1950s,ts and the loyalty oaths demanded of teachers in 
KwaZ_ulu government schools in more recent times.t6 
How have teachers responded to the above tensions within schooling? Education 
literature from South Africa in the 1980s presents a bleak picture of apathetic and 
demoralised teachers. Crain Soudien and Wendy Colyn, writing of a school in a squatter 
community outside of Cape Town in 1991, describe the apathy and disempowerment of 
teachers there. Teachers caught within a deteriorating system could not see beyond the 
familiar structures which had, in part, led to the deterioration.11 Ken Hartshorne, 
describing the phenomenon more gene rail y, wrote in 1986: 
·Pressured and criticized from all sides, often for inadequacies for which 
they are not to blame, treated often by departments not as professionals 
but as instruments of policy (as in recent instructions on security in the 
~ Mizana Matiwana, Shirley Walt.=rs and Zdda Groener, The Struggle for Democracy: A Study of Community 
Organisations in Grearer Cape Town from rhe 1960s tv 1988 (Bellville: CACE, UWC, 1989) 17. 
15 Murphy. See, in particular, Chapter Nine, "Iron Curtain in the Classroom," 175-195. 
16 As a teacher at Shayina High School in KwaNgwanase, KwaZulu, in 1990, I was given a loyalty oath to 
sign. 
17 Crain Soudien and Wendy Colyn, "The Safety of Theory: Working with Educators in a Squatter 
Community," unpublished paper (n.d.) 26. 
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schools), it is not surprising that in many areas the morale, confidence and 
self-image of teachers is at a low ebb.1s 
Even earlier, as Trish Flederman wrote after interviewing fifteen "coloured" teachers in 
1980, "Teachers seem to have suffered extreme personal stress. There is little sign of their 
having received support from any quarter." 19 
Support, ofcourse, could come from wirhin the teaching corps, and it did. As 
suggested above, unity fosters strength to combat negative self-images and low morale. 
Disunity, a sense of operating in isolation under great pressures, enhances vulnerability and 
feelings of powerlessness. Teachers' organisations and the process of teacher unity had an 
important role to play in combatting such feelings. During the 1980s, teachers asserted 
influence within the "education struggle" by creating new teacher organisations and 
agitating for change within older groups. Teacher unity efforts expressed possibilities of 
enhancing that intluence. Teacher unity had another important role to play in overcoming a 
set of disempowering contradictions in aparrheid South Africa: those involving class and 
race. 
Before attempting an analysis of race, class and "professional" constructs within South 
African teacher politics, it will be instructive to look at such theoretical discussion from an 
international perspective. In part, this will help to situate the South African context, and 
lend useful tools for understanding South African teacher politics. Also, such theoretical 
debate around changing ideas about teacher "professionalism" is largely absent from South 
African literature. 
Teachers and Theories of Change: 
An International Perspective 
In contrast to South Africa, a longer history of teacher unionism in the United States, 
Britain and, to a lesser degree, the Philippines has spawned an array of literature on issves 
crucial to the contemporary South African setting. While there is not space here to conduct 
a review of that literature, brief discussion of a few theorists will enable a more subtle 
understanding of South African teachers during the eighties. 
Carnoy and Levin, in a remarkable book entitled Schooling and Work in the 
Democratic State, write of the contradictions inherent in capitalism and schooling in a 
capitalist state.2o Discussing schooling in the United States, they argue that schools are 
underpined by contradiction. While schools are indeed intended to reproduce existing 
relations of production -- through hierarchy and catering for employers needs, for example 
-- they also provide space and promote values which challenge existing social stratification 
18 K[en] 8. Hartshorne, "Post-Apartheid Education: A Concept in Process: Opportunities in the next tive 
years," in People's Education: A colleCiion of articles (CACE, UWC) 119. 
19 Trish Flederman, "Some effects of the boycott on the role of classroom teachers under the Department of 
Coloured Affairs," in eds. C.J. Millar and S. Philcox, Some Aspects of the Educational Crisis in the Western 
Cape in 1980 (Cape Town: UCT, Centre for Extra-Mural Studies) 39-40. 
20 Carnoy and Levin. 
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and relationships of production. This contradiction ensures that struggle over the direction 
of schools always exists, and that the contradiction fuels change: 
Although at any given time one of the forces [creating contradiction] may 
appear to dominate and achieve hegemony, the existence of underlying 
contradiction means that the struggle continues in various latent forms. 
Contradiction is at the heart of educational change by generating a series 
of continuing conflicts and accommodations that transform the shape of 
the schooling process.21 
Contradiction breeds conflict, either overt or hidden, and conflict breeds change. 
This contradiction can be specified to the terrain of teachers who, as primary agents 
of school maintenance, embody the contradiction most acutely. Teachers serve as agents 
for the maintenance of social and production relations. Yet, strong forces promote an 
assertion of democratic rights and the desirability of justice and equality. The latter forces 
are particularly relevant at times of educational reform seeking to empower teachers, 
reform which has become predominant in American educational discourse in the early 
nineties.22 Carnoy and Levin touch on this specific contradiction when writing about 
teachers as alienated labour. Teachers, they argue, cannot control important aspects of 
their "restrictive work environment". The authors conclude that tension is inevitable: 
. . . the fact that schools are employers -- with relations of production 
between teachers and administrators that correspond roughly to those in 
capitalist private enterprises -- means that labor conflicts in the schools 
will occur and will take approximately the same form as in the private 
sector.2J 
The same can be said of South African teachers; one simply needs to look at their specific 
grievances around work conditions and departmental control mechanisms. 
Conflict is also inevitable according to the argument presented in Kerchner and 
Mitchell's book on The Changing Idea of a Teachers' Union.24 Presenting a case for cycles 
of generational change, they believe that conflict alters the idea of teachers' organisations, 
their "professional" ideology and the relationship between teachers and their employers. 
"Generational development through cycles of conflict and accommodation," they write, 
"substantially alter how we understand unionism.... Not only will the daily working 
relationships between labor and management change, but the underlying assumptions and 
beliefs about the nature and purpose of that relationship change. "25 South African teachers 
would seem to be undergoing such a transition in the early 1990s. Applying Kerchner and 
Mitchell's theory, South African teachers are at a moment of intense conflict which will 
lead into a new generation of ideas about teachers' work and their unions. 
Kerchner and Mitchell's argument is rooted in a history of United States teachers, a 
history which has been elegantly recorded by Marjorie Murphy.26 In presenting a subtle 
21 Camoy and Levin, 144. 
22 "Reinventin!! America's Schools: A guide to the ideas and programs that are driving education reform." 
23 Camoy and Levin, !57. 
24 Kerchner and Mitchell. 
25 Kerchner and Mitchell, 42. 
26 Murphy. 
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view of "blackboard unions" from the turn of the century, Murphy documents the early and 
continuing tensions between professionalism and unionism, the "coming of age of teacher 
unionism" and the varied social and economic forces affecting the transitions. Of particular 
relevance to South African teacher militancy in the late eighties are her assertions that 
teacher militancy in the sixties in America was due to both economic factors and frustration 
with the mechanisms of bureaucracy,21 and that, "Professional ideologies ... are constructed 
within a historical context of social hierarchy. "28 As South Africans began questioning 
apartheid's social hierarchies, teachers began questioning their "professionalism". 
Such recognition of the historical underpinnings of "professionalism" is also found in 
Lawn and Grace's edited collection, Teachers: The Culture and Politics of Work. One 
contributor states that in England in the mid-eighties, "The word 'professional' is certainly 
used [amongst teachers] but in a loose fashion indicating commitment, self-organisation, 
and a certain status.... Increasing numbers of teachers see an improvement in their pay and 
working conditions coming via trade union action rather than special pleading as a 
profession. "29 He relates this transition to the conservative Thatcher years. He quotes a 
teacher from a 1984 National Union of Teachers publication: 
Morale is also low at a time when unemployment is so high and often 
frighteningly inevitable; one can no longer encourage with 'try and get 
some decent grades and you '11 be o. k.' -- I have heard comments like 
'What's the point? There are no jobs.' from second years!Jo 
Such sentiments resonate with South African teachers' experience in the 1980s. 
Philippine teachers also began assuming more control over their work and engaging in 
more militant tactics in the early eighties. Referring to the progressive Alliance of 
Concer.ned Teachers (ACT), based in Manila, one Filipino magazine published an article in 
1984 entitled, "Once apolitical, the underpaid, overworked teachers get into the ACT." 
Documenting an array of economic and political hardships endured by Filipino teachers, 
resulting in a series of rallies, demonstrations, sit-ins and mass "leaves of absence", the 
writer asserts that teachers " ... count among the most militant and courageous bureaucrats 
hereabouts -- and in the post-Aquino [sic] nationalist ferment, very much in the forefront of 
the struggle for freedom and justice." Suggesting interesting parallels with South Africa, 
she writes that the early eighties spawned many new teachers' organisations, including ACT 
which formed in June 1982. The first chairperson of ACT, Loretta Ann Rosales, is quoted 
as saying, "Teachers are tired of government neglect and broken promises. "31 
While, according to later ACT leader Enrique Torres, teacher organisations 
"flourished during the post-[World War II] period as teachers were inspired by the 
resurgence of the workers' trade union movement in the 1950s," and organisations were 
27 Murphy, 222. 
28 Murphy, 262, fn. 
29 Richard Pietrasik, "The Teachers' Action, 1984-1986," in eds. Lawn and Grace, 169. 
30 Pietrasik, 175. 
31 Belinda Olivares-Cunanan, "Once apolitical. the underpaid, overworked teachers get into the ACT," Mr. & 
Ms. 24 February 1984. 
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established to campaign around economic issues, teachers suffered severe hardship under 
the Marcos regime. It was not until 1982 that the "golden years of the nationalist teachers' 
movement" would begin. Teachers then began playing a much more prominent political 
role outside the sphere of education.n An ACT Handbook explains in elaborate prose the 
birth of ACT at that time: "Even as the standard of living --and inescapably the quality of 
instruction -- of Filipino teachers deteriorated, the school system of which they were part 
became a handy tool of the government deceiving and misguiding the youth about the real 
state of the nation. "J3 Thus canny similarities with South Africa are presented. 
At the end of the decade, teachers in the Philippines staged a massive nationwide 
strike. In 1989, around 200,000 public school teachers participated in various forms of 
protest.34 Militant action continued through 1990. When the government responded 
repressively, and dismissed nearly 2,000 teachers, ACT and other organisations took 
further militant action the following year. Then, when all but 357 teachers were reinstated, 
though over 1,000 remained suspended, twenty-nine teachers began a hunger strike on 17 
November 1991.35 The hunger strike lasted for a month before compromise was reached 
with President Aquino's government, requiring Aquino's intervention in the faGe of the 
education minister's intractable stand.36 After it ended, Elena Dilag, one of the hunger 
strikers, said: "We have done the supreme sacrifice. What more can we do?" Reflecting 
an international condition, another striker said, "Instead of being rewarded we are being 
punished for rendering good services." A third, Jimmy Dayao, suggested a further point of 
similarity between motivations for protest in the Philippines and in South Africa. While 
reflecting on the former hunger-strikers continuing joblessness, he said, "I'm not really 
disappointed anymore. What can you expect from this kind of government? These people 
are very arrogant. "37 
The important parallels between Filipino teachers' militancy and the South African 
militancy under discussion here is perhaps best articulated by an article in ACT's Teachers' 
Journal of January-March 1989: 
When it was considered criminal to strike, ACT led teachers all over the 
county to launch national strikes. At least one major strike a year led by 
ACT since 1983 implanted in the consciousness of teachers that they still 
have the initiative to act collectively using the traditional tool of mass 
concerted action to improve their conditions.... Thus, the years of 
economic struggle have been also the years of political awakening for 
teachers.3s 
Similarities in both plight and response can be seen in the histories of teachers' 
organising in the United States, Britain and the Philippines. Of most relevance for this 
32 Torres, 10-15. 
33 ACT Handbook (Manila: ACT, 1988) 21. 
34 "The Teachers Nationwide Strike," Teachers' Journal I: 3 (July-December 19~9): 3-5. 
35 Edward R. Kiunisala, "Justice, They Cried," Philippines Free Press, 21 December 1991:6-8, 32. 
36 See Philippine Daily Enquirer and Philippine Daily Globe, from 26 November 1991 to 13 December 1991. 
37 Interview with seven former hunger-strikers, Manila, 5 January 1992. 
38 "Years of Struggle, Years of Awakening, 1982-1988," Teachers' Journal 1: 1 (January-March 1989): 39. 
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study is the similar ways in which changing economic and political conditions, both in and 
out of schools, affected ideas about how teachers should organise, and about in what 
activities teachers should legitimately engage. Repressive state action, poor salaries and 
working conditions, growth of school populations, limited control over work and a growth 
of public discontent are all contributing factors to changing teacher attitudes about their 
work and their locations -- race, class and "professional" -- in society. 
Teachers and the Contradictions of Class and Race 
in South Africa 
Harold Wolpe, in an important work on Race, Class and the Apartheid State, has warned 
against " ... the inadequacy of the attempt to deal with political conflicts in isolation from an 
analysis of the structural context -- a context which both conditions and may be conditioned 
by these conflicts." J9 The concepts of class, race and "professionalism" provide such a 
struct"l!ral context for a discussion of the place of teachers in society. 
There have been attempts to determine teachers' location within the economic 
structures of capitalist societies. Jennifer Ozga and Martin Lawn, writing of England, 
suggest that teachers produce "invisible commodities" while selling their labour on the 
labour market. 40 This, along with work in a bureaucracy which curtails freedom and 
demands uniformity,4t goes some way towards explaining what Gerald Grace has called 
teachers' "intrinsic connections with the working class. "42 Further, it has been argued in 
South Africa that teachers' class formation often hinges on the class location of their 
parents. J. Erntzen, a COSATU executive member, writes that, "A very large percentage 
of black teachers in South Africa come from the ranks of the working class and are 
therefore easily able to continue their identification with the cause of the working class. "43 
Teachers' existing class interests, however, are socially constructed and not fully premised 
on family background. Whether or not black teachers have an "intrinsic connection" with 
workers in South Africa, the historical legacy of their profession has created "bourgeois 
aspirations. "44 Teachers, suggest some analysts, are socialized into an "acceptance of the 
dominant class ideology ... ,"45 which in South Africa is a middle class ideology. Teaching 
has been a rare opening for upward social mobility amongst black people in South Africa, 
which allowed access to a certain amount of middle class status. 
Because of these structural pressures towards both working class and middle class 
ideologies, teachers are generally seen as occupying an ambiguous class location. It is 
39 Harold Wolpe, Race, Class & the Apartheid State (London: James Currey, 1988) 20. 
40 Ozga and Lawn, 44-50. 
41 Shirley Walters, The Role of the Teacher in South Africa, unpublished paper, August 1981, 30. 
42 Gerald Grace, "Teachers and the State in Britain: A Changing Relation," in eds. Lawn and Grace, 197. 
43 J. Erntzen, "Should Teachers' Organizations be Trade Unions," in eds. Millar, et al, Breaking the Fonnal 
Frame: Readings in South African (:'(/ucarion in rhe eighties (Cape Town: Oxford University Press, 1991) 307. 
44 N.S. Pillay, L.S. Jeevanantham and R.W. Naidoo, "Comments on Class Location as a Constraint on 
Teacher Transformative Potential," ASSA conference paper, University of the Witwatersrand, June 1989, 12. 
45 Pillay, Jeevanantham and Naidoo, 10. 
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"contradictory and stressful," writes Nicos Poulantzas.46 Educational sociologist Jonathan 
Hyslop writes that teachers in South Africa " ... should be seen as occupying a contradictory 
class position, in which they stand between the working class and the petty bourgeoisie, and 
are subject to the political pressures of both groups. "47 Such an ambiguous class location 
creates a context for teachers which is subject to influence by contradictory forces, thus 
rendering teachers particularly vulnerable in times of heightened class conflict. 
Attempts at locating teachers in terms of class can, however, lead to reductionism, 
particularly in the South African context. The assumption by some COSATU 
spokespersons that black teachers' filial affiliation with the working class should determine 
their behaviour is one example of the weakness of such an interpretation. Class is socially 
determined, as Richard Levin has argued, " ... on the basis of material and political 
conditions. "48 This social determination requires an understanding of class within a 
broader, societal context. Wolpe refutes any attempt to analyse class in isolation from other 
structural int1uences. "The central theoretical question in the analysis of the South African 
social formation," he writes, "is how the relationship between race and class should be 
understood. "49 
Teachers are indeed located within a political realm, and their political action -- or 
inaction -- is rooted in the contradictions of their class location, as described above, and 
their contradictory racial position in apartheid South Africa.so For teachers involved in 
organisations, and in attempts at unification, racial contradictions heightened during the 
1980s as powerful elements of the liberation movement espoused "non-racialism" as a 
central unifying ideology. 
A clear illustration of the antagonistic tensions of teachers' racial locations is provided 
by the simple fact that by the mid-eighties all teacher groups espoused non-racialism, yet all 
remained racially distinct. When a major teacher unity initiative began in April 1988, it 
was confronted with historical racial divisions amongst teachers. Each organisation 
represented at the unity talks was comprised of members from a particular education 
department. Under pressure from the state -- which utilized middle class values and notions 
of "professionalism" to support the racial status quo -- to maintain these divisions, 
ethnically-defined organisations found it difficult in practice to become non-racial. Race 
divisions, intertwined with class divisions, proved a remarkably durable obstacle to unity. 
The racial divisions were not, as many apologists within conservative teacher 
organisations suggest, simply a product of separate bureaucracies and government 
46 Quoted in Ozga and Lawn, 52. 
47· Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade Unions." 90. 
48 Richard Levin, "People's education and the struggle for democracy in South Africa," in eds. Unterhalter, et 
al, 120. 
49 Wolpe, 10. Emphasis added. 
so The ambiguous concept of "race" in the South African context has been widely discussed. See, for example 
Wolpe; Emile Boonzaier and John Sharp, eds. Sourh African Keywords: The Uses and Abuses of Political 
Concepts (Cape Town: David Philip, 1988); Gerhard Mare, Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and 
Ethnicity in South Africa (Johannesburg: Ravan Press, 1992); and Lewis. 
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departments. Separate organisations allowed for professional assertions of group identities, 
the groups being defined in terms of race and ethnicity. Sociologist Gerhard Mare writes 
that, "An ethnic identity is similar to a story, a way of dealing with the present through a 
sense of identity that is rooted in the past. "s1 The vast majority of Coloured teachers and 
their CTPA leaders in the Western Cape could not cast off their identities -- as Coloured 
"professionals", for many -- in response to gradually changing understandings of their work 
and their world. Mare continues: "Ethnic identities call on what has been, what appears to 
be known, and what we have some certainty about in an uncertain world. "52 He further 
states that" ... the emotional appeal of ethnicity stresses security and familiarity. "53 Apart 
from a desire to maintain material benetits, leaders of established organisations asserted 
traditional ideas because their traditional groupings were familiar. It made sense to 
maintain traditional group identity, ·reflected organisationally, rather than walk into the 
"vacuum" of unity described by leaders of established organisations. 54 
Thus it can be understood why teachers within separate organisations, defined in 
terms of ethnic or racial identities, clung to these identities while articulating antagonism 
towards them. These contradictions of race intertwine with class contradictions in that 
social identities also imply class identity. In 1990, Yousuf Gabru, the WECTU 
chairperson, labelled the CTPA "entrenched leadership" as "racist", representing the 
"coloured middle class". "They have fear," he concluded, "the same fear as whites about 
being swamped in a non-racial South Africa. "ss Firmly entrenched ethnic identities connect 
to class identity in that status within an ethnically-defined community rested on both 
economic position and the continued existence of the ethnic identity. This connection could 
also be articulated within the highly-charged ideology of "professionalism". 
Teachers and Professionalism 
The concept of "professionalism" appears at the centre of race and class tensions amongst 
teachers. The contradictory nature of their race and Class location, and their differing 
conceptions of "professionalism", largely contribute to divisions within the ranks of 
teachers. 
"Professionalism" is an ideological construct. It is both a social mechanism of 
control, and an assertion of teachers' power. Ozga and Lawn believe that teachers " ... 
have used professionalism strategically and had it used against them. "56 The state uses 
"professionalism" as a "strategy for control of teachers", they argue, while teachers use it 
as both "a weapon of self-defence" against "dilution", and to promote their autonomy.s7 
51 Mare, 2. 
52 Mare, 2. 
53 Mare, 12. 
54 Interview with Randall van den Heever, 8 March !990; interview with John Stonier, 20 August 1990. A 
complete list of intormants appears in the hihliography. 
S5 Interview with Yousuf Gahru, 28 Fehruary !990. 
56 Ozga and Lawn, !47. 
5? Ozga and Lawn, vi-vii, 2, and 123-124. 
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The concept comes to be used by the state and teachers as both a controlling and mobilizing 
mechanism. "Professionalism" therefore has multiple meanings. 
One symptom of the contradictory "professional" -- and class -- location of teachers in 
South Africa has been contentious debate around teachers' organisations as professional 
associations or as unions. This debate played a prominent part in teacher unity. Monica 
Bot, in a recent article on the politics of teacher unity, states that, "The basic division is 
between teachers who see themselves as professionals and teachers who see themselves as 
workers and support unionism. "58 
The terms of this debate, however, are mis-used and little understood. Neither 
"professionalism" nor "unionism" implies a static set of ideas. Both terms have historically 
specific meanings, which change over time. 
"Professionalism" in South Africa is historically underpined by middle-class values, 
and has been taken to imply status within racially-defined communities. It has also implied 
antagonism towards "political" involvement by teachers. However, the meaning of 
"professional" began to change in popular discourse toward the end of the 1980s, as some 
teachers aligned to emergent unions began to call themselves "professional workers". 
These militant teachers, along .with other political groups, challenged the "professional" 
tradition based on racial and class status. 
Another challenge to conventional "professionalism" emerged in the 1980s. The 
teaching profession in South Africa has been schooled in Fundamental Pedagogics, a 
theoretical framework which elevates teachers to the level of experts based on a scientific 
model.59 The "professional" assumptions of Fundamental Pedagogics came to be 
questio_ned by educationists developing the ideas of People's Education in the second half of 
the eighties. 
During this period of questioning and transition there was a great deal of ambiguity 
around "professionalism". Established organisations began using the vocabulary of the 
working class in an attempt to divest themselves of the increasingly negative perception of 
"professional" attitudes. These established teacher groups, however, did not allow such 
public posturing to affect their material conditions, or their position of relative privilege. 
Middle-class values were not erased overnight. 
The ambiguity of "professional" location allowed room for increased cooperation 
between established and emergent teacher groups in the movement towards unity. But the 
ambiguity was artificial in the sense that professional associations generally used the 
shifting rhetoric to cover static ideas about their class position and desire for professional 
status. 
The CTPA offers examples of such ambiguity. During the Defiance Campaign of 
1989, it called a members' meeting in Bellville on 31 August 1989 to discuss the Mass 
Democratic Movement's (MDM) stay-away call for 5 and 6 September. The chairperson 
58 Bot, "The Politics of Teacher Unity," 14. 
59 See Enslin. 
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explained that the meeting was to determine how members "felt" about the proposed stay-
away. The meeting concluded with the understanding that individual teachers at individual 
schools had to decide for themselves whether or not to stay away.6o This contradictory 
stand both allowed room for the possibility of t~e CTPA subscribing to militant action, and 
for the maintenance of a "professional" ethos. The meeting allowed for the possibility of 
"professionals" behaving militantly, but did not condone such behaviour. The organisation 
remained aloof from the shifting ideas about what "professionalism" implied. 
Randall van den Heever, a CTPA president and a contradictory figure himself,6J 
reflected the CTPA Is continuing ambiguity around "professionalism" when he said in 1990 
that while the CTPA had built up "a professional culture", the " ... success of the new 
[unified] union will be the success with which it can cater for both professionalism and 
politics. "62 This retlects the CTPA Is, amongst others, continuing insistence on defining 
professionalism as· distinct from politics. Franklin Sonn also exemplified this with his 
notion of teachers as "comrades" and "professionals" .6J 
In 1988, a CTPA Conference resolution illustrated a central problem for the CTPA in 
the debate about "professionalism". " .... [T]he teacher," stated the resolution,. "is both a 
worker and a professional. "64 Could teachers really be considered "workers"? The answer 
had behavioural and organisational implications since workers joined trade unions, while 
professionals belonged to associations. In this ambiguous time, the CTPA debated its 
organisational detinition in terms of the union-association dichotomy. In 1989, Sonn 
argued against a union of teachers, while ambiguously stating that, " ... the voluntary 
professional association like the present established organizations are at present not very far 
removed from a trade union [sic]. "65 The established organisations did not want to engage 
in trade unionism despite rhetorically posturing as "workers"; "professionalism" remained 
the antithesis of unionism. 
TASA, the established organisation for Indian teachers, also illustrated ambiguity 
about the professionalism-unionism dichotomy. Its National Council, at a meeting on 5 
March 1988, decided that union acrion had become the only realistic method for 
negotiations.66 Action engaged in by a professional association which diverged from past 
60 Personal notes, CTPA members meeting, Kasselsvlei, 31 August 1989. 
61 Randall van den Heever, former president of the CTPA, left his organisation to become the first secretary 
of SADTU, and watched his former organisation withdraw from the unitication he had worked diligently to 
achieve from within the CTPA. The CTPA's involvement in and withdrawal from SADTU will be explored 
in Chapter 7. 
62 Interview with van den Heever, 8 March !990. 
63 Franklin Sonn, "Address on the Occasion of the AGM of the Progressive Teachers Union in Johannesburg 
on Friday 26 May 1989," photocopy, 9. 
64 CTPA, "Resolutions," in Education for a Democratic South Africa: 2Jsr Annual Conference- June 1988-
Conference Papers (Bellville: CTPA. 1988) 64. 
65 Sonn, 8. 
66 Suruiay Tribune, 13 March 1988. This was at a time when T ASA was protesting about the more than 1,300 
newly-qualified teachers who were without permanent employment. and they were disillusioned with 
consultation through the HoD. 
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practices needed to be termed "union" action. This did not, however, render the 
professional association a union. 
A further example of TASA' s ambiguity concerning "professionalism" was a speech 
delivered to the 1990 AGM of TASA 's Cape Regional Council by Kenny Ernest, Cape 
Town branch chairperson. Warning against the maintenance of entrenched attitudes he 
said, "The time for fear of losing our middle class status is long gone, for the march to 
freedom has inexorably begun. "67 The implication was that teachers should accept a loss of 
status in a liberation process led by the working class. This suggestion delivered by a 
member of a status-oriented, middle-class, ethnically-defined organisation was rhetorical, 
and ironic. 
TASA, however, did move farther than other established teacher organisations 
towards resolving its "professional" ambiguity. In 1990, just prior to the launch of 
SADTU, only T ASA of the established organisations had accepted the idea of becoming 
part of a trade union.6s The established organisations' rhetorical alliance with "workers" 
and II unionism II I which had been an important facilitator of unity efforts, proved to be 
largely superficial when, at the launch of SADTU, many opted for non-involvement in the 
new teachers' union. SADTU's style was deemed by them to be too "unprofessional", a 
fact reflected in the formation by the established bodies of a rival group, the National 
Association of Prqfessional Teachers' Organisations of South Africa (NAPTOSA). 
Launched in 1991, a federal amalgamation of twelve teacher groups, NAPTOSA focussed 
"on the needs of the individual child", said its first president, Leepile Taunyane, who was 
also president of the Transvaal regional ATASA affiliate. Professor Maree, a NAPTOSA 
vice-president, said that desegregation of schools was a political issue, "and the members of 
this organisation are not politicians, but educators. If they want to be politicians they can 
become candidates in political organisations and not here. "69 
One common simplification of this highly complex debate about "professionalism" 
throughout the unity process was the use of the words "professional" and "unionist" as 
synonymous with those who refused to strike and those who were willing to do so in 
specific circumstances. Bot opens a section on "Professionalism versus unionism" with the 
sentence: "Perhaps the issue on which teachers are most deeply divided is that of 
strategies. "7o But the dichotomy between these contending ideologies runs much deeper 
than behaviour. Behaviour is, rather, an expression of ideology. The ideologies imply 
certain behaviours and attitudes, and as the ideologies shift, so will the behaviours. 
Strategy does not dictate to ideology. Members of established associations strategically 
posed as "workers", but were precluded from behaving as such by an ideology of 
"professionalism". 
67 Kenny Ernest, "Chairman's Address," Tenth AGM of the Cape Regional Council ofT ASA, 5 May 1990, 
l. 
68 "Seize the time," WECTU newslerter 2.3 (n.d. [ 1990]): l. 
69 Quoted in the New Nation, 30 August-S September 1991. 
70 Bot, "The Politics of Teacher Unity," 14. 
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There are two central elements to an understanding of the dichotomy between 
"professionalism" and "unionism" which have been largely absent in the South African 
debate. The first concerns class. Historically, "professionalism" has been used by the state 
to entrench race and class divisions. The state has adopted a strategy of trying to co-opt 
teachers away from the working class, and thus bolster the middle-class values so important 
for a capitalist state. Also, teachers need to be co-opted away from a restive working class 
during times of revolt. "Professionalism" implies certain middle-class values, such as 
status, affluence and faith in existing, government negotiation channels. It is telling that in 
her SAIRR report on teacher unity, Bot's section on "Professionalism versus unionism" is 
devoid of any mention of class or the state's intentions. 71 She reflects the existing dearth of 
class-analysis in popular, contemporary understanding of "professionalism", and thus fails 
to grasp the importance of entrenched class-location for a full understanding of 
"professionalism". 
The second important aspect of this dichotomy concerns the contradictory nature of 
schooling as presented by Carnoy and Levin. According to these writers, schooling is 
contradictory in that it intends to reproduce existing social and labour relations, and yet it 
creates space for varied forms of resistance to such relations. n The same can be said of the 
terrain of teachers. Teachers are expected to conform to government-imposed reproductive 
practices -- a "professional" standpoint -- and yet the very nature of teachers' space between 
conflicting constituencies and within practical realities (such as poor remuneration and poor 
working conditions) allows for resistance to such reproduction and resistance to static 
notions of "professional" behaviour. 
Naturally, neither self-styled professional associations nor teachers' unions admit to 
such complexity, nor overtly recognize the confusion. At the first round of post-Harare 
teacher unity talks DETU wanted the unified structure to "be part of the labour movement"; 
WECTU stated "it must be a trade union and affiliate to COSATU"; the three older 
established groups-- ATASA, UTASA and TASA --were not prepared to immediately 
accept the Harare Accord on Teacher Unity.7J How, then, could unity be achieved? 
Socioeconomic and political pressures could simply be exerted on established organisations 
to force rhetorical posturing towards more broadly acceptable "professional worker" 
positions. The resulting ambiguity could serve as a gloss for more deeply-rooted 
commitment to "professionalism". and identities based on race and class. A DETU 
executive member believed in 1990 that such commitment comprised the substance behind 
the gloss. He said that, " ... the CTPA is interested in privilege." He continued: "We 
could be united tomorrow, but they [the established organisations] are still worried about 
status. "74 
71 Bot, "The Politics of Teacher Unity," 14-17. 
72 Camoy and Levin, passim. 
73 "Minutes of the Planning Meeting for Teacher Unity Held on the 27th August 1988." 
74 Interview with informant D, 6 March 1990. Informants who requested anonymity are referred to by a letter 
of the alphabet. A complete list of informants appears in the bibliography. 
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Interest Groups and Political Tensions 
A variety of "interest groups"·, impinging on the teachers' realm, create and enhance 
contradictions because of their desire to influence teacher politics, the definitions of 
"professionalism" and schools. They create tensions because they are oppositional. 
Different teacher organisations are susceptible to different pressures. In other words, 
the pressures exerted by different interest groups do not uniformly affect teachers, nor do 
they uniformly affect organisations. This lack of uniformity in fact creates space for 
different organisations to evolve. But the pressures exerted by particular groups at specific 
historical moments can move organisations closer together, however superficially, as will 
be seen in the chapters below. The groups thus pia y an essential role in fostering both unity 
and disunity. The definition and specific motivations, as well as the actions, of these 
various groups will add to the context -- as did the contradictions of race, class and 
"professionalism" -- essential for an analysis of teacher disunity in the Western Cape. 
The means to the end 
Before examining the interest groups, and their influence over teachers, it will be useful to 
explore similarities in their style of operation which directly relate to the concept of 
"professionalism" discussed above. 
One mechanism used by various interest groups to influence teacher politics involves 
defining the credibility or reputation of teacher organisations. Such definitions apply 
substantial pressure to teachers if enough support can be mustered by the interest group 
doing the defining. Much of the discourse about credibility is founded on attempts to 
redefine the role of teachers, to impose new visions, to re-create behavioural 
responsibilities, and to redefine and mythologise about teachers so-called traditional roles. 
Attempts to define what teachers ought to be is an indirect way of suggesting acceptable 
forms of behavior. 
One example concerns a notion of historical legitimacy. "Part of the struggle for 
teacher unity," writes educationist Ian Moll, "is to once again put teachers back in their 
rightful place as one of the pillars of the education struggle. "75 The assumptions are that 
teachers have a prescribed "place", that they have been in that place before, and that they 
are historically obliged to engage in "the struggle" as defined by this writer. Every player 
with a vested interest in education engages in such prescriptions, linking teachers' 
credibility to their willingness to adopt particular attitudes. 
"Professionalism" is also linked to credibility. Departments have rarely shied away 
from terming unwanted teachers "unprofessional", thus implying that there is something 
wrong with their behaviour, or that they are morally deficient. Attempts to define teachers' 
75 Ian Moll, "Towards one South African teachers' union," South African Labour Bulletin 14.1 (April !989): 
73. 
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class location, a central aspect of "professionalism", is an indirect means of influencing 
teachers, and is also rooted in attempts to suggest acceptable forms of behavior. The 
terminology of class lays out guidelines for teachers' proper deportment, be it 
"professional" or "working class". The ideologically-loaded concept of "professionalism" 
is used to dictate behaviour and "political" attitude, and it is manipulated by the interest 
groups. 
Students engage in prescription when they term teachers "collaborators" and dictate 
the qualities of a "progressive" educator. At a time, during the eighties, when students' 
assumed an ascendent position of authority within many schools, their voice carried both a 
moral and an intimidating weight. Many educators agreed with the rectitude of student 
grievances, and were loathe to earn the public censure of students. Such censure could 
even, at times, assume violent proportions at an historical moment when "collaborators" 
were physically punished. Students thus claimed a right to dictate teachers' style of 
teaching, and, importantly, enhanced the public credibility of teacher organisations seen to 
be engaging in "the struggle" as allies of the students. 
Other direct mechanisms of control were used by interest groups to influence teacher 
politics. These will be outline.d in the sections below. 
Teachers themselves 
Teachers are the central players in the realm of teacher politics. They are both active and 
reactive agents in determining the shape of their political sphere. The heterogeneous nature 
of people grouped together according to a chosen job, notwithstanding the myriad 
motivations of individuals, 76 make the network of political cross-currents within the 
teachers' realm highly complex. 
A large body of teachers greatly influences teacher politics through inaction. Some of 
these are teachers who sit quietly in the staff room awaiting the end of a boycott, who do 
not engage in organisational activities, who put pressure on their colleagues to keep quiet. 
These teachers are reactionary: they fully support the status quo. There are, of course, 
reasons for their passivity. If, as Shirley Walters has suggested, "Teaching has provided 
the most common channel for upward social mobility amongst the working classes, "77 then 
many would be loath to abandon their means of escape from a lower social and economic 
status. Also, many would take no action which might jeopardize their job security. This 
was especially true during 1985, as The Weekly Mail pointed out: "With the recession 
biting deeper, there are not many alternative jobs for teachers. "7s State cooption provides 
incentives for "establishment" standpoints. 79 Teaching posts, for example, often include a 
variety of benefits, such as housing subsidies. Teachers with low qualifications make up 
76 Shirley Walters lists various motivations for hecoming a teacher, gathered from a literature survey, 
including prestige, parental intluence, and employment opportunity. Walters, 20. 
77 Walters, 19. 
78 I11e Weekly Mail, 4-10 Octoher 1985: II. 
79 Walters, 19. 
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the majority of black teachers: at the end of 1985,42,000 of the DET's 45,000 black 
teache~s had less than a matric plus a two-year diplomaso; in that year, more than sixty 
percent of black teachers had a standard 8 certificate with a two-year diploma.si The 
insecurity which comes from restricted access to other jobs, and jobs which are not 
necessarily as well-paying, is enough to dampen overt political involvement. So a large 
number of teachers passively intluence their colleagues through inactivity. 
Other teachers remain overtly politically passive because they disagree with prevailing 
strategies. Many teachers, for example those within the TLSA, decry school boycotts on 
moral and educational grounds. These teachers, whether or not they are members of 
organisations, influence teacher politics by eschewing involvement in the popular resistance 
movement. 
There are many, on the other hand, who actively seek to influence teachers' 
behaviour, public identity, relations with the state and the community, and "professional" 
location. These, then, are the organised teachers, who group together around both 
conservative and progressive ideologies. 
Teachers can influence their politics through the vehicle of organisations .. 
Organisations need members, so organisations recruit teachers, set up the required 
structures to maintain members, and try to ensure that they remain relevant and attractive to 
their constituency. Organisations seek influence over larger and larger numbers of teachers 
because the teachers' bodies are of some practical benefit, for example, in terms of 
increasing pressure for better working conditions. The greater the numbers, the greater the 
pressure. Teachers also organise themselves to assert an identity. There can be organised 
responses to antagonism directed towards the teaching profession, as with the Teachers 
Action· Committee (T AC) formed in response to the 1980 schools crisis in the Western 
Cape. If external groups try to undermine the credibility of teachers, organised teachers 
can offer a riposte. 
While teachers within an organisation group together to affect both teachers within 
their body and potential recruits, teaching organisations also work to influence each other. 
Radical groups have tried to influence more conservative groups, attempting to shift the 
dominant thinking away from "professionalism" towards "liberation". Splinter groups and 
factions have agitated from within organisations, and have eventually broken away to 
agitate from without, as was the case with DETU. 
When two organisations want to impress their agenda upon the same group of teachers 
in, for example, schools falling under the Department of Education and Culture (DEC) in 
the House of Representatives (HoR) ,s2 criticism levelled at each other is common. This 
80 Monica Bot and Lawrence Schlenuner, "The Classroom Crisis: Black Demands and White Responses," An 
Indicator SA Issue Focus July 1986: 7-8. 
81 H. H. Dlamlenze, "Teachers' Associations and Crises in Schools," in ed. Ashley, 76. 
82 The HoR is the Coloured House of Parliament. The House of Delegates (HoD) is the Indian House. Both 
the HoR and the HoD have Departments of Education and Culture (DEC). The DEC under discussion at any 
given point in the text will be detined by the House to which it belongs. 
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criticism serves to int1uence the rival body by undermining credibility and support. When a 
new "progressive" teachers' organisation, comprising about 200 members, formed in the 
Eastern Cape intending to operate "in opposition to" the CTPA,83 Franklin Sonn said: "A 
so-called new teachers' organisation in the Eastern Cape, if it still exists, is not a breakaway 
body from the CTPA. "84 A 1987 letter to Sowh by "Concerned members of the Western 
Cape Teachers Union" focussed entirely on the CTPA, and was caustically titled "Naked 
Opportunism. "8s Such critical discourse works to int1uence reputation, to affect 
membership and to control an ideological terrain. 
Perhaps most importantly for teacher unity,· teachers who look towards controlling an 
organisationally unified profession do so to resist external control. As the president of the 
predominantly-Coloured Teachers' Educational and Professional Association (TEPA) said 
in 1965, "We must get together to talk about our problems to decide on a course of action. 
Unless we do so, we are at the mercy of others who will decide our destiny for us. "86 
Teachers can assert control over themselves to resist domination. 
This does not imply that teachers, or organised teachers, act in isolation. Alliances 
are struck between organisations, and with other interest groups, such as state agencies or 
liberation organisations, to enhance the power of a particular teacher group. 
The state 
Gerald Grace writes that the state, in the context of British education, can be perceived as 
too conspiratorial or as too abstract. Rather than as a single, unified entity, he argues, the 
state in education must be seen "as a set of' agencies, departments, tiers and levels, each 
with their own rules and resources and often with varying purposes' .... "87 Many state 
departments and agencies have played prominent roles in South African education. From 
the numerous education departments, to the "own affairs" chambers of Parliament, to the 
state security apparatuses, the South African state has utilized a variety of methods to 
int1uence teachers. 
Two distinct strategies cut through this spectrum of departments and agencies. The 
state has attempted to both repress and coopt teachers. 
Firstly, as it attempts to maintain firm control over teachers, the state has utilized a 
battery of repressive mechanisms from t~reatening job security and service conditions to 
intimidation. In the 1950s, documents sent to classrooms for teachers' signatures warned 
black teachers in Cape Town not to participate in meetings or associations. "Teachers were 
83 Sunday Times, 19 May 1985. 
84 Cape Times, 18 June 1985. 
85 South, 19-26 November 1987. 
86 Quoted in Educatio 4th Quarter (1977): 10. 
87 Grace, 196. 
39 
afraid," said one teacher from that time.88 In 1955, nine members of the CATA executive 
were dismissed;89 Such repressive actions have continued into the 1980s. 
Education departments clearly defined teachers' work and acceptable teacher 
behaviour. The state has implemented draconian codes of conduct, defining "misconduct" 
as public criticism of government departments, amongst other things. "Perhaps the most 
blatantly sinister provisions of the Coloured Persons' Education Act [of 1963]," states 
Molteno, "were those for the control of teachers. "90 Education departments also approve 
syllabi, and promote particular methodologies. Teachers who step outside of the acceptable 
pedagogical, political or behavioural boundaries are subject to a variety of repressive 
disciplinary measures meted out by the departments. Teachers can be dismissed, suspended 
or transferred. Salary cheques can be withheld. Further, housing subsidies have been 
threatened. Education departments have been very severe in their dealings with "agitators" 
and "leftist" school teachers. In September 1988 the DET sent a circular to its principals 
requesting the names of "radical" teachers,9t a clear form of harassment. Further, the state 
has banned and harassed teacher organisations in its attempts to influence teacher politics. 
Another mechanism used by the state to influence teacher politics has been official, 
departmental recognition of teacher bodies. Recognised organisations, apart from being 
allowed access to departments for discussion and negotiation, are given important stop-
order facilities. The state has denied stop-order facilities to officially unrecognised 
organisations, inhibiting them from gaining access to members and funds while bolstering 
the monies and membership of officially-sanctioned teacher groups. Soon after UTASA 
withdrew from DEC (HoR) structures in 1986 in protest against apartheid education, the 
Labour-Party-controlled Ministers' Council in the HoR threatened to cut off its stop-order 
facilities. The threatened loss of an annual R650,000, along with the implications about 
government control, warranted an emergency meeting of the heads of UTASA, ATASA, 
TASA and the white Federal Council of Teachers' Organisations. "We are not acting 
against teachers," claimed Allan Hendrickse, the Labour Party leader, "but against UTASA 
as far as membership fees are concerned. If teachers take a political decision they must be 
prepared for the consequences. "92 SADTU executive members complained in 1991 that the 
state's failure to recognise the new body was inhibiting its organising and fund-raising. 
Teachers also experience more violent state repression wrought by state security 
forces. Organisations can be banned, and prohibited from undertaking activities. Teachers 
during moments of crisis, can be subject to arrest and detention. Schools have been sites of 
struggle, and have often become violent battlefields where stones and batons and rubber 
bullets have been common weapons. Teachers feel intimidated by overt violence, and more 
covert threats. For example, Gareth Rossiter, a teacher activist, wrote of one white school 
88 Cameron. 159. 
89 Cameron, 199-200. 
90 Molteno, 12. 
91 Argus, 10 September 1988 and 15 September 1988. 
92 Argus, 27 August 1986 and 3 September 1986. 
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in Cape Town: "A student revealed to a teacher that he had been approached by a member 
of the security police who offered him money to report on the actions of teachers and 
students and on the content of. lessons. "93 
Allies won with a carrot are better than those got with a stick, however, and thus the 
state channelled energy into the second aspect of its dual strategy: cooption. The cooption 
of teachers centred on improving their material conditions and on perpetuating what Ozga 
and Lawn have described as "the myth of partnership and autonomy", which "can be traced 
to the needs of a State and its tactics in controlling teachers. "94 During the 1980s, the state 
altered teachers' salaries: it raised them; it promoted wage equality between different 
"population groups"; it eliminated disparity based on gender. The state also began offering 
promotions to black educators, and implemented various teacher upgrading schemes. It can · 
be argued that teachers made certain "professional" gains through the state's implementation 
of such salary increases and programmes, and that the state, in fact, succumbed to the 
pressure of an increasingly powerful teaching force to improve teachers' conditions of 
service. This does not, however, negate the state's intention to coopt teachers into a more 
acquiescent position through the mechanism of service conditions. 
State cooption was challenged by the "threat" of a national, non-racial, democratic 
teachers organisation, writes educationist Ken Hartshorne. The state feared the power of a 
unified teaching corps, which would undermine the state's "own affairs" reform measures. 
Therefore, using several of the above-mentioned repressive tools, the government 
maintained a policy of keeping teachers divided. 95 "Divide and rule" was state policy in 
education, as in other social and political spheres. 
Students 
Student-teacher relations are complex. Teachers participate in an education system which 
promotes authoritarian structures and top-down imposition of commands, ideas and even 
knowledge. Students, in the scheme of this structure and its implied relationships, remain 
on the receiving end of instructions and "facts". Resentment often lies behind aspects of 
their usual silence; such resentment usually remains part of James Scott's "hidden 
transcript". At times of relative calm, student dissatisfaction with schools and teachers 
might articulate itself as "boredom", "laziness" or random acts of anonymous vandalism, 
such as graffiti. This is what American educationist Ira Shor refers to as a " ... performance 
strike by students who refuse to study under current social conditions. "96 The discourse 
alters completely when revolt occurs. "Especially after the banning of COS AS [in 1985]," 
93 Rossiter, n.p. 
9.4 Ozga and Lawn, 91. 
95 Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge, 318. 
96 Shor and Freire, 5. 
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writes Johan Muller, "the frustrations of the students turned inwards towards student-
student and student-teacher conflicts. "97 
. This is not to imply that real grievances against teachers do not exist. An Indicator 
South Africa survey, published in 1983, of black Standard 10 students in Johannesburg 
townships states: "The complaints of the students ... tended to focus around teachers. Not 
only did students feel teachers most hampered their progress at school..., but they were also 
seen as the most likely cause of boycotts .... " The complexity of such anti-teacher feelings 
showed itself in various specific complaints of these matriculants: lack of good teachers, 
lack of teacher effort, sexual harassment, racism, drinking, corporal punishment, bad 
teaching methods and authoritarianism. 98 
At a fundamental level, students have perceived teachers as complicitous in an 
education that students began overtly rejecting in 1976. This does not mean that students 
universally rejected their teachers; there was, in fact, some cooperation between teachers 
and students after the revolt. Many students, however, began decrying teachers as 
"stooges" and collaborators. Teachers implemented the education; teachers symbolized the 
system. Students therefore sought to counter-act teachers' repressive or authoritarian 
behaviour, to undermine teachers' hegemony within schools. "Student boycotts and the 
rising militancy of the students ... ," writes Kumi Naidoo, a student activist, "have served as # • 
a control on over-compliant teachers. In fact school boycotts transform the nature of 
teacher/student relations, and the power equation in the school is temporarily reversed. "99 
Students, like the state, use a variety of methods to influence teachers. Students 
pressure teachers, generally, by their militant action at schools. As students disrupted 
school~ in the 1980s by boycotting classes, running alternative education programmes, and 
battling with police, so the lives of teachers were disrupted. 
After 1976, students also specifically pressurized teachers to engage in educational 
and political change. Firstly, students heavily bruised teachers' public prestige. Teachers 
were stripped of much credibility as students behaved disrespectfully, decreasing teacher 
authority in schools. Secondly, some students employed physical intimidation to influence 
teachers. Some teachers have been physically threatened by students and youth. The DET 
occasionally withdrew teachers from school premises because of threats by students. roo In 
1981, a principal wrote of a "Crisis of Authority" in schools, describing what he called a 
lack of discipline, arrogance and rudeness. tot In 1986, an article entitled "The teachers in 
fear of their pupils" appeared in The Weekly Mail. It described scenes from black schools 
where teachers were threatened not to fail students, and forced to sing Nkosi Sikelel' iAfrika 
97 Johan Muller, "People's Education for Pt!ople's Power and the National Education Crisis Committee: The 
Choreography of Education Struggle," in People's Education, 107. 
98 Monica Bosschieter and Mariannt! Cullinan, "Black Mat ric Student Perceptions," Indicator South Afri··a 1.3 
(1983): Urban Monitor, 10-12. 
99 Kumi Naidoo, "The Politics of Student Resistance in the 1980s," in ed. Nkomo, 129. 
100 See, for example, Cape Times, 20 January 1989. 
101 Educatio Conference Edition (1981): 8-9. 
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while being "paraded" in front of students. More dramatically, "The houses of several 
teachers have been the targets of arsonists and stone-throwers in the past year. "102 
Certainly much pressure brought to bear on teachers was intended to humili_ate and to 
punish. Colin Bundy writes of "an essential dualism to youth politics". "Youth-student 
politics in a time of crisis," he writes, "is a hybrid of precocity and immaturity."toJ In 
agreement with Bundy, Hartshorne wrote in 1986: "Pupils have experienced the heady 
feeling of power over their teachers and, as with all power that is not accountable, this has 
sometimes led to youthful arrogance in speech and action." 104 
On a different level, students have also sought to win supporters for their demands, 
and have thus worked to participate in decision-making mechanisms at schools -- such as 
Student Representative Councils (SRCs) and Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs) 
-- thereby creating more democratic institutions for which they need the compliance of 
teachers. As the nature of protest around schools shifted in the mid-eighties to a stage 
where education was being fundamentally questioned and challenged, rather than simply 
rejected, students have needed alliances with teachers, who are essential allies for counter-
acting inferior educational practices. 
While many students may have been without specific political direction as they 
experienced their newly-won, heady power, many other students and student organisations 
understood that their educational and political agendas required the cooperation of teachers. 
Liberation movements 
Liberation organisations have also wanted to int1uence teachers. The Mass Democratic 
Movement (MDM), the National Education Coordination Committee (NECC),105 the Unity 
Movement (through the TLSA), and external liberation organisations such as the ANC and 
others have worked to gain the support of teachers. On 10 April 1990, Dullah Omar, 
prominent MDM lawyer, spoke at a "Mass Meeting" called in the name of the Western 
Cape Teacher Unity Forum. "I just got a call from the ANC," he explained. "The ANC 
... is vitally interested in the process of unity that has begun and that must be developed .... 
The view of the ANC is that teacher unity is absolutely essential and nothing must stand in 
its way." 106 
The ANC and other liberation organisations wanted to win support among teachers, 
and to use teachers to spread their message within schools. Similar to the state, they have 
wanted to spread their ideologies, particularly during the eighties when schools were an 
essential part of "the struggle". A writer in Sash further suggested that, by aiding the 
formation of a single teachers' body, " ... the 'mass democratic movement' would be 
102 The Weekly Mail, 27 March- 3 April 1986: 13. 
103 Bundy, "'Action, comrades, action!"' 217. 
104 Hartshorne, "Post-Apartheid Education," 119. 
105 Though firmly aligned with the Charterist MDM ideology, the NECC can also be seen as an education 
body with an educational agenda. 
106 Personal notes, Teacher Unity Forum Mass Meeting, Hanover Park, 10 April 1990. 
43 
strengthened by improving its access, through teachers, to rural communities which are not 
yet organised. "1o1 
Some liberation organisations also wanted to liberate the thinking of children 
"indoctrinated" by state education policy, to contradict and halt the state's educational 
intentions. People's Education has evolved from the work of various groups and 
individuals aligned with sections of the liberation movement. Those education 
organisations, in particular, who want to see People's Education become a reality have 
needed the support of teachers. 
The trade union movement 
The trade union movement in South Africa fell squarely within the liberation movement 
during the 1980s. It is, however, important to distinguish the trade union movement from 
the broader liberation movement as it impacted teachers. Trade unions, and in particular 
COSATU, had a very specific agenda for teachers and schools; and thus very specific 
reasons for seeking to influence educators. The trade unions under discussion here were 
broadly aligned to the MDM, and its Charterist politics. While a substantial number of 
other unions, such as those affiliated to the predominantly-Africanist National Council of 
Trade Unions (NACTU), influenced the direction of trade union politics, they did not 
directly influence teacher politics, and would not have been interested in teacher unity 
involving white organisations. 
Trade union activists want power over schools to further working class interests. 
Workers seek control over schools to present a particular ideology, and to counteract a 
capitalist hegemony within schools. As Alex Erwin, a COSATU national education 
secretary, wrote in 1986: "The power of the working class will be much greater if 
education in the schools deals with the history of the liberation movement and the struggles 
of the working class. "108 
According to another COSATU spokesperson, trade unionists also sought to utilize 
teachers as intellectuals within the movement. "For the working class movement and trade 
union movement," said Erntzen in 1986, "it is essential that they have within their ranks 
persons, who can, from within, assist in the dissemination of ideas and the development of 
working class ideology and outlook."1o9 Further, and more fundamentally, workers seek 
social transformation, and therefore want working class allies with a similar agenda. 
Erntzen stated: "I look forward to the day when we, workers and teachers sit together 
inside COSATU working towards a common solution for our social problems. "11o 
For these reasons, trade union activists in South Africa have sought influence over 
teachers. COSATU, in particular, played a pivotal role in facilitating the teacher unity 
107 Dewar, 20. 
I08 Alex Erwin, "Education and the workinl! classes: COSATU's role," in eds. Millar, et al, 297. 
109 Erntzen, 307. ~ 
110 Erntzen, 310. 
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initiative which led to the formation of SADTU. While clearly located within its "one 
industry, one union" agenda, teachers represented a significant power bloc, and COSA TU 
wanted a national teachers' trade union. For these ends it sacrificed a great deal of time 
and energy, and money, in the last two years of the eighties. 
Communities 
The "community" is a broad category for a pressure group, comprising elements of the 
students, liberation organisations, the trade union movement, and teachers themselves. It is 
also a highly problematic term, for a "community", while often assumed, is difficult to 
define. "The concept of community," writes educationist Wally Morrow, "has had a 
disturbed and troubled theoretical history over the past two and a half centuries." 111 
The difficulty of defining "community" arises because of assumed, common-sense 
ideas about what a community is. In South Africa, the term has been used by the state, and 
accepted by some others, as synonymous with racially-defined "population groups". 
Thornton and Ramphele write that, "'Community' is a political term-- perhaps the political 
term." The definition of "community" largely depends on who is doing the defining. 
These two writers, in their attempt to define and understand the term, state that it denotes a 
group of people who have something in common. 
The current popular conception of communities as being " ... residential entities such 
as townships," claim Thornton and Ramphele, arose from the Black Consciousness (BC) 
movement of the 1970s. However, such a definition is subject to change. Communities, 
they argue, " ... are the result of complex political processes and exist in history, not above 
it." Communities, they conclude, are created by people's belief in them and thus remain 
largely symbolic.112 
For teachers, then, a "community" can apply pressure in so far as teachers perceive 
the people who live with and around them to be applying pressure. Established 
organisations, such as the CTPA, had a strong sense of ethnically or linguistically-defined 
communities. This dissertation, however, will adopt the conception of community popular 
within the MOM: it can be seen as comprising those who reside within the area of a 
teachers' school, those who send their children to that school, those who live alongside 
teachers. 
It is a powerful group. In 1989 Morrow explained its powerful authority over 
teachers: 
The word 'community' has a rich life in the language of the criticism or 
legitimation of particular decisions, actions, practices, policies and 
strategies. It is locked into the practical language of justification -- the 
language of praise and blame, approval and accusation -- and the manner 
Ill Wally Morrow, "Education and Community in South Africa," in ed. M.D. Masekela, The Proceedings of 
the Kenton Conference 1989, Kenton at Makgobaskloof, 17-30 October 1989, 82. 
112 Robert Thornton and Mamphela Ramphele, "The quest for Community," in eds. Boonzaier and Sharp, 29-
30, 35, and 38-39. 
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of its use has important consequences for all of us, particularly, we may 
add, for those of us to whom fate has assigned the public role of 
professional teachers at this time.IIJ 
This authority carries great weight at times of heightened repression, for specific notions of 
"community" are possible within South Africa because of "repression by the apartheid 
state" .114 "Community" pressures took several different forms in the Western Cape, since 
workers, students, parents, and other activists made up the people of any given community. 
"Community" pressures became particularly strong with the growth of alliance politics. 
Alliance politics largely emanated from the trade union movement. As the union 
movement developed, it wielded greater impact over other organisations, particularly as it 
emphasised economic issues and their relation to politics, and working class issues, such as 
the necessity for working class leadership of "the struggle" .115 In 1986 this led Hyslop to 
write: " ... the current mass struggles have renewed working class pressure on teachers for 
an alliance." 116 And Eric Molobi, NECC national coordinator, explained how the NECC, 
trade unions and teachers organisations " ... are working together to formulate curricula for 
a new South Africa." 111 
Community pressures also took the form of various political tendencies in the Western 
Cape. Charterist tactics and ideology grew in the Western Cape during this period, and 
affected many of the emergent community groups. This ANC-oriented political culture was 
new to the Western Cape, a former stronghold of PAC, Unity Movement and Black 
Consciousness ideologies, 118 ideologies which many teachers held and which were now 
being cast aside by large sections of Western Cape communities. 
The World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) 
International bodies, too, have sought to direct teachers actions in South Africa. The 
World Confederation of Organisations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP) in particular 
has wanted a unified South African organisation as a powerful constituent member. It has a 
history of involvement in South African teachers' organisations. Prior to SADTU, only 
ATASA was officially recognised by WCOTP, though it met with other groups. 
Recognition by the world body would be a powerful feather in the cap of any organisation, 
especially when negotiating with the government. But WCOTP withheld this feather from 
A TASA' s ethnically-defined counter-parts during the seventies and eighties. UT ASA was 
11 3 Morrow, 83. 
114 Levin, 120. 
115 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 28. 
116 Jonathan Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade Unions," 95-96. 
117 Eric Molobi, "South Africa: Education Under Apartheid," Keynote Address, NECC, Conference on US 
initiatives for the Education and Training of South Africans and Namibians, Michigan State University, 23 
November 1986, in People's Education, 76. 
118 Bundy, "'Action, comrades, action!'," 213; Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 16; Duncan Innes, 
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particularly keen on recognition, and held a number of meetings with WCOTP during the 
late 1970s and through the 1980s.119 
· WCOTP may have been withholding recognition as an impetus for unity during these 
decades. In 1977, the President of WCOTP addressed a joint gathering of the CTPA, 
ATASA, and two Cape-based white teacher professional associations -- the South African 
Teachers' Association (SATA) and the Suid-Afrikaanse Oderwysersunie (SAOU). He 
spoke of the division amongst teachers the world over as a "disease". At that point, 
SAFTA was intending to apply for recognition by WCOTP.12o Later, in 1980, when 
JOCTASA was formed it immediately decided to send a joint delegation to a WCOTP 
meeting in Brazilia.121 In 1987, at a conference in Switzerland attended by UTASA and 
ATASA, WCOTP decided to hire a curriculum developer in Johannesburg to work on a 
nationally representative curriculum.122 WCOTP was deeply involved in both the 1988 
Harare gathering, and in the unity initiative which followed. As Hartshorne wrote about 
1988: "For some time WCOTP had been very concerned that teacher unity was not being 
realized, as this not only weakened the power of the teaching profession in South Africa, 
but also prevented the SA profession from being fully represented in the deliberations of the 
world body. "123 WCOTP thu~ felt a responsibility to channel both time and money into the 
1988 Harare conference, and the negotiations which followed. 
Conclusion 
Each of the interest groups described above has had a role to play in shaping teachers' 
behaviour and the process of teacher unity in South Africa. The state has actively 
attempted to keep teachers disunited for fear of the power of a unified teaching corps 
espousing a liberatory agenda. This was true at a time when the unity process was being 
facilitated by COSATU and fell squarely within the anti-government MDM. Conservative 
teacher groups have also distanced themselves from a unity process that would have 
required the dissolution of their familiar, ethnically-defined organisations. Other, more 
radical teacher bodies have actively struggled for a unified teaching corps to increase their 
influence over education in South Africa. 
The interest groups taken as a whole help to perpetuate disunity because of the 
contradictions they create within the realm of teachers. Placed within the context of 
contradictions inherent in teachers' race, class and "professional" locations, teacher unity 
becomes an even more elusive goal. 
Teachers respond to pressures as they work within their contradictory terrain. But 
teachers also actively take advantage of opportunity. While buffeted about by winds of 
change and the varying strengths of groups seeking to influence them, teachers still actively 
119 Educatio. 
120 Educatio 1st Quarter (1977): 10. 
121 Educatio 2nd Quarter (1980): 8. 
122 Argus, 6 April 1987. 
123 Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge, 315. 
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engage in their own struggles for their own reasons. While remaining pawns in some 
senses, teachers must be perceived as active players in the processes of both educating 
children, and constructing and unifying teacher organisations. 
CHAPTER TWO 
NEW GROUND: THE WORLD OF TEACHERS 1976-1979 
Two striking aspects of the teacher unity attempts begun in Harare in April 1988 were the 
number of teachers I organisations involved -- seven in the Western Cape alone -- and the 
membership figures of these organisations. The so-called "progressive" organisations 
throughout the process commanded a more powerful influence than that of the much larger 
established organisations. But the combined total membership of all progressive groups 
involved was around 5000, a fraction of the established organisations' more than 100 000 
members. 
Such a powerful voice could be accorded to relatively small numbers of teachers only 
within the context of popular resistance which favoured the progressive groups. This 
favoured position could only be fully utilized once two developments had occurred: the 
progressive organisations had to be born, and the traditional organisations had to be 
persuaded to negotiate on new ground. Both of these developments sprang directly from 
the fertile soil of the post-1976 social and educational terrain. Specifically, the period 
1976-1979 saw the established organisations come under fire and begin questioning their 
place and role in the now-turbulent education sphere. 
1976 and the several years following were thus extremely unsettling for teachers and 
their organisations. As Hartshorne has written: "Teachers and teacher organisations were 
ill-prepared for the events of the years from 1976-80. "1 Teachers, living with the various 
tensions described in Chapter One, had become accustomed to a state-dominated balance of 
power in schooling. Hyslop described the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s as "a decade 
and a half of careerist and cautious teacher activity". He claimed that during this time, 
"Teachers, seeing no chance of a different political order, opted for seeking the best 
possible deal from the authorities. "2 The state had assumed the only significant mantle of 
authority; the existing teachers I organisations -- apart from the secretive TLSA -- were 
recognized, professional bodies which did not dabble in "politics". 
The revolt of 1976 brought a new era into schools. A new assertion of student 
authority upset the existing balance of power. School-based contradictions were heightened 
as students pitted themselves against the state in its various guises: the security forces, and 
education structures. Schools and teachers became symbols of "the enemy" in some J 
students' eyes as black youth began to question school and teacher complicity in an 
oppressive apanheid system. 
1 Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge, 303. 
2 Hyslop, "Teacher Resistance," in ed. Nkomo, 94. This single reference refers to the revised, published 
version of the ASSA conference paper of the same title cited elsewhere in the text. 
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The state responded repressively to this new student militancy. Teachers and their 
organisations found themselves the targets of intense student pressure for change~s-well""as 
-.:.-----__ - --- --- ·-- ·- - --- -· 
continued state pressure for a. maintenance of the status quo. The intent and ~fficacy of·-
--~ -----1 
-a.panheid schooling came into question, however crudely, in these early years, and teachers 
had no answers. These were years of crisis management for teachers as their former place - - - --·. - ~ - ' --
within schools -- and control over compliant students -- was increasingly contested. Not 
only did many black students refuse to participate in the proffered schooling, but broader 
forces of liberation -- such as the trade union movement -- rejected the historical race and 
class divisions within the context of aparrheid education. Most teachers continued to cling 
to established ideas of "professionalism". These ideas were familiar, and it was not yet 
clear that the challenge to schooling, spawned by students, would assert itself as a dominant 
aspect of liberation politics. 
The end of the seventies was thus a tumultuous time for teachers and teacher 
organisations. This was the beginning of a period of intense questioning for teachers, the 
beginning of a process of change within teacher politics. In 1976, teachers began to take 
the new political opportunity to redefine their race, class and "professional" locations, 
which led to enhanced prospects for teacher unity at the end of the following decade. 
The 1976 Revolt in the Western Cape 
The impetus for the well-documented3 1976 student uprising sprang from black schools in 
the Witwatersrand. The uprising did, however, spark off protracted student action in Cape 
Town, since the underlying causes were largely national. 
The national factors which led to a restive climate of frustration, anger, despair and a 
desire for self-empowerment, and which provided fertile ground for the revolt, were varied. 
Firstly, increased worker militancy, begun in Durban in 1973, affected black communities. 
"The strikes of 1973 to 1976," writes Baruch Hirson., "helped create the atmosphere of 
revolt and showed that the Blacks were not powerless. It was by the multitude of strikes, 
small and large, that the example of resistance was taken into the townships. "4 Such 
industrial action, engendered by an expanding independent trade union movement, linked 
worker and community struggles.s Schools were directly affected by this worker militancy 
because of the large number of first-generation secondary students with working class 
parents.6 
This expansion of first-generation students resulted from expanding numbers of high 
school students, which grew from 122,489 to 318,568 between 1970 and 1975, and gave 
3 See, for example, Hirson; and Alan Brooks and Jeremy Brickhill, Whirlwind Before the Storm: l11e origins 
and development of the uprising in Sowero and rhe rest of South Africa from June to December 1976 (London: 
International Defence & Aid Fund for Southern Africa, 1980). 
-4 Hirson, 156. 
5 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 37. 
6 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 4. 
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rise to other factors behind the revolutionary climate. Hyslop descripes how this growth 
created a "sociological generation" in schools, a group with "its own generational 
consciousness." Surrounded by a new urban youth culture, these students and youth were 
freer than their predecessors to break from the generations which preceded them. 7 Bundy 
concurs, stating: "Studies of the Soweto risings, notably, show how a self-aware age-group 
sought generational unity, distanced themselves from their parents, and spoke for 'we, the 
youth of South Africa. I "s Students were less constrained by filial obligations; frustratioQ 
and anger replaced obedience. 
Part of this new generation 1 s uniqueness came from the political awareness afforded 
by Black Consciousness (BC) and radical church groups.9 Though BC organisations 
remained small, their impact was widespread and marked by militancy.1o 
The expanding number of students put increasing pressure on a social and economic 
system which could not sustain such pressure. Economically, as Duncan Innes has written, 
"The phenomenal economic boom of the sixties gave way to a more subdued pattern of 
cyclical swings during the seventies in which each downswing was worse than the preceding 
one." 11 There were not enough jobs for the increasing numbers of school-leavers, and the 
growth of educational resources did not match student growth. Therefore, more high 
school students dropped out.l2. The situation was dire in Cape Town, where African high 
schools could not accommodate seventy-five per cent of the children who completed their 
primary education.IJ Township youths not attending schools had nothing invested in 
education, and had much to resent. 
The 1976 revolt, suggests Hyslop, also stemmed from international events, and a 
growing "sense that the [South African] regime was isolated and could be challenged." He 
points to the end of Portuguese colonialism in Mozambique and Angola, the SADF's failure 
to successfully intervene in Angola, and the heightened military struggles in both Namibia 
and Zimbabwe. t4 
In black South African schools, the state helped to create a situation ripe for revolt by 
moving from a thirteen to a twelve-year schooling structure at the beginning of 1976. 
There was, according to Hartshorne, a "resultant bulge in secondary school numbers": 
Pupils found themselves in large classes, often in temporary 
accommodation at a distance from the main school building, under 
teachers who were dealing with secondary school work for the first 
time .... 1s 
7 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 3. 
8 Bundy,"' Action, comrades, action!,"' 207. 
9 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 37. 
10 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 3. For a thorough discussion of BC and its impact see Hirson, 
especially chapters 4, 6, 15 and 16. 
11 Innes, 2. 
12 Hyslop, "School Student Moveme~ts," 3. 
13 Hirson, 220. 
14 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 4. 
15 Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge, 73-76. 
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This unwieldy situation was coupled with a second policy shift: the move to a dual-medium 
of instruction. 
Starting in 1976, there was to be half English and half Afrikaans teaching in Standard 
5, and in Standard 6, arithmetic, mathematics, history and geography were to be taught in 
Afrikaans.16 The initial outrage and grumbling from many quarters gave way to the first 
act of "overt violence" on 27 May 1976 when a teacher of Afrikaans was stabbed with a 
screwdriver at Pimville Higher Primary School.17 As the protest spread, schools 
themselves were often the targets of attacks. Hirson counted approximately fifty schools 
which were damaged or destroyed by tire in the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal 
during the ten days following 27 July.1s Such incidents, both during and following the 
explosion on 16 June, indicate clearly that students and youth were reacting, in part, against 
authority, class, and privilege. As Hirson writes, "There were also reports that the homes 
of' collaborators' and some of the more prosperous were set alight." 19 Hartshorne argues, 
in fact, that the context of schooling, more than the two new education policies, " ... was to 
prove the decisive factor in its disintegration". He points to growing frustration in 
townships, distrusted administration boards, unemployment, and housing, rent and transport 
issues.2o While students and youth protested against school policies, they also fought to 
undermine local state power structures and to redress economic inequality. 
It took about two months from the Pimville attack for the conflagration to spread fully 
to Cape Town. Violence began sporadically with attacks directed at school buildings. On 
24 June, the principal's office at a Nyanga primary school was burned, and two attempts 
were made to burn down Hewat Teachers' Training College in Athlone in early August. 
On lO August, there were three explosions in a Cape Town primary school. And on 12 and 
17 August fires were started at Modderdam and Arcadia High Schools in Bontehewel, 
respectively. 21 
The Cape revolt began to take a more organised form on 11 August when students 
from Langa marched through their township, followed by teachers (hoping to maintain 
order) and riot police.22 As the conflict spread, boycotts and violence affected both African 
and Coloured schools. "Before August was out," writes Hyslop, "in striking confirmation 
of BC's black unity line, students in the Cape Town 'Coloured' townships were drawn in, 
participating in militant demonstrations in central Cape Town. "23 Hirson, however, 
describes how African and Coloured students, though participating in the same flow of 
events, with similar causal roots, remained separate: 
16 Hirson, 99; Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge, 74-76. 
17 Hirson, 178. 
l8 Hirson, 209. For specitic examples, see pages 190,202,209, and 212. 
19 Hirson, 186. 
20 Hartshorne, Crisis wui Challenge, 74. 
21 Hirson, 226-230 passim. 
22 Hirson, 228. Interestingly, a girl at Gugulcthu High School claimed that a student from Soweto returned to 
Cape Town with details of events, thus sparking the Cape revolt (p. 192). 
23 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 5. 
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Two detachments of rebels faced the same central authority, had the same 
basic demands, and knew that they were allies in the same fight. ... [But] 
[t]he physical separation of the two communities, each tied to their 
respective ghettos, prevented joint action and probably militated against 
the smooth functioning of a joint [student] committee ... 24 
Such divisions were but one aspect of the Cape Town revolt, which lasted into 1977 when a 
very troubled return-to-school plagued many of the country's schools. 
The student resistance throughout the country directly affected teachers. In particular, 
it undermined traditional authority, and reduced "professional" credibility. 
Teachers and 1976: 
New Pressures and Heightened Contradictions 
By the mid-1970s, the traditional prestige of the teaching profession was battered. Several 
factors contributed to this decline. Physical conditions worsened in schools, Increasing 
tensions within schools, and an intractable state authority, disempowered teachers and 
/ lowen~d their morale. More importantly, however, the sharp increase of student activism, 
and the recriminations fired at teachers, began to take their toll. Teachers felt powerless in 
the face of the student revolts, partly because students were to some degree reacting against 
teachers. Teachers felt powerless, too, in the face of violent state reprisals which brought 
uniformed men onto school grounds. 
Over-crowded classrooms, with teacher-pupil ratios of one to just under sixty in 
African schools and just under thirty in Coloured,2s constituted part of the intolerable 
working conditions faced by some teachers within the national context. Salaries remained 
perennially low, even for qualified teachers; women still earned less than men;26 and in 
1974, 1330 teachers up to Standard 2 taught double sessions.21 
The complexity of teachers' positions was heightened by the recession of the mid-
seventies, with its concomitant inflation growth. There was a teacher shortage, which 
allowed more, less-qualified teachers to enter the profession, while hundreds of people left 
t~und 1976,28 in part because they could obtain higher=payingJob.D_njndustry...QL_ 
commerce. ,__, __ _ 
Against this background, a shift in the balance of power among the various interest 
groups seeking to control teachers occurred. The perennial contradictions in the teachers' 
realm intensified as a direct result of the student revolt. 
24 Hirson, 229. 
25 Neville L. Robertson and Barbara L. Robertson, Education in South Africa (Bloomington, Indiana: The Phi 
Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1977) 13. 
26 In the late seventies, a male African teacher with a Standard 10 and two years of teacher training would 
earn a starting salary of R210 per month; a woman earned Rl50 to Rl80. Ernst G. Malherbe, Education in 
South Africa. Volume 2: 1923-1975 (Cape Town: Juta & Co, Ltd, 1975) 551. Troup gives the following 
figures for 1973: African men with a Junior Certificate and a professional qualification (possessed by about 
half of both male and female African teachers) started at R71 per month; women started at R56 per month. 
The corresponding figures for whites were R209 and R 167. Freda Troup, Forbidden Pastures: Education 
Under Apartheid (London: International Defence & Aid Fund, 1976) 41. 
27 Malherbe, 551. 
28 William Finnegan, Crossing the Line (New York: Harper & Row, 1986) 243. 
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Increased pressure from students 
The most significant aspect of teachers' increasingly untenable situation was the newly-
claimed student authority in the context of schools. Students aggressively articulated what 
had previously been part of a "hidden transcript". Students attacked both the rule-makers 
and the rule-followers in schools. They pressured teachers to stop towing a government 
line. They questioned and undermined and, at times, ridiculed teachers' self-perceived 
"professionalism". Students struck out viscerally. They struck back at the mechanisms of 
their educational control, and teachers were part of those mechanisms. Students utilized the 
space for resistance always open to them in schools. While this would later serve as a 
model for teachers, and others, during those early years teachers remained disempowered. 
A Rand Daily Mail article written in 1976 stated: "In some schools, teachers admit they / 
have lost their authority completely and are jeered at by pupils if they suggest it is time~ (.__../' 
get down to study. "29 
Unwilling to endure the "crass stupidity" of "Bantu-ized" teachers,Jo students 
schooled in the new militancy of BC rejected what they considered their parents' 
passivity.3t "The adults" in Cape Town's townships, said Kittman Fresi of the Black 
Mamba People's Movement in August 1976, "have to listen to the youth. The best they 
can do is take orders. "32 BC instilled pride and a spirit of defiance which, at least in the 
short term, detrimentally affected teachers. "It allowed youth to abandon fear," claimed a 
BC student from Natal. "Without fear" of traditional authorities in their parents' 
generation, "we are not afraid of teachers. "33 
This lack of fear, and a willingness to fight with traditional authorities, marked the 
beginning of the process of teachers' transformation. Students did not construct 
contradictions for teachers in 1976. Rather, they brought contradictions to the surface. 
The state, of course, wanted the contradictions left below ground. 
The state's continued control 
The state fought back against restive students to maintain the status quo. In the escalating 
conflict with students and communities, the state applied pressure, demanding loyalty from 
teachers. 
Teachers resisted confronting their employers, and for good reason. In 1976, "an 
African teacher ... may be demoted or discharged not only for inefficiency, but if the 
Department suspects misconduct. ... There is no appeal or legal representation for the 
29 Quoted in Brooks and Brickhill, 105. 
30 The Editor, "The role of the black teal.: her in the conununity," SASO Newsletter 2.1 (March/ April 1972): 
116. 
31 Hyslop states: " ... a change in authority relations within urban black families has taken place since the 
1950s which has undermined parental authority." Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 9. 
32 Quoted in Hirson, 234. 
33 Interview with informant F, 18 March 1988. 
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teacher. ... Misconduct may include criticism to the press of government policy, or of any 
Bantu Authority or School Board. "34 In 1979, the government passed the Education and 
Training Act which gave the Minister the power to hire, fire and promote teachers; which 
defined teacher misconduct; and which permitted teachers to criticize the DET at meetings 
of recognized teachers' associations.Js This latter stipulation was particularly intended to 
bolster the state's construction of "professionalism". 
Further, in 1976 security forces attempted to prevent political activity by basing 
guards within schools. "Teachers were expected to give lessons under the eyes of armed 
soldiers," stated a Black Sash writer.36 A Soweto student at the time, Mark Mathabane, in 
his autobiographical Kaffir Boy added that, "Armed and camouflaged soldiers would from 
time to time burst into classrooms, interrupting lessons to read off lists of those suspected 
of subversive activities, rounding them up in armoured vehicles .... "37 And at Trafalgar 
High School in Cape Town, police beat a teacher in his classroom in the presence of his 
students.Js 
At this early stage the state had not begun its strategy of material cooption of 
teachers. There was no real need in the sense that teachers and their organisations were 
rooted in a recent history of "professional" non-involvement in politics. The state, through 
its departmental codes of conduct, buttressed this ideology. In the aftermath of 1976, some 
~achers le~ jobs as ~d their working conditions unbearable. Thereafter, the 
state developed a sophisticated response to teacher resistance post-1980 when teachers 
remained and resisted wirhin schools. 
The workers' indirect effect 
While organised workers were not yet articulating direct pressure on teachers -- the trade 
union movement would only expand dramatically in the following decade -- increasing 
worker militancy imbued urban communities with a nascent rebellious ethos. Worker 
militancy directly affected the student revolt of 1976', and thus affected teachers. 
While teachers could be derided as lackeys of the state, their class allegiance was not 
the issue it would become in the eighties under pressure from a more powerful trade union 
movement and a liberation movement espousing socialist rhetoric. 
34 Troup, 41. 
35 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1978, 403-404; SAIRR, Annual Survey 1979, 490-491. 
36 Judith Hawarden, "Apartheid Education, 1986," unpublished paper presented at the International 
Federation of Free Teachers Unions' International Conference on Education Against Apartheid, Lusaka, 
March 1987, 7. 
-37 Mark Mathabane, Kaffir Boy: T71e True Story of a Black Youth's Coming of Age in Apanheid South Africa 
(New York: Macmillan, 1986) 289. 
38 Hirson, 235. 
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Communities 
Students and workers, and others, comprised the communities in which teachers lived and 
worked. As mentioned above, Hartshorne contends it was the background of schooling 
which most forcefully allowed its disintegration. "In the townships," writes Hartshorne of 
the 1976 period, "anger and frustration were growing .... " 39 
The 1970s politicized black communities, of which teachers were a part. Following 
from the 1973 strikes and the 1976 student uprisings, writes Harold Wolpe, " ... broad 
sections of the black population (more particularly in the urban areas) were mobilised on an 
unprecedented scale, around a wide spectrum of social, political and economic questions. 
Everything was put in issue .... " Seemingly disparate and localized issues were united 
under a single, anti-apartheid rubric largely because of the prominent re-emergence of 
ANC ideology, and because " ... regulation by the state of the conditions of life of the black 
people and their subordination in every sphere to the structures of white domination, served 
both to politicise all demands and to link them, no matter how apparently disparate, to the 
apartheid system as such. "-to 
Heightened contradictions 
All of these various tensions, some new, some old, served to throw teachers off balance, 
and to begin the process of re-shaping their complicated locations in society. The change in 
student attitudes lessened teachers' credibility in the eyes of students. Increased pressure 
from both students and state began eroding the myths of autonomy and prestige essential to 
self-perceived "professionalism". 
The contradictions of teachers' race and class locations had not yet become 
articulated. Teachers' simply felt the sting of student attacks, and were forced to question 
their "professional" position. The tension between two groups, students and the state, 
seeking power over teachers intensified. Teachers themselves responded directly, but did 
not yet choose to engage in the battle for control of schools, of their work, of race and class 
and "professional" locations, or of ideology. 
The Response of Individual Teachers 
This is not to say that all teachers remained inactive, or docile, or removed. Even prior to 
1976, teachers showed signs of resisting state policy. Educationist Lynn Maree visited 
several black secondary schools, mainly in Soweto, in April 1975. The history classes 
Maree visited "showed again and again the tendency to forge links with the real world, as it 
was experienced by the teachers and the students." Teachers often omitted parts of the 
civics syllabi. She noted: 
39 Hartshorne, Crisis and Chall£-ng£', 74. 
40 Wolpe, 77. 
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dislike of what was written in the textbook, and unease as to how to teach 
it to students who would ridicule. A young ·teacher said, 'How do you 
teach history, particularly South African history, to a class of Black Power 
students? They don't want historical objectivity.' An older teacher whom 
I observed read earnestly from the textbook and then allowed questions· to 
interrupt her reading. That way, she had not raised any thorny issues.41 
These observations capture teachers contradictory position at that time. While beginning to 
fear "Black Power" students, teachers could not dismiss their obligations to their 
employers. Teachers were reactive. rather than active, but some involved themselves in the 
students' resistance. 
Hirson also rejects notions of teachers' passivity. Upon hearing the proclamation 
about Afrikaans-medium instruction, he claims, "There was an immediate protest from the 
teachers." He does not, however, offer any examples.42 While some teachers would have 
objected to the teaching in Afrikaans for purely practical reasons,4J others welcomed the 
renewed resistance against the education system. One Cape Town teacher, for example, 
said in mid-August 1976: "You must salute to Black power and most people are excited by 
this Black power, even though they know people are dying. Its after sixteen years of being 
bottled up and afraid. Adults have not forgotten 1960. "44 Teachers helped students to 
organise marches and protest rallies; in mid-1976, Hirson writes, " ... lessons were replaced 
by debates on current affairs or on the shape of things to come .... Teachers joined pupils in 
these discussions. "45 Furthermore, 475 teachers in Soweto resigned at the request of 
students after the government took over forty post-primary community schools in August 
1977.46 The ranks of teachers had been gradually infused with younger, more "politicized" 
teachers who had been schooled in BC at universities and colleges in the late sixties and 
early seventies, and these younger teachers. like the students, began a rejection of the 
docility of older generations. 
The Response of Organised Teachers 
After 1976, teachers and their organisations began searching for a new place for themselves 
within the context of rapidly-changing schooling. The 1976 revolt thus fostered the 
beginnings of change in established organisations. In 1976, it seems, none of the 
organisations which would in the next decade participate in radically anti-apartheid 
discussions made a firm stand against state education policies.47 However, 1977 saw the 
41 Lynn Mart!e, "The! Ht!arts and Minds of the People!," in t!d. Peter Kalla way. Apartheid and Education 
(Johannesburg: Ravan Prt!ss, 1984) 153, !55. 
42 Hirson, 99 and 177. 
43 Hirson bdie!Vt!S that African kachas were not proficient in Afrikaans, partly because all teacher training 
colleges, except one, were English-medium (99). 
44 Quoted in Hirson. 234. 
45 Hirson. 178. 
46 Hirson, 277; Hartshorne. in Crisis and Clwl/enge (p. 304), states that in 1977, an "estimated 500 
secondary school teachers had resigned their posts in protest against the situation in which they found 
themselves." 
47 Hyslop makt!s this claim ahout African teachers organisations. "T C!acher Rt!sistance," 37. 
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formation of a short-lived, new body, the Soweto Teachers Action Committee (STAC) 
which coordinated the post-1976 resignations and tutored students. ~R 
To fully understand the shifting nature of the established organisations' policies and 
practice we turn to an overview of these organisations in the 1970s. Here we will focus on 
the four professional bodies active in the Western Cape: PENATA, the CTPA, TASA and 
the SATA.~9 
The Peninsula Afdcan Teachers' Association 
PENATA was first named the South West African Teachers' Association (SWATA), a body 
which formed in 1967. SW ATA changed its name to PENATA in 1980 because the 
education department and organisational sponsors did not like "SWATA".so It was an 
affiliate of CATU, which itself was affiliated to the national body ATASA. Regional and 
local ATASA affiliates consistently followed the direction of their national leadership. 
PENATA' s Constitution states under "Aims and Objects": "To co-ordinate the activities of 
the PENATA with those of C. A. T. U. the provincial body and A.T.A.S.A. the National 
body by establishing and maintaining connections with them. "51 AT ASA has been a 
cumbersome and top-down organisation; it's leaders have exerted a strong influence over 
policy and programmes. 
Founded in 1921 as the South African Native Teachers' Federation (SANTF), it's 
name was changed to AT ASA in 1962: "The primary function of this association was to 
serve as a link between the provincial associations for Black teachers and the government 
(Education and Training) on the one hand, and international teachers' associations on the 
other. "52 From its inception, AT ASA sought to improve teachers' salaries. Consistently 
mindful of the "professional" status of teachers, it came to focus additionally on the 
upgrading of teachers' qualitications.sJ 
CATU was formed in 1953 at Grahamstown, largely as a result of moderate 
dissatisfaction with the existing CATA. CATA, in 1948, had affiliated to the All-African 
Convention and the NEUM, and was thus considered too political by some teachers. A 
teacher involved in CA TU' s formation said of CAT A that " ... teachers' affairs are not being 
dealt with. "54 
From these moderate beginnings, CATU went on to affiliate to ATASA, whose 
president, R.L. Peteni, remained conservative and opposed to political involvement during 
48 Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade Unions," 95. 
49 This dissertation will not deal with the Afrikaans SAOU, since it did not become involved in the unity 
efforts in the 1980s within the popular resistance movement. The TLSA will be excluded from this discussion 
for the same reason. 
50 Interview with Basic Nikani, 13 June 1990. 
51 The Peninsula African Teachers Association, Constitution. 
52 L. Pienaar, 111e History of the Transvaal Unired African Teachers' Association (TVATA) (Pretoria: Human 
Sciences Research Council. 1986) 97. 
53 Pienaar, 95-97. 
54 Cameron, 71, 205, and 210. 
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the 1960s.ss This conservatism did not deprive AT ASA of the unusual position of being the 
only teachers' organisation in South Africa recognised by WCOTP, a distinction it bore 
proudly from 1973.56 
The 1970s, as described above, brought new pressure to bear on teachers from 
students and state, and new pressures from within their own ranks. These pressures 
specifically challenged the conservatism of organisations like ATASA. Responding to this 
challenge, Peteni later offered public evidence of ATASA's "progressive" history. He 
claimed that in 1963 the government rebuffed AT ASA' s attempt to discuss the medium of 
instruction. "Although Atasa made strong representations again in January 1975 [ 12 years 
later] on the medium of instruction," continued Peteni, "the Department did not heed those 
representations until the riots broke out in June 1976." Also, in January 1975 ATASA 
urged education Minister M.C. Botha to work towards placing all "population groups" 
under one minister of education .57 All of these representations took place within a tradition 
of negotiation and cooperation with government education structures. "Teachers policy," 
said the PENA TA regional organiser in 1990, "was based on negotiation. Confrontation 
cannot solve any problem. "sR A PENATA constitutional aim was: "To uphold and 
maintain the just claims of its members by negotiating through recognised channels of 
communication with educational authorities to achieve acceptable conditions of 
appointment, service promotion, remuneration and superamunation [sic]. "59 ATASA, as an 
officially recognised body, had access to ministers and state education committees. The 
method of conveyance is as important as the message conveyed. So, while its secretary 
offered statements about the imposition of Afrikaans,6o it was being further distanced from 
the students for whom it purported to work. It is further unclear what the "crisis meetings" 
it held with government education authorities in 1976 accomplished, judging from 
ATASNs silence on this issue.61 
The students' perception of ATASA was not positive about ATASA's style and 
results. The ATASA offices were among the targets destroyed by arsonists in 1976.62 
Also, the BC movement criticised A TASA during the seventies; ATASA "had trouble 
dealing with the growing number of politicised young teachers. "63 
A good illustration of Cape Town teachers' dissatisfaction with SWAT A in Cape 
Town was the launch of a new teachers organisation, the Teachers Improvement and 
55 Hyslop, "T~ach~r R~sistanc~." 3 1-32. 
56 Pi~naar, 99. 
57 R. L. Pcteni, "The Contrihution T c-:11.:hcrs' Associations Could Make Towards the Struggle for a Just Society 
in South Africa," in ~d. Ashl~y. 34-35. 
58 Interview with Basic Nikani. 13 June 1lJlJO. 
59-The Peninsula African T~achcrs A-,q,~·latwn. Con,ritution. 
60 In 1976, th~ s~cretary statc:J: "Tu "ay th:1t the Blacks <Ire oppos~d to the study of Afrikaans is a gross 
understatement.... In strict terms what we oppose now is the manner in which this is being done without 
regard to the interests of the chilJrc:n conL·emc:d. And if this trend continues without being checked then the 
education of the Black child will he seriously thr~at~nc:d." Hirson, 176. 
61 Dlamlenze, pmsim. 
62 Hyslop, "Teachers and TraJc Unions," 95. 
63 Hyslop, "Teach~rs and Trad~ Unions," 95. 
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Research Association (TIRA), in 1977. The idea for TIRA had been mooted in 1975, but 
the teachers concerned tried to set SWAT A back on track by attending the CA TU 
conference in Grahamstown, ·:at which the object of compelling SW ATA to fulfil its 
obligations to all its members was largely achieved." Still, TIRA was formally created on 
5 December 1977. According to a TIRA report on the need for its own building, "TIRA 
found itself to be the only available means of effective expression for a large number of 
African teachers who considered that SWAT A ... was failing to represent their interests. "64 
That TIRA did not perceive itself in political terms is obvious and informative. SWAT A, 
therefore, was failing to a greater or lesser degree to meet its purported "professional" 
obligations. 
A TASA faced a number of challenges from students, state, and teachers in the 1970s. 
In describing the reasons for its survival, Hyslop writes that, tirstly, there was no effective 
organisational challenge. Secondly, teachers generally paid little attention to organisations 
as industry recruited them into better-paying jobs. And, thirdly, 
the ATASA leadership cliques found ways of retaining control of their 
organisations. They had been given quasi-official status by the 
Department, and could use this to pressure recalcitrant teachers into 
paying subscriptions. Gerrymandering tactics, such as holding meetings in 
out-of-the-way towns were used to ensure that no untoward decisions were 
made. The patronage system continued with leaders using it especially to 
control less well paid female members.6-' 
ATASA, thus, continued after 1976 largely as it had done before that fateful year, though 
decidedly less comfortably. 
The Cape Teachers' Professional Association 
The CTPA, like CATU, is a regional aftiiiate of a national body. Unlike CATU, however, 
the CTPA has been instrumental in determining the policy of its national body, UT ASA. 
The CTPA was formed in 1967 in a move whi~h united two older organisations --
TEPA and the Cape Teachers' Association --and drew some members from the TLSA, 
which refused to participate in the unification.66 The newly-constituted CTPA then played 
a significant role in the establishment in December 1969 of the national UTASA, a 
federation, like ATASA, of four provincial bodies. UTASA, however, was for Coloured 
teachers. As the CTPA reported: "The great role that the C.T.P.A. played in the 
establishment of this body is evident from the fact that the first President, Vice-President 
64 "The Teachers Improvement ami Resc:an.:h Association - TI RA - project: proposed resource and cultural 
centre, Gugulctu," hooklet. n.d. 
65 Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade: Unions," 95. 
~6 Randall van den Heevt:r. "Address on Teacher Unity," CTPA 2Jrd Annual Conference, June !990, 3; "The 
Establishment and Growth of the Cape Teachers' Professional Association," in CTPA, 21st Anni1·er.wry, 
booklet, n.p. 
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and Secretary/Treasurer of this national body came from the C. T. P. A. "67 UTASA was 
formed to negotiate salaries, bonuses. service conditions for teachers, and the like. It was 
left to its constituent organisations to make representations on local issues.6s A later 
commentator would claim that UTASA and its affiliates had the strongest research 
department and "theoretical base to its positions" of all South African teachers' 
organisations.69 
From the beginning, the CTPA rejected the efficacy of "non-collaboration" as a 
policy. As Franklin Sonn, CTPA president from 1976 to 1990, later wrote of the 
Coloured teachers who created the CTPA: 
They realised full well that to make any headway they would be compelled 
to exploit the middle ground. They would have to come to terms with the 
realities of apartheid education, but at the same time not to compromise 
their principles. Fortunately they were able to reject as childish and silly a 
major hurdle, viz., the prevailing contention that negotiation was equal to 
collaboration. 70 
It was in this light that the CTPA won official recognition for itself from the Administration 
of Coloured Affairs in 1970. This recognition, given when the CTPA had roughly 1200 to 
1400 members (ten per cent of Coloured teachers in the Cape), allowed it stop-order 
facilities, and also placed the CTPA in various Departmental committees concerning 
syllabi, books, bursaries, and so on. They had access to "top" officials, who helped solve 
their members' problems. 71 Also, the CTPA maintained close links with the Labour Party 
(see Chapter Four).n 
This early decision to fully cooperate with government structures set firmly in place 
the contradictions that would prove problematic to the CTPA when popular opinion swung 
against "collaboration". Time and again, the CTPA found itself publicly justifying its 
position. A 1977 editorial in Educario stated the two CTPA "ideals" as being: "the 
concern with the satisfying of short term needs," such as salaries and syllabi; and "the 
realisation of long term goals," such as a single, colour-blind South African education 
system. 73 The following year an editorial in the same journal explained: "The CTPA is 
deeply conscious of the temptation to become so ideological and so embroiled in matters · 
political only that it forgets the job at hand." 7-1 .And echoing these sentiments in the 1981 
UT ASA annual magazine, the CTPA wrote: 
67 "The Establishment and Growth." n.p. See also the anonymous Report on CTPAfor NECC, 09.11.87, 1. 
The report, written for the NECC, is a thorough critique of the CTPA for debate about whether the CTPA was 
to be allowed representation on the Westem Cape NECC. 
68 Randall van den Heever, "The SAFT A: An Historical Appraisal," Educatio 4th Quarter (i 978). 
69 Roger Burrows, "Beyond the Blackboard: Teacher Associations & Politics," Indicator SA 3.4 (Autumn 
1986): Urban Monitor, 16. In this context Burrows appears to neglect the established white teacher 
associations. 
7° Franklin Sonn, "Teachers in Opposition: Strategic Alternatives," in ed. Ashley, 32. 
71 Report on CTPAfor NECC, 9. 
72 Report on CTPAfor NECC, 5. 
73 "Editorial: A Worthy Cause," Edumrio 3rd Quarter ( 1977): 3. 
74 "Editoriai/Redaksioneel: Judge Us By the Facts," Edumrio 2nd Quarter (1978): 2. 
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the association has never shared the feeling that all present problems in 
teaching should be left untouched until the day an acceptable political 
dispensation is created in South Africa.... The organisation is therefore 
prepared to enter into dialogue with any institution if it could contribute to 
the alleviation of the suffering of our people on [sic] the short term. 75 · 
Although the tension between "negotiation" and "collaboration" r~mained with the 
CTPA from its inception through the late 1980s. 1976 can be seen as a turning point. In 
1988, Sonn ret1ected back on the early 1970s: "Initially, the organization adopted an 
extremely careful stance, consequently failing to create the image of an organization ready 
and able to articulate the sentiments of disillusioned teachers. "76 It was into this self-
defined breech that he himself stepped in 1976. In the mid-seventies, Sonn claimed, he 
decided to "take over the CTPA from inside" rather than form a new teachers' body.n 
Sonn was elected president in 1976, and he brought a new momentum and political style 
with him. 
"Since 1976," wrote van den Heever in 1990, "the CTPA clearly started to place its 
functions as a teachers' organisation within the broader context of the political struggle for 
liberation." How much of this was a rhetorical stance is unclear. But even van den Heever 
admitted that, "The organisation's main thrust, however, was to negotiate aggressively on 
teachers' rights. "7R While van den Heever's above claim in 1990 was dubious at best, 
certainly Sonn' s tactics worked wonders for CTPA membership. "The metamorphosis 
which the CTPA underwent with Franklin at the helm was nothing short of breathtaking," 
writes van den Heever enthusiastically in the forward to a CTPA-published book devoted 
entirely to Sonn, and entitled A Decade ofSrruggle. The organisations 2000 members in 
1975 grew to 13,000 by 1978.79 The organisation's membership remained largely rural and 
very conservative. The CTPA maintained a Christian character. 
the CTPA, true to its word, has focussed on educational issues that have been of 
practical benefit to teachers and students. Apart from continued negotiations to improve 
salaries and working conditions, the CTPA has set up a bursary fund which allocated no 
less than R250,000 worth of bursaries per year by the end of the 1980s. It also built a 
Teachers' Centre in Bellville. 
It can be argued that Sonn achieved great organisational successes. However, he took 
office during a turbulent year. The student uprising and shifting popular pressures 
determined the CTPA's future direction as much as he did. 
No amount of later rhetoric can disguise the CTPA' s fundamentally ambivalent stance 
during that year. As an established. officially-recognized body, it had to be circumspect 
about public positions. Also, as a group which foregrounded its "professional" status, the 
75 "The Cape Teachers' Prot'c!ssional Assm:iation: Commitment to Dynamic Educational Growth and 
Progress," in Teachers in Uniry, UT ASA Annual Magazine, 1981: 12. 
76 Franklin Sonn, "The C.T.P.A.: An Historic Perspective," in CTPA, 21st Anniversary, booklet, n.p. 
77 Personal notes from: Franklin Sonn, auuress, Lawyers for Human Rights conference, Stellenbosch 
University, 4 August 1989. 
78 van den Heever, "Aduress on Teacher Unity," 3. 
79 Randall van den Heever, "Foreworu," in Franklin A. Sonn, A Decade of Struggle (Bellville: CTPA, 1986) 
n.p. 
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CTPA could hardly side with student tactics. "The CTPA," reported the Cape Times of 6 
September 1976, "condemned violence of any kind, including stone throwing. It accepted 
that it was the task of the police, even under difficult circumstances to maintain law and 
order. "so In his first presidential address, delivered in June 1977, Sonn included a section 
on "Unrest of 1976." Within this section, he talked of international student uprisings, 
universities, and the CTPA' s participation in the Cillie Commission of Enquiry into the 
events of 1976. Nowhere does a CTPA position on the uprising appear.st 
The CTPA prepared a forty-three-page memorandum for the Cillie Commission. The 
CTPA participated, Sonn claimed, "because of its basic inclination towards the positive and 
the constructive."R2 This was clearly in line with its policy of cooperation with government 
structures, a policy which would come under greater and greater pressure from external 
forces as the seventies became the eighties. 
The Teachers' Association of South Ajdca 
TASA, a national association centred in Durban, traces its roots back to 1925 with the birth 
of the Natal Indian Teachers Society (NITS), which obtained official state recognition in 
1926. In 1967, as Indian education became a concern of central government, NITS and the 
Transvaal Indian Teachers' Association joined to form the South African Indian Teachers' 
Association (SAlTA). SAlTA focussed on conditions of service and professional 
development, among other things. In 1968 it changed its constitution to allow non~Indian 
teachers to join. 
Despite this constitutional change, and other changes in the mid-1970s which tried to 
allow more "grassroots" participation in decision-making, SAlTA remained a top-down, 
"professional" organisation for Indian teachers. In 1975, Pat Samuels became president. 
Under his guidance, SAlTA continued to emphasise professional development and service 
conditions.sJ "The teachers' association is concerned largely with conditions of service," 
he stated in 1985. "Basically [TASA] tries to protect the quality of the [school] 
programmes largely by way of the well considered resolutions it takes on, among others, 
pre-service and in-service education [sic]." X4 It was in 1979 that SAlT A shed the "Indian" 
in its name, and became the Teachers' Association of South Africa.ss But even in 1985, 
Samuels spoke of "my people" and "the Indian teachers' sense of community 
responsibility. "86 
Unlike the CTPA, TASA c!id not publicly denounce aparrheid education, or engage in 
such "political" rhetoric. But like the CTPA, TASA had a strong membership (about 8700 
80 Quoted in Report on CTPAfor NECC, 5. 
81 Franklin Sonn, Presidential Address. CTPA Conference, 20 June 1977, in A Decade of Struggle, 10-12. 
82 Sonn, Presidential Address (1977) 10. 
83 "NITS -TIT A - SAlT A - T ASA," paper delivered on behalf of th.: T ASA Cape Peninsula Branch, 9 March 
1990, n.p. 
84 Pat Samuels, "The Relationship Bc::tween Professionalism and Community Interests," in ed. Ashley, 41, 43. 
85 "NITS- TITA- SAlTA- TASA," n.p. 
86 Samuels, 45. 
at the end of 1989), its own building (the Teachers' Centre in Durban), and large financial 
revenue. Its 1989/90 budget included a total income of R954,000. TASA claims a gradual 
increase in membership during the years under study: from 4600 in 1969 to 5966 in 
198l.S7 
TASA, under its previous name of SAlTA, arrived in Cape Town in 1976 with the 
opening of the first Indian secondary school, Rylands. A Cape Town branch formed in 
1977. In 1990, the branch had 102 members.::~::~ This branch, far from head office in 
Durban, contending with regionally different ideological and political terrain, became more 
radical more quick! y than the national leadership in the late 1980s. The end of the 1970s, 
however, was more confusing than directed for TASA teachers. 
The South African Teachers' Association 
SATA is the white, English-speaking teacher organisation in the Cape Province. Though a 
sister, Afrikaans-speaking organisation exists in the Western Cape, the SAOU, it remained 
isolated from the events recorded in this thesis. 
SATA, the first conference of which was held in 1888,89 has consistently avowed 
"professional" ideology, in antagonism to teacher unionism. John Stonier, president in 
1975 and 1987, said in 1985: "The ideal would be to create a climate that encourages the 
highest level of professional pride and responsibility. "9o Contemporary officials echo the 
sentiment written of in its organ, Education, in 1944: "The special characteristics of a 
Trade Union render this type of organisation unsuitable for the teaching profession. "91 It, 
like its established counter-parts, is officially recognised. In fact, it is an affiliate of the 
white Teachers' Federal Council (TFC), which was granted statutory recognition by the 
government in 1986. SATA possesses a stately building in Rondebosch, and ample 
resources. It focuses primarily on salaries and service conditions for teachers, though a 
1944 article in Education claimed that, "conditions of service ... occupy only a secondary 
place in the deliberations of the Association. "n 
Whether or not this was true at that time, or has continued to be true, "politics" 
certainly do not occupy the primary place. The SATA remained steadfastly apolitical, 
confining itself strictly to educational matters until the watershed of 1976. While it is true 
that SATA did not have the pressure placed upon it by students and parents that other 
organisations, which were directly involved in the revolt, did, it was witness to state 
repression, and it did feel pressure from other teachers' organisations with which it had 
contact. 
87 "NITS- TITA- SAlTA- TASA," n.p. 
88 Interview with Kenny Ernest, 8 May 1990. 
89 A.R. Goodwin, Ceflfennial:A BriefHisrorycifSATA Conferences J888-J987(SATA, 1987) l. 
90 J.L Stonier, "The lmportant.:e of Professional Autonomy for the Teacher in the Classroom," in ed. Ashley, 
61. 
9 1 "The S.A.T.A.," Educarion January 1944: 147. 
92 "The S.A.T.A.," 147. 
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A SATA document entitled "S.A.T.A. Mandate Concerning Non-Racial Education: 
Relevant Motions Passed Since 1977" lists SATA's "relevant" motions from 1977, the year 
following the Soweto uprising. The document begins with two 1977 motions, one 
suggesting further "contact with other racial groups" on sports fields, and the other 
requesting the white education department to allow "suitably qualified Black teachers to 
teach Bantu languages in white educational institutions." From there, SAT A grew more 
daring. In 1982, it "urges the Government to act upon all of the principles and 
recommendations of the de Lange Report as a matter of extreme urgency," and called for 
one Ministry of Education.'~J Arid, in 1983, "the S.A.T.A. condemns apartheid as r-
detrimental to education in South Africa. "Y4 This changing rhetoric illustrated the pressure 
and space the SATA felt in the years following 1976. However, it consistently maintained 
the rectitude of "professionalism", and sought to work across race divides, not to abolish 
them. 
Cooperation and unity ejj01ts among the established bodies 
The recognized, established teachers' organisations have a history of cooperation, 
specifically aimed at looking into educational or service-condition matters which affected all 
of them. 
The most notable example of this cooperation was the South African Federation of 
Teachers Associations (SAFTA- see Introduction). Formed in 1958, SAFTA comprised 
Indian and Coloured teachers. A T ASA brochure explains that, "Initially SAFT A 
concerned itself with parity in salaries. SAFTA agreed to pursue the principle of' equal 
pay for equal work with equal qualifications. '"95 However, when Indian and Coloured 
education were separated into different governmental departments, SAFTA encountered 
"practical difficulties," according to Muriel Horrel of the South African Institute of Race 
Relations (SAIRR). Writing in 1970, she claimed, "The organisation still exists, but is 
dormant. "96 The TASA brochure offers the more enigmatic statement that when the 
separation occurred, " ... SAFTA changed its emphasis to professional matters." In 1974, 
the white Transvaal Teachers' Association (TTA) joined. Before the end of the decade, 
both the Natal Teachers' Society (NTS) and SATA had officially participated.97 
But as the winds shifted after 1976, SAFTA collapsed. The CTPA withdrew, sensing 
that the time was no longer ripe for such federal negotiating structures. At their 1979 
conference, a resolution was adopted which spoke of " ... our ultimate goal of one unitied 
93 The De Lange Report, commissioned by the state and composed under the auspices of the Human Sciences 
Research Council (HSRC), made recommendations for the improvement of South African education. It will be 
fully discussed in Chapter Three. 
94 SATA, "S.A.T.A. Mandate concerning Non-Racial Education: Relevant Motions Passed Since 1977," 
photocopy (n.d.) n.p. 
95 "NITS- TITA- SAlTA- TASA," n.p. 
96 Muriel Horrell, 77w Edumtion ufthe Coloured Community in South Africa !652 to 1970 (Johannesburg: 
SAIRR, 1970) 141. 
97 "NITS- TIT A- SAlTA- TASA," n.p. 
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teachers organisation. "lix Mike Reeler, a SATA participant in SAFTA, claimed in 1990 
that the CTPA pulled out because of "political bitterness and political awareness". The 
three participating white organisations -- TTA, NTS and SATA -- were not prepared to 
adopt a "political stance", according to Reeler. "SAFTA felt absolutely impotent," he said, 
"so it fell apart."99 According to a TASA member, "SAFTA failed because political 
thinking changed after 1976. "1oo The official dissolution took place in 1984. 
While SAFTA hobbled along before 1980, other initiatives were undertaken, 
seemingly outside the auspices of SAFTA. The Sunday Times reported on 26 June 1977 
that "Cape Teachers Back One-Body Call," describing an idea for a "multi-racial umbrella 
for all teachers' associations in South Africa" which was supported by all the established 
bodies.IOI TASA's arrival in Cape Town brought unity efforts. "When we came to Cape 
Town we tried to get all teachers together," said the T ASA Cape Town branch chairperson 
in 1990. TASA called a joint meeting at Rylands attended by PENATA, CTPA, SATA, 
SAOU and TASA. Several meetings followed, including history workshops. "At that time 
we wanted to form a kind of federal structure," stated the TASA Cape Town chairperson. 
But this initiative, 1 ike others, "just faded away." 102 After a CTP A vice-president attended 
a SATA conference in June I ?77, and the executives of both organisations met to plan "a 
panel-discussion on the relationship between the senior and junior (first year) teacher," 
Educatio lauded this as "A Step Towards Normalizing Education in South Africa." This 
discussion took place on 9 September 1977 at Spes Bona High School, 103 where first Sonn 
and then van den Heever served as principals. 
Specifically, the black organisations were finding it more and more difficult to 
coope~ate in the same ways, focussing solely on things "professional." This became more 
acutely apparent following 1980. A 1981 meeting of representatives from "all population 
groups" to discuss the establishment of a statutory body for salary negotiations for all 
teachers was unsuccessful because of the African and Coloured groups insistence "that such 
an issue could not be discussed in isolation from political and socioeconomic isslies." I04 
This did not mean that cooperation between the established organisations would remain 
impossible. Unity efforts continued. Pat Samuels of TASA explained how cooperation 
continued in the early 1980s around conditions of service: "Minister De Klerk brought us 
here to Cape Town, all four associations were here, and we won an important victory on 
three aspects of the proposed cut-backs. The key memorandum was signed by the four 
National Presidents." 10s 
98 Educatio Conference Edition ( 1979): II. 
99 Interview with Mike Reeler, 2 April 1990. 
100 Interview with Kenny Ernest, 8 !vLty 1990. 
101 Reproduced in Educatio 3rd Quarter (1977): 5. 
102 Interview with Kenny Ernest, 8 May 1990. 
103 Educatio 4th Quarter (1977): 10. ATASA and SAITA were also represented at the SATA conference. 
104 Hendrik van der Merwe and Patrick J. !'v!urphy, "The Need for Negotiation in an Unjust and Polarised 
Society: The Responsibility ofTeachers in a Democratic Society," in ed. Ashley, 119. 
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Conclusion 
That established organisations were coming under greater fire from students, authorities, 
and communities in the latter half of the 1970s may be one reason why SAFTA broke 
down. Clearly teachers needed to redetine their roles in relation to students and parents. 
As indicated above, all the established organisations began a gradual shift in the second half 
of the seventies. But by and large, the shift was slight, and tentative. There were no real 
internal threats to these organisations; teachers were not applying much pressure on their 
organisations. 
Whether afraid of losing their jobs, or of militant students, teachers in 1976 were 
embattled. "Morale among teachers was low," writes Mathabane.I06 Teachers now felt 
they had to justify themselves, and students would not necessarily appreciate their 
justifications. Times had changed, and in 1978, writes Hirson, "students where quick to 
challenge teachers who tried to impose tight discipline in the classroom. "1o1 Post-1976 
schooling also had to contend with "mass resignations" of teachers.1os Apart from those 
who resigned at the behest of students, many "could not work within the confines of the 
Bantu Education system. "IO'J Further, the state characteristically dismissed teachers who 
had "sided" with students during the revolts.IIO As the student uprising came gradually to 
an uneasy end in 1977 because of state repression and violence, the former, more 
authoritarian, system was being displaced. "For all their continuing criticisms of aspects of 
education," writes Hyslop, "teachers had come increasingly to find that their a-political, 
professional approach had placed them in a position where they could not attack Bantu 
Education without undermining their own social status." 111 New connections were being 
made between privilege and political repression, between class and power. It was 
becoming less acceptable for teachers' to uphold middle-class status. Students and some 
others within the broader community asked teachers to re-examine their positions; teachers 
needed to tind a new place within their schools and their communities. By 1980, Cape 
Town teachers were more actively engaged in this task. 
106 Mathabane, 271. 
107 Hirson, 278. 
108 Peter Kalla way, "An lntroJu~:tion to the Study of Education for Blacks in South Africa," in ed. Kalla way, 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADAMANT CHALLENGE 
AND TEACHERS' TENTATIVE SHIFf: 1980-1984 
Historian Tom Lodge has called the social and political upheaval of the 1980s "the most 
massive and prolonged rebellion in South Africa's history." 1 As the decade began, another 
wave of student boycotts swept across the country, and substantially affected the political 
life of the Western Cape. The growing trade union movement assumed an ascendent place 
within the country's political landscape. Also, as Lodge argues, the prolonged economic 
recession played a crucial causal role as the rebellion began and matured. Inflation and 
unemployment burdened township residents, adding to the restive climate.2 
During 1980 and the years immediately following, teachers experienced growing 
pressure to redefine their traditional race, class and "professional" locations, more pressure 
than at the end of the preceding decade. Students, unions, communities and sections of the 
liberation movement rejected the "professional" foundation of established teacher 
organisations. The liberation movement broadened its base within oppressed communities, 
and created space for teachers to more actively challenge their existing organisations, and to 
establish new, more radical groups. Teachers remained embattled, caught in a web of 
political tensions, sometimes with stultifying effects. But some teachers also began a 
creative response to the renewed challengepresented by the anti-government, class-
conscious rebellion. 
The state adopted a policy of reform at the beginning of the eighties, which created an 
important context for resistance.J This reform allocated certain benefits to teachers. The 
conflictual tensions within teacher politics remained taut. By 1984, teachers' traditional 
ideas about their race, class and "professional" locations remained firmly entrenched within 
some organisations, but the crucial importance of change in the context of rebellion 
infiltrated the realm of teacher politics, and was articulated by teacher groups, both old and 
new. 
Boycott: The Western Cape Context 
If the 1976 boycotts set off glowing sparks in the Western Cape, the 1980 boycotts burned 
brightly. In 1980, sixty percent of the Coloured population of Cape Town had moved to or 
been resettled on the Cape Flats. The resultant poverty, crime, parental absence and 
"alienation between parent and child" -- which existed in African townships as well -- were 
in part responsible for the way in which students and youth responded to the boycotts.4 
1 Lodge, 23. 
2 Lodge, 30-31. 
3 Lodge, 30. 
4 George Gibbs, "A community in crisis," in cds. Millar and Philcox, 23. 
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Hyslop, taking the point that the majority of the 1980 population was under twenty-one, 
argues that, "This ... provided part of the basis for a shift of the balance of power within 
the urban black family in which parents became increasingly unable to command the 
obedience of their children. "s Patterns from 1976 recurred. 
The rebellious situation was compounded by the growth of gangs in the townships. In 
Bonteheuwel, for example, a new gang called the Hobos emerged, "reportedly 500 strong," 
and comprised "of young people," school boys who dropped out during boycotts.6 
Other factors influencing the 1980 boycott were varied. A contemporary 
commentator, Edgar Maurice, defined several causes in Coloured schools in the Western 
Cape, echoing much from the 1976 revolts. There were increased numbers of students at 
schools, and these students comprised a new, post-1976 generation. Students from the 
University of the Western Cape (UWC) and local training colleges lent direction, and acted 
in some instances as leaders. 7 Nationally, between 1980 and 1984 African school 
enrollment doubled to more than a million.s 
Schools' physical disrepair did much to heighten resentment. In the Western Cape, 
buildings damaged or destroyed in 1976 remained unrepaired. As one student said at a 
community meeting on 20 March 1980: "We want to learn, but we're not being taught. In 
fact, we can't be taught under the conditions at our schools and with the teachers and 
principals we have. "9 The aparrheid distinctions between education departments added to 
the resentment. The boycotts, insists Maurice, were caused by the "totality" of 
separateness: segregated schools, and different curricula.Io For, although the 1979 
Education and Training Act replaced the 1953 Bantu Education Act, the South African 
Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) claims that "the diet remained the same. "II 
Coloured students in 1980 boycotted classes for eleven weeks, while the boycott in 
African schools was more protracted.I2 In September the DET closed seventy-four Cape 
schools for the remainder of the year.D White schools, of course, remained largely 
uninfluenced.I4 
5 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 4. 
6 Gibbs, 25. 
7 Edgar Maurice, "Some Aspects of the Crisis in Education in the Western Cape," in eds. Peter Buckland, et 
al, The Education Debate: A selection of papers presented at an Extra-mural class series, UCT, April-June 
1981 (UCT, Centre for Extra-mural Studies) 1-18 passim. 
8 Lodge, 31. 
9 Molteno, 27-28, 32. 
IO Edgar Maurice, "The curriculum and the crisis in the schools," in eds. Millar and Philcox, 18-19. 
I1 SAIRR, Cape Western Region, "The Political Crisis as it affected Educational Institutions under the 
Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), mid 1985 to early 1986," Regional Topic 
Paper 86/2, February 1986, 2. 
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The Challenge to Teachers' Assumptions 
Within this turbulent context, teachers' "professionalism" became less acceptable. 
"Professionalism", as described in Chapter One, is an ideological construct which changes 
over time. In the 1980s, established teacher organisations' beliefs in their "professional" 
location apart from politics and aspiring to the middle class was called more emphatically 
into question by a growing liberation movement. Students, trade unions and communities, 
in particular, challenged teachers to question their "professional" location, and redefine 
their self-perceived position in society. This was done through both class and race 
analyses. 
Lodge claims that class-consciousness infiltrated large sections of the liberation 
movement. "In contrast to earlier phases of black opposition," he writes of the 1980s, "a 
class-conscious ideology was the essential motivating force among a large number of its 
rank-and-file activists." 15 Students still comprised a large percentage of these activists. 
Student discourse during the 1980 boycotts was notable, states Hyslop, for its "high level of 
politicization". Students began expressing class-based analyses.l6 Such analyses allowed a 
new articulation of the challenge to teachers. The students involved in writing an "Inter-
School Manual" produced during that time, for example, stated their antagonism to 
teachers' material aspirations: 
Without a doubt, teachers in general have once again demonstrated their 
bankruptcy ... 0 Their sole concerns are their cheques, their bonds on 
houses, their cars and a host of other interests.l7 
Students such as these took much of their cue from the expanding trade union movement, 1s 
and the growing primacy of "workers" in the liberation struggle. "New black trade 
unions," writes Lodge, "were beginning .. ~ to shape the form and content of popular 
resistance." 19 The oppressed masses in South Africa were mainly comprised of members of 
the working class, who were became increasingly vocal. Teachers could no longer assume 
superiority. 
The pressure for a newly-defined "professionalism" had some effect. The "class 
consciousness" of teachers was altered, suggests one observer, as middle class teachers 
increasingly respected their lower class students.1o 
Further, the aspects of traditional "professionalism" which implied racially-based 
status became more untenable as the ANC and a Charterist ideology began to assert a 
stronger position in the political spectrum of the Western Cape. Matiwana, Walters and 
Groener state that " ... the theory of a non-racial national democratic struggle began to find 
favour with many activists. "21 
15 Lodge, 29. 
16 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 7 0 
17 "Teachers- The Stillborn Radicals," Inter-School Manual, photocopied pamphlet (nod.) nop. 
18 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 70 
19 Lodge, 30. 
20 Flederrnan, 35 o 
11 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 26. 
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The state, on the other hand, increased pressure on teachers to maintain their 
"professional" position. It continued a policy aimed at coopting teachers, and continued 
violently repressing "political" activity amongst teachers. The various interest groups 
seeking to influence teacher politics thus remained contlictual, perpetuating the 
contradictions inherent in the teachers' realm. 
Interest Groups and Teacher Politics 
The period 1980 to 1984 was a time of shifting tensions within teachers' political realm. 
While in the years immediately following the Soweto uprising, the central line of tension 
ran between students and the state, at the beginning of the eighties the students were 
becoming part of a much broader alliance of liberation forces. Teachers felt increased 
pressure from a number of sources within this broadened alliance, particularly the unions 
and the communities. 
In 1980, students placed greater emphasis on cooperation with parents and workers.22 
Education historian Linda Chisholm states that the Western Cape, in fact, was the only part 
of the country where an alliance between students and workers, albeit a weak one, came 
into being.2J Such a bilateral alliance strengthened and generalised outwards to other 
sections of oppressed people. Bundy has noted that the period between 1979 and 1983 saw 
the emergence of "a decentralised, localised, radicalised community-based politics. "24 
This development saw organisational expression in the 1983 launch of the United 
Democratic Front (UDF). The creation of the UDF, a broad front of ANC-aligned 
liberation organisations from every sector of the movement, "was a turning point in [the] 
shift in the balance of power between the South African government and the black 
opposition," writes Lodge. He continues: "The movement that the UDF headed was 
profoundly popular, infused 'from below' by the beliefs and emotions of' ordinary 
people.' "25 
There was more room, in light of the growing rebellion, for "grassroots" political 
maneuvering. For example, many educational, research and information organisations 
formed during the 1980s. The reasons were varied; including the politicisation of schools, 
repression, the availability of funds, increased confidence in the future, and a deterioration 
of social and economic conditions. 26 People in the Western Cape were taking greater 
control of their lives, and traditional authorities, such as "professional" teachers, were 
challenged. 
22 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 40. 
23 Linda Chisholm, "From Revolt to a Search for Alternatives," Work in Progress 42 ( 1986): 17. 
24 Bundy,"' Action, comrades, action!"' 210. 
25 Lodge, 29. 
26 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 82. 
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The state's continued assettion of control 
In direct opposition to the broadened liberation movement, and vying to maintain a strong 
influence over the behaviour and attitudes of teachers, was the state. Its various agencies 
continued utilizing a dual strategy of cooption ?-nd repression. The cooption of teachers, at 
the beginning of the eighties, fitted within the state's new policy of reform. "In the early 
1980s," writes Lodge, "the state determined to strengthen its authority by abandoning direct 
coercion in favor of limited political and institutional accommodation. "27 
In 1965, Leo Kuper wrote that " ... there is an absolute barrier to African mobility. 
Members of the African bourgeoisie are pushed back toward the masses by an equal 
subordination. "28 Gradually recognising the danger inherent in this truth, the state sought 
to separate the "bourgeoisie" from the "masses"; organised teachers fell into the former 
group. The state responded to the events of 1980 with a series of reform strategies, in part 
aimed at coopting a section of the black middle class, of which many teachers formed an 
important part. "The political aim was to fragment black opposition through stratification," 
writes Hyslop.29 
In education, the state began improvements in earnest. In May 1980, after militant 
action by some teachers, the government promised that black teachers' salaries would be 
equal to white teachers.Jo The DET, in an Educamus supplement in 1980, laid out its 
strategy for improving black education: increased teachers' salaries, with service 
conditions equal to whites'; new teacher-training centres and in-service programmes; and 
other improvements.Jt On 6 June 1980, a five-year plan for the improvement of Coloured 
education was announced, which included R2.6 million for improvement of teachers' 
qualifications.32 The new "own affairs" Coloured education department, the DEC (HoR), 
announced further service condition improvements in 1984. Married women teachers could 
now become permanent, the costs of transfers to senior posts would be covered, and breaks 
in service of up to one quarter of a school year would no longer result in salary and benefit 
losses.33 The education budget for all departments for 1982-1983 included a fifteen percent 
salary increase for all teachers.34 
The state, in fact, undertook a complicated process of achieving salary parity for 
teachers within different "population groups". The highest qualified African, Indian and 
Coloured teachers achieved parity first, announced in 1981. This cost the government less 
than allowing all teachers parity, and it was part of the government's plan to motivate 
27 Lodge, 31. 
28 Leo Kuper, An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, and Politics in South Africa (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. 1965) 94. 
29 Hyslop, "School Student Movements", 8. 
30 Walters, 69. 
31 Cited in Kallaway, "An Introduction," 26. 
32 Molteno, 101. 
33 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1984, 675. 
34 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1982, 466. 
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lower-qualified black teachers to improve their qualifications.35 By 1986, there had been 
equalisation ofqualified teachers' salaries across the colour bars.36 Whether or not the state 
was responding to pressure from teachers to improve their conditions of service, the 
element of cooption was still strong. In a discussion of teacher organisations in the mid-
eighties, Hyslop .claims: "Many teachers were influenced towards an apolitical position by 
the considerable improvements in salaries and conditions of service which the state had 
granted over the previous decade." J7 
Such blatant attempts at cooption were also apparent outside the field of education, 
where the state's "restructuring program" included the lifting of some restrictions on 
African workers and black businesses, the slow tolerance of a black urban class, 
privatisation, the removal of petty apartheid laws, and constitutional reforms which led to 
the tri-cameral parliament in 1983.38 Many of these reforms clearly influenced teachers. 
One specific example was announced in 1984. A government official said that influx 
control regulations did not apply to African teachers, who were not required to have 
accommodation in urban areas before taking up positions there.39 
The De Lange Commission of Enquiry, established by the Human Science Research 
Council at the request of the state, was part of this reform process. The commission, 
according to Hyslop, was part of the government's plan for formulating a counter-
revolutionary education policy: "Importantly, the strategy was aimed to intensify class 
differentials while reducing racial ones. "4o Sonn, the CTPA president, agreed to sit on the 
twenty-six-person committee which oversaw the commission. 
The De Lange proposals included a call for a single ministry of education, and 
accepted the principal of free association in South African schools.4t That these proposals 
would be rejected by the government in its White Paper in response to De Lange is hardly 
surprising. And even though Sonn liked to claim that the Commission's recommendations 
had their "heart cut out" by the government,42 Chisholm denounced the De Lange 
Commission proposals: 
Recommendations tallied with the 'total strategy' then in vogue: they 
aimed to modernise apartheid by improving urban social conditions in 
order to drive a wedge between urban and rural blacks, and between 
middle-class and working-class urban blacks.43 
35 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1981, 335-336; SAIRR, Annual Survey 1982, 484, 488. 
36 Bot and Schlemmer, 12. 
37 Jonathan Hyslop, "Teacher Resistance in African education from the 1940s to the 1980s," in ed. Nkomo, 
113. This single reference refers to the puhlished version of the longer ASSA conference article cited 
elsewhere under the same title. 
38 Innes, 3-4, 6-7. 
39 SAIRR, Annual Survev 1984. 667. 
40 Hyslop, "School Stud~nt Movements." 8. 
41 Van den Heever, "Foreword." n.p. 
42 For example, personal notes from: Franklin Sonn, address, Laywers for Human Rights Conference, 
University of Stellenbosch, 
43 Chisholm, "From Revolt," 18. 
75 
Sonn later claimed that, "We walked out; the rest stayed to implement. "44 
The committee which drew up the De Lange proposals proved to be an avenue for 
drawing educators from different "population groups" into an increased "professional" 
commitment. The South African Teachers' Council for Whites Amendment Act of 1984 
embodied a further example of this. According to the SAIRR, the Act extended the 
council's period of office for two years, to March 1987, to "enable it, with other bodies, to 
investigate the establishment of a professional registration body for teachers of all race 
groups and professional councils for each race group" .45 This would attempt to entrench 
state-defined "professionalism". Popular resistance, however, overtook such efforts and the 
"registration body" never saw the light of day. 
The process of state reform, while meeting with some success amongst teachers in 
upholding an ideology of "professionalism", heightened tensions within teacher politics by 
allowing room for greater political mobilisation on the part of the liberation movement. 
The state could not offer enough cooptive incentive to black teachers, who were part of 
communities of oppressed people. Continued attacks on black political groups, the 
"centralisation of white power," a more tightly controlled judiciary, and decreased press 
freedom demonstrated an ambiguity in state strategy. 46 The state continued its more heavy-
handed approach to the teaching corps through continued repression, thus partially 
undermining its strategy of cooption. 
During the turbulent years following 1980, state agencies did not hesitate to wield 
their considerable legislative control over the lives of teachers. The 1979 Education and 
Training Act defined teacher's "misconduct" as the criticising of the Department, among 
many other things.47 A 1981 amendment to this Act invested the minister of education and 
training with the power, in misconduct cases, to determine the length of time that teachers 
should be denied appointment. 48 In March 1980, three teachers were dismissed for alleged 
involvement in the boycott.49 One of the three, Elizabeth Everett, a white teacher fired 
from a Coloured school for attending a student meeting "just prior to the boycott", 
explained teachers' fear of their employers: 
... "coloured" teachers can have their appointments terminated at any time 
during their five year probationary period when they are part of the 
temporary staff.... All teachers are well aware that no machinery exists 
for investigating or fighting unfair dismissal and that a teacher may be 
blacklisted without her/his knowledge and be permanently denied any 
opportunity of teaching in a government schoo[.5o 
44 Personal notes from: Franklin Sonn, address, Laywers for Human Rights Conference, University of 
Stellenbosch, 4 August 1989. 
45 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1984, 682. 
46 Innes, 3-4, 6-7. 
47 Quoted in Peteni, 34. 
_48 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1981, 353. 
49 Walters, 68. 
50 Everett, 120. 
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Apart from fearing outright dismissals, there was further concern, for example amongst 
African teachers in August 1980, that teachers might be transferred to undesirable 
locations. 51 
The state publicly threatened teachers. At the end of July 1980, the DET stated that, 
"We have got to utilize teachers. They cannot sit around doing nothing and get paid for it." 
A few days later the DET added that during the boycott other departmental jobs might be 
found for teachers.52 Such threats clearly indicate the Department's frustration with what 
they regarded as teacher complicity. Taking such back-handed threats a step further, 
Minister Steyn announced in Parliament that: 
If they do not restore order and normalize school attendance in this week, 
con~ideration will have to be given to closing schools, and in their 
interests, the future of the teachers will have to be considered.53 
The newly-created "own affairs" departments also harassed teachers who were 
antagonistic to their new employers. In 1984, for example, the deputy rector of Springfield 
College of Education compiled a "blacklis.t" of sixty-two new Indian teachers who had 
expressed opposition to the South African Indian Council (SAIC). The department then 
posted those teachers on the list to remote schools. The deputy rector admitted to 
compiling the list on the instruction of the rector of the college, and Mr de Klerk, then 
minister of internal affairs, said that an investigation of his department had discovered that 
the blacklist had indeed been prepared. The two "officers" responsible were transferred.s4 
The tensions between established teacher groups and their respective departments will be 
further discussed below. 
Continued pressure from students 
During the boycotts of 1980, students expressed a "changed attitude" towards their 
education. They were dissatistied.ss As students in 1980-81 said, "The school and 
education is my salvation; I want to break with this low quality of life. "56 In 1980, 
however, Maurice contends that the students were " ... not merely requiring identical 
curricula and syllabuses, as in the past, but making a radical demand for a total revision of 
the whole aim and purpose, the ideological orientation, and the content of their 
education. "57 A large number of students challenged teachers' former behaviour and 
attitudes which were no longer acceptable. 
The challenge to teachers' authority was done, at least in part, with an alternative 
program in mind. As the student Committee of 81 -- which attempted to coordinate 
5! Walters, 70. 
52 Molteno. 140. 
53 Molteno, 58-59. 
54 SAIRR, Annual Surw.-'V 1984, 679. 
55 Maurice, "Some Asp;cts," 1-18 passim. 
56 Gibbs, 26. 
57 Maurice, "The curriculum," 18-19. 
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activities at Coloured schools during the 1980 boycott -- wrote in its "Manifesto" of 14 
May: "We must demand an end to the teacher being the most important person in the 
classroom. "58 This demand was coupled with alternative education programs in schools, 
which served the dual function of educating students about relevant issues, and claiming the 
educational terrain.s9 Chisholm has suggested that in 1980, unlike 1976, students were 
involved " ... in generating a pedagogy which questioned school hierarchies as well as the 
content and method of education. "6o Students "bombarded" teachers with "continual 
questioning, "61 and, after the boycott one researcher noted that, "Every teacher with whom 
I spoke [fifteen in total] described pupils as far more 'assertive', 'questioning' or 
'independent'. "62 
As stated above, the students, as part of this process, began to look outwards towards 
their communities for support. This reaching outward increased student pressure on their 
teachers, particularly at a time when many student complaints -- focussing on the moral 
bankruptcy of their teachers, apart from pedagogical concerns -- would resonate within 
communities. 
Molteno enumerates fourteen issues raised at a 13 March 1980 public meeting in 
Hanover Park of students, parents and teachers from Mount View and Crystal Senior 
Secondary Schools. The issues included drunk teachers, underqualified and unreliable 
teachers, and some teachers' practice of leaving schools on Wednesdays to place bets at the 
race course. Also, apparently, "Teachers had threatened that, if students did attend [the 
meeting], the security police would be called and they would be expelled. "63 More 
generally, educationist P.C. Luthuli wrote in 1982 that, "There is little doubt in the mind of 
every educator or educationist that an ill-qualified teacher force is ... likely to contribute to 
problems which have recently resulted in chaos in these schools because they do not 
understand or know which direction to take in leading their pupils. "64 The students 
involved in writing the "Inter-School Manual" during that time stated their position bluntly: 
" ... they [teachers] are a mistit lot condemned to the. Sewage Tanks of Athlone .... As a 
body, they cannot be trusted. "65 
Such sentiments appeared in a variety of shapes and forms during 1980, but the 
message was always the same. The position of teachers was no longer unquestioningly 
accepted; the doubts raised in 1976 multiplied. As Molteno observed: "The authority of 
principals and teachers was removed overnight as students began to boycott. "66 
58 Quoted in Molteno, 91. 
59 See, for example, Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 7. 
60 Chisholm, "From Revolt," 15. 
61 Henry Joubert, "Coping in a Crisis: a headmaster's case study," in eds. Millar and Philcox, 48. 
62 Fledennan, 33. 
63 Moltf'no, 29-30. 
64 P.C. Luthuli, An Introduction to Black-oriented Education in South Africa (Durban: Butterworths, 1982) 
110-111. 
65 "Teachers- The Stillborn Radicals," Inter-School Manual, photocopied pamphlet (n.d.) n.p. 
66 Molteno, 125. 
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Students sought to intluence teachers in more physically confrontational ways as well. 
Molteno offers a graphic example from Cape Town's African townships in 1980, where a 
crucial issue was the fourth term re-registration of all students demanded by the DET. 
During the night of 9 September, students "made examples of" one person from each of the 
four African high schools: a principal's home was burnt and his family terrorized; another 
principal's car was destroyed in front of his house; the windows of a teacher's house were 
broken; and a Langa student's windows were stoned. In a separate incident one week later, 
students killed a principal in New Alice.67 In the following year, 1981, nine principals 
received death threats in the mail for supporting the government.68 These incidents, if 
seemingly remarkable, were illustrations of the tensions which existed between students and 
teachers, and were extreme examples of ways in which students sought to influence teacher 
politics. 
The growing influence of trade unions 
Unions asserted indirect intluence in the terrain of teacher politics by fostering a political 
climate premised on working-class ideology and class-consciousness. This posed a direct 
challenge to teachers' "professional ism". As trade unions influenced the broader liberation 
movement, so they influenced the pressure on teachers to abandon what where coming to be 
perceived as oppressive ideologies. 
in 1979, the state legalised black trade unions through the Industrial Relations Act. In 
the same year, unity efforts amongst black unions led to the formation of the Federation of 
South African Trade Unions (FOSATU). In 1979, through a series of bitterly-disputed 
strikes-in the Cape Province, "community unionism" was born, and went on to assume an 
ascendant position in the union alliance. 
The economic recession of the early eighties brought with it a massive increase in 
union activity. National union membership grew from 808,053 in 1979 to 1,406,302 in 
1984. The number of strikes per year in South Africa increased from 101 to 342 between 
1979 and 1981. Unions comprised an important force in the launching of the UDF in 
1983. "In 1980," writes Lodge, "the strongest forces for mobilizing black protest and 
resistance were more often in the factories than in the townships, in trade unions rather than 
in political organizations. "69 
The broader communities 
Traditional assumptions within teacher politics were also influenced by other sections of the 
broader communities where teachers lived and worked. Civic organisations were one 
articulation of a community-based liberation movement. No fewer than thirty-two civic 
organisations, emphasising bread-and-butter issues such as transport costs and rents, formed 
67 Molteno, 146. 
68 Molteno, 149. 
69 Lodge, 28, 38·39. 
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in Cape Town's Coloured townships between 1980 and 1982. By 1983, and the launch of 
the UDF, the Western Cape could boast a strong civic sector. 70 
Other sections of the community did not articulate themselves through organisations, 
but remained influential in the teachers' realm. Of crucial importance for teachers were 
parents, who asserted cont1icting pressures on teacher politics. 
Some parents fully supported their childrens' actions and demands. In 1980, an 
article in The Caperonian claimed: "A new sense of solidarity is the chief result of the 
mass decision to boycott classes. Parents, teachers and students have united in their 
struggle to achieve change -- in some cases for the first time." The article described an 
obstacle: "Meetings revealed a profound lack of communication between parents and 
teachers. "71 With enhanced communication between students and their parents came 
enhanced pressure on teachers. Parents, too, wanted answers to hard questions about the 
positions of teachers. 
Other parents, however, did apply pressure on teachers to ignore student calls. One 
parent, in a letter to a Cape Town newspaper, blamed teachers for the boycott, claiming 
that teachers wanted both higher pay and less work. A teacher, interviewed by. Molteno, 
claimed that pressure from parents and, indeed, some students, had forced him/her to keep 
teaching during the boycotts. 72 
Liberation organisations 
Such developments took place in the context of a changing political terrain. In the years 
following 1976,. the ANC experienced a p~riod of increased support and reinvigoration. In 
the late seventies, the ANC escalated its guerrilla warfare, an example of which was the 
bomb attack on the SASOL plant in 1980.73 This armed struggle, explains Hyslop, was, 
attractive to the younger generation. About 4000 students left South Africa to join with the 
ANC's guerrilla activities after 1976: "In time some of them filtered back into the country, 
re-establishing more firmly the prestige and organisation of the ANC amongst the youth." 
After 1976, the ANC began to tinct widespread support amongst "the new political 
generation. "74 
In the Western Cape, the ANC became the dominant force in liberation politics. 
"Before the 1980s" writes Bill Nasson, "the ANC had relatively little support in the 
Western Cape.... But the Soweto uprising and the protracted education crisis in the late 
1970s exposed large numbers of Coloured youth to ANC political ideas and styles of 
expression; and the upheaval in the 1980s enabled the ANC, mainly through the activities 
70 Lodge, 40-41. 
71 "Schools boycott-- why did it happen? Where will it end'?" 777e Capetonian 2.8 (July 1980): 5. This 
article is based on interviews with parents, students, teachers and social workers. 
72 Molteno, 63-64. 
73 Innes, 2. 
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of the UDF, to establish a hold on political loyalties in the region. "75 In other parts of the 
country, dormant Charterist organisations -- the Transvaal Indian Congress and the Natal 
Indian Congress, for example -- emerged, 76 just as the ANC' s military exploits made it 
nationally more popular. n 
These developments had important implications for teacher politics and teacher unity 
efforts. Increasingly intluential elements of the liberation movement espoused non-
racialism, and completely rejected the implementation of the tri-cameral system of 
government in 1983. Established teacher groups who operated within the confines of the 
"own affairs" system were forced to question the political and moral efficacy of accepting 
these confines, and upholding their traditionally race-conscious "professionalism". 
Embattled Teachers 
Because of such student, departmental, and community stances, teachers' positions seemed 
to be as unenviable as in 1976. The principal of a junior secondary school wrote in 1981: 
"We teachers occupy perhaps the most invidious position imaginable and it would take the 
combined talents of Peter Weiss and Woody Allen to portray our almost bizarre, tragi-
comic role. "7s Another headmaster wrote of 1980: 
Teachers were in fact very effectively excluded from the action, be it 
educative or otherwise. The initial stages of the boycott caused severe 
disorientation and temporary diminution of the teachers' status and self-
esteem. Most teachers were simply left in a state of helplessness.... as 
pupils seemed to gain in self-confidence the teacher seemed to withdraw 
further. 79 
One further observer, who interviewed fifteen teachers from nine schools, catalogued 
teachers' boycott-induced ills: their professional and personal identities, as well as their 
--- - - . ----------- ~ ~ 
traditional authority, were threatened; comm~nication with students had broken down_;_ 
';bsenteehm and alcohol use were increasing; and the stress induced such physical traumas 
as ulcers and breakdowns. "Teachers seem," she concluded, "to have suffered extreme . -
personal str~s_s."s.2. 
... -- . - ~--....---
This unenviable position has been eloquently summed up by Francis Wilson and 
Mamphela Ramphele in their book Uprooting Poverty, an overview of the Second Carnegie 
Inquiry into Poverty in Southern Africa, which took place in 1984. In describing teachers' 
"lack of morale", they claim: 
... one of the most disturbing insights from the Carnegie Inquiry was the 
number of reports, seldom committed to paper, that were received of quite 
appalling breakdown in schools, with teachers often drunk, absent from 
75 Bill Nasson, "Political Ideologies in the Western Cape," in Lodge, eta!, 214. 
76 Innes, 2. 
77 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 32. The ANC's military attacks increased from 44 in 1984 to 230 in 
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78 Brian O'Connell, "The Crisis of Authority in Schools," Educario Conference Edition (1981): 8. 
79 Joubert, 43-44. 
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work, and (in some instances) assaulting -- even raping -- pupils. This 
loss of morale in what was long one of the most highly regarded 
professions amongst South Africans of all races has complex roots that 
take us to the heart of the South African crisis. For it has much to do 
with frustration, powerlessness, anger of the unfranchised [sic], combined 
with the ambivalence and loss of confidence that comes from attacks by 
schoolchildren who lash out at the teachers as the nearest symbol of an 
authority they reject. Caught between the government which pays their 
salaries and militant students intent on overthrowing the whole structure, 
teachers have little room to manoeuvre and many of them retreat under 
pressure from all sides into themselves where drink is often the only 
solace.8I 
Teachers' invidious positions led to an increase in the number of teachers who left the 
profession. Dr Gerrit Viljoen, the minister of national education, spoke in 1980 of the 
"crisis" of the shortage of teachers. An increasing number were leaving teaching to join 
private enterprise, he said, and the applications for student teacher bursaries and grants had 
dropped from previous years.82 In the following year, R. Thomas, the executive 
chairperson of the newly-formed progressive teacher group, the National Education Union 
of South Africa (NEUSA), spoke of a worsening "critical shortage" of coloured and Indian 
teachers due to resignations.8J 
Despite this malaise, to perceive teachers as being completely overwhelmed would be 
fallacious. Teachers and their organisations were challenged during the 1980 boycotts and 
their aftermath. Many teachers, both individually and organisationally, did not respond 
with resignation and apathy. The period 1980 to 1984 saw some creative response on the 
part of teachers, as well as significant questioning within established organisations. 
Creative Response: The Teachers' Action Committee 
During the 1980 boycott in the Western Cape many students decried teachers as 
"collaborators". Once· again, however, we must move away from simple generalizations, 
and roughen the texture of teachers' terrain. There was growth and change during the 
boycotts. Teachers did, in some instances, overtly support the student boycott. Apart from 
the organised actions discussed below, at all of the community meetings teachers stated 
their support for students. And, according to Molteno, "Students at all schools had the 
support of at least a few teachers whom they characterised as 'progressive'. "84 This was in 
part due to a more politicized, younger generation of black teachers. In 1984, the Minister 
of Education and Training, Barend du Plessis, said that one-half of the teachers employed 
by the DET were under thirty years old. "In other words," he said, "we have young 
teachers, relatively inexperienced, and an older-than-average school population. "85 
81 Francis Wilson and Mamphda Ramphdc, Uprooting Poverty: The South African Challenge (Cape Town: 
David Philip, 1989) 144. 
82 SAIRR, Annual Survt"Y I 980, 497. 
83 SAIRR, Annual Surv~ /98/, 358. 
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As the possibilities of the boycott became clear, even before the smoke dispersed, 
many activists began to understand the fundamentally important role teachers would have to 
play in re-shaping education .. "Teachers," wrote one observer, "need support to channel 
this opportunity and build constructive change. "&6 But even during the boycotts teachers 
were not without support; at least a group of teachers during the 1980 boycotts received it 
from the most obvious quarter: their own ranks. 
During the third week of the 1980 boycott, a group of about 1200 teachers met 
several times, and established an ad hoc committee representing over one hundred schools. 
This ad hoc group became the Teachers Action Committee (TAC), and represented a 
fledgling attempt at a more radical, organised response to student boycotts within Coloured 
schools.87 TAC was anti-government, pro-student, and it decided, at the third of its 
teachers' meetings in Cape Town on 1 May 1980, to "down tools" .88 Although this 
abortive attempt to show solidarity with student demands was called off after a week, and 
was supported by only a small number of teachers, it indicates the degree of teacher 
militancy present within TAC. 
TAC, while comprising~ relatively small group of teachers, had a large agenda. A 
T AC newsletter explained: 
We need to create forums for discussing the tasks facing us, our role in 
the community, our stand against racism, our view on political 
developments in our country, the educational interests of our pupils and 
students, new ideas on teaching, the contents of the syllabi and ideas on 
solutions to the problems we face as teachers in an educational system 
based on a political ideology which we reject.89 
Further, the newsletter stated that, "Our schools should be run as democratic institutions in 
which parents, students and teachers have an equal voice. "90 In an article in the community 
newspaper Grassroots, a TAC member explained that, "The TAC was born of the need for 
alternatives -- alternatives to the status quo -- in the classroom, in the meeting place, in the 
community. "91 
To accomplish these broad goals, TAC organised itself into eighteen regions, 
produced three newsletters and a series of pamphlets-- on "A New Approach to Education" 
and "A History of Education in South Africa", for example-- and set up workshops and 
lectures. The workshops focussed on such aspects of education as, "How could we use 
86 Flederman, 40. 
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education for the benetit of the voteless people instead of preparing our students and pupils 
to become pawns of apartheid policies. "92 
.In interviews in 1990, DETU's Mr Mbekwa and PENATA's Mr Gqaji spoke of 
similar developments in Cape Town's African townships in 1980. A small group of 
teachers, elected from a teachers' meeting in 1980, also formed a Teachers' Action 
Committee (TAC). Mbekwa claimed that this DET school-based TAC met with students, 
who "were hard on us". He continued: "We had to prove our credentials. We had to 
undertake some actions like confronting the DET. Their [the students'] hatred lessened." 
Gqaji explained the PENATA was not pleased with this TAC i~ DET schools because 
"things were not done procedurally when working with the community". Mbekwa added 
that teachers in this TAC "had a paternalistic attitude to students". This small group of 
teachers in African townships thus began to tentatively respond to student challenges, but to 
respond from a "professional" position. While posing a threat to PENATA, according to 
Mbekwa, by "radicalising teachers", this TAC in DET schools illustrated the beginnings of 
change in teacher politics. 9J 
The stronger TAC, based in Coloured schools, appears to have been largely a reactive 
body. A need was apparent, for by the end of the second week, students were asking · 
teachers to organise and join the boycott. 94 As students wrote in the "Inter-School 
Manual", "The Teachers Action Committee, like the Committee of 81, was an attempt to 
organic;e teachers during the crises. "95 An express purpose of TAC was to work with 
students, and the Committee. An 8 May 1980 statement by TAC declared: "We have 
demonstrated a unity of purpose between students and teachers. "96 "We have been without 
a voice_," said one teacher at the second meeting on 29 April 1980, "and it is about time we 
show our solidarity with the students. "97 Shirley Walters has written that TAC was 
"established to try to help teachers analyse society in order to develop a new role for 
themselves. "98 
A T AC member suggested a more active, rather than reactive, reason for the founding 
ofTAC: 
We have been asked: Are you a boycott organisation? The answer is 
simply no. The TAC was established ... during the pupils' .b9ycott, yes. 
The TAC identified with the reasons for the pupils' boycott aud their 
demands, yes. But its establishment was coincidental, inevitable. 99 
The argument may be rhetorical, but the point suggests that progressive and radical teachers 
were ready to articulate a challenge to apolitical, traditional "professionalism". 
92 TAC Newsletter No.3; TAC m~::mh.:r, 3.15. 
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This challenge was articulated in part as opposition to the established association in 
Coloured schools. TAC and the teachers' meetings which formed it soundly rejected the 
CTPA as an established, conservative body organised along racial lines.1oo Van .den 
Heever, the CTPA deputy president, himself admitted that, " ... it was clear that there were 
a number of teachers who did not see the CTPA as providing a home for themselves in 
terms of the broader political agenda which they felt needed to be addressed quite 
fundamentally by teachers' organisations." 101 He claimed in an interview that T AC 
comprised "teachers who did not belong to the CTPA", 102 but such an assertion is 
reductionist. Teachers both within and outside of the CTPA' s largely conservative 
constituency began responding to a radically-changing social and political climate. 
The very nature of these initial responses, in relation to the creation of a crisis 
committee, made it difficult for TAC to survive. The meetings at which TAC was formed, 
wrote Molteno, "were a reflection of the intense pressure on teachers to take a public stand 
rather than of effective organisation. [sic] Much of what support for TAC there was, 
proved ephemeral." The militant rhetoric of TAC frightened some teachers, while others 
felt uncomfortable with TAC's rabid denunciation of the CTPA which was an ~ffective 
teachers' association as well as an outspoken advocate of many of the ideals striven for by 
the students. IOJ T AC' s workshops, in fact, were attended by only a "few" teachers.I04 
TAC disintegrated, in part because of victimisation of its leaders, 105 but, according to 
Molteno, especially after being perceived as arrogant by many of the students with whom it 
was trying to ally itself. 106 
Although the T AC initiative was short-lived, it was an indication of growing teacher 
discomfort with the traditional "professional" style, and with non-involvement in the 
boycotts. Teachers wanted to reclaim their "voice", and their legitimacy which had been 
shaken in 1976 and 1980. TAC was a form of teacher empowerment. TAC emerged 
because of student pressure for greater teacher involvement in the boycotts, and as a 
reaction against an established teachers' grouping which appeared to some incapable of 
responding effectively to a new and militant situation within schools. TAC emerged, more 
generally, because the political turmoil of 1980 in Western Cape schools profoundly 
influenced teacher politics. 
The Response of Established Teacher Organisations 
While some teachers grouped together within the more radical T AC, others responded to 
the 1980 boycott, and the broadening liberation movement, within the ranks of the 
100 Molteno, 82-83. 
101 Van den Heever, "Address on Teacher Unity," 3. 
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established organisations. The established bodies were still politically hampered by notions 
of "professionalism". But growing tensions within teacher politics, in the face of state 
reform and particular departmental pressures, took the form of tentative questioning and 
some public posturing for political credibility in the eyes of students. 
Afdcan and Indian education 
In Cape Town during the 1980 boycotts, PENA TA remained quiet, perhaps in part because 
of its continuing low public profile. The Cape branch of TASA, like PENATA, did not 
publicly engage with the boycotts. It is interesting, however, that the Lenasia branch of 
TASA was the sole teachers' organisation publicly in opposition to the boycott. On 7 May 
1980 it stated: " ... the students have made their point.. .. The students should ignore all 
support for· the continuation of the boycott." 101 
Tensions were emerging from within TASA, however. In 1980, neither the director 
of Indian Education nor his deputy attended the TASA July congress in Durban, although 
the deputy was scheduled to deliver an address. This snub was thought to be a result of a 
teachers' meeting in Pietermaritzburg at which the director and his deputy were called upon 
to resign.tos Further tension existed between TASA and the SAIC, which took control of 
Indian education in 1976. From the SAIC's inception, TASA had refused to deal with it. 
In October 1982, the power over promotion of Indian teachers was removed from the 
director of Indian education and vested in the SAIC. TASA condemned the change on the 
grounds that the SAIC was a political body. The chairperson of the SAIC, A. Rajbansi, 
demanded TASA's cooperation, threatening to withdraw TASA's stop-order privileges if it 
did not comply. The tension continued into the following year when, in June 1983, the 
SAIC required any communication from T ASA to the Department of Internal Affairs to be 
channelled through the SAIC. Directcommunication was prohibited.1o9 This was a means 
of entrenching the SAIC 's power over Indian "own affairs", and a method of forcing T ASA 
to work with the SAIC. 
Such tension exemplified the growing conflict between established organisations and 
their respective departments. Teachers were challenged to respond to the education crisis, 
and to reject the education system created by an apartheid state. TASA began to do so in 
the 1980s. 
Coloured education 
Amongst the few teachers' organisations in the Western Cape at the time, only the CTPA 
lent immediate and public support to the students' grievances, though not to their tactics. 
"It should ... be clear," Randall van den Heever wrote in Educatio in 1980, "that the 
107 Quoted in Molteno, 89. 
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C.T.P.A. did not suddenly become aware of problems in teaching when pupils started 
boycotting, but that its involvement in the current climate of dissatisfaction is based on a 
commitment which the organisation has consistently carried out over the years." 110 It's 
"involvement", however, was a matter of debate, both during and after the boycott. In 
1980, with 17,000 members, the CTPA's strength lay in rural areas; Molteno claims it was 
" ... weakest in the Cape Peninsula's southern suburbs were it was virtually denied 
consideration by teachers and students alike." 111 And historian Gavin Lewis writes that in 
1980, "In the Western Cape, youth leaders sharply criticised the established Coloured 
political organisations [the Labour Party, the CTPA, and the TLSA]. "112 Criticism of the 
CTPA thus formed part of the students' broader political complaints. 
The student pressure, pressure from within their membership, and teacher agitation 
expressed through T AC led to a CTPA/UT ASA meeting in Bellville South on 3 May 1980. 
Five hundred teachers met and agreed unanimously upon a five point resolution, which 
denounced apartheid and detentions, called for a single education department, lauded the 
students' conduct, and requested "an urgent interview with the Prime Minister". No 
decision was taken about teachers' boycotting classes because "it was felt that it would be 
difficult to enforce a resolution in this regard" ,113 The CTPA response remained in the 
realm of rhetoric and negotiation. 
The mandated meeting with Prime Minister P.W. Botha took place two days later, on 
5 May. At the meeting, the UTASA/CTPA delegation supported the student demands. 
Sonn recognised the unpopularity of negotiation at the time, and declined to appear on 
television with Botha, thus refusing the state president the political mileage of appearing on 
television with a Coloured leader.ll4 
The results of this meeting are unclear. Sonn later stated that he had met Botha 
"against the wishes of my community" ,115 And the Committee of 81 made their resentment 
known in their 14 May "Manifesto": "The suspension of the boycott has been decided upon 
by the students at all schools represented by the Committee of 81. We have not made our 
decision in response to PW nor because creepy crawly Sonn saw and negotiated with the 
regime against the wishes of the boycotting students." 116 But van den Reever writes that, 
"At the end of the meeting the P.M. for the first time in S. A. history pledged his 
government to the principle of equality in education. He also appointed a commission of 
enquiry which would make an in-depth investigation of the ills besetting S.A. eduction." 111 
The CTPA thus implied that its meeting with Botha gave rise to the De Lange Commission. 
110 Randall van den Heever, "Consistt:m:y or Opportunism: An Assessment of Teachers Involvement in the 
Current School Crisis," Educario 2nJ Quarter ( 1980): 4. 
111 Molteno, 86-7. 
ll2 Lewis, 281. 
113 Cape Times, 5 May 1980, in "CTPA Statements in the Press," Educario 2nd Quarter (1980): 6-7. 
11 4 Molteno, 78, 79; Educario 2nd Quarter (1980): 6-7. 
115 Personal notes from: Franklin Sonn, aJJress, Lawyers for Human Rights Conference, University of 
Stellenbosch, 4 August 1989. 
116 Quoted in Molteno, 92. 
117 Van den Heever, "Foreword," n.p. 
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Further, in 1980 a group of CTPA teachers associated themselves with students at a 
funeral of two youths whom the police had killed. liS This gesture, both symbolic and 
practical, underlines the ambiguous, because shifting, stance of the CTPA. "In 1980," 
writes van den Heever, " ... with the outbreak of protracted unrest at high schools in the 
Western Cape the focus shifted from the service conditions of teachers to the political 
struggles of the community." 119 
Despite such claims, the fundamentally "professional" and reformist approach of the 
CTPA remained clear. It continued cooperating with the state. In 1982, Sonn attended the 
Labour Party's Eshowe conference and was involved in their dramatic decision to 
participate in the tri-cameral parliament. The Sunday Times reported that he subsequently 
sent a message of goodwill to a Labour Party congress in Port Elizabeth, a message which 
Hendrickse announced.12o This illustrated the reform-minded, cooperative approach the 
CTPA maintained towards the state during these years. 
Franklin Sonn later said of 1980 that, "We never actively supported the boycott," for 
the CTPA did not agree with such tactics although they stood behind the grievances. The 
CTPA was caught between anxious parents and members who worried about the children, 
and militant students. "We felt our role as teachers was to use the pressure the students 
placed on us to bargain for improvement, for reform - but the kind of reforms the 
Government couldn't afford to make," said Sonn. 121 The somewhat ambiguous response of 
the CTPA, reflected by Sonn is this enigmatic statement, was therefore geared entirely 
towards non-confrontationist negotiations. They participated in a the De Lange 
Commission, and, at their 1981 June conference, they passed the following resolution under 
the general heading, "The Crisis of Authority in Schools": 
This conference wishes to appeal to students and pupils to refrain from 
negative and destructive acts of disrespect, unruliness and vandalism 
where it occurs. We are furthermore distressed to note that pupils are at 
times playing havoc with their futures and inflict personal harm on 
themselves in an effort to give vent to frustration and rage, and we want to 
implore them to secure their futures by diligent study and disciplined 
scholarliness. Our education and preparation for the future is after all not 
expendable.122 
White education 
While the government's reform strategy took shape in black schools, interesting 
developments were occurring in white schools. In white education, the government's 
reform plans aimed to include parents in virtually all aspects of schools, from finance and 
admission to curriculum development. As educationist Michael Ashley has written, "The 
118 Molteno, 115. 
119 Van den Heever, "Address on Teacher Unity," 3. 
120 Sunday Times, 16 June 1985. 
121 Molteno, 86. 
122 "Conference Resolutions: The Crisis of Authority in Schools," Educatio Conference Edition ( 1981 ): 31. 
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same developments have not occurred in black education .... the state cannot rely on the 
same degree of loyalty and therefore cannot delegate in the same manner." 123 But the 
expected loyalty was being called into question as early as 1982 with the formation of a 
"progressive" students' and teachers' group called the Social Issues Group (SIG). Primarily 
a discussion group, SIG created a forum for those who worked and studied within Christian 
National Education to more fully understand their place within apartheid education, and to 
begin articulating a rejection of some of its tenets. It was a small group, but significant for 
the terrain in which it operated. SIG, in fact, presaged ED AS A. 124 
Established white groups also began to question their past "professionalism" in the 
face of their own education "crisis". In 1980, dissatistied with the government's failure to 
announce any salary increase the previous year, white teachers held protest meetings, and 
threatened to strike or refuse participation in extra-mural activities. The white Federal 
Council of Teachers' Associations went so far as to claim that teachers might form a trade 
union.12s In the Transvaal in 1984, just such a circumstance arose, albeit on a small scale. 
A group of white teachers formed the South African Teachers Guild, and affiliated to the 
conservative Trade Union Council of South Africa (TUCSA). Although the English-
speaking, established teachers' body, the TT A, attacked the guild as harmful to 
"professional" status, 126 the guild illustrated the ambiguity of teachers' "professional" 
locations, even in more privileged white schools. 
Established Teacher Unity Efforts 
' One indicator of the tensions within teacher politics was an increased desire for teacher 
unity on the part of the established organisations. Federal unity was a way for the 
established bodies to come to terms with non-racialism and the increasingly restive political 
climate. It was clear that their isolation within racially segregated departments of education 
was no longer acceptable to many students, others within the liberation movement and some 
teachers. The teacher unity efforts of these years reflected tentative moves towards a more 
credible and acceptable position in the eyes of the liberation movement and some members 
of the teaching corps. 
Specifically, the black organisations were finding it more and more difficult to 
cooperate as they had in the past by focussing solely on things "professional". This became 
more apparent following 1980. A 1981 meeting of representatives from "all population 
groups" to discuss the establishment of a statutory body for salary negotiations for all 
teachers was unsuccessful because of the African and Coloured groups insistence "that such 
an issue could not be discussed in isolation from political and socioeconomic issues" .127 
123 Ashley, 17-19. 
124 Rossiter, n.p. 
125 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1980, 494. 
126 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1984, 655. 
127 Vander Merwe and Murphy, 119. 
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This did not mean that cooperation between the established organisations was 
impossible. Unity efforts continued. UTASA and ATASA met and established a new unity 
organisation, the Joint Council of Teachers' Associations of South Africa (JOCTASA). 
Formed in April 1980, it sprang from " ... the need for greater unity between the oppressed 
community of teachers." Randall van den Heever, a participant in the talks, explained: 
"The main purpose of the emergence of JOCTASA was for a united thrust by the 80,000 
teachers in the council towards the realisation of education equality and full citizenship for 
all South Africans." 12s Its stated aims were thus overtly political, straying from matters 
strictly educational. 
JOCTASA's first conference was held in East London between 8 and 9 January 1981. 
It can be seen as an attempt by these two established bodies to grapple with their new 
terrain. SAFTA had only recently fallen apart. And during the boycotts both ATASA and 
UTASA were often criticised as racist, so cooperation could only help their popular 
reputations. Also, the conference theme was "Education for the Future." 1980 showed 
how unpredictable that future might be. "Many speeches at the J.O.C.T.A.S.A. conference 
forced teachers away from cliches and slogan-slinging," reported the Argus, " .. ·.into a more 
sophisticated and profound look at the sort of education system they really want." The 
students had asked hard questions, and put teachers in difficult places. This new teacher 
unity effort was a tentative answer.I29 
In 1983, as part of this effort, UTASA drew up a Charter for Teacher Unity (see 
Appendix A) which was adopted by JOCTASA, and later accepted by other 
organisations.I30 This document rejects apartheid, calls for a single education ministry and 
a single teachers' union, and a "democratic system of education," among other things. 
However, there are two aspects of the Charter which illustrate the inherent "established" 
bias. Firstly, it states: " ... we undertake to enter into discussions with the existing 
educational authorities on matters requiring immediate and urgent attention." Secondly, it 
claims: "Given the essentially separate basis of education policy and practice in South 
Africa, we realistically recognise and appreciate ... the difficulties inherent in establishing 
and effectively organising and operating teachers' associations on a practically open 
basis .... " 131 Though rhetoric was shifting, actions remained consistent with the federalism 
and government-cooperation of the past. 
This was further illustrated in 1984 when JOCTASA called representatives of all, 
South African teachers' organisations to Cape Town. The gathering discussed a national, 
non-racial organisation, and even established a steering committee. But NEUSA, a radical 
128 Van den Heever, "Address on Teacher Unity," 4. Emphasis added. 
129 'Teachers in Unity, UTASA Annual Magazine 1981: !5-!7. Argus l2January !981, quoted in this 
journal. 
130 "Other organisations" claim by J.F. Steyn, "The Present and Future Role of Teacher Organisations in 
South African Education," in ed. Ashley, 90-92. 
131 J. 0. C. T.A.S.A. Charter for Teacher Unity. 
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teachers' body which enjoyed credibility within the liberation movement, rejected the 
initiative on the grounds that the proposed charter for unity did not go far enough. 132 
Conclusion 
While much can be said about educational and political gains won during the 1980 boycott, 
the reality was more grim. After the boycott, Molteno reports, II ••• teachers were relieved 
still to have their posts and preoccupied with getting through the syllabus. II 133 It is true, 
however, that a fire had been started, and it continued to burn. 
1980 was a significant year for teachers in that once again they found the ground 
shifting beneath their feet as students, the state and elements of the liberation movement 
attempted to influence them and guide their activities. Established organisations grappled in 
their own, professional ways, and a new organisation, TAC, illustrated the latent frustration 
and potential of radical teachers. In 1980, students demanded a new role of teachers, 134 
both eoucationally and politically. Students emphasised the need for unity between 
workers, teachers and themselves.1Js And, as Maurice writes, the boycotts II ••• brought a 
renewed sense of political awareness to a whole community of people, perhaps grown 
lethargic and indifferent because of frustration, disillusionment, and a feeling of 
hopelessness. "136 
Such awareness was not lost in the years between 1980 and 1984. There were 
attempts at state reform, at cooption, but the pressures "from below" were also strong. 
Teachers, too, were discovering a voice, a new role they could, and had to, play in their 
communities, not just in their schools. So organisations shifted. All the revolutionary 
strains of 1980 recurred in 1985, only more forcefully. 
132 SAIRR, Annual Survev 1984, 655. 
133 Molteno, l. -
134 Flederman, 34. 
135 For example, Molteno, 60. 
136 Maurice, "Some Aspects," 15. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
COMMUNITY AND EMERGENCY IN 1985-1986 
The period 1985 to 1986 was arguably the most significant moment in Western Cape 
teacher politics in the decade. Prior to 1985, elements of the growing liberation movement, 
primarily students, challenged teachers to break with past "professional" attitudes and to 
work against rather than with the state. Teachers responded tentatively, reeling from .the 
shock of a new, aggressive student authority and from a changed school realm. In 1985, 
the atmosphere at schools and in communities drew teachers into more militant action, and 
increased their antagonism towards apartheid education and the state. Traditional, 
established teacher organisations remained vocal and visible, and adopted increasingly 
political positions, but they remained within the framework of conventional apartheid 
society. The "professionalism" they espoused implied a commitment to cooperation with 
state structures. In 1985, elements of the liberation movement challenged teachers to end 
such cooperation, and to engage in overtly "anti-professional", political action within the 
context of the popular resistance movement. 
The smaller, "emergent" teacher unions formed in 1985 in the Western Cape-- and 
their national allies such as NEUSA -- maintained highly visible positions because they ·. 
moved within the high profile context of resistance politics. The disparity between these 
emergent groups and traditional teacher bodies posed dilemmas for the ANC and its allies 
as they sought to int1uence teacher politics. Should the liberation movement bestow 
"legitimacy" on its allies within the emergent teacher unions for loyal revenue, or should 
the ANC attempt to draw the established associations onto its side at the risk of alienating 
its emergent teacher allies? The pressure from the resistance movement, in 1985-1986, was 
shaped around both options. But already is was becoming clear that winning the allegiance 
of the established organisations was moving to the c~ntre of the ANC' s strategy. 
Gradually, teachers adopted more "political" positions. The specifics of the education 
and liberation struggles also influenced the race and class aspects of teachers' locations and 
"professionalism": the community-based rebellion upheld a working-class ideology and 
more forcefully espoused non-racialism. 
Teachers, under pressure to respond, but also taking advantage of an opportunity to 
articulate their own antagonism to oppression and exploitation, asserted themselves within 
the liberation struggle. In 1985, within the context of a violent wave of unrest and state 
repression, "progressive" teachers in the Western Cape rallied to create a number of highly 
politicized teachers' unions after the fashion of NEUSA in the Transvaal. These unions --
WECTU, DETU and, in a different vein, EDASA --established immediate credibility 
within a changing liberation movement, and asserted an organised, radical voice in teacher 
politics. 
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The "emergent" unions, as they came to be known, posed a direct challenge to 
"professionalism" and to the established teacher associations, which also felt increasing 
pressure from community-based liberation organisations to abandon state-supported notions 
of "professional" behaviour. The MOM-aligned National Education Crisis Committee 
(NECC) in particular adopted a strategy of cooperation with the established groups, rather 
than a principled rejection of them, in order to allow them an opportunity to work with 
elements of the opposition movement. 
The birth and growth of the emergent unions, and the shifts in the established bodies, 
dramatically altered teacher politics in the Western Cape. These changes both built on 
teachers' tentative shifts in 1980-1984, and set the stage for the unprecedented unity efforts 
of 1988-1990. Political forces operating within and outside schools gave progressive 
teachers the space to boldly articulate their own antagonism to the mechanisms of 
apanheid. The changed political context afforded the small numbers of teachers within 
emergent groupings a much louder political voice, within the context of the liberation 
movement, than the established groups whose "professional" voice was effectively silenced. 
The progressive teachers influenced both the "professionalism" of the established 
associations and teacher unity _efforts. 
The significance of these events warrants two chapters in this study. Chapter Four 
will provide the essential structural background, analyzing the sociopolitical forces affecting 
teache~ politics in the Western Cape at the time. Chapter Five will examine teachers' 
action and reaction, within both the emergent and established groups. Teacher unity efforts 
of this period will also be discussed as an indicator of seemingly intractable obstacles to a 
unified_ profession, and of continued tensions within teacher politics. 
Western Cape Context: 
The Political and Social Climate 
The political and social unrest in the Western Cape during 1985-1986 challenged the 
apolitical, middle-class and ethnically-defined nature of "professionalism". In a climate of 
rebellion, in which non-involvement in struggle was often deemed "collaboration" with an 
oppressive state, perceived teacher passivity became increasingly unacceptable to students 
and those committed to democratic, political organisations. In a worsening economic 
climate, which partially fostered a powerful trade union movement, the middle-class values 
of teacher "professionalism" became increasingly untenable. Further, as the education 
struggles of the recent past merged more completely with the broader political struggle, 
teachers were challenged to reject aparrheid education and the apartheid distinctions 
between their "professional" associations. The state's response, which escalated the conflic_~ 
undermining teachers' "professional" positions, shattered a myth of "professional" 
autonomy. 
The economic climate, fueling rebellion, looked bleak. In 1984 South Africa 
experienced its worst recession since 1929, and by 1985 the rising unemployment was at its 
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highest rate ever. 1 Intlation stood at sixteen percent, and this would rise to over twenty 
percent in 1986.2 The cost of basic foods went up greatly, and GST increased twice.3 
Matriculants were finding themselves in the ranks of the urban unemployed, side-by-side 
with those who had dropped out of school. As a result, there was growing restiveness 
amongst students and teachers about the efficacy of the education being offered by the state. 
The Western Cape had been "politically quiet" except around the Coloured elections 
in 1984. Student revolt began after the first, limited State of Emergency was imposed on 
20 July 1985. The Emergency, as initially declared, did not include Cape Town,4 but DEC 
(HoR) schools were boycotting within a week. Cape Town's DET schools joined soon 
after. The upheaval lasted for three months, and involved street battles, consumer boycotts 
and severe repression.s At schools, a "cycle of violence" was set in motion. Peaceful 
protest led to violent suppression, which in turn led to student anger, and more police 
brutality.6 
Bundy claims that "the state's heavy-handed coercive measures" were the main force 
behind the rising student-youth militancy. 7 "In the 1985 emergency," writes Glenda Kruss, 
"government seemed to have lost control; it acted wildly in all directions to crush 
opposition political activity. "8 The total deaths in that year's political violence numbered 
879.9 Officially, 201 children died at the hands of police. Information gathered in this 
regard caused the Lawyers for Human Rights in New York to decry state action as a "war 
against children" .10 
The state detained thousands of people during the unrest, including many children. 
When the government extended the State of Emergency to include the Western Cape on 26 
October 1985, the police detained about 400 people. II Nationally, people under twenty-
five years old accounted for more than sixty percent of those detained. "Unimaginable 
mental, psychological and emotional damage has been inflicted on thousands of children," 
writes Linda Chisholm. 12 
State repression continued feeding into the cycle of violence. The Weekly Mail 
reported in November: "In short, the townships of Cape Town have become the frontline 
in a war of attrition being waged by people who see themselves as guerillas in a struggle 
I An unofficial estimate put it at thirty-seven percent of the economically active population. Innes, 2. Bundy, 
however, offers a more cautious fifteen-to-thirty percent of the workforce. Bundy, ·'Action, Comrades, 
action!' " 209. 
2 Innes, 2, 6. 
3 Chisholm, "From Revolt," 17. 
4 It was extended to much of South Africa by 7 March 1986. A second, national State of Emergency became 
Jaw on 12 June 1986. Leonard Thompson, A History of South Africa (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990) 235. 
5 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," p(L\"sim. 
6 Wilson and Ramphele, 149. 
7 Bundy, "'Action, Comrades Action!'" 211. 
8 Kruss, 173. 
9 Thompson, 229. 
IO Wilson and Ramphele, 149. 
II Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 56. 
12 Chisholm, "From Revolt," 19. 
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against the government." 13 Trained guerillas were also at work, as the number of 
insurgency attacks around the country increased to 136 in 1985.14 
Once again the schools were at the centre of the national liberation struggle. 
According to government figures concerning 1985, seventeen "Black" (as opposed to 
"Coloured" and "Indian") schools were destroyed; thirty were "seriously damaged"; and 
247 were "slightly damaged." 15 
During 1985, writes Hyslop, "the student movement had shifted its focus from 
educational demands as such to broadly political ones." As students worked to build strong 
student coordination, 16 trade union action increased, with 290 strikes throughout the country 
involving 240,000 workers in 1985.17 Bonds were being formed between different 
elements of "the struggle". Communities were being drawn in, and were empowering 
themselves. Between 1985 and 1988 in Greater Cape Town, about 145 new organisations 
were established, almost twice the number established in the first half of the decade.1s 
Such ~ctivities heightened local militancy, which was also partly enhanced, according to 
Bundy, by "the growth locally of popular support for the ANC .... " He wrote that, 
"' Charterist' sympathies and allegiances spread rapidly, especially in some DEC schools 
where they had previously scarcely existed. "19 An ANC strategy in the eighties was to, 
. "Make the system unworkable and the townships ungovernable. "2o The "system" included 
schools. 
Although the militancy of students has been criticised -- because it fostered disunity, 
for example21 --Hyslop maintains that during the period between 1984 and 1987, "Student 
protest provided the detonator for an explosion of worker and community struggle which 
posed the dominant classes with their greatest ever challenge. "22 This time of great social 
and political upheaval created a much greater sense of the possibility of liberation. 
A divided region 
As discussed in the Introduction, communities in the Western Cape remained divided along 
apartheid lines. This continued having profound influence on teacher politics, since both 
emergent and established organisations operated within distinct education departments. 
Since other sections of their communities were only beginning to overcome apartheid 
13 The Weekly Mail, 8-14 November 1985: 7. 
14 Thompson, 229. 
15 South African Yearbook 1987-1988 (Pretoria: South African Bureau of Information) 515. 
16 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 16. 
17 Thompson, 229. 
18 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 47. 
19 Bundy,"' Action, Comrades, action!'" 213. 
20 Innes, 12. This was, interestingly. at the same time as South African business met with the ANC, and, 
"hopes for a peaceful change soared." Anthony Sampson, Black and Gold, discussed in The Weekly Mail, 27 
February to 5 March 1987. 
21 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 20. Parents withdrew children from schools; unemployed youth 
took advantage of the militancy; "homelands" were unaffected. 
22 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," I. 
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distinctions, the pressure on teachers to retain ethnic identities was strong, and affected 
"professionalism" and unity efforts. However, there were contradictory pressures in the 
form of greatly increased support for the non-racialism of Charterist organisations. 
It was difficult for teachers and their organisations working within different contexts 
to unify. The differences were particularly marked between black and white schooling. 
The 1985 boycotts, also, followed different courses in African and Coloured areas. "While 
all students were initially part of [a single, organising body], conditions in the different 
areas later on (particularly after the extension of the State of Emergency to the Western 
Cape) tended to separate the students [into their distinct education departments] and forced 
them to work autonomous! y," wrote the Western Cape SAIRR in 1986.23 
During 1985 and 1986, students and popular organisations1 like the UDF and the 
NECC, worked at overcoming these divisions between African and Coloured groups. Ihron 
Rensburg, the national secretary of the NECC, said in a 1986 interview that the Western 
Cape " ... is divided, with one CEC [Crisis in Education Committee] based in the coloured 
community and another in the African community. This is not an ideological but a 
geographical divide, which we are trying to resolve. "24 Supporting this statement, Graeme 
Bloch, Cape Town activist, explained that in early 1986 there were three student groupings: 
the Joint SRCs in township schools; the Athlone Student Action Committee; and a loose 
alliance of Student Action Committees in Coloured areas like Mitchell's Plain and 
Mannen berg. Bloch wrote that a UDF education conference in March 1986 " ... helped to 
consolidate a drive for unity within student ranks .... "25 
In 1985, the divisions were firmly entrenched and remained an important aspect of the 
school boycotts that year. Like students, teacher groups, including the new unions, 
remained separated by departmental distinctions, and the different schooling contexts these 
created. But there were efforts to resolve the differences, and powerful elements of the 
liberation movement worked to overcome the distinctions, and thus undermine a racially-
based teacher "professionalism". 
The repressive atmosphere within disrupted schools, created by students, youth and the 
state, greatly influenced teacher politics, urging teachers away from the limited political 
profile of "professional" passivity. The specific factors which engendered the change in 
teachers' locations described in Chapter Five included student action, a strong community-
based liberation movement, and the state's dual strategy. 
23 SAIRR, Cape Western Region, "The Political Crisis as it affected Educational Institutions under the 
Department of Education and Culture (House of Representatives), mid 1985 to early 1986," Regional Topic 
Paper 86/2, February 1986, 5. Henceforth referred to as SAIRR, CW Region. 
24 Ingrid Obery, "People's Education: Creating a Democratic Future," [interview with Ihron Rensburg] Work 
In Progress, 42 (May 1986), in People's Education, 12. 
25 Bloch, 118-9. 
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The Bovcott and Student Challenges 
In 1985, during a time of great soul searching, a CTPA editorial posed the following 
question: "We should ask - why is it that our young appear hesitant to enter the future 
which we, as teachers, hold out to them? ... Where have we failed to fight the right battles 
so that our children might confidently remain at their desks?"26 These questions reflect the 
significant influence student action had over teacher politics. Students rejected teacher 
attitudes and ideologies which were theoretically premised on concern for students' best 
interests. These attitudes and ideologies, in order to become more acceptable to large 
numbers of students, needed reshaping by teachers. 
The atmosphere within schools during 1985-1986 politicized teachers more than in 
preceding years; the revolt had become protracted. Student action helped create an 
atmosphere of conflict and repression. Teacher politics shaped during a time of student 
quiescence were ill-suited to a time of student rebellion. 
The Western Cape school boycotts: a chronology 
In order to situate teachers within a clearer context, a brief outline of events in Western 
Cape schools during 1985-1986 will here be undertaken. Such a chronology does not exist 
in the current South African education literature. Once again, it must be stressed that 
developments in African areas are vastly underrepresented in the available sources, such as 
newspaper accounts, from the period. 
During 1984 students nationally began a more coherent programme of organisation 
than during 1976 to 1983. Students organised within the Congress of South African 
Students (COSAS), and, along with unemployed township youth, built youth congresses. 
"[T]he students of 1984," writes Hyslop, "especially through COS AS, had a real national 
organisation that could make calls to action which could evoke a national response. "27 
The Western Cape students became involved in a national wave of political protest at 
the time of the Coloured elections on 22 August 1984. Hundreds of thousands of mostly 
Coloured students boycotted. Though the boycott faded in the Western Cape, in the 
Transvaal and Eastern Cape student protests continued. "It was the riots and police killings 
that took place in the' Vaal Triangle' industrial area's townships at the beginning of 
September [1984]," writes Hyslop, "and the subsequent deployment of the SADF in this 
area that transformed school boycotts into a leading sector in a national political struggle. "28 
The following year the Western Cape became a fiery centre of student revolt. As in 
the rest of the country, student boycotts which focussed on education grew to encompass 
t broader political issues. The murders of four Eastern Cape community leaders, including 
the teacher Matthew Goniwe, and the imposition of the first State of Emergency on 20 July 
~6 "Editorial: The CTPA and the Boycotts," Educatio 3rd Quarter ( 1985): 2. 
27 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 13. 
28 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 12-14. 
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1985, rekindled student protests. Although neither event directly impinged upon Western 
Cape schools, students and university students organised an 8000-strong rally at UWC on 
26 July. Police used sjamboks to eject 200 Mitchell's Plain students from their buses en 
route to the rally.29 At the rally, students demanded the reinstatement of a Scottsdene High 
School teacher, an end to the Emergency and the withdrawal of troops from townships. 
Support for a boycott was voiced.3o On 29 July, a boycott of classes began.31 
The Weekly Mail reported that students boycotted in solidarity with the UDF and with 
detained student leaders, and in opposition to "gutter education" .32 At the beginning of 
August, participants included about forty schools, colleges and universities in African and 
Coloured areas. The escalating cycle of violence had begun, as police doing battle with 
students in Gugulethu, for example, killed one youth and injured others.33 
A separate Western Cape student organisation, formed within the initial three weeks 
of the boycott,34 grew into a "strong" coordinating organisation,35 comprised of 
representatives from schools, colleges and universities.36 It began as the Inter-Schools 
Coordinating Committee (ISCC), representing about twenty-five schools in and around 
Cape Town. Along with educational issues, the ISCC made such broadly political demands 
as the release of political prisoners, withdrawal of troops from the townships and the 
resignation of community councillors, MPs and "collaborators" in general.37 The ISCC 
became the Western Cape Student Action Committee (WECSAC), made up of ten action 
committees, and encompassing forty educational institutions.3s At its peak, this number 
grew to eighty .39 
The growth of WECSAC meant that the Western Cape was not as affected by the 26 
August_ 1985 banning of COS AS as other parts of the country. Some areas now had no 
effective coordinating body, 40 although Hyslop claims that COS AS was " ... too elementally 
powerful a movement to be stopped by decapitation .... "41 
Three days after the COSAS banning, on 29 August, a watershed event occurred for 
the 1985 unrest in Cape Town. A peaceful march to Pollsmoor Prison, asking for the 
release of Nelson Mandela, and attended by thousands of students, was first banned and 
then violently dispersed by state forces: twelve people were killed and many injured. Over 
29 SAIRR, CW Region, 4. 
30 The Weekly Mail, 20-26 Decemher 1985: 3. 
31 SAIRR, Cape Western Region, 4. 
32 The Weekly Mail, 18-24 October 1985: 7. 
33 The Weekly Mail, 2-8 August 1985: 6. 
34 SAIRR, CW Region, 4. 
35 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 16. 
36 SAIRR, CW Region, 4. 
37 The Weekly Mail, 2-8 August 1985: 6. 
38 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 153; SAIRR, CW Region, 4. 
39 The Weekly Mail, 20-26 December 1985: 3. 
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the next three days, the official death toll rose to thirty-one, with more than 150 injured.42 
The ~AIRR claimed that, II A new and ugly tone had been set. II 43 
Continued confrontations maintained a high level of violence. Students organised 
within the Inter-Regional Forum (IRF), which took the place of WECSAC, and which had 
the organisational advantage of excluding tertiary institutions. The IRF wanted the boycotts 
to continue. "Normal schooling" was rendered even more difficult by the 15 October 
"Trojan Horse" killing of three school children in Athlone, and the mass funerals which 
followed.44 On 26 October, the State of Emergency was extended to Cape Town. In the 
Western Cape, the SAP's divisional commander, Brigadier Swart, gave orders which 
supplemented the Emergency, particularly aimed at containing school unrest and mass 
funerals.45 Johan Muller writes that this put SADF personnel in schools and produced "a 
fraught learning environment and a situation of constant confrontation and provocation".46 
As the year-end approached, the examinations became a burning issue. In the middle 
of October, as the Director of Education and Culture (HoR) in the Western Cape told forty-
four Coloured-school principals that examinations would go ahead as scheduled,47 the 
Athlone Student Action Committee - representing sixteen high schools - and t~elve 
Mitchell's Plain schools decided to boycott their examinations. 48 While some teachers, 
notably within WECTU, fully supported this decision, and paid for their refusal to 
invigilate with dismissals and salary docking (see Chapter Five), many parents did not 
support the examination boycott. 49 The IRF, however, came out on 28 October in favour 
of not writing. 5o 
The SADF supervised most internal examinations, and many matriculation candidates 
wrote at the Goodwood Showgrounds, Wingfield military base, and the Cape Corps base at 
Faure. Internal exams at Cape schools were described by The Weekly Mail: "The sight of 
Casspirs and buffet armoured personnel vehicles surrounding schools has become 
commonplace. Soldiers and policemen stand guard inside the grounds. "51 
Of the 25,584 students who registered for Standard 10 in DET schools around the 
country in 1985, only 10,523 wrote the examinations. Of the 25,584, only 19.1% passed 
on the ordinary grade; 5.2% obtained their matriculation exemption.52 An official DEC 
(HoR) statement of its own results claimed that 11,052 wrote the examinations (out of an 
·undisclosed possible number), of which 64.4% passed, and 1,381 obtained matriculation 
42 The Weekly Mail, 20-26 December 1985: 3. 
43 SAIRR, CW Region, 6. 
44 SAIRR, CW Region, 14-16. 
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exemption. In the Wynberg, Athlone and Bellville (but excluding Mitchell's Plain) regions, 
53.9% of registered students sat for their examinations. 53 
The crisis in black schools, especially around the examinations, manifes'ted itself in 
poor results and an unsettled beginning of 1986. Due to the absenteeism and low results, 
schools faced a massive dilemma concerning promotions. Initially, the DEC (HoR) took a 
hard line on matriculants, sending letters to matriculation students at the end of 1985 saying 
that re-registration for March supplementary examinations would only be considered with 
affidavits and statements from principals swearing the December exams had not been 
written.54 On 2 January 1986, the Labour Party leader Allan Hendrickse extended the 
deadline for re-registration to 14 January.ss 
Internally, marks were added to students' results to facilitate promotion in a large 
number of schools.s6 In 1986, too, many students seem to have simply promoted 
themselves. 57 Belatedly, on 7 February Carter Ebrahim, the minister of education and 
culture (HoR), announced that planned promotions of those wno participated in the boycott 
would be allowed, and that schools could opt for re-examination at their discretion. 58 In the 
Western Cape generally students returned to school on 28 January in line with an NECC 
call, emphasizing the suspension, not the end, of the boycott. 
Despite the return to school, protest action continued. In late February, for example, 
forty-one Bonteheuwel students were detained for two days, which prompted a 2,500-strong 
protest meeting, and added to student militancy in that area.59 In April, after the March 
NECC conference in Durban, 100,000 students were boycotting country-wide.6o Students 
at ID Mkhize and Sizamele High Schools, in Gugulethu and Nyanga, rejected a minor 
government concession by burning their free exercise books because they were too thin.6t 
By the time the second State of Emergency was declared in June 1986, the DET closed 
seventy-three schools, located mainly in the Eastern Cape, due to "endemic" boycotts. The 
school re-opening was postponed; re-registration was required; new security measures were 
implemented. The Department excluded more than 300,000 students around the country 
who refused to re-register.62 
While these violent eruptions and militaristic state interventions beleaguered Cape 
Town's black schools during the latter half of 1985, their white counter-parts remained 
largely unaffected. Some political action did occur, however, on a very small scale. On 4 
September 1985, for example, a group of about twenty white school students staged a 
peaceful march in central Cape Town, and were met with characteristically brutal 
53 Sunday Times, 5 January 1986. 
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repression at the hands of police.6J Also at the beginning of September, a small group of 
white students meeting clandestinely in an Observatory home formed the Pupils Awareness 
and Action Group (PAAG). Their initial campaign involved a three-day stay-away called in 
solidarity with black students, involving "alternative programs" at UCT. Gareth Rossiter, a 
teacher-activist involved in the initiative, wrote that about sixty students participated.64 The 
Weekly Mail offered a more conservative estimate of twenty students who joined the 
boycott. Around one hundred students attended an afternoon meeting protesting, among 
other things, "tight governmental control over' white' educational system" .65 There was 
another small progressive group of mainly teachers in which white students became 
involved, wrote Rossiter, called the Students' Information Group (SIG). It was a resource 
and discussion group, and worked in about twenty English-language high schools in 1985 
and 1986. "At the height of [SIG's] activities," Rossiter stated, "the working group was 
not larger than fifteen people although the network of supporters was much wider. "66 
PAAG, along with the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) and the Black Sash, took up a 
protest against the cadet system in white schools, campaigning under the slogan: 
"Schoolyard today, townships tomorrow. "67 
White schools were not affected by the unrest in black schools, although some white 
teachers and students offered small gestures of solidarity and support. Teachers in black 
schools, on the other hand, lived with contlict, tensions and violence. 
Student influences on schools and teachers: 
repression and liberation 
The general climate created by protesting students immediately affected teachers. The 
boycotts fostered both a repressive and liberating atmosphere in schools. Teachers 
reassessed their "professional" attitudes and behaviour within schools because teachers were 
subject to both student and state aggression --as witnesses and as victim~,-- and because the 
renewed student militancy brought with it a sense of the possibilities for change. 
Student aggression against "professional" teachers, challenging them to engage with 
an ideology of liberation within schools, took several forms. Firstly, students took 
advantage of drastically altered school dynamics to break free of previous social strictures 
which had been eroding since 1976. Whether this meant ignoring teachers, defying them, 
or verbally haranguing them, the effects were similar: teachers were stripped of previous 
authority and credibility. During 1985, students "humiliated" teachers.6s 
Secondly, the new student authority did not allow room for a questioning of its 
tactics. Many students asserted a policy of "non-collaboration", an example of which was 
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their refusal to write examinations at the end of 1985. Duncan Innes wrote of this 
phenomenon: " ... in effect the boycott strategy has come to be regarded as virtually 
inviolable. Thus, not only do most popular organisations refuse to participate in official 
state structures, but they also refuse even to negotiate directly with the state. "69 Established 
teacher organisations premised their "professional" activity on cooperation with the state in 
administering education. Students, however, refused to cooperate, and challenged teachers 
to adopt a similar strategy. 
A third aspect of student action in schools which rendered teachers most fearful was 
-"-~ -- - - ---·· -- -- - --~-
the use of violence. In 1980, teachers were sometimes targets of students' physical attacks. 
Thiscircumstance repeated in 1985. Students and youth engaged in acts of physical 
violence directed at teachers and the property of teachers around the country, both in and 
out of schools. The Weekly Mail recorded, for example, that the homes of two Madibane 
High School teachers in Soweto were attacked. 10 The Cape Times, further, reported that 
Soweto teachers had not gone to their schools for several days "for fear of injury" from 
youth. 11 Students petrol bombed some principals' homes, and in February 1985 threatened 
to burn the homes of teachers who were contemplating accepting their departmental 
transfers from Cradock to Graff-Reinet. n 
Randal Peteni, ATASA president, summarised the important role that fear of students 
played in facilitating change within teacher politics: 
Most of our negotiations must take the form of fighting for a just society, 
for an end to discrimination and apartheid, otherwise we are in danger of 
becoming the targets of the anger of our own students, just as all 
supporters of the system, such as the community councillors, and the 
police, have become the victims of our angry young people. 73 
This comment, made at a conference in 1985, illustrated a shift in AT ASA' s public 
position. This "professional" association had begun to distance itself from its former, 
collaborationist positions, if only publicly at this point. 
Aggressive student action, however, was only one aspect of the boycotts which 
facilitated change within the location of teachers, who also gained some inspiration from 
their students. The boycotts fostered a greater sense of the possible within schools. As 
teachers looked for ways of reestablishing a constructive position within schools, they took 
. some cues from the protesting students. 
Students in 1985 had built more effective organisations than in 1980. COSAS 
nationally and WECSCO locally serve as examples of this. More effective student 
organisation based on broader political aims resonated with teachers more than the past 
rejection of education, and won teachers' respect. It was through these organisations that 
students consulted with teachers, and, as DETU chairperson Andile Jonas said in an 
69 Innes, 11. 
70 The Weekly Mail, 4 to 10 October 1985: 11. 
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interview with South in 1988, student consultations with parents and teachers persuaded 
teachers to support students.74 Bundy reminds us, however, that in 1985, "The unity 
sought across generational lines was repeatedly stretched thin, and on occasions frayed. "75 
Student organisations, further, took up teachers I issues as well as their own. Student 
demands at the time often included the release of teachers from detention, and the 
reinstatement of suspended and dismissed teachers. WECSCO, for example, took up an 
issue of central concern to teachers organisations: the reinstatement of all teachers 
dismissed, suspended or transferred during the 1985 end-of-year repression. 76 
Student action at schools also drew teachers towards a redefined "professional" 
location by continuing to reject state education while implementing alternative education 
programmes. One analyst suggested that students were, in fact, engaged in power-struggle, 
making demands, for example, via SRCs about school policy and teachers 1 behaviour. 77 At 
the very least, the State education reform strategy was rendered ineffectual. 78 The teachers 
and the departments no longer dictated the form and content of learning. Western Cape 
students, in particular, concerned themselves with alternative education. "Organised 
programmes" began after July 1985,79 with both SRCs and the nation-wide COSAS 
encouraging discussions on education and strategy .8o WECSCO called for a continuation of 
alternative education programmes during the boycotts.8t Teachers were drawn into such 
programmes, and began to play a significant role. 
Finally, students in tluenced teacher politics by broadening both students' aims and 
their strategies. Student protests focussed on broad political concerns, and often fell within 
a growing alliance of elements within the liberation movement. Students were no longer 
isolated at the forefront of the movement. The broadened base of liberation politics 
allowed more room for teacher involvement, and increased the pressure from all sides. 
"Should. the authorities not listen to our demands by March," explained a WECSCO 
representative at the beginning of 1986, referring to an NECC-initiated strategy, "then in 
consultation with parents, teachers and workers, we will decide on a national basis what 
further action to take. "82 
Community Action and Alliance Politics: 
the Influence Over Teachers 
Teacher politics were influenced a great deal by the broader political alliance developed 
between students, parents, community-organisations, elements of the liberation movement 
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falling into the increasingly popular Charterist camp, and unions. Teachers lived in 
communities which began to espouse a politics of "people's power". This challenged 
teacher organisations to assert a newly-defined "professionalism" or risk political isolation. 
"The slogan one often hears now," reported The Weekly Mail, "is, 'The Western Cape will 
liberate South Africa. '"83 Activists from many sectors believed that "victory is certain," 
and that the state could indeed by beaten by "people's power".84 
Alliance politics became tirmly rooted in contemporary political strategy focussing on 
people's power,8s as students were drawn into broader community-based struggle. The 
Weekly Mail reported in October that, " ... what has the authorities worried is that 
student/pupil action seems to be arousing perceptible sympathy in the community as a 
whole".86 Ian Moll echoed this belief, contending that an important qualitative difference 
between the uprisings of 1985 and their predecessors was that: "education struggle had 
become rooted in communities as a whole" .87 Many people in 1985 were prepared to 
confront police; they were less afraid.s8 Bundy stated that student-youth perceptions of 
their own achievements included a recognition of the need for alliances with the working 
class, and the linking of "struggles over educational grievances" with "broader political 
objectives .... "89 In Bontheuwel, for example, the students' coordinating body prioritized 
organising and mobilizing parents by May of 1986.90 
The communities' unofficial re-opening of some schools closed by two departments 
served as a "highwater mark" of this unity around schools.9I On 6 September 1985, the 
DEC (HoR) closed 464 Coloured schools and colleges in the Western Cape. The DEC 
(HoD) also closed its only high school in Cape Town. This act angered some parents and 
teachers, as well as students, who refused to accept the HoR DEC's planned reopening of 
schools at the end of the official September holiday. 92 While the Cape Times claimed that 
the closure " ... politicizes the parents, who are paying taxes to have their children 
educated, "93 The Weekly Mail claimed that, "Parents and teachers threw their weight behind 
the students' struggle. "94 
Indeed, both progressive teachers and parents joined students on 17 September 1985 
as thousands unofficially "re-opened" their schools. Many were dispersed by police 
without incident, though Rylands High School -- in the Indian department -- was 
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successfully re-opened. 95 At Alexander Sinton Secondary School in Belgravia, 173 people 
were arrested.96 Police briefly detained twenty-tive teachers and ten students in Grassy 
Park. 97 Then, in an act of continued detiance, the official school re-opening on 1 October 
was ignored as more than 5000 students met at UWC, chanting ANC slogans. A student at 
the meeting said: "What is different is that now the youth have faced the authorities. "98 
Also, it was significant that the youth had faced the authorities with the support of much 
broader elements of the liberation movement, including teachers. 
A central element in the broadening alliance was the involvement of the trade union 
movement. The unions continued to impact teachers indirectly by injecting class discourse 
into the liberation movement, thereby continually undermining teachers' "professional" 
assumptions about their class locations. "More prominent in the discourse than in 1976 or 
1980 is the language of class struggle, class alliances, and working-class leadership," wrote 
Bundy of 1985.99 The trade unions moved more fully into the national democratic struggle. 
For e'\_ample, COSA TU, formed in 1985, opted to join the NECC as part of "national co-
operation between COSA TU and other progressive organisations," said a COSA TU office-
bearer in 1986.100 
There are at least two distinct traditions within South Africa's union history. One, the 
"community unionism" described in Chapter Three, comprises a "national-democratic 
tradition," which focuses on the need for a multi-class alliance under the leadership of the 
ANC. The second tradition, characterized as "shop-floor unionism", did not engage in 
broader political movements for fear of dilution and of sacrificing true workerist goals. In 
1983, many of the former unions affiliated to the UDF.101 During the first half of the 
eighties, there was a gradual shift away from "shop-floor unionism" in favour of 
"community unionism". 
In 1985 and 1986, unions became increasingly involved in community-based protest 
politics, particularly as the general political climate changed.1o2 Unions engaged with both 
national political questions as well as the student-led township revolt.10J "Finally," two 
union analysts claim, "it was the process of intensified struggle, where workers confronted 
the crisis in the townships daily, rather than in refined debate over the problems of 
'populism', which marked the decisive break with political abstentionism." The unions 
increased willingness to work together, and to work with community groups, led to the 
formation of COSATU in December 1985.to4 
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COSATU demonstrated a commitment to the national liberation struggle with an early 
1986 visit to the ANC in Lusaka. A joint ANC-SACTU-COSATU statement firmly aligned 
COSATU with the national democratic struggle: "As a representative of our working class, 
COSA TU is seized with the task of engaging the workers in the general democratic 
struggle, both as an independent organization and as an essential component of the 
democratic forces in our country." 105 COSA TU would extend this commitment within 
teacher politics towards the end of the decade through its involvement in the NTUF. 
Broadened community involvement in asserting a politics of "people's power" which 
rejected cooperation with the state had some harsher effects as well. Teachers, in this vein, 
had reason to fear continued "professional" engagement with state structures. In 1985 and 
1986, community-members murdered several hundred people considered collaborators. 
State President Botha said that between September 1984 and April 1986, "508 people, 
mostly moderate blacks, were brutally murdered by radical blacks," and arson damaged or 
destroyed more than 6000 township buildings.1o6 "Many of these acts," writes Neville 
Alexander, "were the consequences of maturing political and socioeconomic conditions of 
heightened class conflict." 101 Powerful elements of the liberation movement drew a 
distinction between "collaborators" and those people committed to a working-class struggle. 
Groupings of teachers, starting with NEUSA in 1980, and extending to the new 
unions of 1985, moved within the latter context, and can therefore be seen as part of the 
liberation movement which pressurised the established teacher associations into reassessing 
their location and legitimacy. The established groups also needed to resist the threat of 
teacher defection to the emergent teacher unions. 
The NECC and People's Education 
One of the most significant developments of 1985 and 1986 in the educational arena, and 
specifically for teacher politics, was the formation of the NECC. The NECC worked 
within community-based politics to create an alternative education programme in the form 
of what came to be known as People's Education. From its inception, the NECC 
recognized the importance of including teachers in the process of developing People's 
Education, and of resisting the state's oppressive educational agenda. The NECC thus 
included both emergent and established teachers' groups in its deliberations and structures. 
For the first time, a powerful element of the liberation movement did not reject established 
teachers' organisations and their entrenched "professional" ideologies. Rather, it sought to 
influence those bodies to change their attitudes towards the current education system and 
crisis, and their locations within the conflicted education arena.· The NECC utilized 
strategies of debate and negotiation. It also challenged teachers to involve themselves in 
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Parent-Teacher-Student Associations (PTSAs), the crucial mechanism for the 
implementation of People's Education. 
Established in the middle of the education crisis of 1985 as the Soweto Parents' Crisis 
Committee (SPCC), this body organised a consultative conference at the University of the 
Witwatersrand in December 1985. In preparation for the conference, the SPCC held 
discussions with various groups, including teacher organisations, 108 and eventually invited 
160 organisations of various types to attend.109 
The SPCC defined three tasks for itself. Firstly, it attempted to involve parents in the 
crisis. Secondly, it aimed to provide leadership and direction for the various student 
movements. To this end, an SPCC delegation met with the ANC in Harare on the eve of 
the conference to gain support for its rejection of the slogan "liberation before education". 
Thirdly, the SPCC hoped to unify teachers and students. 
These goals were combined in the SPCC's "People's Education for People's Power" 
campaign, which challenged and redefined education rather than simply protesting against 
it.110 In his keynote address at the December conference, Father Smangaliso Mkatshwa 
spoke of " ... drawing on the anger and drive for action of thousands of people who reject 
their present misery, towards concrete actions and activity"; and taking the struggle " ... to 
places or arenas not previously penetrated." 111 The conference agreed to a list of short-term 
demands, and decided to meet again in March 1986 to assess whether their demands had 
been met. 
In March, the NECC conference in Durban comprised regional representatives from 
parent, student and teacher organisations. This highlighted the fact that the NECC was, as 
NECC National Secretary Ihron Rensburg stated, "a specialized educational organisation of 
the people .... "112 
In March the NECC again focussed on uniting various elements of the education 
struggle, and Zwelakhe Sisulu suggested in his keynote address that students merge into a 
broader community struggle rather than maintain their position at the forefront. To 
facilitate this, and in complete concord with the December initiative, the NECC established 
a formal network of student, parent and teacher organisations, and PTSAs.113 Hyslop 
points out that, " ... the NECC had succeeded in convincing the majority of students to 
organise themselves within the schools rather than move back to indefinite boycotts." 114 
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This was despite the fact that the NECC adopted· a strategy which allowed it to negotiate 
with departmental authorities. liS 
. The NECC maintained its aim to smooth the troubled waters between teachers and 
students.ll6 To this end, the SPCC and then the NECC specifically targeted ATASA, and, 
through its two leaders, Peteni and Dlamlenze, drew the conservative organisation towards 
the progressive movement. There was, in fact, ATASA representation on the SPCC 
delegation which met with the ANC in December. II? This controversial alliance drew ire 
from progressive teachers, but it allowed Zwelakhe Sisulu to speak of more than just 
progressive groups in his March keynote address when he said: " ... teachers are coming 
into the fold of the people .... We now have to ensure that this process is accelerated, that 
teachers fully identify with the aspirations and struggles of the people. "118 As a political 
group the NECC wanted an organised profession aligned to it, working to spread its 
message and implement its ideas.ll9 The envisioned vehicles for this would be a united, 
progressive teachers' union, and a network of PTSAs. 
Those encouraging PTSAs saw these significant, school-based groupings as fulfilling 
several functions. On one level, as Bundy explains, they were an attempt to bridge gaps 
and facilitate communication. "The question of cooperation across generations," he writes, 
"recurred frequently. Time and again, leaflets and speeches by youth and student militants 
stressed to their comrades the desirability of making common cause with their parents. The 
formation of PTSAs was an important attempt to realise this. "12o Lungile Daba, 
chairperson of the Joint PTSAs in the Cape Town area, also explained how PTSAs had to 
" ... increase the critical awareness of parents on questions which affect the education of the 
child. "t21 
Fundamentally, proponents saw the possibilities of utilizing PTSAs as a more 
democratic way to control schools. Muller explains how the NECC regarded PTSAs as 
"shadow school management committees," which would deal with crucial educational 
issues, such as vetting "curricular proposals and curricular materials. "122 The Western 
Cape SAIRR agreed with this assessment of their potential, stating: "The PTSAs aimed to 
replace the existing school committees which excluded students and were not representative 
of the communities from which the students at a particular school were drawn. "123 The 
PTSAs could also be seen as an important tool for the implementation of People's 
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Education. Ihron Rensburg said that, "The Crisis in Education Committees and eventually 
the Parent-Teacher-Student Associations will lay the foundations for future education 
structures. In some cases they have already taken on local education responsibilities." 124 
Another important aspect of the PTSAs revolved around the roles teachers played in 
them. Relying on progressive teachers for their success, 125 PTSAs also sought to mobilise 
teachers who were reticent to engage in "political" struggle. "For those of you struggling 
on the education front," said Sisulu in his March NECC keynote address, "your task is to 
deepen people's control over education. This means strengthening democratic teachers 
organisations ... , setting up SRCs in every school, and parent, teacher, student committees 
to control education in these schools [sic]. "126 During 1985-1986, the PTSAs which existed 
served to increase contact and cooperation between teachers and parents. They remained 
primarily crisis organisations, however, and proved difficult to maintain. Educationist 
Michael Ashley, writing later when such PTSAs were "common" stated: "Their effect is to 
impress on teachers that they are part of the community they serve, hence breaking down 
the hierarchical distinction between the well-educated and the less well educated .... " 121 
Teachers' traditional "professionalism" relied on hierarchy and status. PTSAs attempted to 
redefine "professionalism" into a less status-conscious ideology. 
The PTSAs met with some success, especially in the Western Cape where a strong 
PTSA network was established in Coloured schoois.128 By the end of 1985, there were 
twenty-six PTSAs in the Western Cape, which helped the area to cope with the banning of 
COSAS, and to avoid a myopic focus on single-issue grievances.l29 The Western Cape 
regional report to the December SPCC conference stated that these roughly twenty-six 
PTSAs would launch a federation in January.13o Matiwana, Groener and Walters' survey of 
all voluntary organisations in the Western Cape during this period lists "PTSA" formed in 
1985 with "18 affiliates," and a Western Cape Federation of PTSAs, launched the 
following year.l31 The interim committee for the formation of the PTSA Federation was 
operational even before the December conference. In mid-December it released a militant 
statement telling students not to apply for the March supplementary examinations; asking 
for the reinstatement of all victimised teachers, the release of detainees, the withdrawal of 
the SADF and the SAP from schools and townships; and demanding that the 1985 final 
examinations be declared null and void. Since many students had not written examinations, 
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and others wrote under difficult conditions, the PTSA Federation demanded that the results 
be scrapped.t32 
Such militant stands, along with their undisguised challenge to state educational 
structures for control of schools, made the PTSAs very unpopular with the authorities. 
Although a ruling by the Supreme Court gave them the right to continue meeting, the DET 
maintained a right to bar them from schools.t33 Molobi said near the end of 1986 that the 
State of Emergency had hurt PTSAs.134 
With or without fully operational PTSAs, however, People's Education would prove 
an important influence on education and teacher politics in the following years. Wolpe and 
Unterhalter write: "The transformative role of people's education was not, in the first 
place, seen to be in the content or character of people's education but rather in its use as a 
means of mobilising and organising teachers, students and parents as a political force in a 
particular sphere of the struggle for national liberation. "135 " •.. [I]t is intimately linked to 
the wider political struggle," wrote Peter Randall, director of Teacher Education at the 
University of the Witwatersrand.t36 People's Education has meant many things to many 
people. But, pragmatically, it was soon realised that educational transformation would 
occur within schools, utilizing existing structures. As Father Mkatshwa said in his keynote 
address to the December SPCC conference, " ... current schools must be taken over and 
transformed within .... "m All those parties interested in implementing a version of this 
ideal recognised the absolute necessity of securing teachers' cooperation. 
One analyst suggested the difficulty in grappling with the nebulous concept of 
People's Education: " ... there is no brief answer to the question, 'what is People's 
Education?', for it is quintessentially developmental, a process involving entire 
communities, and which is being explored in the teeth of ferocious opposition. "138 The 
guiding philosophy would focus on a democratic community-based education aimed at 
dismissing authoritarian pedagogy in favour of relevant, "creative-thinking" practices. This 
challenged teachers to re-shape their entrenched attitudes about "professional" teaching and 
curriculum development. 
Beyond this, the political aspects of People's Education remained clear. Black Sash 
writer Helen Zille specified that, "It represents perhaps the most significant shift in 
resistance strategy this decade .... " She continued: 
In essence, the NECC, with the backing of the ANC and the most 
important internal resistance movements, was opting for transformation 
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from within the present education system rather than the revolutionary 
goal of making education ungovernable.IJ9 
Another analyst, Johan Muller, explained that People's Education's "evolution" during the 
conferences was a " ... movement from a strategy of potentially militant struggle which 
temporarily has to forfeit education, to a strategy of emancipatory education as an 
alternative to militant struggle." t4o 
For many, including many teachers, the "political" nature of People's Education 
rendered it frightening or inappropriate. Others, too, found fault with its ideological base. 
Kalla way, for example, believes it to be a repetition of liberal education theory, one which 
did not include an essential reconsideration of education and its role and possibilities in a 
capitalist society .141 However, the importance of the movement cannot be denied. As 
Hyslop persuasively argues, it " ... saved the student movement from devouring itself and 
gave it a renewed role in the political conflict." People's Education offered students a 
motivation to return to schools, formed the basis of non-boycott tactics, and established 
space for discussion of alternative curricula.t42 
It was within this last area that responsibility rested on teachers. "People's Education 
for People's Power ... redetines the role of the teacher in the community," said 
Gardiner.t43 And some teachers did choose to break with former "professionalism" and 
redefined their role. Randall van der Heever wrote: II ••• the call for People's Education 
challenged [the teacher] to a more direct involvement in the struggle for an alternative 
society. II He specifically mentioned methodology and alternative curricula.144 The pressure 
exerted on teachers to join this developing process came mainly from the NECC and its 
allies within the democratic movement. In 1986, also, African students were demanding 
that teachers work in progressive groups to facilitate People's Education.145 Such students, 
along with the NECC, realised what Ken Hartshorne articulated: 
No post-apartheid education will be possible without post-apartheid 
teachers: changes in the control of education will inevitably come about by 
political means; new policies, instructions, curricula and syllabuses can be 
introduced by political tiat; but, in the end, teachers remain the most 
potentially powerful group of change agents, particularly if they were to 
be freed from present constraints.t46 
As Rensburg said in an interview, "We will have to rely particularly on teachers currently 
involved in democratic teachers organisations, as the most effective people to implement 
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140 Muller, 110. 
141 Peter Kallaway, "Education and the State: From Mass Education to Bantu Education to People's 
Education. Some Preliminary Not.es," in eJs. Douglas Young and Robert Burns, Education at the Crossroads 
(Rondebosch: The School of Education, UCT, 1987) 52. 
142 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 21, 26. 
143 Gardiner, 57. 
144 Randall van den Heever, "The Role of the Teacher in the 'Struggle,'" in The People Shall Govern, 
booklet (Kasselsvlei: CTPA People's Education Publication, December 1989) 9-10. 
145 Chisholm, "From Revolt," 15. 
146 Hartshorne, "Post-Apartheid Education," 131. 
112 
people's education." 147 Rensburg was highlighting the crucial alliance between the NECC 
and progressive teacher groups such as NEUSA and WECTU. This alliance within the 
context of popular struggle pr.essurized established teacher bodies to cooperate with these 
liberation organisations or risk alienation from an increasingly popular liberation 
movement. 
The transition from past practices to a new ideology would not be easy for teachers. 
"While the NECC stressed participatory, non-authoritarian learning," writes Hyslop, "the 
teaching profession was steeped in authoritarian practice." 148 This emphasises the 
conservatism of teacher politics, including a traditional anti-democratic pedagogy. The 
gradual shift in teachers' understandings of their location in a politicised society was 
mirrored by a shift in their understandings of their teaching practice. The NECC and 
progressive teacher groups sought to erase the "professional" distinction between the two --
politics and pedagogy -- but, as Hyslop pointed out, this would prove very difficult. 
nu State's Repressive Response 
The state remained the primary antagonist of the growing community-centred revolt, and 
thus continued to create a contradictory tension within the realm of teacher politics. The 
state utilized its battery of control mechanisms to enforce a "professional" ethic amongst 
teachers. The Minister of Education and Development, Gerrit Viljoen, at a graduation 
ceremony of the Sebokeng Teachers' Training College in March 1986, said that the strength 
of teachers lay in "professionalism" and in an avoidance of politics. Teachers, he reminded 
the graduates, were not political appointees.149 This "professionalism" implied a rejection 
of "political" activity, a maintenance of middle-class status and the upholding of divisions 
between "population groups". State attempts to contain teacher political activity, however, 
had the converse effect amongst some teachers who found it difficult to maintain 
"professionalism" in the context of heavy-handed repressive measures directed at teachers. 
Also, in the face of state violence directed at students, some teachers could not abide the 
complicity of their education departments in the harassment of students. 
Despite this contradictory effect of repression, the state continued during 1985 and 
1986 to use both its security apparatus and "own affairs" departments to quell the rising tide 
of teacher political activity. 
Violence burgeoned in the Western Cape as the antagonism between state and 
communities heightened, and teachers were caught within this context. Teachers at 
Kasselsvlei Senior Secondary reported: "A Casspir rode our school fence completely flat 
and police followed, firing teargas, rubber bullets and birdshot after people trying to 
escape"; and a teacher was shot with birdshot "as he tried to hurry children into classrooms 
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when police stormed the school grounds." tso Burning street barricades crossed roads in 
some townships, and petrol bombs replaced some stones. At the beginning of September, 
almost thirty people were dead in the Western Cape, and 238 had been arrested. 
Unfortunately, reported the Western Cape SAIRR, " ... the police response to the escalating 
violence and their own inability to control it came in two rather .different ways: the 
beginning of a clampdown on news reporting and the use of live ammunition. "151 State 
repression was, if anything, more severe than in previous years. 
Within the context of escalating battles and some activists' inflated sense of the 
possibilities of change, teachers more readily defied the state, and the state, in turn, more 
readily strove to impose tighter control. The state, as it lost control over schools, struck 
out at teachers as agents who had failed to maintain discipline. Also, teachers were 
sometimes blamed as provocateurs. The state was, in many respects, under siege, and it 
fought back. If, ironically, the methods used sometimes put greater distance between the 
state and teachers, this was because in this time of crisis the state often overreacted. 
In August 1986 Ken Hartshorne wrote that the state " ... regards teachers as 
employees ... and is claiming total ownership of their thoughts, actions and behaviour." 1.c.2 
The myth of "professional" autonomy, upheld by established teachers' organisations, was 
difficult to maintain. It is ins'tructive that the most recent phase of teacher-state relations in 
England, according to British educationist Gerald Grace, has been the disruption of a " ... 
social democratic and professional consensus and the return of a politics of confrontation 
(l970s-l980s). "153 Such confrontation, as in South Africa, undermines assumptions of 
"professionalism," possibly irreparably replacing them. 
Confrontation occurred as security forces worked to repress teacher activity. Firstly, 
troublesome teachers were often detained. On 17 October 1985, for example, police 
armoured vehicles surrounded a school in Bellville South, where they proceeded to detain 
three teachers because of "undesirable" educational charts and newspaper clippings on their 
classroom walls.t54 On 20 November, in Lansdowne, police detained three teachers in 
front of their colleagues and students, after the police, claimed a local police spokesperson 
later, " ... were called in when teachers prevented pupils from writing examinations. "155 By 
the end of November, of the about 500 people detained in the Western Cape, at least forty 
were teachers.I56 
Along with such detentions came bannings. Both individuals and organisations were 
banned. By the first day of October, the Coloured education department had prohibited all 
student and teacher bodies not recognised by the department from meeting or functioning at 
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schools.157 The larger state apparatuses went further on 27 October, banning the meetings 
of one hundred Western Cape organisations, including teachers' groups, such as WECTU, 
and combined bodies such as the PTSAs.Iss By 10 January the following year, fifteen 
individual teachers had also been banned in the Western Cape.I59 
The security forces cooperated with state education departments as an overall state 
strategy was developed. It was a time, claimed an activist-teacher, when "Teachers were 
more afraid of the inspectors and administration than of the police." I60 There is some 
evidence to suggest that the DET attempted to repress school unrest in ways similar to the 
security forces "dirty tricks" departments. The Van den Heever Commission into 
corruption within the DET published a report in December 1989. The report called for an 
investigation into allegations, made to the commission, that DET officials belonging to a 
secret section of the DET, Gemeenskapskommunikasi (Gemkom), had defrauded the 
department of millions of rands. According to the allegations, Gemkom was formed in 
1985, and financed at least one journalist to publish a newspaper in Cradock to suppress 
student unrest in that area. According to an SAIRR Annual Survey, Gemkom attempted "to 
influence African thinking and education in various areas" ,161 
The education departments specifically repressed teacher activism as well. For 
example, Carter Ebrahim, the Minister of Education and Culture in the Coloured House of 
Representatives, announced on 22 October 1985 that forty-two teachers and principals 
suspected of "assisting" the boycotting students were being investigated (WECTU took up 
this issue, and it will be fully discussed below).I62 Also in October, Ebrahim threatened 
headmasters that if they were found to be in support of the boycott, they would be 
dismissed.163 
Other very clear examples of direct state control over teachers surfaced during the 
year-end examination crisis. As the school boycotts continued, and, as discussed above, 
some student bodies decided to boycott the examinations as well, a group of teachers, 
mostly affiliated to WECTU, decided not to invigilate examinations because they 
considered the examinations, in light of the ongoing schools boycott, to be farcical and non-
educational. By the end of November the Argus reported that about 200 teachers in the 
Cape Peninsula had opted not to participate in the examinations.164 The Weekly Mail 
reported: "A number of teachers from at least seven Cape Town secondary schools are 
standing by their refusal to administer end-of-year examinations, in the face of a strong 
police and army presence at some of the schools .... Teachers say they are working under a 
lot of stress, whether or not they are among the minority refusing to participate in the 
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examinations." The newspaper quotes one teacher as saying, "Those who are going 
through with it feel very bad, but they are afraid of losing their jobs." 165 At Cathkin High 
School, where twenty-five of forty teachers refused to set examinations, "The inspector 
came to school and threatened suspension or dismissal. A lot of the teachers had 
subsidies." 166 
These refusals of teachers to set and invigilate the end of year examinations in DEC 
schools were large! y coordinated by WECTU, the emergent organisation formed in 1985 in 
this department. The antagonism between WECTU and the Department partially explains 
the state's severely repressive response. 
The state responded to these refusals in four ways. First, the Coloured department 
suspended some teachers. By 30 November 1985, three deputy principals and six teachers 
had been suspended indefinitely .167 Most of these came from Cathkin High School in 
Heideveld where twenty-seven teachers refused to invigilate; the seven suspended from . ------
Cathkin were the deputy principal and six heads of department:T68The-principal of .. 
Crestway in Steenburg was suspended, as was the deputy-principal of Alexander Sinton.l69 
Suspended teachers seemingly had no recourse to the courts, for an urgent application to the 
Supreme Court by eight suspended teachers for reinstatement was dismissed with costs on 
Christmas eve. Suspended teachers could not ente~c_hools,_and, Ebrahim explained, 
;-- -- -- - ---- -- - .... --- -· __ __.I 
suspended teachers were being investigated on charges of misconduct during the , 
,...._. 
boycotts.11o By January 1986, nineteen teachers had been suspended by his Department.I71 
\......::__ 
Teacners h'ad actively begun rejecting the implementation of state education policy, and had 
begun alienating themselves from the mechanisms of apanheid education. 
Second, the Coloured education department withheld teachers' salary cheques to 
influence teacher behaviour, using their dictatorial authority as employers. At Alexander 
Sinton in Athlone, after all fifty-four teachers suggested a postponement of examinations, 
~he department threatened to withhold salary payment. Eleven of the fifty-four changed 
their minds, but forty-three teachers' salaries were withheld for November and 
December.112 The entire staff of Harold Cressy in Cape Town, which took a stand against 
the examinations, was told to return their November and December paychecks.I7J 
Ultimately, about one hundred teachers at Crestway, Cathkin, Harold Cressy and Alexander 
Sinton suffered the same fate.l74 November salaries were, however, paid after WECTU 
threatened the Department with court action. m As an added punitive measure, in January 
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those teachers who had been suspended or dismissed, and then reinstated, received only half 
of their January salaries, as if they were newly-appointed to their posts.176 
Along with salary cheques, the state provides a number of other financial services to 
its teacher-employees. Allan Hendrickse reminded teachers of this when he warned those 
in Port Elizabeth and Uitenhage, after a strike had been suggested to protest the transfer of 
three colleagues, that they were placing their housing subsidies in jeopardy .177 This threat 
manifested itself at the LP' s October Congress, where a resolution depriving troublesome 
teachers of benefits such as housing subsidies was approved.178 
Third, in terms of departmental pressure, it wielded its most threatening axe by 
dismissing a number of teachers. At the beginning of December, two teachers at Valhalla 
High School were dismissed, though both had invigilated. It was thought that the 
government disapproved of their affiliations with community organisations.179 Other 
dismissals especially hurt temporary teachers, who were on 24-hour notice. Eleven 
temporary teachers were fired at Harold Cressy, seven at Groenvlei in Lansdowne, and six 
at Bonteheuwel Senior Secondary .180 As .the new year began, a total of sixty-eight teachers 
had been dismissed.181 . 
· Lastly, education departments ~ferred_teache~Jl._an_attempUo prevent. ~-t(i--'V../ ( 
~professjona1~.ac_tivi!Y· The Cape Times reported that two teachers had been transferred 
by 10 January 1986, presumably from a Coloured school.182 Once agaln we are confronted 
by the paucity of written evidence about African township schools. However, it will be 
instructive to look at the case of an Indian high school in the Peninsula. At Rylands, the 
state illustrated its repressive tactics, including the use of transferrals. Once again, an 
education department's repressive measures precipitated increased politicisation amongst the 
teachers and community of Rylands. 
On 9 December 1985, more than half of the forty-three teachers at Rylands received 
notice that they were being dismissed or transferred: eleven were fired, and eleven re-
located to Piet Retief, Barberton and Lenasia. The department gave no reasons, although 
the preceding inspectors had questioned teachers at the school about the boycotts, which 
saw only 200 of the school's 750 students write internal examinations. Pat Samuels, the 
president of TASA, said: "The unprecedented scale of the dismissals and transfers makes it 
obvious they are a punitive measure." The official school committee resigned in protest, a 
petition began circulating, and the PTSA began to fight back.183 
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Within two weeks the DEC (HoD) had succumbed to pressure from TASA, including 
court action, and withdrew the transfer notices after settling out of court and agreeing to 
pay costs.l84 The court battle concerning the dismissed teachers was scheduled to begin on 
19 February, 185 and in the meantime a battle was waged at the school. 
At the beginning of the 1986 school year, the DEC (HoD) sent fourteen replacement· 
teachers from Durban to Rylands. On Monday, 13 January, more than 300 resentful 
parents, students and teachers persuaded these "scabs" to leave the school grounds. On 
Tuesday, they returned, but were clearly isolated. Angry students again forced them to 
leave school on Wednesday. Police arrived on Thursday in an attempt to enforce calm, but 
on Friday most students boycotted school in protest.l86 In February, protests continued. 
On 19 February, about 500 students would not enter their classrooms because of the 
continued presence of the "scabs" .187 The following day, the principal, claiming that he 
could not guarantee their safety, told the fourteen to report for duty at another school that 
day .188 
The court case for reinstatement began in late February, and the teachers argued that 
they had not been given reasons for their dismissals, and that the dismissals were "for an 
ulterior political purpose" .189 However, despite the protests and their arguments, the 
teachers lost their case. In upholding the dismissals as lawful, Mr. Justice Thirion said: "It 
is clear the teachers had lost control of the pupils and they were unable or unwilling to 
regain control. "190 These words serve as a good reminder of who the state blamed for the 
ongoing boycotts, and why they asserted control over teachers. 
The Softer Gloves of the State 
The state utilized other, indirect methods of influencing teacher politics and upholding a 
"professional" ideology. These "softer" methods took two general forms during 1985. 
First, there were the machinations of political parties seeking support among their "own 
affairs" groups. The best-known example emerged in KwaZulu where Inkatha required all 
its teachers to swear affiliation and loyalty to the chief minister and the KwaZulu 
government.l9t The CTPA accused the Labour Party (LP) of similar, albeit more subtle, 
activities. In December 1985, the CTPA claimed it would investigate allegations that LP 
ministers used lists of teachers who were candidates for promotion posts as a basis for 
membership drives.l92 In January 1986, the LP also made an announcement which seemed 
184 Cape Times, 24 December 1985. 
185 Cape Times, 24 December 1985. 
186 Cape Times, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 January 1985. 
187 Cape Times, 20 Feb~ary 1986. 
188 Argus, 20 February 1986. 
189 The Weekly Mail, 21 to 27 February 1986. 
190 Argus, 11 June 1986. 
-191 Also, "Teachers supporting the UDF have been threatened with dismissal by a KwaZulu chief minister." 
Natal Regional Report, "Report". in People's Education, 26. 
192 Argus, 3 December 1985; Cape Times, 6 December 1985; Herald, 14 December 1985. 
118 
to be a bid to curry favours, such as membership and support, from less-qualified rural 
teachers. "From now on," proclaimed Allan Hendrickse, "promotion will be on merit. 
The old stalwarts, who have always formed the backbone of education and who have the 
necessary expertise on the basis of experience, will be evaluated by independent inspectors 
of schools, and promoted on merit." This was a move away from the official paper-
qualification promotions of the past.t9J This could be seen as an attempt to win loyal 
supporters in return for promotions through a system of patronage. Such a system was not 
unknown to the department, and the CTPA had, in fact, always operated on a patronage 
system.194 
The second, softer angle of approach adopted by the state as it worked to influence 
teachers took the form of cooption. The state, while crisis-managing the school and 
community unrest, was not blind to the necessity of longer-term solutions. The early and 
mid-1980s reforms were an important part of such solutions, and the development and 
cooption of an urban, monied, black middle-class was an important part of the reforms. As 
Innes wrote in 1988, "The more positive features of restructuring are clearly designed to 
create greater freedom in a variety of spheres for urban black South Africans, so as to assist 
in building up a black middle class inside the country. "t95 Teachers, many of whom were 
aspirant middle class holding onto the ideologically loaded concept of "professionalism", 
felt the effects of this broader strategy. Ken Hartshorne, while discussing a government 
"Ten Year Plan," wrote in 1986, " ... clearly there is to be an improvement in material 
resources and in the financial position of black teachers."t96 The "stop gap measures 
softening some existing policies" included new teacher-upgrading programmes.197 
In keeping with reform strategies, the state also used the mechanism of salary-
improvement. At the end of March 1985, President Botha announced that austerity 
measures would include bonus cuts for teachers and other civil servants. Importantly, 
teachers in Category A and lower would be excluded, and would, in fact, receive an 
increase.I98 The increase affected a large number of teachers since, in 1983, seventy 
percent of African teachers had less than a matriculation qualification.I99 In May 1985, 
Indian teachers received a R5,085,000 pay increase on top of a special dispensation 
previously announced.2oo In July, Minister of National Education F.W. de Klerk 
announced that salary parity across education departments would be achieved by October, 
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with R56 million being spent to benefit about 100,000 teachers.2o1 The following year, 
Viljo~n announced that full parity would actually be achieved in December 1986.202 In 
February 1986 teachers and other civil servants were given a ten percent salary increase.2o3 
Such attempts at material cooption certainly had an effect. But at moments of crises, 
with other influences such as physical intimidation at the fore the actions of teachers were 
not always based on their desired bank-balance or material status. 
The state adopted a policy of "professional" upgrading as well. Educational reform 
involved the creation of a "multiracial" advisory body, the South African Council of 
Education (SACE), in which teachers organisations could participate. A new department of 
national education, to set general education policy for all "race groups", and governed by 
principles espoused in the De Lange Com mission report of 1981, was created in 1985.204 
Then, in February 1986, Viljoen announced a policy aimed at involving African 
educationists in structures concerning education policy. AT ASA was invited to nominate 
"experts" for advisory committees on policy. African educationists were also being 
appointed to senior departmental posts. In February, for example, there were seven 
African deputy directors at the seven regional DET offices.2os 
These departmental policy changes attempted to persuade increasingly alienated black 
teachers that they could benefit by cooperating with their departments. "Professionalism" 
would provide material comfort and upward mobility. By bettering teachers' material 
conditions and allowing teachers access to ethnic hierarchies, the state hoped to bolster the 
"professional" commitment to apartheid departments. 
Conclusion 
Randal Peteni, AT ASA president, offered a grim warning in 1985. After talking of "in-
fighting" between student organisations, and political conflict amongst blacks, and of 
"gruesome deaths", he concluded: "If [teachers] stand aside, they do so at their peril. "206 
Petini, here, reflected the pressure his conservative, "professional" association felt in 1985. 
Such a public reassessment of former positions, in the face of political pressure, illustrated 
the significance of 1985 for teacher politics. 
In 1985 and 1986, teachers did not stand aside. They actively participated in 
resistance politics. A liberation movement resistant to state structures created an 
atmosphere in communities and schools which rendered overt cooperation with the state 
difficult for teachers to sustain in the public arena, and rendered the "professionalism" of 
quieter times obsolete. Teachers expressed their own resistance to the oppression of 
201 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1985, 368-369. 
202 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1986, 419. 
203 Cape Times, 21 February 1986. 
204 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1985, 363-364. 
205 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1986, 409. 
206 Peteni, 36. 
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apartheid and apartheid education in the space created by the unrest. This expression was 
both reactive, in part due to the fear expressed by Peteni, and active, in that many teachers 
took advantage of an historical moment to break free of state structures. 
Past "professionalism", based on an apolitical, middle-class, ethnically-defined 
ideology, was rejected by many teachers who worked to re-shape the definition of their 
place in society and the nature of their work. For many teachers, the silencing of 
"professional" attitudes was a product of political unrest, and would prove temporary as the 
state repressed political opposition in 1987-1988, and as the political climate shifted again, 
after a renewed wave of militancy in 1988-1990, at the beginning of the following decade. 
But 1985_allowed the birth of a new "professional" ideology, one which allied teachers with 
r-;orkers, with the non-racial liberation movement and with democratic education. This new 
"professionalism" was institutionalised in the emergent unions and significantly influenced --- -- -- ·- ----·· ---- -·-- -- ·--
tlie establis~~? __Ee_ach~r as_sp~ia_tiof)s_. __ These organisational developments are discussed in the 
next chapter on teachers' responses to the social and political upheaval of the mid-eighties. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
EVOLVING TEACHER "PROFESSIONALISM" IN 1985-1986 
In 1985-1986, many changes occurred in the realm of teacher politics. Forces and 
organisations, described in Chapter Four, which opposed the state and the state's education 
created space for "rebellious" teachers to voice their antagonism to apartheid policies. 
State repression, in response to the new climate within schools and teacher politics, 
exacerbated the antagonism between teachers and the state. "Teachers have been detained 
or questioned," said a teacher in November 1985, "simply for saying they have sympathy 
with the kids, or worse, because some faceless spy has said they support the kids -- how 
can we not support them in the face of this endless repression?"' Teacher action in support 
of their students involved protecting students from police action, refusing to administer 
examinations, and joining student boycotts.2 
The teaching profession was being infused with a large number of politicized younger 
teachers.J Some teachers began exhibiting a public spirit of defiance. For example, a 
teachers' meeting in August 1985 expelled a secret policeman, after teachers present at the 
meeting tore up his notes, contiscated his firearm and stink bombs, and gave him "a few 
smacks" on his way out.4 
Teacher action, however, was not simply visceral reaction to repression. 
Contradictions within the realm of teachers emerged more strongly than over the preceding 
decad~, as a shift in the balance of power away from the state and towards the liberation 
movement took place. Political scientist James Scott suggests that when state control is 
weakened, or confronted in a powerful way, an opportunity arises whereby hidden political 
dynamics -- the "hidden transcript" --can become public: 
The problem we face in examining a public transcript of deference 
amounts to this: how can we estimate the impact of power relations on 
action when the exercise of power is nearly constant? We can only begin 
to measure the intluence of a teacher's presence on a classroom of students 
once he or she leaves the room - or when they leave the room at recess.s 
1 Cape Times, 23 November 1985, in SAIRR, CW Region, 19. 
2 In August 1985, for example, 600 tea<.:hers went on strike for two days in the Western Cape. The Cape 
Times reported, as well, a"' solidarity' hoycott" of their lessons by all Mitchell's Plain teachers. See, 
respectively, The Weekly Mail, 23-29 August 1985; Cape Times, 20 August 1985. 
3 There was an infusion of younger teachers schooled during the post-1976 climate. There are many examples 
of student-teacher militancy in 1976 and 1980. See, for example: Hirson, 188; Molteno, 115. The Western 
Cape teaching corps was greatly effected by students graduating from UWC, where they had highly 
politicizing experiences. Moll claims that the emergent unions appealed to these younger teachers. See Moll, 
"Towards one South African Teachers' Union," 64. 
~Cape Times, 21 August 1985. Three days later a Mitchell's Plain man was detained, possibly in connection 
with the incident. Cape Times, 24 August 1985. 
5 Scott, 25. 
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In 1985, with the state's hegemonic position faltering, some teachers publicly expressed 
their antagonism -- the "hidden transcript" -- to implementing apartheid education. 
Political ideas and attitudes antagonistic to traditional "professionalism", which was 
premised on race and class divisions, could surface and be given organisational expression. 
In the Western Cape, three new "emergent" teacher organisations-- WECTU, DETU 
and ED ASA -- directly contradicted conventional "professionalism" and thus found 
themselves in opposition to established teacher associations which espoused it. The 
emergent groups reclaimed faltering teacher credibility within the liberation movement. As 
elements of the liberation movement rejected "professionalism", the emergent unions 
redefined their work according to a new ideological framework. They redefined 
"professionalism" to fit their new, turbulent circumstances. 
In the context of the national democratic movement, traditional "professionalism" had 
several aspects which the emergent unions rejected. "Professionalism" implied an aversion 
to overt "political" activity, and the new teacher groups supported the anti-apanheid 
liberation movement. "Professionalism" necessitated cooperation with the various J 
education departments, which the new unions rejected. "Professionalism" impl_ied status 
within ethnically-defined "po~ulation groups", and the emergent unions fully supported --
and eventually began to practice -- non-racialism. They also rejected the status, and 
middle-class aspirations, supported by "professionalism"; they defined their organisations as 
unions, and themselves as workers.6 The three new groups did not prioritize the material 
conditions of teachers. Gareth Rossiter, an EDASA activist, said in 1990: "We haven't 
really dealt with bread and butter issues. "7 Barbara Houghton, an early WECTU 
participant in Cape Town, added: "Unlike the CTPA, the higher salary issue was never 
ever a concern. "8 These comments illustrate that the emergent groups, though aspiring to 
become fully-fledged unions, deliberately stepped out of a self-centred "professional" role. 
Because they adopted these positions in opposition to traditional "professionalism", 
the three new teacher organisations utilized tactics and strategies that were often criticized ~e.J! 
as being ~'unprofessional~ by their employers and establis.hed teacher organisations. The~· l.f'v-1"../r~ 
supported boycotting students, under certain conditions; some members re_fused to invigilate , · 
--eXaminations; anothey were publicly ~gonistic to the staje and_th~!!" jmmed~te 
~state -responded in a predictably repressive manner. Victimisation and 
-fiarassment of leaders and members, as well as the bannings of groups and individuals, 
greatly curtailed organisational activity. 
The transition to a new concept of "professionalism" was problematic. An entrenched 
set of practices could not be redefined overnight. Rather, 1985 marked the beginning of an 
institutionalized process of changing "professionalism" and of changing attitudes about 
teachers' work. The new unions were ethnically defined, despite their espousal of non-
6 At tirst, EDASA did not define itself as a union, although later, during the process of teacher unity begun in 
Harare in 1988, it fully supported the ideas of teachers as workers, and teachers' organisations as unions. 
7 Interview with Gareth Rossiter. 5 March 1990. 
8 Interview with Houghton, 22 March 1990. 
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racialism. Their desired unity was rendered problematic by their racial distinctions, as well 
as by .sectarian conflict within WECTU and DETU. Also, the new organisations were 
crisis-born, and experienced their greatest support at the peaks of political conflict. They 
acted within politicized high schools, depriving themselves of a much broader support base 
to be had within primary schools, a traditional stronghold of the established teacher 
groups.9 And, partly due to a lack of official recognition which deprived them of stop-
order facilities, the emergent unions were constantly short of funds. In 1990, Monde 
Tulwana, an executive member of DETU, lamented: "Members are still using money from 
our own pockets. We travel with o'ur own cars." to 
The emergent teacher organisations, rather than harbingering immediate change, 
represented the possibility of change. Born of crisis in 1985, these progressive groupings 
institutionalized a desire to break with past notions of "professionalism" and to redefine 
teachers' work in aparrheid South Africa. 
The forces sh~·oing the emergent unions, and the unions themselves, threw the 
established teacher organisations-- the CTPA, PENATA, TASA and SATA in the Western 
Cape -- off balance as their "professional" attitudes were increasingly under attack. During 
1985-1986, the new teacher groups and a changing sociopolitical climate stripped the 
established organisations of much of their credibility. The established groups appeared 
incapable of dealing with the new educational and political terrain. They suffered internal 
tensions, and adopted ambiguous positions which reflected their increasingly untenable, 
"professional" positions. Their traditional voices were effectively silenced within the 
context of popular resistance. Clinging to an older style of "professional" behaviour, many 
oftheir actions now seemed inappropriate to large numbers of students, teachers and others 
within the liberation movement. Experiencing internal contradictions, and under pressure 
from elements of the liberation movement, the CTPA and PENATA --the latter completely 
under the influence of A TASA -- began to question and shift away from their traditional 
"professional" positions. Both, for example, withdrew representatives from their respective 
departmental structures in 1986. 
Tensions and contradictions thus emerged strongly in teacher politics in 1985-1986. 
Teacher organisations -- both new and old -- reacted to the pressures described in Chapter 
Four. They also acted to define a new credibility, and to find a new "professional" place 
within a changing educational and political terrain. 
A Time of Bitth and Troubled Growth: 
The Emergent Unions and "Anti-Professionalism" 
Set up as antagonists of the state and aparrheid, calling for educational and political change, 
the emergent organisations embodied a spirit of defiance that was not new. The Western 
Cape SAIRR wrote of progressive Coloured teachers, for example, "who, over the years, 
9 Interview with Houghton, 22 March !990. 
10 Interview with Monde Tulwana, 7 March 1990. 
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had seen fit not to join the CTPA but whose efforts had largely been disparate and 
unorganised."II The TLSA, neither disparate nor unorganised, had a long heritage of 
antagonism to apartheid and to the CTPA and its "collaborationist" tactics.12 The short-
lived TACs in the Western Cape in 1980, and NEUSA nationally since 1980, were earlier 
expressions of teachers' "anti-professional" sentiments. That background, plus the 
experiences of teachers during 1976-1984, gave rise to the new organisations which 
focussed the dissatisfaction and gave expression to underlying historical forces. "I believe," 
said WECTU chairperson Yousuf Gabru in 1990, "that it was the 1976-1980 experience 
that gave rise to WECTU." u 
In part because they represented historical tensions within the teachers' realm, and in 
part because they had the support of sections of the liberation movement, the emergent 
teacher groups could pressure the established bodies more specifically than students or the 
NECC. These were teachers who battled on the same terrain, who offered different models 
of tea~her behaviour to students and the community. These were teachers who gained 
organisational support and credibility, and thus strength to wage campaigns in schools and 
in staff rooms. None of the emergent groups, in the long run, could boast memberships 
which threatened the established organisations. But their voices were loud, and could not 
be ignored. As a COSATU speaker at a WECTU conference claimed in 1986: "Such was 
the pressure from the masses [over the last few years] that the more progressive teachers 
were able to play a role which was more significant than their numbers. "14 
What role did they play in redefining "professionalism"? This question will be 
answered within the historical context of each organisation. 
11ze Western Cape Teachers' Union 
WECTU, formed in the education crisis of 1985, became the strongest emergent union in 
the Western Cape. It exerted strong influence within the region's teacher politics, and 
significantly effected both teachers' "professional" ethic and the CTPA's "professional" 
position. Born of crisis, WECTU did not become another TAC; it did not remain a crisis 
organisation, nor did it dissolve as the crisis waned. Despite initial internal debate about 
whether to remain a small pressure group, or move towards becoming a broad-based 
union,Is WECTU institutionalized and perpetuated a movement away from traditional 
"professionalism". 
II SAIRR, CW Region, 5. 
12 Chisholm, "Education, Politics and Organisation," passim. 
13" Interview with Yousuf Gabru, 28 February 1990. 
14 Erntzen, 308. 
15 "A continuing debate in WECTU has been the nature of the organisation," said Gabru. "Are we going to · 
continue to act as a pressure group or are we going to try to build a mass organisation that operates as a trade 
union ... ?" Yousuf Gabru, "WECTU. Chairperson's Report 25 May 1986," photocopy, 5. An article entitled 
"Whither WECTU" in the October 1986 issue of WECTU's newsletter contained an identical question: " ... 
should this be a broad-based mass organisation that attempts to take large numbers of teachers along towards a 
more progressive viewpoint and practice than their objective conditions allow for? Or should WECTU be a 
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WECTU's birlh in crisis 
On Friday, 9 August 1985, teachers and lecturers met at UWC out of concern for the 
recently-begun Western Cape schools' boycott. Participants at the meeting planned another 
meeting for the Samaj Centre in Rylands to be held on 15 August.16 In 1987, a WECTU 
executive member would recall: "I remember when word went around in '85 that there was 
to be a mass meeting of teachers at the Samaj Centre in Athlone. There was no debate 
about it. We didn't wonder whether we should go. We all just went without question. "17 
Between 700 and 3000 teachers1s went to the Samaj Centre that Thursday. They heard a 
variety of UDF and church speakers, and resolved several crucial issues for teachers. A 
solidarity boycott of classes was planned for the following Monday and Tuesday, during 
which teachers would engage in "awareness programmes" and relevant discussions. While 
setting up an interim structure, the Concerned Teachers' Coordinating Committee (CTCC), 
teachers also exp~essed a desire for a more permanent, formal organisation. The idea for 
WECTU was thus publicly born.19 
At this 15 August meeting, a participant later recalled, there was a " ... haranguing of 
teachers from every speaker virtually, ... a negative attitude .... It doesn't give teachers 
their due. Some have the students at heart. "zo The decisions of the meeting must have 
satisfied teachers' most vociferous critics. Apart from the two-day "chalk-down," teachers 
present declared their support for a consumer boycott underway in the Western Cape. The 
CTCC immediately issued a pamphlet declaring that, "teachers are firstly part of the 
oppressed community and should be an integral part of the struggle for freedom," and 
demanding an end to the State of Emergency (not yet extended to the Western Cape) and 
the "Dismantling of apartheid," among other things. The pamphlet, intended to advertise 
the "chalk-down", talks of preparing "the groundwork for the launching of a dynamic 
progressive organisation to represent teacher [sic] to fight apartheid. "21 
The teachers' boycott of classes involved about ·l 000 teachers within the DEC 
(HoR).22 A planned assessment meeting at the Samaj Centre on 20 August once again 
attracted between 700 and 2000 teachers and lecturers from seventy-nine institutions. 23 
Participants at this meeting voted to continue their class boycott24 (a decision soon aborted), 
and took a strong stand on the need for an organisation, not just an action committee. 
smaller, more politicised grouping that acts as a radical pressure group." WECTU newsletter 2 (Dc::cc::mber 
1985): 2. 
16 Argus, 14 August 1985. 
17 Argus, 2 September 1987. 
18 Cape Times, 19 August 1985; Argus, 2 September 1987; interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
19 Cape Times, 19 August 1985; Argus, 16 August 1985; Herald, 24 August 1985; interview with Zubeida 
Desai, 12 August 1990; interview with Yousuf Gabru, 28 February 1990. 
20 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
21 CTCC, "Teachers Unite!" pamphlet, n.d. 
22 SAIRR, CW Region, 5. 
23 Argus, 21 August 1985; Argus, 2 September 1987. 
24 Argus, 21 August 1985. 
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Teachers at the meeting " ... looked back at TAC," said a participant, "which had petered 
out. "25 
WECTU was duly launched a month later in Athlone, on 29 September, after "a hell 
of a turbulent period" with "lots of crises. "26 Though the Cape Times claimed a pre-launch 
membership of 1500 DEC (HoR) teachers,27 Chairperson Yousuf Gabru said 800 teachers 
were members at the launch. Yet despite these auspicious beginnings, the organisation 
remained small. Giving a first Annual Report, the Wynberg branch Chairperson would 
lament that, unless action was taken, " ... we will continue having 250 teachers out of a 
supposed membership of 1800- 2,000 prepared to participate. "28 
The "anti-professionalism" of WECTU 
WECTU rejected traditional "professionalism" is several ways. Primarily, it refused to 
accept apolitical parameters, and actively engaged in working for political change in 
opposition to the state. This overtly political position was anathema to established 
"professional" ideology. "The formation of WECTU," claimed WECTU' s first newsletter, 
" ... has the potential of breaking through the silence and apathy shown over long periods by 
teachers in schools of the oppressed. "29 
Its political position was to a large degree influenced by student politics. "The 
struggle of the students is our struggle," stated the CTCC pamphlet.3o WECTU aligned 
itself with t~e broader, community-based struggle as well. According to its newsletter, 
"WECTU has placed itself firmly in the fold of all other progressive organisations in this 
country struggling towards a S.A. free of oppression and exploitation. "31 WECTU 
demonstrated its community involvement by, for example, picketing in Athlone for the 
release of all detainees on 1 October 1985.32 The CTCC pamphlet requested "Teachers and 
students to inform the community of their stand on the emergency, student struggle and 
consumer boycott. "33 
In part, WECTU's overt political position was an attempt to regain political 
credibility within the broader liberation movement. "For many," wrote the Wynberg 
Chairperson, "WECTU membership merely means political respectability. "34 Barbara 
Houghton, active in the Cape Town branch in WECTU's early years, also claimed that, "At 
certain schools all people signed up to be seen as progressive in the eyes of the students. "35 
25 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 Au!!ust 1990. 
26 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
27 Cape limes, 28 September 1985. 
28 Chairperson Wynberg, "Annual Report," photocopy (n.d. [ 1986]) n.p. 
29 "2000 Teachers Unite," WECTU newsletter 1 (November 1985): 1. 
3° CTCC, n.p. 
31 "Editorial," WECTU netvslerrer I (November 1985): 3. 
32 Cape limes, 2 October 1985. Thirty teachers were involved in this demonstration organised by the 
Athlone Central region. 
33 CTCC, n.p. 
34 Chairperson Wynberg, n.p. 
35 Interview with Barbara Houghton, 22 March 1990. 
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WECTU's political stance, however, was not simply reactive. According to Hyslop, 
WECTU " ... was formed to draw teachers into political action. "36 This supposition was 
born· out in a paper entitled "The Political Economy of Education in South Africa," 
presented at the WECTU launch. The paper concluded: " ... we believe that teachers in all 
apartheid schools, including 'white' schools, cannot be neutral. They are either on the side 
of progress and liberation or they support the forces of oppression and exploitation. "37 
Apart from political change, WECTU also broke from past "professionalism" by 
focussing on educational change. An articulated reason for the formation of WECTU was 
to support the students' position against apartheid education.3s One of WECTU's 
constitutional goals was, "To work towards democratic control over the education system 
and to militate against the propagation of ~ppressive education. "39 Its educational critique 
expressly followed that of Brazilian educationist Paulo Freire. The front-page article in its 
second newsletter was "Education for Liberation," a theoretical piece on certification, and 
Freire's notions of "banking" and a "culture of silence." An attached suggested reading list 
included Freire and Ivan Illich.4o WECTU thus engaged in thought-provoking 
examinations of the nature of education. 
WECTU attempted to i~fluence education, to re-shape and re-direct it, ·along with 
other similarly-inclined progressive bodies. The first newsletter reported: "In various 
workshops, meetings and discussions, teachers have begun to identify what makes up the 
system of gutter education that frustrates them as educators. "41 This desire for educational 
change manifested itself practically in WECTU's support for PTSAs. WECTU was 
involved in the SPCC and NECC conferences, and in PTSAs: " ... those schools with well 
established PTSA' s were most successful in mobilizing community support," said Gabru in 
1986. · " ... We must continue to organise strong PTSA' sat all times and not only at a time 
of crisis. "42 The Cape Town region held a workshop on PTSA 'sand how to form them.43 
And the ideal was rendered constitutional under "Aims and Objectives": "To bring together 
and work jointly with parents, teachers and students in democratically elected P. T.S.A 's 
and P.T.A's. "44 An example of this cooperation occurred after DEC (HoR) Minister of 
Education Carter Ebrahim announced the closing of DEC schools on 6 September (see 
Chapter Four). "While the CTPA prepared to 'make urgent representations to the 
36 Hyslop, "School Student Movements," 21. 
37 "The Political Economy of Education in South Africa," a paper delivered at WECTU's founding conference 
on 29 September 1985, photocopy, 6. 
38 Cape Times, 26 August 1985. 
39 WECTU, Constitution, photocopy (n.d.) n.p. 
40 "Education for Liberation," WECTV newsletter 2 (December 1985): 1-2. Although it was meant to be the 
first in a series, the only other appeared in its third newsletter. Called "Towards Progressive Education," this 
article offered criticism of the existing system, linked education to politics, and suggested some democratic 
teaching guidelines. "Towards Pr.Jgressive Education," WECTV newsletter 3 (January 1986): 8-9. 
41 "2000Teachers Unite," 2. 
42 Gabru, 3; "NECC: 'a watershed in the liberation process'?," WECTU newsletter 5 (May 1986): 3-4. 
43 "Forming PTSA's," WECTV newsletter 4 (March 1986): 3. 
44 WECTU, Constitution, n.p. 
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authorities' for the reopening of schools, "-+s the CTCC was crucial to the joint re-opening of 
schoo~s by parents, students and teachers. -+6 
A further practical application of WECTU' s "unprofessional" strategies for. 
educational change concerned "alternative education". In October 1985 The Weekly Mail 
reported that, "There is a wild card in the dissemination of alternative education in the 
Western Cape, and that is the newly formed [WECTU]. "47 Alternative education 
programmes were attempts, in part, to model future education. They hoped to foster 
critical ret1ection about society, ret1ection necessary for action and for change. 
WECTU thus broke with past "professional" practice by wo'rking towards both 
political and educational change. "If we stand together in our union," the launch 
conference paper stated, "we can and we will succeed in winning control over our 
schools. "48 
The desire for educational change brought WECTU teachers into cont1ict with their 
employer, the DEC (HoR), and illustrated another example of WECTU's rejection of 
"professionalism". Traditional "professionalism" implied cooperation with the departments 
"in the interests of the children and education", while WECTU became critical to redefining 
these terms. 
WECTU' s call for the cancellation of year-end examinations in 1985 illustrated its 
"unprofessional" antagonism towards the education departments. As early as 24 October, 
the Argus reported that WECTU had asked teachers not to administer the year-end 
examinations.49 The issue was contentious, but at a meeting held at UCT on 25 November, 
at which 300 teachers from most WECTU regions were present, the vote went against 
invigilation; perceived in the context of on-going boycotts and political action, external and 
internal examinations were considered harmful and "anti-educational". A 27 October 
WECTU statement supported the vote, requesting teachers not to participate in either 
internal or matriculation examinations. WECTU even threatened court action to get the 
examinations declared invalid.so 
WECTU' s reasons were practical. "From an educational point of view," stated an 
article in the November newsletter, "it was impossible to support exams. Furthermore, 
students were psychologically unprepared to write at a time when teachers and students 
were being arrested and detained, and the community intimidated and harassed. "51 The 
school year had been so disrupted that examinations would have been a "mockery". 
In the event, examinations were held under difficult circumstances and the department 
belatedly, in February 1986, announced a selective promotion scheme. The scheme 
45 SAIRR, CW Region, 10. 
46 Cape Times, 28 September 1985. 
47 The Weekly Mail, 18-24 October 1985: 7. 
48 "The Political Economy of Education in South Africa," 6. 
49 Argus, 24 October 1985. 
50 Argus, 18 November 1985 and 26 November 1985; Cape Times, 26 November 1985, 28 November 1985 
and 30 November 1985; The Weeklv Mail, 1-7 November 1985. 
5I "Dilemma," WECTU newsletter .1 (November 1985): 5. 
130 
announced by Carter Ebrahim essentially allowed principals to decide about promotions; 
students could opt for March examinations, or be promoted en masse. There was great 
confusion during this period, and WECTU publicly condemned the department's scheme 
for promoting "confusion and division in schools and communities" .52 
WECTU publicly rejected the education facilitated by state departments. WECTU' s 
antagonism towards the education departments further manifested itself around departmental 
harassment of teachers during the student unrest. As early as October 1985, Carter 
Ebrahim announced an "investigation" into the actions of forty-two teachers and principals 
during the boycotts; all had allegedly helped the students. The number was later raised to 
seventy-three. WECTU responded in earnest. Gabru claimed that, "The whole of WECTU 
will react to any action taken against the 42 teachers now being investigated by Mr. 
Ebrahim. "53 The seventy-three were charged with misconduct, which centred around the 
failure to invigilate examinations, in a saga that continued for two years, including a May 
1986 ~petition delivered to the DEC (HoR) Roeland Street offices by about 250 teachers and 
students, and WECTU' s "Hands Off Our .Teachers" campaign. In 1987, Hendrickse 
announced that charges were being dropped.54 
Meanwhile, WECTU kept up its defense of teachers who had already suffered 
dismissal or suspension at the hands of the departments. WECTU had indeed pledged, as 
early as the Samaj Centre meetings, to "come out in support of our colleagues who may be 
victimized by the education 'authorities. '"55 This support took several forms. At the end 
of November, WECTU appealed for community contributions to a fund for suspended 
teachers; WECTU members agreed to contribute R50 each month.56 "Within the space of a 
week we collected over R20,000 to establish a Trust Fund to assist victimized teachers 
financially," claimed Gabru.s7 In part, this fund helped finance legal action. Affidavits 
from thirty schools were collected for a legal application which was launched on 12 
December for the reinstatement of all teachers. 58 
Although a member would later claim that the organisation got "bogged down" in 
court cases,59 and WECTU lost the case launched on 12 December one week after the 
application,60 these and other pressures met with some success. Other pressures included, 
for example, an Athlone Central region newspaper advertisement in the Cape Times 
headed: "Action of Education Departments Denounced." It publicly denounced the 
52 "Promotions: Motives Exposed," WECTU newsletter 4 (March 1986): I; SAIRR, CW Region, 24. For a 
presentation of the various options, see "To Pass, or Not to Pass," WECTU newsletter 3 (January 1986): 14. 
53 Argus, 22 October 1985. 
54 Argus, 17 May 1986 and 2 Septemher 1987. 
55 CTCC, n.p. 
56 Argus, 26 November 1985. 
57 Gabru, 4. 
58 Gabru, 4; "Sto;> Press," WECTU newsletter 2 (December 1985): 7; "Education crisis update," Update 2 
(January 1986): 2. 
59 Interview with Barbara Houghton, 22 March 1990. 
60 "Education crisis update," 2. 
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dismissals, suspensions and transferals of teachers.6I In early January 1986, WECTU was 
still publicly calling for the "unconditional reinstatement of all 118 teachers throughout the 
Western Cape who have been victimized. "62 In these ways, WECTU kept up its 
"unprofessional" challenge to the departments of education. 
Apart from its political and uncooperative -- in relation to the education departments -
- stands, WECTU resisted traditional "professionalism" by defining teachers not as 
"professionals" but as workers. WECTU allied itself with the working class. An editorial 
in the second newsletter spoke of a "Vital Role for Teachers": "We in WECTU ... have a 
right to feel that, no matter how small we are numerically, we are part of a larger 
contingent of oppressed workers, students, and sincere democrats whose active resistance 
has begun to spell the end of this system of oppression and exploitation. "63 A remark in the 
launch conference paper castigated teachers' middle-class aspirations. "Teachers must not 
pay lip service of allegiance to the working class," stated the paper, "when by their very 
actions at school towards the children of the working class, they contradict this 
allegiance. "64 
Logically, then, WECTU regarded itself as a union, not a professional association. 
The initial CTCC pamphlet included the workerist slogan, "An injury to one is an injury to 
all. "65 In 1987, Dale Lautenbach of the Argus, after interviewing several WECTU 
executive members, offered a more definite analysis; he saw WECTU's "dream and goal" 
as being a national union of teachers seeking to affiliate to COSATU .66 For all intents and 
purposes, WECTU engaged in a kind of "populist unionism" ,67 emphasizing political, as 
opposed to economic, goals. 
This "anti-professional" ideology, rooted in a politics of resistance, articulated itself 
in "unprofessional" activities within the context of Coloured education. WECTU engaged 
in stay-aways and, specifically contradicting acceptable teacher activities -- as defined by 
conventional "professionalism" -- broke the law of the time. WECTU ignored the order 
forbidding the holding of meetings in schools, for example. 
WECTU's "anti-professionalism" brought it into direct conflict with the established 
teacher association, the CTPA, operating within the same department. Some of WECTU's 
resistance to "professionalism" was aimed directly at the CTPA, which still sat on DEC 
(HoR) subject committees, enjoyed stop-order facilities and met regularly with the 
61 Cape Times, 21 December 1985. 
62 Argus, 13 January 1986. 
63 "Editorial," WECTU newsletter 2 (December 1985): 3. 
64 "The Political Economy of Education in South Africa," 6. 
65 CTCC, n.p. 
66 Argus, 2 September !987. 
67 According to union analysts Rob Lambert and Eddie Webster, "populist unionism" implies that "trade 
unionism and struggles in the fadory are downplayed. [Populist unionism] is a tendency that neglects 
struggles over wages, supervision, managerial controls at the workplace and job evaluation. It places in its 
stead a political engagement that only serves to dissipate shop tloor struggles." Rob Lambert and Eddie 
Webster, "The Re-emergence of Political Unionism in Contemporary South Africa?," in Eds. Cobbett and 
Cohen, 21. 
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department as betitted its recognised status. The first WECTU newsletter stated: "Many 
teachers have turned to WECTU because certain teachers' organizations have been widely 
rejected on principle because.of their active or implicit promotion of apartheid divisions, 
and because of their subservient collaboration with state education authorities. "68 
A process of change: tensions within WECTU 
Teachers' transition away from traditional "professionalism" was not smooth. Rather, 
WECTU represented and institutionalized a process of change which was full of tensions 
and contradictions. Within WECTU, these tensions took several forms. 
The first of these tensions arose from WECTU' s political position in Coloured schools 
in the Western Cape, with its peculiarly divided ideological history. To overcome divisions 
between various internal elements, particularly the Unity Movement and Charterist camps, 
WECTU adopted a strongly non-sectarian line. As Gabru explained about the 
organisation's formation: "When there are needs people don't worry about ideologies. 
They organise. "69 Whether or not the organisers worried, ideologies were an issue, for 
much emphasis was placed on non-sectarianism. There was, explained Zubeida Desai, an 
early WECTU activist, "a hang-over of Unity Movement within people [in WECTU]." 
Randall van den Heever of the CTPA went so far as to claim that WECTU was principally 
guided by Unity Movement ideology. 10 Houghton said, though, that the different 
ideologies, while "not an issue," were "apparent". 11 Therefore, a WECTU spokesperson 
could claim before the launch that it was, "Non-sectarian, comprising people from all the 
political movements fighting for change in South Africa. "72 And Gabru pragmatically 
claimee that, "People chose to be non-sectarian because they wanted to maintain the unity 
of teachers. "73 Thus, the following was duly added to the "Aims and Objectives" of 
WECTU's constitution: "To strive for a non-sectarian approach at all times. "74 And the 
January 1986 newsletter proudly touted: "We have illustrated in WECTU that a non-
sectarian approach to struggle is our only way forward to victory. All teachers in WECTU, 
irrespective of their political affiliations, can and must work together as comrades. "75 
Beneath the rhetoric, however, lay a more uneasy truth. Discord existed within 
WECTU on this ideological front. "Sectarianism has not left WECTU unscathed," wrote 
the Wynberg chairperson in 1986.76 Gabru' s first annual report contained a warning: 
"Divided the state can and will pick us off one by one. In the future we will be called upon 
to act decisively. We cannot then allow ourselves to be immobilised by our allegiance to 
68 "2000 Teachers Unite," l. 
69 Interview with Yousuf Gabru, 28 February 1990. 
70 Interview with Randall van den Heever, 8 March 1990. 
71 Interview with Barbara Houghton, 22 March 1990. 
72 Cape Times, 28 September l985. 
73 Interview with YousufGabru, 28 February 1990. 
74 WECTU, Constitution, n.p. 
75 "A Victory for Unity," WECTU newslerrer 3 (January !986): 2. 
76 Chairperson Wynberg, n.p. 
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different sections of the liberatory movement. "77 An Athlone Central member, in writing 
to the newsletter about "principled unity", was more critical: " ... it is precisely because we 
have become trapped by the sectarian interests and ideological in-fighting and intolerance, 
that any form of united action is diffused and emasculated from the outset. "78 
One aspect of the sectarianism within WECTU created a second major tension within 
the organisation, that involving the principle of non-collaboration. Traditional 
"professionalism" implied a readiness to collaborate with state structures. WECTU, in 
rejecting "professionalism", also rejected "collaboration". But tensions arose within 
WECTU about exactly what this non-collaborationist aspect of a new "professionalism" 
meant. 
Non-collaboration had been a major tenet of Unity Movement policy, and was thus 
espoused by the large Unity Movement contingent within WECTU. During the eighties, 
with the ascendency of Charterist philosophy, the term became nebulous within the political 
context of popular resistance. Township youths, in particular, declared war on 
"collaborators", harassing and killing people who worked within state local authority 
structures, the tri-cameral parliament, the police and the army. Teachers, too, were often 
considered to be "collaborato~s" by some activists and youth because teachers worked 
directly for the apartheid government. WECTU, det1ecting these accusations, wrote in its 
constitution that it aimed: "To refuse to collaborate with any State department or person 
who seeks to preserve the status quo. "79 
The tension within WECTU arose over both the nebulous definition of 
"collaboration", and its practical application. While condemning the CTPA for its ties with 
the education department, WECTU itself met and negotiated with dep~tmental officials. 
For example, on 14 January 1986, a three~person WECTU delegation met with the DEC 
(HoR) executive director, A.J. Arendse, in the Roeland Street DEC offices. Supported by 
. between 250 and 300 colleagues on the street outside, the delegation gave Arendse a 
petition demanding the unconditional reinstatement of all teachers and students, and the 
removal of the police and army from the schools. Arendse claimed no security forces were 
present at schools, and he agreed to the readmission of students. That night on state 
television, Hendrickse announced the reinstatement of all suspended teachers. WECTU 
declared it an important victory, although the plight of dismissed temporary teachers had 
not been resolved.8o Was the meeting an act of collaboration? Clearly the populist, 
democratic style was not that of the CTPA, with crowds waiting and being consulted in the 
street. But, Gabru admitted that a "few" teachers left WECTU after their first 
demonstration in Cape Town: "They argued that we were negotiating with the 
department." · Some teachers within WECTU rejected what they considered to be the 
"collaborationist" tactics of WECTU leadership. Gabru continued: "I imagine others have 
77 Gabru, 5. 
78 Athlone Central member, "A Plea for Principled Unity," WECTU newsletter 3 (January 1986): 16. 
79 WECTU, Constitution, n.p. 
8° Cape Times, 15 January 1986; Argus, 15 January 1986; "A Victory for Unity," 1-2. 
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left because of our militant position, or because of our talks with the CTPA. "s1 A second 
incid~nt of perceived "collaboration" occurred in which a WECTU executive member 
responded to a telephone call from Arendse requesting a meeting with him. This second 
event sparked off heated debate within WECTU about procedure, collaboration, and 
negotiation.82 Clearly, "non-collaboration" meant different things to different people. The 
dilemma for WECTU concerned how far members should, in fact, go towards rejecting 
their department and its officials. 
In the same vein, boycott tactics, with their ideological implications, remained a 
tension within WECTU. The strategy of boycotts grew in popularity in the eighties and 
were closely associated with the burgeoning popularity of the ANC. The Unity Movement 
historically opposed such a strategy. And although some teachers boycotted classes, and 
declared their full support for their students' actions, the prolonged boycott sowed tension 
within WECTU. WECTU, a militantly progressive teachers' union, could come to no clear 
resolution regarding the students' boycott during the latter part of 1985. After a seven-hour 
discussion of this issue at the 6 October 1985 WECTU General Meeting, a member of the 
Athlone East region wrote to the newsletter: "Our inability to take a definite position vis-a-
vis the boycott of schools at this stage takes the teacher-members right back to the start of 
the school boycott in July .... Our inability to take a decision is, in my opinion, a 
weakness. "83 The perceived weakness concerned WECTU's internal tensions about 
strategy. A newsletter editorial spoke of " ... the disenchantment and disillusionment with 
the organisation which many of its members experience in the face of its apparent inability 
to arrive at a clear position regarding the matter of the class boycott. "84 
This contentious issue took the specific form of division within WECTU over the 
year-end examination boycott, described in detail in the preceding chapter. Gabru claimed: 
"The issue which caused the most headaches, and perhaps lost us many members, was that 
of the support for WECTU's call to teachers not to administer exams." He wondered 
whether it was the way in which the decision was taken, or whether it was the non-binding 
nature of the call that was central to its divisiveness for WECTU.8s The January 1986 
newsletter spoke of "the division created within the ranks of our membership on the 
question of the administration of the 1985 final exams. "86 Though all members of WECTU 
"unprofessionally" rejected aparrheid education, the strategies employed to change it 
created these tensions within the organisation. 
Apart from tensions concerning sectarianism and collaboration, WECTU experienced 
internal contradictions concerning its espoused non-racialism. The movement towards a 
8! Interview with YousufGabru, 28 February 1990. Here Gabru is referring to the various meetings 
involving the CTPA in 1986 (the March NECC meeting), 1987 (the Western Cape NECC), and the unity 
meetings after 1988. 
82 "WECTU: Union or Not?," WECTU newsletter 5 (May 1986): 2, 15. 
83 A member of the Athlone East rel.!ion, "Letter to WECTU," WECTU newsletter 2 (December 1985): 7. 
84 "Editorial, • WECTU newslelter 3-(January 1986): 10-11. 
85 Gabru, 4. 
86 "Editorial, • WECTU newsletter 3 (January 1986): 11. 
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new "professionalism" not reliant on racial divisions, and towards a unified teaching 
profession, was structurally problematic. WECTU did contain members who were white 
and Indian, as well as Coloured, since these people worked within DEC schools. Initially, 
too, it met with some organisational success in African schools. "Quite a few teachers from 
African schools did join up," said Desai, who went to Guguletu to publicize WECTU. 
Guguletu teachers fell under the Athlone East region of WECTU; Langa teachers fell under 
Athlone Central. "It worked for a time," Desai continued, "but you needed that kind of 
[political] momentum all the time. "87 There were clear practical difficulties: WECTU 
meetings occurred in Coloured areas, and were dominated by DEC (HoR) teachers. The 
first newsletter spoke to this issue: " ... WECTU faces the immense challenge of putting its 
commitment to non-racialism into practice. More specifically, it is already evident that the 
active interest shown in WECTU by teachers in Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu encounters 
severe practical problems in making contact with the union - the onus is on WECTU to 
break down the divisions that apartheid has built up. "88 Also,-it was reported at the 
December 1985 SPCC conference that, "Because of the State of Emergency, they [the 
mainly Coloured teachers who comprise WECTU] were unable to meet with African 
teachers." 89 
The problem of WECTU' s ethnic identity was, ironically, exacerbated by the launch 
of another "non-racial" organisation, DETU. After DETU formed, the African teachers 
who had participated in WECTU dropped out. 90 As the Wynberg chairperson wrote, 
"Apartheid has been so successful in separating people, including teachers, that ghetto-
based organizations have emerged .... , "91 once again in the context of education, and 
popular political resistance espousing non-racial strategies. The crucial issue in confronting 
its principled non-racialism then became the establishment of a unified teachers' 
organisation. As an Athlone East member wrote to the newsletter, "WECTU is not a racist 
body of exclusively white, coloured and Indian teachers.... DETU and WECTU must be 
united. "92 
Although interested in joining with DETU, WECTU ignored the other progressive 
teachers' organisation, EDASA. It denied individual EDASA members the right to sign up 
by invoking a rule against being members of more than one teacher organisation (initially 
aimed at CTPA members).93 Then, too, WECTU refused to acknowledge EDASA's 
' 
existence in any of its published materials. Mainly, WECTU opposed "liberals" teaching in 
white schools. By rejecting EDASA in this way, WECTU further called into question it's 
non-racialism, and its stated desire to overcome apartheid's barriers. 
87 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
88 "Breaking the Barriers," WECTU newsletter l (November 1985): 3. 
89 Western Cape Regional Report, "Report," in People's Education, 23. 
90 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
91 Chairperson Wynberg, n.p. 
92 Athlone East member, "Letters," WECTU newsletter 4 (March !986): 7. 
93 Interview with Cheryl Schwikard, 8 May !990. 
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A further tension experienced by WECTU in its transition to a new "professionalism" 
concerned its espousal of working-class allegiance. For example, WECTU rejected funding 
from the Urban Foundation, which was seen to be working to coopt a black middle class. 
In an apologetic letter to the newsletter, a certain E.J. Daniels contested this opposition by 
claiming: "Personally, sir, without trying to be derogatory in any way to any member of 
WECTU, I must point out that in our midst there are members who qualify for this social 
position [within the black middle class]. "94 
Apart from the reality that teachers remained committed in some ways to middle-class 
values, there was another internal tension which emerge from WECTU's vision of teacher-
workers. WECTU, engaged in crisis-management, could not fully undertake the duties of a 
union. The first newsletter spelled out these duties as follows: "As a union, WECTU must 
reach out to teachers and design its activities and projects around the day-to-day problems 
that teachers face; for example, their employment conditions, sex-discrimination, access to 
teaching resources and new teaching methods, relations with students in the classroom, and 
salary problems. "95 During the crisis of 1985, with relatively small numbers of engaged 
members, such a vision was impractical. 
An article entitled "WECTU: Union or Not?" which appeared in the May 1986 
newsletter illustrated this tension. At the time of the launch, constitutional debate on this 
union-association issue was resolved by pragmatically deciding " ... that WECTU would 
have characteristics of both kinds of structure." Debate flared again after the two meetings 
with Arendse discussed above, raising inter-linked questions about unions, professional 
associations, and negotiations with the state. 96 
WECTU had difficulty resolving the tensions concerning sectarianism, collaboration, 
racialism and unionism as it rejected conventional teacher "professionalism". The transition 
to a new "professionalism" was thus fraught with several tensions inherent in teacher 
politics in South Africa. 
WECTU's organisational issues and success 
The tensions inherent in the teachers' realm, which emerged during the process of change 
away from established notions of "professionalism", along with the repressive political 
climate in schools, affected WECTU' s organisation. In his annual report, Gabru wrote: 
At the time it seemed that regional structure was the most appropriate but 
in practice there have been problems.... In the original wave of 
enthusiasm many people accepted positions on a regional executive but 
thereafter failed to fulfil their commitments. So some regions never really 
became established and little or no recruitment or organisation took place. 
Many teachers who would have joined a progressive teachers' organisation 
94 E.J. Daniels, "Letters," WECTU newsletter 5 (May 1986): 15. 
95 "2000 Teachers Unite," 2. 
96 "WECTU: Union or Not?," 2. 
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were either unaware of the region's existence, or if they were aware of its 
existence, did not know how to get involved.97 .· 
The difficulties WECTU experienced in maintaining fully-functioning structures were 
due in part to state repression. In October 1985, for example, soon after WECTU's 
launch, Carter Ebrahim banned non-recognised organisations from operating at schools. 
WECTU ignored the ban.98 On 7 November, Gabru was detained after other WECTU 
executive members had been arrested. 99 In the words of an executive member in 1987: 
"We've had so many crises to respond to that we've never really had a true lull during 
which to build our administration and get on with the ordinary business of working towards 
the educational system we envisage." 100 Or, as Gabru said after its tirst year: , 
Since its launch WECTU has had to do two things: both respond to the 
State of Emergency and attempt to build a permanent teachers 
organisation. Many of the problems we have experienced since the 
inception of our union can be attributed to the difficulty involved in 
building an organisation while also confronting the demands of the 
emergency .101 
Despite these repressive pressures, however, WECTU met with success in both 
institutionalizing an "anti-professional" ideology, and in supporting elements of the 
liberation movement. The Western Cape SAIRR wrote of one example of such support for 
militant teachers: " ... pressure from WECTU brought about the reinstatement of most 
teachers dismissed at the end of [ 1985]. "102 
Organisational activities were undertaken to create a more permanent organisational 
ethos outside of crisis, and to try to live up to its ideological aims regarding education. 
WECTU committed itself to media, and produced two newsletters in its first three months. 
The newsletters continued regularly, comprised of editorial comment, letters, reports, 
poetry and illustrations. They were clearly an organisational strength. Also, apart from the 
usual fund-raising activities such as films and tee-shirt sales, WECTU organised various 
talks and workshops on teachers' rights, international education and primary school 
teaching, amongst other things. Later, one region conducted a winter school.Io3 
Clearly, WECTU accomplished a great deal during and after the 1985 schools' crisis. 
It provided a voice for teachers in opposition to "professional" ideas about their work; it 
lent support to the liberation movement; it offered valuable input on the shape of a future, 
liberatory education system. Struggling to maintain a non-sectarian approach and live up to 
the ideals espoused in its constitution, WECTU defended itself with varying successes 
97 Gabru, 4. 
98 Herald, 12 October 1985. 
99 Argus, 18 November 1985. 
100 Argus, 2 September 1987. 
-101 Gabru, 3. 
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against the state, which sought to silence it and r~turn teachers to their "proper" and 
"professional" place within the education bureaucracy. 
The Democratic Teachers' Union 
As WECTU asserted a new "professionalism" within Cape Town's Coloured schools, 
similar developments occurred within teacher politics in African townships. DETU, like 
WECTU, rejected the fundamental tenets of traditional "professionalism". Working to re-
establish lost credibility within the repressive atmosphere of African schools and 
communities, DETU adopted an overtly political position within the liberation movement. 
It remained antagonistic towards the DET as it strove for educational change. DETU also 
rejected "professional" elitism. In the spirit of a newly-forming "professionalism", DETU 
aspired to becoming a non-racial union of teachers. 
The transition away from traditional "professionalism" was challenging and 
problematic. An institutionalized part of this process, DETU experienced internal 
contradictions regarding its non-racialism. Also, DETU suffered during the repressive 
political climate of 1985-1986, and remained small. However, DETU moved beyond the 
crisis of those years towards a permanent place within teacher politics, and achieved some 
successes. It claimed credibility in the eyes of students and communities, and it added an 
important weight to the shift away from traditional "professionalism". 
After "a quiet launch without any fanfare or pomp in May of 1985, "104 DETU --
originally named the United Democratic Teachers' Union (UDETU) --claimed between 
300 and 450 members out of a total of around 700 high school teachers.1os Born in crisis, 
and operating amongst the more politicized high school teachers, 106 DETU shared a few 
similarities with WECTU. As DETU itself argued, however, Coloured and African 
township conditions were dissimilar. DETU organised amongst a smaller group of 
/ 
teachers, and confronted the potential for more dangerous antagonism from its 
communities. Though a founder member, Monde Mbekwa, wrote grandly that, " ... by and 
large the organisation has been felt and recognised by organisations in the country and 
outside as one of the most important forces for change in South Africa, "101 DETU's public 
voice was a quieter one than WECTU's. 
1°4 Monde Mbekwa, "Organisational Analysis: The Democratic Teachers' Union," paper for Diploma for 
Educators of Adults, UWC, August 1989, 2. In an interview with Mbekwa, 9 August 1990, he said the 
launch took place in June or July, before the tirst State of Emergency. 
105 Interview with informant D. 6 March 1990; Shtpherd Mdladlana, "Welcome Colleagues!" DETU News 
1.1 (July 1987): 2. 
1°6 Here it can only be suggesttd that primary school ttachers were mainly women, largely under-qualified 
and therefore more afraid of "political" involvemtnt which might cost them their jobs, while more men 
worked in high schools. This might begin to answer the question about why DETU met with success mainly 
in high schools. 
I 07 Mbekwa, 7. 
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DETU's challenge to ''professionalism" 
DETU challenged "professionalism" in several ways, and its antagonism to this traditional 
ideology articulated itself in antagonism towards PENATA, the established teacher 
association operating within Cape Town's African schools. The changing terrain of teacher 
politics, some teachers believed, required a new organisation. This antagonism to 
PENA T A demonstrated itself in May of 1985 at the first meeting of teachers which led to 
the formation of DETU. On the day of the first gathering of "progressive" teachers in 
African townships, a parallel meeting was held in Guguletu. The "progressive" meeting at 
the NY 117 Church comprised mostly high school teachers; the other, at the Uluntu Centre, 
had been called by PENATA, and was attended mainly by primary school teachers.1os 
The NY117 Church meeting, the first of several which led to DETU's formation, was 
a rebuttal to PENATA. There was a feeling amongst some teachers that PENATA utterly 
failed to respond to the student and other pressures of the 1985 school crisis.I09 As Andile 
Jonas said in 1988, "The 1985 crisis in education led to the formation of DETU after it 
became clear that the teachers' organisation which existed at that time could not adequately 
tackle problems affecting education."IIO Specifically, according to DETU, PENATA failed 
to confront student complaints, or take them up in any meaningful way. Mdladlana stated: 
"Concerned teachers had pressured PENATA to take up pupils' demands and grievances 
with the relevant authorities. When those teachers saw for the umpteenth time that they had 
failed in their efforts to persuade PEN AT A officials to respond to the crisis, they decided to 
form a progressive teachers' union. "111 A DETU executive member later added, "Teachers 
appealed to PENATA to go to the students. They were afraid. "II2 
Later, a PENATA regional organiser would complain that DETU "was always 
attacking PENATA" .113 In part, DETU needed to justify its existence in this way, for it 
was a "break-away" or "splinter" group. There was "wrangling" at the time about whether 
to form a separate union or attempt to re-direct PENATA through, for example, a vote of 
no confidence. The reason offered by one DETU executive member, that "PENATA was 
not convening meetings", is clearly only a partial truth.II4 In fact, some of the DETU 
leadership were former PENATA executive members. Mdladlana had been a PENATA 
secretary, for example, and the DETU ranks boasted a former PENA TA president, vice-
president, assistant secretary, music convenor and education secretary .IIS There were, 
according to a DETU executive member, "personal conflicts" .II6 
108 Interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 Aul!ust 1990. 
109 Interview with Monde Mhekwa, 9 Au~ust 1990; interview with informant D, 6 March 1990: 
.liO South, 13 October 1988. -
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112 Interview with informant D, 6 March 1990. 
113 Interview with Basie Nikani, !3 June !990. 
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Although such conflicts may have affected the political decision to form a new teacher 
organisation, more important motivations lay in both a desire for credibility and a feeling of 
responsibility towards students and the community at a moment of intense political contlict. 
DETU Chairperson Shepherd Mdladlana wrote that, "Teachers were at last also realising 
their responsibility to their pupils and to the community at large." 111 
This responsibility extended into the realm of the liberation movement, where DETU 
rejected the apolitical nature of traditional "professionalism". DETU cooperated with 
student and community organisations. DETU formed some alliances with township 
organisations, attending civic meetings, for example, and working with both the Joint 
SRC's and the African township-based Parents' Action Committee.11s It participated in 
UDF structures,119 finding its political home in the mass democratic movement. 
Its political involvement, like WECTU's, involved DETU in work for educational 
change. It strongly opposed the education being offered -- Mbekwa wrote bluntly that 
DETU " ... had in mind the taking up of cudgels on behalf of pupils ... "12o While DETU 
sought short-term concessions in line with· student grievances, it, like WECTU, had visions 
of more fundamental changes in education. A constitutional aim was to gain control of 
syllabi and curricular content.121 DETU came into being hoping to establish a single 
education system, and to facilitate the development of People's Education (or its pre-NECC 
incarnations).122 DETU sent a delegate-- Mdladlana -- to the December 1985 SPCC 
conference, and to the March 1986 NECC conference in Durban. It also foregrounded 
work within PTSAs.123 
DETU promoted new understandings of education. With hindsight, Mbekwa wrote 
that, "The organisation, though unaware, has reflected the theoretical positions of Paulo 
Freire and Antonio Gramsci. "124 DETU desired to render education democratic and 
liberatory, in opposition to a "professionalism" inclined towards the educational status quo. 
This commitment to educational change led DETU into a further "unprofessional" 
position. DETU immediately developed antagonistic relations with the DET, adopting an 
uncooperative stand in relation to its employer. The event which sparked DETU's 
formation, in fact, involved resistance to a departmental decree. As township students 
engaged in a full-scale boycott of classes, and schools, in May of 1985, tensions mounted. 
Disturbed by the free time the boycott afforded teachers, the department called all high 
117 Mdladlana, l. 
11 8 Mbekwa, 3; South, 15 October 1988; interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 August 1990. 
119 Mbekwa, 4. 
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121 Mbekwa, 3. 
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school teachers to St. Francis in Langa during school hours to "sit and prepare lessons for 
the following year" .125 Teachers could not be idle. 
But the DET instruction, meant to assert authority, backfired. Firstly, teachers at 
Sizamile High School did not attend, due to some tensions with their students. Secondly, 
those teachers from other schools that did arrive at St. Francis did not "sit and prepare", as 
requested. Rather, they gathered together for an "unauthorized" meeting, as the 
supervising inspectors informed them. This "unauthorized" meeting at St. Francis opted to 
follow Sizamile's lead. The teachers who had arrived at St. Francis decided that they 
needed to be at schools; they could not so completely expose pupils.126 That evening, after 
teachers had rejected the DET' s St. Francis gathering, "progressive" teachers held the 
meeting at the NY 117 Church in Guguletu which led to DETU's formation. 
The St. Francis "rebellion"127 foreshadowed DETU's later relations with the DET. 
DETU never desired to participate in departmental structures. Although negotiations with 
the DET would have been acceptable to most DETU members, the DET refused to deal 
with DETU. According to Mbekwa: "Negotiation with the authorities was considered as 
one way of resolving the problem but unfortunately the department branded the organisation 
a group of committed trouble-makers and so closed the door on DETU. "128 A circuit 
inspector indicated the extent of the antagonism when he warned teachers against DETU by 
saying, "Be careful of biting the hand that feeds you. "129 
Along with its political, "uncooperative" positions, DETU rejected the elitism 
inherent in traditional "professionalism". "We [teachers]," stated a founding executive 
member using a patronizing metaphor, "had to come down to the level of the masses." 130 
DETU's calculated disregard for teachers' "elite" or "professional" status also showed itself 
in DETU's constitutional membership rules. Members were mostly teachers, but could also 
work in non-formal e.ducation-related service organisations, such as the Career Research 
and Information Centre (CRIC), or could be non-practicing teachers.131 
DETU members' rejection of an "elite" status 4lso demonstrated itself in their 
conception of their organisation as a union. According to Mdladlana, " ... teachers decided 
that a union of teachers was needed .... " m Though not as significant an issue in 1985 as it 
was for WECTU, Mdladlana asked in a December 1987 newsletter, "Are teachers' 
workers?"133 
Such "unprofessional" stands helped DETU reclaim teacher credibility in the eyes of 
students and communities. Mbekwa explained that, "Students were hard on those teachers 
125 Interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 August !990. 
126 Mdladlana, 1; interview with MonJe Mbekwa, 9 August !990. 
127 Interview with Monde Mhekwa, 9 Au!!ust !990. 
128 Mbekwa, 3. -
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131 Mbekwa, 2. 
132 Mdladlana, l-2. 
133 Shepherd Mdladlana, "!987 -Teacher Unity!," DETV News 1.2 (December 1987): 2. 
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... they regarded as conservative. "134 DETU presented a "progressive" picture of teachers. 
When DETU was formed, claimed Mbekwa, "people were very skeptical. We were put to 
the test." He continued that later, after experiencing victimization, "We had graduated." 135 
DETU' s "graduation" influenced teacher politics in the Western Cape, adding an important 
impetus for a changed understanding of teacher "professionalism". 
DETU and the troubled process of change 
._DETU's movement away from traditional "professionalism" presented the organisation with 
some challenges and internal contradictions. In particular, DETU experienced tension 
around its stated ideal of non-racialism. In practice, DETU opted to work only within DET 
schools. Township conditions, they argued, were qualitatively different from elsewhere. 
"The idea of linking up with another organisation of teachers in 'coloured' schools, also in 
a state of conception, was mooted but shelved for a later stage when both had found their 
feet," wrote Mbekwa. 136 Their lack of success in establishing a desired non-racial identity 
caused Mdladlana to write in December 1987, " ... we must move away from talking about 
non-racialism. We must put non-racialism into practice. "137 
Another illustration of the troubled move towards a new "professionalism" stemmed 
from the crisis-management nature of DETU. "Professionalism" was being vociferously 
challenged within a political context. Because commitment to its new ideologies within 
teacher politics meant harassment by state and educational authorities, DETU's membership 
remained small. Also DETU operated within more overtly politicized high schools, rather 
than in primary schools where teachers' employment was less secure and conditions of 
work more strictly controlled due to a lower level of student militancy than existed in high 
schools. An antagonist, the chairperson of the rival PENATA, claimed that, "DETU at the 
time [of its inception] had no majority. They were few. "138 In 1988, Chairperson Andile 
Jonas did not answer the direct question posed by South: "What is DETU's 
membership?"139 As with WECTU, DETU's active membership was small due to 
contradictions about "professionalism" and due to the repressive atmosphere in schools. 
Elements of the liberation movement which actively sought a new definition of 
"professionalism", however, afforded DETU a significant voice in teacher politics. 
DETU's institutionalization of the 
challenge to "professionalism" 
Small membership did not render DETU ineffectual as it institutionalized the process of 
change towards new teacher perceptions of their work and their place within education. 
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II At first we thought this [formation of DETU] would be a temporary measure, II said a 
founding member, "but we realised there was a need." 140 Analysing "reactionary 
associations" and "teacher action committees and their limitations, "141 the teachers 
concerned opted to follow the example set by NEUSA -- formed in 1980 and operating in 
DET schools mainly in the Transvaal -- by establishing a permanent union. 
As an emergent union, many of DETU's political protest actions, such as meetings 
and its participation in demonstrations, were successful. In July 1987 it produced a first 
newsletter, and in December 1987 a second, and final, newsletter appeared. The 
newsletters, aimed at articulating " ... the aspirations of oppressed teachers, as well as the 
views of students and parents on the present crisis in education", 142 contained information 
about DETU positions, a couple of thoughtful pieces on Brazil and history, reports, poetry, 
a pupil essay, profiles and a crossword puzzle. 
The newsletters serve as a symbol of an organisation too small, too beleaguered, too 
embattled to produce media during the crisis-ridden year of its birth. DETU matured 
greatly in 1987, offered life and direction by the gradually unfolding process of teacher 
unity. This does not mean DETU was bereft of self-contained merit or credibility. An 
executive member claimed that it helped greatly to restore teachers' credibility: "Teachers 
were no longer petrol-bombed because of DETU. "143 Teachers used DETU to influence 
their reputation, and to fundamentally influence the nature of teacher politics and teacher 
"professionalism". 
Education for an Aware South Africa 
During 1985-1986, EDASA challenged entrenched "professional" ideology in white 
schools. While espousing a new "professionalism" similar to that of WECTU and DETU, 
EDASA experienced and exacerbated tensions within conservative white schools which 
were not in a state of unrest. "We knew our constituency was different [from black teacher 
groups]," said Cheryl Schwikard, an early member.l44 
As battles raged in black schools, pressuring teachers to act and react in their "sites of 
struggle", the organisation and functioning of white schools remained largely unaffected. 
Certainly no student action tlared, no boycotts occurred, and no police invaded campuses. 
And as the state enforced media restrictions, even the flow of information about the black 
education crisis was curtailed. 
Therefore, EDASA encountered a great deal more resistance from its constituency 
than WECTU or DETU. EDASA was not riding the wave of popular resistance which 
allowed WECTU and DETU such loud voices and acceptance within their communities. Its 
constituency's resistance to its ideas, along with ED ASA 's movement towards acceptance 
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by the militant democratic movement, retlected itself in a very small membership. ED ASA 
committee-member Mike Adendorf, speaking of the 200 or so who arrived at the initial 
Rosebank Methodist Church meeting which led to EDASA's formation, said, 'There were 
never as many again at an actual EDASA meeting." The initial general meetings comprised 
forty or forty-five people, numbers which "tailed off" dramatically after 1986, he said. 
While Schwikard put the membership at about eighty, founder-member Pam van Dyk said 
that fifty members at a meeting was considered a large group, with only twenty sometimes: 
"Basically, it was the reality of our situation." Adendorf concurred: "We were conscious 
of the fact that we were doomed never to be a large group. "145 
Established ideas of teacher "professionalism" where thus more difficult to challenge 
in white schools. But EDASA challenged them as it institutionalized the shift away from 
entrenched notions of proper teacher behaviour and ideology. 
EDASA 's ''professional" transition 
Like WECTU and DETU, ED ASA' s most significant contribution to a new 
"professionalism" was an overtly political understanding of society and teachers' work. 
The "unprofessional" political nature of EDASA was apparent from its inception, emerging 
from the motivations for its formation. 
Despite the divisions between white and black education in the Western Cape, a small 
minority of white students and teachers felt the township traumas impinge on their 
consciences enough to react in a public, organised way. The SAT A's verbal response to 
the education crisis (see below) did not suffice for some teachers. The teachers' reaction 
resulted in the formation of EDASA. The signal event for the small group of teachers was 
the 26 July 1985 State of Emergency. A founding member, Pam van Dyk, claimed that 
ED ASA "was formed in response to the State of Emergency": 
I realised that there would be no reaction where I worked. My pupils 
wouldn't know about the State of Emergency; it would not touch their 
lives at all. I thought, 'How bizarre. We live in the same city. As 
educators we must do something about this. '146 
So van Dyk and a few others organised an open meeting at the Rosebank Methodist Church 
on 9 August under the heading, "Education in a State of Emergency," with various 
groupings, including the Progressive Federal Party's Jan van Eck, on the platform.147 This 
meeting, attended by 150 to 200 people, many of whom taught at white or private schools, 
adopted several motions calling for the abolition of segregated education and school cadet 
programmes, and for the establishment of a progressive organisation. Teachers from many 
schools formed a large committee which hammered out a constitution, and chose the neutral 
145 Interview with Mike Adendorf, 7 August 1990; interview with Cheryl Schwikard, 8 May 1990; interview 
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name, to the chagrin of more politicised members.148 The first general meeting, which 
ratified the constitution, took place on 5 October 1985. 149 
EDASA thus emerged from a broadly political arena, and remained increasingly 
outspoken about political issues. An editorial in the second issue of its organ, Update, 
stated that, "Remaining silent is a political act: it implies acceptance of the status quo and 
of the world view of the class that owns the means of economic production." 1so A 
recruitment advertisement appearing in the June 1986 issue of Update suggested ED ASA 
could offer "a sense of meaning, commitment to South Africa's future, and a real 
understanding of democracy." Further, involvement offered opportunities to "restore faith 
in your own sense of agency," to "gain support from other teachers who also take a stand 
on moral principles," and, among other things, to "generally keep abreast of the latest 
trends, educational and those of a broader nature, in our society .... " 151 
In these ways, EDASA maintained a public commitment to political change. As 
Coor~inator Gareth Rossiter commented in a 1986 AGM keyn-ote address after one year of 
EDASA: " ... more than simply reacting to state pressure in the educational arena, we have 
a vision of a changed, new South Africa, and it is here that ED ASA finds its context. ... " 
-EDASA worked within white schools "primarily," wrote Rossiter, "as an activist 
organisation concerned with the conscientisation [sic] and organisation of teachers in our 
constituency." 152 
Politically, ED ASA moved further away from established ideas of teacher 
"professionalism" by engaging with the broader liberation movement. This posed certain 
dilemmas for the organisation, which had a difficult time winning credibility within a 
Western Cape context distrustful of white liberalism. An Update editorial stated that, " ... 
we ... work on the periphery of the broader struggle for a just and democratic education in 
South Africa ... ";1sJ and van Dyk admitted, "I guess we were low-key and small."154 In 
particular, explained Schwikard, "We were desperate for credibility with other teachers' 
organisations." 155 "The struggle to gain credibility for white teachers working in these 
schools," stated an ED ASA member, "and a place [for] these teachers in the democratic 
movement has been an enormous task. Sometimes I think too big a task for too few 
people. "156 But, van Dyk argued, "Without credibility, there's no point in organising. We 
don't want to be an isolated white group." 157 This desire played itself out as ED ASA 
joined with other anti-apartheid organisations in a Cape Town "front" in opposition to the 
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Emergency, !58 and as ED ASA' s public rhetoric maintained an increasingly radical tone in 
line with the broader liberation movement. 
Another aspect of EDASA's "unprofessional" ideology linked to its overtly political 
nature was an articulation of the political nature of education. A front-page editorial in 
ED ASA' s second Update began, "Education is a political issue." 159 
This political understanding of education articulated itself in several ways for 
EDASA. This emergent white organisation rejected apartheid education divisions and 
undertook specific organisational actions which targeted the crisis in black education. 
EDASA repeatedly attempted to express a solidarity with black teachers, which was, during 
1985-1986, not always reciprocated by WECTU. A 12 September 1985 public forum dealt 
with "Education: A Deepening Crisis", and ED ASA held a picket-protest on 19 September 
demanding the release of all teachers and pupils from detention.t6o A 27 November 
"emergency" forum dealt, amongst other things, with the crisis in Coloured schools. 
EDASA expressed support for the teachers refusing to write or invigilate examinations. A 
spokesperson is quoted as saying: "As white teachers in secure posts in white schools we 
feel we need to show our solidarity with teachers in coloured schools." 161 
ED ASA' s articulation of the political nature of education further led it to express 
desire for educational change. With Freire as their ideological touchstone, EDASA 
propagated the need to overcome the "culture of silence", and the need to liberate students 
and teachers through alternative approaches to teaching and learning. Educational change 
was meant, in a way similar to DETU and WECTU, "to win back control of the schooling 
process .... " 162 
A primary means of accomplishing its educational vision, and a primary reason for its 
formation, lay in ED ASA' s creation and dissemination of alternative education materials. 163 
ED ASA 's concern with progressive methodologies led to a workshop held on 17 August 
1985 ·--only a week after the first large meeting-- entitled "Education Action for Peace" 
which involved teachers in the creation of resource packages of alternative classroom 
materials. This was followed on 26 October with another workshop at which resource 
packages were presented. 164 Members continued to work on these resources, which were 
then placed in the Language Education Unit at UCT.I65 A methodology workshop took 
place on 20 November.t66 And a 1986 tirst term diary of events in Update included a 19 
February methodology workshop, and a 15 March resource centres exhibition.l67 This 
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methodology workshop became, in fact, a lecture on action research, while the exhibition 
never got off the ground.168 Another plan that did not bear fruit was the desire to open an 
awareness resource centre.16~ In line with this commitment to assessment of methodology, 
Rossiter devoted a section of his 1986 keynote address to "Teaching strategies", in which he 
suggested, for example, that, "The principle ideological issue we can expose is the issue of 
education for socialisation. "170 
ED ASA Is engagement with the politics of education allowed it access to national 
education initiatives linked to the liberation movement. ED ASA 1S ties to the broader 
educational arena, and to black education specifically, where considerably improved by an 
invitation to send two delegates to the March 1986 NECC conference in Durban. Further, 
EDASA actively participated in the national Education Charter Campaign in April, hosting 
a public meeting on the issue on 29 May.111 This improvement was also assisted by an 
invitation from NEUSA to send two observers to its national conference in Bloemfontein on 
23 May. Later, EDASA would find itself firmly bound to its black counterparts in the 
progressive unity initiatives of 1987 and in the Harare initiative begun in April 1988. 
Apart from its involvement in education issues linked to struggles in black schools, 
ED ASA challenged traditional "professionalism" in white schools by devoting energy to 
two other school-related issues: the abolition of enforced cadet training; and-opening 
schools to all people. The former aim led ten EDASA teachers and student teachers to join 
-- for one week beginning on 30 September 1985, on a roster basis -- a fast for peace and 
justice begun by ECC leader Dr. Ivor Toms. An EDASA spokesperson is reported to have 
said that the fast was "in line with one of ED ASA 1 s specific aims, which is to promote a 
peacef~l and just society by discouraging militarization in our schools and actively 
supporting the peaceful resolution of conflict." 172 The anti-militarization activities were 
carried further by an EDASA-organised "emergency" public gathering held in UCT 1s 
education building on 27 November 1985. Titled generally "Education- The Present and 
the Future", this meeting discussed, among other things, alternative activities to replace 
cadet-training. The headmaster of the Bishops Diocesan College, who spoke at the 
meeting, announced that boys at his school would be permitted to engage in community 
service instead of cadets from 1986.173 The January 1986 issue of Update included an 
article stating EDASA 1 s position on the cadet programmes, which played "a crucial role in 
the militarization of our society." m The article was written is support of the ECC's 
"cadets campaign week" from 29 January to 5 February 1986. 
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The second white-school oriented campaign that EDASA undertook concerned "open 
schools". A 10 February 1986 forum held by EDASA to examine the Education Policy Act 
also .delved into issues concerning non-racial schools. r7s In February 1986 parents at an 
elite, private school precipitated this issue in Cape Town by deciding to allow entrance to 
students of all "races". EDASA, in response to what became a ."raging" debate, launched 
an open-schools campaign. The campaign began on 4 March with a general meeting, and 
the following weeks included the circulation of a petition demanding "open schools in an 
open society", 10,000 pamphlets distributed to schools and homes highlighting the 
education crisis, single-person placard demonstrations on 21 March, and a larger public 
gathering entitled "Responding to the Education Crisis" organised with the National Union 
of South African Students (NUSAS), PAAG (discussed in Chapter Four), the UDF, and a 
progressive lecturer group.I76 An Updare article explained: 
It is not because EDASA wishes to be involved in the government's 
'reform initiatives' that we feel that this debate must be raised in all 
schools, but because we believe that everyone in our community --
especially teachers, parents and pupils -- should think about this issue and 
take the initiative in demanding change in the educational arena.m 
Troubled transition within white teacher politics 
As EDASA propagated a new "professionalism" amongst white teachers, it experienced 
many tensions within its political arena. EDASA found it difficult to both woo other 
progressive organisations and cater for its constituency. As ED ASA pandered to the 
demands of the broader democratic movement by adjusting its publicity, van Dyk wondered 
in 1990 whether "we needed to use more liberal speakers and take a more liberal stand for 
our constituency. But we didn't for fear of our credibility [within the popular resistance 
movement]. "178 
But even without radical stands, ED ASA' s change-oriented aims would have pitted it 
against those it sought to assist. For example, it proved difficult to implement alternative 
education, as van Dyk attested: 
There was a lot of pupil resistance. Pupils were angry at the guilt they 
felt when they realised the truth. It's hard to take people beyond this. It's 
a process and guilt is part of the process. Pupils felt frustrated, feeling 
'What am I supposed to do?' Also, there was total resentment at the 
mention of politics. I was quite frequently asked [in class] if it's 
al1owed.l79 
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If students resisted, all the more reason for teachers to resist, which they did by refusing to 
participate in any significant numbers.18o 
A second tension within white education experienced by ED ASA involved .apanheid 
education divisions. White teachers working in white schools formed an organisation, as 
Rossiter stated, " ... in response to the critical situation in black schools .... " 181 Therefore, 
van Dyk articulated a central dilemma: "You're organising people around ideas rather than 
around things that touch their lives." 182 
Thirdly, the "professionalism" of white teachers was more unassailable than that of 
teachers in black schools. The unchallenged position of the established white "professional" 
association, SATA, illustrated this. EDASA could not present a direct threat to SATA, so 
they did not attempt to. Although Rossiter claimed that ED ASA was formed, in part, " ... 
out of a frustration with the lack of response from the established teacher bodies in the 
'white' constituency ... ," 183 ED ASA presented a marginalized organisation in the face of 
SA TA' s acceptability within the ranks of English-speaking white teachers. This was 
illustrated in a number of ways, including EDASA's abortive walk-out at a 1987 SATA 
conference.l84 
While seemingly unable to successfully influence SATA, EDASA experienced a 
further restraint on its "unprofessional" influence by the white education department's tactic 
of denying EDASA any notice. The white department did not feel the need to respond in 
any way to EDASA, and therefore did not make an issue of EDASA which might have won 
it sympathy or credibility. According to van Dyk speaking in 1990, "We've been totally 
ignored by the Department. To this day they pretend not to know who we are. The other 
day an inspector asked me." 185 
EDASA did experience limited repression. Much of its third issue of Update was 
censored, and the issue was published covered in thick black lines. More significantly, 
Rossiter was detained. Van Dyk claimed that one of ED ASA 's main purposes was to 
provide a "support group for Gareth". This support took the form, in part, of a petition 
calling for his release signed by 430 people sent to the Minister of Law and Order.l86 Even 
within the realm of repression, however, ED ASA experienced contradictions unique to 
white education which hampered its influence on "professionalism". The lawyers acting for 
a teacher who was suspended from Pinelands High School for refusing to teach on 16 June 
asked EDASA not to publicly agitate against the suspension. Rossiter himself warned 
EDASA teachers at their 1986 AGM, in a style markedly different from WECTU or 
1
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DETU, "Whatever you do, don't get fired and don't quit.. .. Be careful, be realistic, take 
cognizance of the State of Emergency." 1M7 The political context of white schools remained 
markedly different from black schools, creating tensions within a white organisation which 
attempted to engage with the black education crisis. 
A final inhibiting factor which produced organisational tension in ED ASA 's attempts 
to influence "professionalism" concerned non-racialism. As with DETU and WECTU, in 
working towards a "just and democratic society", 188 ED ASA defined itself as "completely 
non-racial, not-sectarian, non-sexist. ... " 189 But the tension that ED ASA shared with DETU 
and WECTU was the nature of being constituted de facto a distinctly racial organisation 
espousing a non-racial philosophy. Rossiter wrote of ED ASA 's formation: 
The argument that the conditions in 'white' and private schools were so 
fundamentally different from those in other schools because of the nature 
of apartheid education that they constituted a special case was accepted. 
But the priority of being part of one non-racial teacher organisation was 
established. 
This contradiction has been at the centre of a tension in the 
organisation's programmes since.its inception.190 
That all three newly-formed progressive organisations desired the same end is clear. But 
the practical means available were not always acceptable, as WECTU, DETU and EDASA 
experienced initial difficulties in communications, relations, and mutual-acceptance. 
Influencing "Professionalism": 
A United Emergent Front? 
The three new teacher organisations desired teacher unity. Each in its constitution stated 
the goal of creating a national, non-racial teacher organisation. Unity would strengthen the 
influence of new ideas about teacher "professionalism II in teacher politics, and enhance the 
process of transition away from traditional teacher ideologies. The sociopolitical tensions 
experienced by each emergent teacher group, however, maintained the divisions between 
them. The tensions which inhibited a smooth transition away from traditional 
"professionalism" also prevented the formation of a united, "anti-professional" front which 
would significantly challenge the established teacher organisations-- in this case the CTPA, 
PENATA (ATASA), and the SATA. Although WECTU, DETU and EDASA attempted to 
forge unity in various ways during 1985-1986, their continued disunity illustrated 
continuing contradictions within teacher politics. 
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Continuing Divisions 
Why did three teacher organisations which formed in the same town at the same time, 
espousing nearly identical ideas and sharing a common vision of a non-racial education 
system, remain separate? The reasons were varied, and ret1ected the intluence of 
sociopolitical tensions on teacher politics. Primarily, the emergent groups did not unify in 
1985-1986 because of the legacy of institutionalized apartheid, and because of 
organisational weakness and sectarianism. 
Apartheid affected teacher politics in several ways, most importantly by fostering 
three separate Western Cape communities by enforcing physical separation. Conditions 
therefore differed greatly from townships such as Guguletu, to the neatly-planned Mitchell's 
Plain, to Observatory. Student attitudes towards school and teachers differed with varying 
school conditions, and with different, class-defined assumptions about education. 
Employment opportunities for matriculants from different areas, for example, differed 
markedly, especially as black unemployment rose. Also, levels of violence varied as 
township students battled police and white-area schools did not experience crisis. DETU 
Chairperson Shepherd Mdladlana, speaking at the first WECTU AGM, asked whether some 
teachers were too fearful to "cross the railway" line to experience the townships for 
themselves.l91 Contact on the ground is fostered by ordinary members moving between 
areas and organising away from home. 
Apartheid spawned separate education departments, which were enough to promote 
separate organisations. With decision-making authority devolved into separate 
administrations, not only were specific issues and complaints often dissimilar, but 
negotiations would have to take place on several fronts. Each organisation thus in practice 
confronted different teacher issues, different community issues and a different crisis born of 
differing circumstances. Also, practically it is much easier to work with teachers in your 
school and your neighbourhood. Importantly, students also organised within apartheid's 
communities, offering yet another pragmatic reason why apartheid worked to create three 
separate progressive teacher groups. 
Times of crisis exacerbated these differences, for organised teachers needed to 
respond to departmental actions and school-based situations. Progressive teachers 
mobilized at such times, but interest waned during lulls: at the moment when 
organisational activity was crying out for unity, teachers were too distracted; when relative 
peace and space made such unity possible, many progressive teachers were largely 
organisationally inactive because the sense of urgency had diminished outside of political 
crisis. 
Apart from the direct heritage of apartheid, there were other reasons why the three 
organisations formed and maintained separate identities despite their many common 
objectives. These related to organisational structure and style. Practically, the three were 
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too busy and too small to devout their over-stretched human and material resources to 
recruitment across "railway lines". The groups could barely maintain even limited 
recruitment initiatives within their own departments, relying more on the force of events 
and external pressures to prompt teachers to join. Ironically, too, once the three were in 
place, "turfs" were mapped out which meant unity had to occur at the level of 
organisational negotiations, rather than practically, on the ground.192 Gabru commented in 
his 1986 AGM address: "We have not been able to give meaningful support to the D.E.T. 
schools because of the existence of two separate teachers' organisations." 193 There were 
also often tense inter-organisational dynamics; teachers who forged their progressive 
groupings out of fraught circumstances -- especially as they battled to survive repression --
became attached to those groupings, and organisational pride developed. An EDASA 
informant spoke of "a lot of suspicion between DETU and WECTU", and DETU's 
Mbekwa spoke of "tensions" with WECTU: " ... they wanted.to swallow us. They were 
bigger." 194 Attached to such concerns was the difficult-to-quantify realm of leadership 
personalities. Some leaders, seeking a power-base either for reasons of personal power or 
in order to protect gains for their specific grouping in the context of UDF politics, were not 
keen to see that base evaporate. 
Finally, differing priorities, at times linked to ideology, kept the barriers up. Rossiter 
touched upon two such issues in his 1986 AGM speech: 
Both DETU and WECTU are, as their names indicate, unions. EDASA is 
not, and clearly not yet ready to be, a union.... Furthermore, apart from 
these unionist considerations, each of us operates in our own apartheid-
created education system, each with its own problems, and therefore 
. strategies. The cadets issue, for example, of central concern to EDASA 
teachers, is of less relevance to WECTU and DETU.195 
Ideological priorities also led to WECTU' s vehement rejection of what it saw as the 
CTPA 's "collaborationist" tactics, a less-important issue for DETU and EDASA insofar as 
"their" established organisations were concerned. Further, some WECTU members 
pointedly rejected EDASA as a collaborationist, white-liberal organisation. 
If these, then, are the various reasons for their separateness, what real attempts 
during 1985-86 were made to overcome them? 
WECTU and DETU 
As indicated above, WECTU's formation involved some African township-based teachers, 
an initiative which met with limited success, but which demonstrated WECTU's desire for 
unity with DET teachers. This tendency continued to be demonstrated after DETU 
emerged. There were meetings about whether the organisations should be distinct, 
192 Here it is interesting to compare the Western Cape Teacher Unity Forum's successful "unity in action" 
initiative during 1990 (see Chapter 7). 
· 193 Gabru, 5. 
194 Interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 August 1990; interview with Cheryl Schwikard, 8 May 1990. 
195 Rossiter, "AGM keynote address," 2. 
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meetings at which DETU argued that "township issues were separate", according to a 
WECTU member.I96 Mbekwa claimed that, "WECTU actually expected that we would 
join them .. ·.. Firstly, we needed to organise teachers in the townships, and not go there to 
be swallowed up. Then we could meet and form one organisation." 197 
DETU's concern about WECTU did not, however, promote conflict. "Almost 
immediately [after forming] we started having a working relationship with WECTU," stated 
a founding DETU member.I98 WECTU' s Desai described relations as "amenable" ,199 Both · 
informants concurred, however, and the record shows, that little joint activity took place. 
"Even when they marched to .Wynberg, we were never invited," said the DETU member. 
"In fact, we just saw that march in the press. "2oo DETU did attend a WECTU meeting on 
29 September 1986, along with the Eastern Cape Te£lchers' Union (ECTU) and two 
NEUSA regions, held "to co-ordinate a relief fund for teachers of the Eastern Cape .... " 
Though mainly concerned with the Eastern Cape issue, the meeting did give WECTU cause 
to report in its newsletter: "This was the first time that such a meeting had occurred, and it 
represents a step forward for progressive teacher organisation. "2o1 Both WECTU and 
DETU's rhetorical stances remained firmly committed to the principle of a progressive 
merger. WECTU' s March 1986 newsletter editorial looked forward to "The proposed 
union of WECTU and DETU and later ECTU. "2o2 At WECTU's May 1986 AGM, the 
chairpersons of both groups voiced commitment to unity. Gabru said: "Up till now we 
have paid lip service to the idea of one progressive teachers' union. The time has come for 
. WECTU and DETU to form one organisation and to begin to break down 'location' 
barriers in a meaningful way. "203 Mdladlana, an invited speaker, stated that, "Teacher 
unity is vital," a:nd also warned that when liberation dawned, "we must not be found 
wearing the jacket of racialism. "204 
DETU and EDASA 
Similarly amenable relations came about between EDASA and DETU, but their relationship 
was also devoid of joint actions. There were meetings between the two organisations. As 
Schwikard said: "We approached the [tirst] meeting with the greatest humility because we 
knew nothing and knew that they'd be suspicious. "205 If suspicions did exist between the 
two·organisations, they fell away. EDASA joined its progressive counter-parts as it 
pledged "solidarity ~ith the teachers of WECTU and UDETU [later DETU], and rededicate 
196 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
197 Interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 August 1990. 
198 Interview with informant D, 6 March 1990. 
199 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
200 ,Interview with informant D. 6 Man.:h 1990. 
201 "WECTU makes contact," WECTu new.1'lerrer 8 (October 1986): 4. 
202 "Editorial, • WECTU newslerrer 4 (March 1986): 5. 
203 Gabru, 5. 
204 "DETU's Comrade Shepherd." 12. 
205 Interview with Cheryl Schwikard, 8 May 1990. 
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ourselves to our goal of a single democratic teachers' organisation. "206 In 1987, EDASA 
and DETU would hold combined workshops and a social evening. DETU, generally, 
played an important role in bringing ED ASA into fold of the ~estern Cape progressive 
teacher organisations. "DETU forced it," said Rossiter.2o1 
WECTU and EDASA 
The barrier EDASA needed to overcome, that which needed to be "forced", was WECTU's 
refusal to accept EDASA as a credible group. During 1985 and well into 1986, EDASA 
did not appear in any of WECTU's literature,2os nor was it mentioned by Gabru in his 1986 
AGM speech. WECTU did not include EDASA in any of its progressive-union press 
statements. "It was very pointed," said van Dyk. "WECTU snubbed us at every given 
opportunity." For example, WECTU did not reciprocate ED ASA' s invitations to AGMs. 
The snub was an ideological one, based on some WECTU members' resistance to liberals 
and to "collaborators" in white schools. Practically, EDASA took an initially bold step 
towards a single union. "When WECTU started," stated van Dyk, "I went to see Yousuf 
[Gabru] and said we'd disband. Could we, as teachers in white schools, join? There was 
always debate, but no answer. "209 This did not prevent the ever-humble ED ASA from 
continuing its support for WECTU. An Update advertisement, for example, asked 
members to contribute to WECTU's fund for victimized teachers during the 1985 
examination chaos: "We urge you to support this fund as a sign of solidarity. "210 
Thus the three crisis-born organisations maintained separate identities, each committed to 
combine, none taking any real initiatives in this regard. In later years it could be claimed 
that unity efforts helped to revitalize flagging progressive unions. During 1985 and 1986, 
though, they were all fully occupied with their differing circumstances, despite similar 
long-term goals. 
nu Rocky Established Road 
Established teacher organisations in 1985-1986 felt the tensions which gave rise to the 
emergent teacher groups. The new groups institutionalized influences which were 
fundamentally altering teacher politics and teacher "professionalism". The established 
organisations, on the other hand, represented traditional "professionalism". The new 
teacher groups, students, communities and other elements of the liberation movement 
206 "Editorial," Update 2 (January 1986): 2. 
·2o? Interview with Gareth Rossiter, 5 March 1990. Schwikard (interview, 8 May 1990) has a slightly 
different account, claiming that "WECTU hegan relying on us for township contacts," and that EDASA 
played a role "getting WECTU and DETU together." This is not necessarily contradictory, for relations were 
clearly complex. 
20S See, for example WECTU newslerters and pamphlets from this early period. 
209 Interview with Pam van Dyk, 2 August 1990. 
210 "Show your support now!" Updare 2 (January 1986): 5. 
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challenged the established teacher organisations to engage in the process of transition away 
from a conventional "professional" ideology towards a new teacher "professionalism". 
Since the established Western Cape organisations -- the CTPA, PEN AT A, TASA and 
the SATA --had been built upon a "professional" ideology, however, they appeared 
incapable of dealing with this challenge within the context of their new political situation. 
The tensions created by the challenge manifested themselves in various ways within these 
organisations. As "professionalism" was being redefined by some teachers and elements of 
the liberation movement into an overtly-political, anti-state, non-racial, anti-elitist ideology, 
the established groups' previous actions and inaction became inappropriate. At times under 
immense pressure, the established organisations underwent some changes. Their underlying 
"professional" values, however, remained largely intact. 
Reasons for change 
It was during 1985 that two important developments occurred in the Western Cape: first, 
organised community involvement heightened; second, permanent, radical organisations 
sprang up. These were two pressures which, in part, caused the shift in stances that the 
established groups underwent. "It was only the impact of the popular insurgency of 1984-6 
... which finally caused a really fundamental re-orientation of teachers," writes Hyslop. He 
continues: "By 1986 every organisation of the profession stood, at least formally, on the 
side of the popular opposition movements. "211 Hyslop's insertion of "at least formally" into 
the above equation is important, for some of what has been regarded as "organisational 
shift" would be more aptly termed "leadership shift". These bodies take direction from the 
top. TASA's 1989 presidential change from Pat Samuels to Poobie Naicker, for example, 
brought about pronounced change in T ASA 's approach to teacher unity. With this 
important caveat in mind, we now ask the question, why did the established teachers' 
organisations experience the changes they did in 1985 and 1986? 
Primarily, the various pressures which prompted the formations of the progressive 
unions212 also affected the established bodies. Black Sash writer Helen Zille wrote of 
"considerable student anger" directed at "collaborators" in the form of members of ATASA 
and the CTPA.2t3 And Ian Moll, explaining how important student and community 
struggles were for the shift in ATASA, UTASA and TASA, stated: " ... school boycotts, 
and the mobilisation and politicization of the communities where their members lived, had 
started to change their political direction. "214 As a Western Cape NECC activist explained 
in 1990, "They didn't want to cut themselves off from the people they were serving .... 
They were also continuously isolated by the MDM. "21s 
211 Hyslop, "Teacher Resistance," 2. 37. 
212 EDASA and SAT A must be excepted from much of the following discussion. 
213 Zille, 6. 
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Conditions existed which forced the established organisations to critically confront 
their ideological assumptions. Previously acceptable behaviour became unacceptable as the 
political discourse changed, as definitions of acceptability altered, as the ground beneath 
them shifted. A central index of these s~ifts can be found in each group's relationship with 
their employing department. The established organisations' modus operandi was rendered 
ineffectual as the education system they worked for split, and their colleagues, charges and 
neighbours rejected them. They had to question their old methods. There was pressure, 
also, from within. The progressive unions wanted to undermine and perhaps replace the 
established associations. But even beyond this, the crises, placing teachers in new 
situations, changed their needs; as new demands were made of them, they looked to their 
organisations for new responses. In mid-1986 Hyslop wrote of, "The current political 
crisis, and the failure of existing 'professional' teachers' organisations to serve the needs of 
their members ... , "216 and Ken Hartshorne claimed that the established groups " ... are under 
pressure, particularly from their younger members, to take up a more militant stance of the 
kind adopted by the newer associations. "217 In the event, it was AT ASA' s Randal Peteni 
who summed up the predominant thinking within established organisations in mid-1985: "It 
is the old brigade like us who are irrelevant if we allow ourselves to become irrelevant. "218 
If the above highlights some motivations for change, what specific forms did the 
change take? During 1985-1986, the established organisations began to lessen their 
antagonism towards the emergent groups. They began to seek legitimacy within the 
popular resistance movement. Did their questioning of conventional "professional" 
ideology, however, lead to change in style of operation, or organisational behaviour? 
11ze Cape Teachers' Professional Association 
Elements of the liberation movement, including some teachers, challenged the traditional 
"professionalism" of the CTPA in 1985 and 1986. Previously "acceptable" teacher 
behaviour, based on traditions of race and class-consciousness, became unacceptable. The 
CTPA's traditions of cooperation with the state became an encumbrance. During 1985-
1986 the CTP A was forced to reassess its ethos. 
At the heart of this ethos was the CTPA 's conservatism. With over 20,000 members 
in the Western Cape region219 coming mainly from rural areas, with large resources and an 
entrenched leadership, nothing would be done to alienate members or to unseat leaders. 
The CTPA's activities remained within the law during 1985 and 1986, unlike progressive 
teacher groups which acted against an oppressive state under an Emergency. 
There were, however, both external and internal pressures for change. Generally 
speaking, as the Sunday Times reported without citing evidence in June 1985, " ... there is a 
216 Hyslop, "Teachers and Trade Unions," 91. 
217 Hartshorne, "Post-Apartheid Education," 120. 
218 Peteni, 37. 
219 The Weekly Mail, 18-24 October 1985. 
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mounting militancy within the CTPA, increasingly fuelled by younger members who want 
the organisation to take a more definite political stance on issues that affect the general 
black community and not only 'coloured' teachers: "22o The underlying premise was 
supported by historian Gavin Lewis. Pointing to a post-1948 erosion of the rule of law and 
a deterioration of the perceived legitimacy of the state, as well as BC and apanheid's 
undermining of the rights and privileges of Coloured elites, Lewis concluded: " ... the 
relevance of specifically Coloured political organisations has steadily declined .... (F]or the 
most part, mainstream Coloured politics has become subsumed within the broader black 
political movements. "221 These changes took shape in 1985 as dissatisfaction with the 
CTPA policy grew within its own ranks. 
The CTPA recognised that its past "professionalism" needed to be questioned. An 
editorial in the first half of 1986 stated: 
After 1985 South Africa and our schools will never be the same again. In 
a sense there is no returning to ' normal.' Our schools and our children 
are different and they will require a new kind of commitment and response 
from their teachers.222 
The organisation, however, with its strong "professional" traditions and close ties with the 
state, experienced this tension in a problematic way. Various tensions within the 
organisation illustrated that, although pressured to do so, the CTPA would not be able to 
shed the mantle of "professionalism" easily. 
The symptoms of a troubled time 
The CTPA posed many questions during 1985-1986, and it attempted to come to terms with 
the new student authority -- a direct challenge to "professionalism" -- and changed teacher 
politics. The difficulties the CTPA experienced in the face of changing teacher politics and 
pressure to redefine its notions of "professionalism" were demonstrated in different ways. 
The CTPA called various crisis meetings, at which the contradictory nature of its 
responses was apparent. The organisation felt the need to pass "confidence motions" to 
support its leadership. Such motions point to internal challenges and dissatisfaction. On 31 
August 1985, for the first time since 1980, the CTPA called an urgent "crisis" meeting in 
Athlone to discuss the situation in Coloured schools. Meeting one week after the formation 
of the CTCC, this 500-person meeting "identified" with the struggle against apartheid, was 
"disturbed" by detentions, and condemned the police invasion of school-grounds. The 
teachers present also pledged one day's salary to a fund for those teachers, students and 
parents who had suffered because of the unrest. By 14 March 1986, the fund had 
contributed almost R50,000 towards "legal costs, funeral and other crisis-related incidents," 
-220 Sunday Times, 16 June 1985. 
221 Lewis, 285. 
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reported the CTPA General Secretary, Paul Jordaan.22J At an emergency executive 
meeting at the beginning of October 1985, a motion of full confidence in Sonn was passed, 
and an appeal for students to return to classes to prepare for the year-end exams was 
made.224 
These meetings often ret1ected a "professional" contradiction within the CTPA. 
"Professionalism" implied an apolitical position. But how could an organisation working in 
black schools remain apolitical during 1985? The CTPA adopted a new public posture, 
which was primarily an attempt to regain lost credibility. The CTPA wanted to reassert 
itself within teacher politics, and the broader political sphere. There was, however, often 
disjuncture between its rhetorical stands and behavioural positions. Its public stance 
remained ambivalent. 
The following two extracts illustrate the ambivalence. The first is taken from Sonn' s 
1984 Conference presidential address: 
The CTPA cannot afford to become a political party or a political 
movement. When the governments proposals [in 1983, such as the White 
Paper in response to the De Lange Commission's report] became public 
we immediately and unequivocally rejecred the perpetuation of the present 
apartheid educarional sysrem in the new constitution. However, how the 
association's individllal members interpret and formulate the strategy to 
follow this principled declaration against apartheid in party political 
context, remains an individual right.225 
The second is part of a CTPA statement of its aims after 1985: 
Although the CTPA is not a political organisation it fully subscribes to the 
contention that politics and education cannot be separated from each other 
and is therefore committed to engage in such political matters that directly 
or indirectly have a bearing on education.226 
Its leaders held steadfastly to the public belief that it could not be a political party, but 
could engage in political action, a way of clinging to a "professional" idyll while being 
forced to behave in "unprofessional" ways. The first extract also points to a common 
CTPA contradiction: afraid to take decisions on boycott-related matters, it hid behind a 
screen of the autonomy of its members. In an organisation run from the top down, with 
members looking to their elected leadership for positions and direction, it is odd that these 
issues should suddenly be relegated back to individual members as an excuse for inaction. 
Apart from questioning, crisis meetings, confidence motions and public ambivalence, 
the symptoms of dissatisfaction within the CTPA took two particularly troublesome forms. 
First, break-away bodies began to emerge. In May, the Eastern Cape Teachers' Union 
(ECTU) was formed with about 200 teachers. ''They intend operating in opposition to 
22J Paul M. Jordaan, "The CTPA and the Challenges of the Eighties," address delivered at UWC. 14 March 
1986, 6; Sunday Times, 1 Septemher 1985. 
224 Cape Times, 11 October 1985. 
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CTP A in the Eastern Cape," reported the Sunday Times, "saying they have lost all 
confidence in the administration. "227 In June, the Cape Times reported that eighteen CTPA 
members had resigned in that area in protest against its handling of the school boycotts.22s 
The months of August and September brought WECTU onto the scene, confronting the 
CTPA with its failure to deal adequately with the crisis in the eyes of a substantial number 
·of teachers. September also saw the birth of the 148-member Paarl Teachers' Union 
(PTU). Though denying any opposition to the CTPA, its chairperson said: "The CTPA 
may have a branch in Paarl but it is not very active and teachers felt they had no platform 
from which to air their views. "229 It should be noted that the CTPA' s disagreements with 
the South African Council of Sports (SACOS), and its opposition to "non-racial" sport, 
were important issues for these new groups. 
The CTPA leadership responded defensively. The Cape Times quoted Sonn on the 
formation of ECTU: "A so-called new teachers' organisation in the Eastern Cape, if it still 
exists, is not a breakaway body from the CTPA. "230 Randall van den Heever, CTPA 
deputy president, adopted a similar attitude to the CTCC formation: "It is a matter of 
concern for us that these opposing teacher groups only mushroom during times of student 
unrest and then fall into dysfunction during times of relative calm. "231 A real concern was 
the threat to CTPA membership posed by three organisation in Cape Town, the Boland, and 
the Eastern Cape. This threat went some way towards influencing the internal debate about 
the CTPA 's "professionalism". 
The second troublesome form of internal dissent was the widely publicized leadership 
challenge, led by Vernon Pitt, at the June 1985 conference.232 Pitt lost his vice-presidency 
at the 1984 conference in George, and was subsequently approached by a "Committee of 
10" to challenge Sonn 's presidency, the first challenge since 1978. This nebulous group, 
the real size and power of which proved to be relatively small, cited its reasons for 
opposing the leadership: cooperation with the department, Sonn's "flirting" with the LP, 
the CTPA's opposition to SACOS, and the CTPA's unwillingness to take a public stand on 
the tri-cameral parliament. The last issue, raised at the 1984 conference, had been left 
unresolved and had raised wider criticisms of the CTPA leadership. Pitt's confidence was 
boosted before the 1985 conference after he defeated a CTPA regional vice-president by 
over 100 votes for the chair of the Mitchell's Plain region. "Mr. Pitt's supporters," 
reported the Sunday Times, "say they have unbridgeable differences with the Sonn 
administration. If they cannot replace it democratically, they say, they will consider 
starting a rival Western Cape teachers' association. "233 Another re-grouping of CTPA 
227 Sunday Ttmes, 19 May 1985. 
228 Cape Ttmes, 24 June 1985. 
229 Cape Ttmes, 28 September 1985; Argus, 25 September 1985; Herald, 26 September 1985. 
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teachers, which reportedly supported Pitt and his "shadow cabinet," called itself 
"Onderwysers in Gesprek". Convened by a teacher, Dennis Malgas, these 108 teachers 
discussed strategies to redirect the CTPA back towards teacher unity. 
At the 1985 conference, however, support for Pitt and his followers failed to 
materialise. Instead, in a well-orchestrated and heavy-handed way, the rival-group 
challenge was quashed. Pitt was outmaneuvered on the first day as van den Heever opened 
the conference with a lengthy denouncement of the leadership challenge, followed by a 
motion of full contidence in Sonn and the executive. Though the discussion took place in 
committee, the vote indicates that things had "gone badly" for Pitt: the motion passed 767 
to 14.234 The underlying theme of van den Reever's speech, and of later discussion, was 
loyalry. Loyalty had to be preserved at all costs. "In 1985 we were bogged-down by 
internecine strife from within," Sonn would later say. "In 1985 the CTPA Conference in 
Vredenburg was accordingly devoted to a purge of the organisation." In gathering itself to 
confront the new political challenges in that year, the CTPA also rejected the tri-cameral 
~ 
parliament, Pitt's central concern.2Js The "purge" was successful, since Sonn and his 
executive were returned to office after the voting had, for the first time, been barred to the 
press. The vote count was also not released. The Conference further mandated Sonn to 
apply a constitutional article against members who violated the organisation 1 s principles.236 
The message was clear: dissent would not be tolerated. But all was not entirely well, as 
the pre-conference publicity, the leadership 1 s heavy-handed tactics, and an unscheduled 
conference address by Sonn appealing for calm -- because "the situation had not normalized 
entirely"237 -- illustrated. The CTPA needed to cure both the symptoms-- such as the 
leadership challenge -- and the disease of cont1icted teacher politics. 
These internal tensions retlect the CTPA' s problematic position: embodying 
traditional "professionalism", and thus rejected by many students and some teachers, the 
organisation struggled to find a new, more acceptable place for itself within teacher politics. 
It was often accused of inaction during this time, but the CTPA did engage in some action 
which illustrated a tentatively shifting understanding of its "professional" position. 
Action and inaction 
During 1985-1986, the CTPA remained a "professional" body, invested with all the 
trappings of a traditional teacher association. It underwent two important shifts however: 
it became outspokenly political, even if this public stance contained contradictions; and, 
while committed to "professional" cooperation with the state, the CTPA weakened its ties 
with the DEC (HoR). During 1985-1986, the CTPA moved from its complete commitment 
234 Cape Times, 18 June 1985; Argus, 18 June 1985 and 3 July 1985. 
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to cooperation with the education department to a withdrawal from departmental structures 
in 1986. 
The CTPA, as a "professional" body, had much invested in the system of education as 
it stood. It could not simply reject it. Therefore, during 1985 it remained committed to 
working within the education system. 
Sonn's re-election at the June 1985 conference was heralded by the Cape Times as "a 
triumph for negotiation politics". They cited advances made in salary issues and in the 
position of married women teachers.238 An Educatio statement on the conference claimed: 
"The CTPA and UT ASA have rebuilt themselves on the basis that the way to destroy 
apartheid is by improving the abilities of people, through the educational process, rather 
than demeaning them through a denial of education. They also firmly resolved to 
negotiate, but never to collaborate. "239 This illustrated a changed position as the CTPA 
began espousing a policy of "non-collaboration", but it still remained committed to 
negotiations. And Sonn responded to a question at a UCT conference on teacher 
organisations in July 1985 with the words: " ... it is impossible not to negotiate with the 
authorities. "240 
The CTPA's negotiations took several forms. The CTPA met with various 
government officials throughout the 1985 unrest as their main tactic in attempting to solve 
the school crises. In March 1985, a CTP A delegation met with Hendrickse and Ebrahim 
about the Eastern Cape boycotts.24t On 12 November, Sonn --not as a mandated 
representative of the CTPA but as an educator of public stature-- was part of a delegation 
of educationists which met with P. W. Both a, de Klerk, Hendrickse and Ebrahim, a 
gathering condemned by the UWC SRC and WECTU .242 The meeting gave Both a the 
opportunity to announce that, "I have also told them that they have an obligation to combat 
leftist radicalism together with the government. "243 Regarding the department's treatment 
of teachers as the school-year came to an end, the CTPA executive were told in a meeting 
with the DEC Director of Education, Mr. A.J. Arendse, on 28 November that 
investigations conducted on a "sound professional basis" and "fair hearings" awaited the 
troublesome teachers.244 
The CTPA remained fully "professionally" invested in the state's education system in 
other ways as well. In a startling move in 1985, Hendrickse announced that Sonn and van 
den Heever and the CTPA secretary had been informed of the decision to close 465 schools 
under the DEC (HoR) in the light of continued disruptions, and had agreed to it. A 
UT ASA response -- perhaps UT ASA was seen as a greater authority -- confirmed that a 
CTPA delegation had been "summoned and informed" of the decision on 5 September. 
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The UTASA response went on ambiguously: "Because the police at the time were entering 
school premises at random and seriously assaulting and injuring teachers and pupils, the 
CTPA delegation could not deny that the situation had reached a critical stage. "245 The 
CTPA's close ties with the department did at times appear to extend beyond the realm of 
negotiating. Van den Heever, as principal of Spes Bona High School, was accused by a 
WECTU informant of giving the department names of teachers who refused to set 
examinations, and a teacher at Spes Bona was demoted for refusing to invigilate.246 
Though the latter was not a CTPA action, it is indica_tive of a leadership attitude, one 
reiterated as the CTPA called for students to return to classes. For example, on ll 
October, according to CTPA General Secretary Paul Jordaan, "the CTPA warned that a 
continuation of the school boycott was counter-productive, and urged pupils to return to 
classes to prepare for the forthcoming examinations. "247 
Part of the cooperation included the CTPA' s continued participation in departmental 
committees, as well as UTASA Is quarterly meetings with the director-general of 
administration in the HoR. The CTPA Is tentative, and then categorical, rejection of the 
department was its biggest step away from the "professionalism" of the past. Although an 
acceptable meeting was held with the director-general of administration in May 1985,248 
UTASA began "hinting" in August that the quarterly talks would discontinue unless they 
were taken more seriously by the director-general and his department.249 
Jn another illustration of the growing tension between the CTPA and its employing 
department, the CTPA used the courts to defend teachers. The first of two actions taken to 
the courts by the CTPA involved the l October regulations introduced by Ebrahim giving 
principp.ls great powers to expel teachers and students and prohibiting meetings at schools. 
WECTU, it will be recalled, opted to ignore the new regulations. The CTPA 1s application 
was successful, as the court found three of the five contested regulations ultra vires.2so The 
second case, unsuccessfully dismissed with costs by the Cape Town supreme court on 3 
January 1986, attempted to force the HoR education minister to allow students the 
opportunity to write supplementary examinations (a decision taken by the department in 
February). In its ruling, the court stated: "They [Ebrahim et at] were concerned first and 
foremost with educational considerations and fairness to pupils and their decision was the 
best one in a difficult situation." The CTPA 1 s decision to pursue the case was taken after 
an unsuccessful meeting with President Botha. 251 
These various indices of the trouble beneath the CTPA 1 s surface, and its growing 
dissatisfaction with the department, presaged the organisation 1 s momentous decision to 
break with its past and withdraw from all departmental committees. Accepted by eighty 
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percent of the delegates at its June 1986 conference in Kimberly, the "decision to distance 
ourselves from the Labour Party and the department" was taken, according to van den 
Reever, "because we realise we have to be in concert with the community. "252 Introducing 
the withdrawal resolution, van den Heever said, in marked contrast to earlier public stands, 
"All I succeeded in doing [by continuing involvement in departmental committees] was 
sugar-coating the apartheid pill. "253 The national body UT ASA also withdrew from 
government structures the next day by a margin of three to one.254 
In a discussion of the conference, the Repon of CTPA for NECC -- a document 
written in 1987 to facilitate discussion about the CTPA' s potential membership in the 
Western Cape NECC --claimed it "has been seen by CTPA as their signal to broad sections 
of the democratic movement of their wanting to make a decisive break from the past." The 
1986 Conference also reflected other policy shifts, such as a desire for government-ANC 
negotiations, and an "objective" approach to People's Education. Although the NECC 
Repon indicates that "CTPA is not being entirely open and honest about this shift, nor is it 
being forthcoming about its exact strength and the dynamics within the organisation," and 
that the CTPA had admitted the "withdrawal has not been as thorough as it sho1,1ld have 
been, "255 it was clear that there was a shift underway within the organisation. Because of 
its strength and size, because of its commitment to its own resources and identity, because 
of its conservatism, the shift could not be an easy nor a quick one. In 1985, expedience 
played a significant role. June 1986 marked the beginnings of action-specific changes, 
which would be followed during the years to come. 
PENATA 's Laborious Effort 
"We have been doing something, although it appears we have done 
nothing." 
Mr. Gqaji, PENATA Chairperson2s6 
Elements of the liberation movement working to redefine "professionalism" vehemently 
criticised PENATA during 1985-1986 for its inactivity. DETU was formed precisely 
because, its founder members claimed, PENATA proved incapable of responding to the 
traumatic township events. Thoroughly invested in traditional "professionalism", 
confronted by the new student authority at schools and by a new teacher union, PENA TA 
remained a passive subscriber to both its underlying "professional" ideology and the 
tentative shifts away from "professionalism" experienced by ATASA, to ~hich it was 
affiliated. Although maintaining a low public profile during 1985-1986, PENATA 
experienced ambivalence born of new tensions in teacher politics. Comprised mainly of 
252 South, 3 July 1987. 
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principals and primary school teachers, PENATA barely responded to the new challenges to 
its "professional" posturing, and emerged from these troubled years with a commitment to 
traditional "professionalism" only slightly tempered by AT ASA Is public transition. 
PENATA 's "professionalism" 
Historically, PENATA was committed to negotiation with the DET, and avoided "political" 
involvement. Even in 1990 Gqaji defended the DET: claiming that PENATA was taking a 
"professional and procedural" approach to student complaints, he implied that students were 
too hurried in their expectations, for the "Department had a planned system" and was 
simply "taking time to respond to (AT ASA Is] resolutions." 
PENATA took its "professional" cues from its parent body, ATASA. Gqaji 
explained how "through ATASA, PENATA forwarded grievances to the department". 
PENATA, at its own conferences, typically enacted resolutions on pre-primary education, 
or in-service education, or the Uluntu Centre, for example, before submitting memoranda 
to the DET. DETU teachers sharply criticized PENATA 1 S style of operation. "PENATA 
is made up of principals, and led by principals," said a DETU executive member. "They 
side with the state. Very few principals are progressive. "257 Another DETU executive 
member added in 1990 that the PENATA executive had been the same for a long time, and 
with the absence of democratic elections was not accountable to its members,258 who 
numbered around 1575.259 
Impetus for change 
Various forces during 1985-1986 challenged PENATA to look beyond its traditional 
"professional" understanding of teachers I position within society and teacher politics. 
Deteriorating credibility in the eyes of students and the community clearly concerned 
members and leaders of PENATA, as it did the CTPA. "We were really humiliated 
[during 1985]," claimed Basie Nikani, PENATA 's regional organiser. "We were publicly 
embarrassed by students." More dangerous threats awaited PENATA members, however, 
within the violent realm of township politics. In 1985, some PENATA members had their 
houses burned down. "We risked our lives," continued Nikani, who expressed a fear "of 
being stoned to death" during those years. Such fears pointed to a great antagonism 
between students and PENATA, and antagonism heightened with the formation of DETU. 
PENATA insisted that DETU worked in collusion with students, spurring them on to be 
ever-more unpleasant to members of PENA T A. The launch of DETU was itself another 
pressure upon PENATA to reject its past "professionalism", just as WECTU, ECTU, and 
the PTU pressurized the CTPA. Nikani said that immediately after the 1985 "splinter 
groups" formed, "We saw it was time to focus on the crisis of education generally.... The 
257 Interview with informant D. 6 March 1990. 
258 Interview with informant C, 18 October 1990. 
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demands of the time, the demands of history and of politics are such that we've got to focus 
on more than just professional matters. "260 What DETU did for PENATA locally, 
NEUSA, a strong force in the Transvaal, did for ATASA nationally. 
The SPCC/NECC, as early as the end of 1985, further prompted ATASA to move 
away from its conventional "professional" stance. The SPCC/NECC decided to include 
ATASA in its consultations and structure. "We recognise ATASA as the major 
representative of teachers in South Africa," stated Ihron Rhensburg, "with 54,000 members 
nationally. "261 Eric Molobi explained: "The NECC believes that the ordinary membership 
of ATASA is not hostile and needs to be brought closer to progressive ideas." He further 
said, " ... to cut links completely with AT ASA would be tactically incorrect. We can never 
throw willing allies into the hands of the enemy. "262 
Ambivalence and change 
These challenges to PENATA's apolitical "professionalism" had some effect. At first, 
PENATA responded with ambivalence. Gqaji, for example, described a meeting called by 
PENA TA at the Uluntu Centre in 1985 to discuss student grievances. The meeting was 
unable to resolve on two central plaints: the harassment of students by teachers, and 
embezzlement of school funds. Particularly, he claimed, the issue of harassment divided 
those present, with some asking whether harassment really occurred. While the meeting 
was called to address student grievances within the turbulent political climate, PENA T A 
proved incapable of responding effectively. With this indecision PENATA illustrated a 
fundamentally ambivalent political position in a time of crisis.26J 
With such underlying ambivalence, PENATA and ATASA focussed on their public 
image rather than on substantial change or action. ATASA President Randall Peteni said in 
his January 1985 conference address: 
Most [political] leaders do realise that a teacher is a professional person 
and cannot be expected to stone or burn up buses and private cars and 
school buildings and private homes. But a teacher must be politically 
conscious and capable of interpreting political trends and public events in 
a way that will not antagonise his students. A teacher should never be an 
informer ... 
Our activities should not seem to be limited to music competitions and 
beauty contests alone, but should be extended to activities directed to the 
alleviation of suffering. Such activities will surely contribute to the 
improvement of the image of the teacher and the teacher's organisation.264 
Further, Peteni stressed at the UCT conference on teachers' organisations that Security 
Branch visits to various officials had "constantly reminded the organisation that we are 
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skating on thin ice."265 In a similar vein, Gqaji claimed in 1990 that, "At principal 
meetings, PENATA principals are always attacking the department. "266 Such claims 
illustrated AT ASA and PEN AT A Is desire for public credibility in the eyes of groups 
antagonistic to the state. 
With various pressures acting upon ATASA, and tiltering down into PENATA Is local 
issues, shifts began to move these established organisations beyond ambivalent posturing. 
Members began to agitate from within the organisations. At AT ASA Is January 1985 
conference, claimed Peteni, a few delegates suggested militant action, but this was not 
accepted. "Nevertheless," he said, "the mood of our members, especially the younger 
members, was that the teachers' association should adopt militant methods to supplement 
the usual methods of memoranda and deputations to the Education Department. "267 
Organisational activity did begin to change. In Cape Town, limited PENATA actions 
included an August 1985 statement released by Gqaji in the name of PENATA calling on 
police to stay off school-grounds because of the provocative nature of such acts.268 Then, 
in October, PENATA publicly supported the decision of matriculants not to sit for their 
final examinations, saying that preparation had been wholly inadequate due to 
disruptions.269 In March 1986, PENATA took up another student grievance by decrying 
"the quality and methods of allocation of free stationary supplied to black schools." The 
Argus reported: "An investigation by PENATA teachers found that the DET's method of 
allocating and distributing stationary differed from that of coloured, Indian and white 
education authorities. "27o 
Meanwhile, nationally A TASA had been strengthening its ties with the broader 
liberation movement, motivated largely from the top in the form of Peteni and Dlamlenze, 
both of whom worked within the SPCC. The cooperation between ATASA and the SPCC 
led to the Soweto principals' November 1985 decision not to administer examinations. 211 
Beyond this, as the Transvaal regional report to the December SPCC conference made 
clear, "ATASA wants to work more closely with other organisations. ATASA was closely 
involved in consulting with parents and students for drawing up the new SRC constitution. 
They also played a major role in negotiating with DET to accept the new [SRC] 
constitution. "272 
ATASA's January 1986 conference in Durban was necessarily held at a time of great 
questioning within the organisation. While the leadership asked the members to stop being 
"apolitical", there was general agreement with Peteni at the conference: "We must not only 
dabble in politics as far as the State is concerned, as we have done for a number of years, 
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but we must also concern ourselves with the political struggle of the masses." At the same 
time, the City Press reported in 1991, "The conference also discussed and explored 
strategies for AT ASA' s survival as a viable and relevant teachers' association which at the 
same time will retain its professionalism and independence. "273 Although there was change 
in policy at the executive level, in 1990 Gqaji was still reiterating these sentiments, 
expressing views reminiscent of the CTPA's: "PENATA is non-aligned. We must be 
neutral. As educators we must only be there to educate. The question of ideology must be 
a personal issue. "274 
Whether unaligned or independent, and whether or not members were to make their 
own political stands, ATASA as a whole withdrew from all DET committees and councils 
on 12 March 1986. It severed its traditional ties with the state "until," its statement read, 
"there is genuine power-sharing in South Africa. "275 It then, according to Hyslop, "began 
to support political calls to action. "276 For example, it supported the 1 May 1986 stay-away 
call.277 
Though the organisation, both nationally and locally, was undergoing a clear shift, 
"professional" ambivalence remained. Peteni illustrated an aspect of this at the UCT 
conference: 
The teachers' assoctatwn has to seek out the leaders of students' 
organi"sations and talk and negotiate with them and try to understand their 
viewpoints and help them to attain those demands which the association 
regards as reasonable and attainable. Perhaps such negotiation and 
possible co-operation may help to bring about some restraint in the 
students' action and the methods they adopt.278 
Peteni was not discussing a democratic partnership. Rather, he exhibited, as did Gqaji in 
1990, the vestiges of a paternalistic "professionalism", one that promoted inactivity. And 
one, clearly, shared by many or most of AT ASA' s members. Chisholm wondered in 1986, 
"whether this shift in AT ASA' s public position represents a fundamental change of attitude 
among its membership, or to what extent it is leadership rhetoric. "279 In a similar light, 
Hyslop pointed to the central issue: " ... this shift has not been accompanied by any shift 
toward more participatory and democratic forms of organisation within these [established] 
bodies. It seems reasonable, therefore, to doubt AT ASA' s ability to transform itself from 
within. "280 The transformation begun in 1985 remained image-related. Though AT ASA, 
like the CTPA, took several overt steps to declare its opposition to the state's handling of 
the education crisis, and education generally, the aura o(apolitical _"profess~onalis~ still X. 
hung thickly over the association. It was an aura which contained undemocratic practices --
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the established organisations operated on patronage systems, and vested much power in 
their leaderships which were not in the habit of consulting members -- and material self-
interest, both of which fundamentally contradicted the ideals of the mass democratic 
movement it sought to join. 
The Teachers' Association of South At!ica 
TASA, like the CTPA and PENATA, had a history of cooperation with state structures. As 
President Pat Samuels said at the 1985 UCT conference, "Basically it [TASA] tries to 
protect the quality of the [school] programmes largely by way of the well considered 
resolutions it takes on, among others, [sic] pre-service and in-service education." Samuels 
differed from his colleagues in the other established organisations in that, in mid-1985, he 
publicly maintained a reactionary stand. For example, at a time when large sections of the 
democratic movement espoused non-racialism, he spoke of schools as places where people 
are "initiated into their cultural milieu and into traditional behaviour". He also spoke of 
" ... the Indian teachers' sense of community responsibility .... " Further, in an era 
challenging the state's authority and education structures, he said: "People who talk about 
a single Ministry of Educq.tion are wasting their time because they cannot attain it until the 
whole political system collapses." Most tellingly, when other leaders' papers focussed on 
crises, only after five pages on in-service training and service conditions did he begin the 
final, salutary half-page: "Lastly, I want to make a point or two about the role of the 
teachers' association in school boycott situations. "281 
Students in Indian schools outside of Cape Town were generally not behaving in 
militant ways, nor were they burning down TASA members' homes. Also, T ASA was 
successfully upholding its top-down leadership style. Samuels himself said in 1989 that the 
reversal of TASA' s top-down decision-making style was the organisation's "biggest 
challenge in the next five years" .2s2 What internal pressure there existed from ordinary 
members was minimal, with no splinter groups apparently pressurizing the organisation 
during 1985-1986. 
But the general education turmoil did not leave TASA unaffected. Elements of the 
liberation movement concerned with teacher politics elicited some response, though T ASA 
managed to cling more securely than the CTPA and ATASA to its entrenched attitudes and 
style. As early as January 1984, though, it called for a judicial commission of inquiry into 
education, a call which involved contact with the state president, a signatures campaign, 
and a mass meeting. In 1984, also, TASA rejected the tri-cameral parliament.283 
In 1985, T ASA began to demonstrate a growing alienation from the department it 
worked within. TASA, in May, pressed for the abolition of matriculation examinations in 
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favour of "accreditation on a continual basis" .284 TASA also became involved in a court 
case against the DEC, HoD, after the Rylands High School episode in Cape Town 
involving eleven dismissed and fourteen transferred teachers. In 1986, T ASA lost the court 
case for the reinstatement of its Rylands teachers, but continued with its few public stands 
taken in opposition to the worst of aparrheid education. With Poobie Naicker as acting 
president for a short while in 1986, TASA submitted a request to the Indian Ministers' 
Council to declare 16 June a national holiday for Indian schools. The council denied the 
request, but TASA still took out advertisements in newspapers across the country a few 
days before 16 June asking all people to observe 16 June as a "Solemn Day of Prayer and 
fasting/abstinence. "285 It was in October 1986 that it began a lengthy campaign in 
opposition to education-spending cutbacks and possible retrenchment of teachers. In 
November a public meeting on this issue included a large number of community 
organisations. 286 T ASA also raised R75, 000 for victims of trouble-torn Phoenix and 
Inanda. Then, sparked by the growth of Cape school unrest, T ASA held a mass meeting on 
19 September in Durban. The meeting, however, examined the rights of teachers rather 
than student grievances.2s1 
TASA was not enured to the dynamics whirling around it as it also became involved 
in broader political issues, albeit in acceptable, "professional" ways. Though focussing 
almost exclusively on matters of self-interest, its 16 June and tri-cameral parliament stands 
indicated a willingness within the organisation to speak out about inequities, about matters 
of serious concern to the broader liberation movement. Such· stands foreshadowed the more 
complete organisational turn-around that was to come in 1989 during the national teacher 
unity initiative. 
The South African Teachers' Association 
Not surprisingly, SAT A did not feel the heat of 1985 to the degree that its counterparts did. 
In fact, rather than student or community pressure, SATA' s marginal "professional" shifts 
came about as a result of its contacts with black teachers' organisations as well as the thread 
of liberalism within it. It was in 1983 that SAT A first publicly rejected apartheid, after 
cajoling from the CTPA, at its conference: "Recognising that the present dispensation 
presents insuperable obstacles in working towards equal opportunities for all the children of 
our land, the S.A.T.A. condemns apartheid as detrimental to education in South Africa. "288 
This condemnation was part of what past-President John Stonier described as "a 
steady move of the association ... to the reality of the injustice". However, Stonier pointed 
out in 1990, "SATA could accommodate conservatives and liberals within it.. .. It could 
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never be a political party. "289 In concluding a 1985 survey of Natal Teacher Society (NTS) 
members -- NTS is SAT A's Natal counter-part, and similarly inclined ideologically --
Indicator SA reported: "The majority position in the English teacher fraternity is one of 
commitment to reform, but along gradual lines and with safeguards. "290 Still, SAT A's 
condemnations kept emerging from its conferences. In 1984 it called for a single ministry 
of education. In 1985 it called, delicately, for open schools. In 1986 it forthrightly 
demanded the repeal of the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act.291 
Of these, it only acted upon the "open schools" issue, setting up a sub-committee 
which produced a thorough discussion document in 1986.292 Clearly, while desiring a kind 
of liberal solidarity with black organisations,293 its activity did not bear this out. During the 
1985 boycotts, for example, SATA publicly condemned the closing of DEC (HoR) schools 
by Ebrahim, and then publicly welcomed their re-opening,294 but it otherwise remained 
quiet. 
With the formation of the statutory Teachers' Federal Council (TFC) in 1986, SAT A 
" demonstrated its entrenched commitment to traditional "professionalism" premised on race 
and class divisions. The TFC was a combination of the constitutional South African 
Teachers' Council for Whites ;:1nd a voluntary federation comprising eight white teacher 
organisations. It had statutory recognition. Its leaders were proud of this white body. 
Alan Powell, a TFC vice-president, spoke of the TFC's legal status: "we have to be 
consulted when any educational matters are discussed." He further stated that the TFC "is 
a professional body that does not cow-tow to the government". 295 SAT A's initial position 
within the TFC remained ambiguous. Though clearly a reactionary apartheid body, the 
TFC provided a national home for SATA. A resolution, adopted at SAT A's 1986 
conference, adequately expressed the ambiguity: 
Conference directs the General Committee to make a public statement at 
the time of the parliamentary debate on the T.F.C. bill expressing 
S.A.T.A. policy that the constitution of the 'own affairs' Teachers' 
Federal Council is unacceptable to this Association but that to meet 
essential short term needs of its members, the S.A. T.A. will participate in 
this body. 296 
The SATA was clearly adrift in its own world, with the turbulent township chaos not 
impinging on much besides healthy liberal consciences. Its tradition of "professionalism" 
remained strong. 
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Troubled Relations Between the Emergent 
and Established Groups 
The conflictual relationships between established and emergent teacher organisations in the 
Western Cape clearly illustrated the continuing contradictions within teacher politics as 
traditional "professionalism" was challenged and redefined. 
WECTU and the CTPA 
"The difference between the CTPA and WECTU," said the CTPA vice-president, "is not as 
great as its made out to be." The difference rested, he continued, on· two points: 
collaboration versus non-collaboration (as firmly rooted in the Western Cape's Unity 
Movement/Congress split); and style of operation.297 
The difference, thus, can be seen in the context of ongoing debates around unions as 
opposed to professional associations. "WECTU would like to see the teacher as a worker," 
said van den Heever. "We would like to see· the teacher as a professional."298 The CTPA, 
as we have seen, had much invested in its traditions, which were not the traditions of 
militant politics. 
From its inception, WECTU perceived the CTPA as a main antagonist. A WECTU 
informant explained that there was "a strong reaction, and over-reaction, to CTPA people 
as collaborators". 299 Gabru, in fact, believed that WECTU' s actual replacement of the 
CTPA was "everybody's fear and hope".3oo WECTU attempted to get UTASA excluded 
from the March 1986 NECC conference, and at its Western Cape launch in 1987, the 
NECC apparently excluded the CTPA on WECTU's prompting. 
_WECTU could put.pressure on the CTPA largely because it had powerful allies in 
the student-youth movement and within community organisations. But the progressive 
organisations did not collectively pressurize the established bodies. Apartheid had worked. 
Communication between Coloured areas and African townships and white areas proved 
difficult. While WECTU waged its campaign against the CTPA, a similar battle was taking 
place in Cape Town's African townships. 
DETU and PENATA 
The driving impetus behind PEN AT A's decision to more fully engage in the education 
crisis was the launch of DETU. "DETU is a break off of PENATA," explained a DETU 
executive member. "PEN AT A could not address the demands of the people, the demands 
of the students. "301 
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When DETU was fully established, there was much animosity. "There was quite a 
lot of animosity, uneasiness," said a PENA TA informant, "when teachers broke from 
another teachers' body." He continued: "DETU wanted society to destroy PENATA. "302 
A DETU informant concurred: "We were quite enemies at that time. "303 
Gradually, tolerance prevailed. There was, for example, the joint action taken on 
behalf of dismissed teachers in 1986, when a combined delegation visited education 
minister Sam de Beer. There were also executive-level meetings. "It's important," said a 
DETU executive member, "for Africans to be together. "304 In 1988, Jonas would state: 
"The unity or alliance talks between PENATA and us is the result of common problems we 
experience with DET .... Initially we had communication problems with PENATA but these 
have been resolved. "3os By 1988, PENATA and DETU could embark on joint campaigns. 
A DETU executive member said in 1990, "PENATA's rank and file work well with 
DETU. In fact, I thought by now we'd have one organisation. "306 The continued existence 
of sel(arate organisations illustrated the ongoing contlict over "professionalism" in teacher 
politics, as well as leadership rivalry. 
EDASA and the SA TA 
While rapprochement seemed to be a possibility in township schools, the same could not be 
said for the established white teacher body and the newly-formed, progressive EDASA. 
This relationship differed greatly from th~ others under discussion in that EDASA claimed 
never to have set itself up in opposition to SATA. "We clearly couldn't offer the same 
things," said one ED ASA stalwart.307 In fact, some ED ASA members were active SA TA 
members. At least one executive member was the SAT A representative for her school. 
Another EDASA member claimed that, "There was no tension between SATA and 
EDASA. "308 
EDASA, however, never earned the respect of SATA. A formal break took place at 
the SATA centennial conference in 1987. "About 20 members of the South African 
Teachers' Association (SATA) have resigned," reported The Argus, "because of 
dissatisfaction with Sata' s decision to remain an affiliate of the Teachers' Federal Council 
[as opposed to pulling out in protest against apartheid education]. "309 The twenty members 
belonged to EDASA. The resignations, it turned out, were a media invention, but the 
incident pointed to differing strategies: "They thought of us as young Turks," said van 
Dyk.3IO Even in 1990, a senior SAT A member did not mention ED ASA amongst the group 
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of teachers' organisations participating in the Western Cape Teacher Unity Forum 
initiative.3tt 
ED ASA did not threaten SA TA organisationally, in terms of membership. But 
SATA' s failure to overtly recognise ED AS A, and its patronizing attitude to the fledgling 
organisation, indicated discomfort with the "unprofessional" attitude of EDASA. 
Teacher Unity 
Amidst the turmoil of 1985, with organisational rifts and splits, and acrimonious exchanges 
between teacher organisations, teacher unity was low on teachers' agendas-- this despite 
explicit and growing commitment to the ideal of a united teachers' body. 
There were, however, movements towards unity. After the establishment of the 
emergent teacher groups, teacher unity assumed significant proportions within the debate 
around "professionalism". A uni tied emergent front would enhance their influence within 
teacher politics, while federal unity amongst established associations would strengthen the 
position of traditional "professionalism". Either way, the movement towards a new 
"professionalism" would be more strongly dictated by whichever grouping could unite. 
Further, the shape of unity across the emergent-established divide would demonstrate the 
direction of evolving "professionalism". 
As soon as the progressive organisations were born talk of unity began. As we have 
seen, however, a few organisations recognised that their own best interests lay in 
maintaining separate identities to maintain "professionalism" premised on race and class 
divisions. Nevertheless, social and political forces began working, as early as 1985, to 
bring teachers together. 
The emergent organisations' vehemently protested against the presence of established 
bodies at the initial SPCC and NECC conferences. In December 1985, A TASA, NEUSA, 
WECTU, DETU and ELPTU attended the SPCC conference, and there were "deep 
conflicts between the traditional and the progressive teachers' organisations".312 At the 
Durban conference three months later, the progressive bodies threatened to walk out 
because of ATASA and UTASA's attendance.313 An item in the May 1986 WECTU 
newsletter explained: 
WECTU, together with teachers from the other progressive organisations 
(DETU, ECTU, ELPTU and NEUSA) protested against the presence of 
AT ASA, UTASA and TASA at the conference. 
A meeting was held with the NECC executive to object to the presence of 
these organisations. The progressive teachers organisations insisted that 
these reactionary organisations should leave the hall, because of their past 
record of having been obstructive to the democratic movement in 
311 Interview with Mike Reeler, 2 April 1990. 
312 Moll, "Towards one South African teachers' union," 64-65. 
313 Moll, "Towards one South African teachers' union," 67. 
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education and their collaborationist policies, assisting in the victimisation 
of teachers and students at schools. 
The NECC executive was opposed to this. After deliberation a 
compromise was reached and it was agreed that a statement should be read 
condemning the presence of these organisations.J14 
The NECC's role in achieving a compromise illustrated their commitment-- discussed 
above -- to drawing the established bodies into their fold. As expressed in the resolutions 
of the March 1986 conference: " ... there is an urgent need for a United, Democratic, 
National teachers' organisation and that no one should handicap the development of unity 
among teachers. "315 A TASA representatives, Dlamlenze and Peteni, were invited to 
participate in the December SPCC conference. "We recognize A TASA as the major 
representative of teachers in South Africa, with 54,000 members nationally," said 
Rhensburg. "Our opinion at the March conference was that it would be tactically important 
to recognize ATASA. "316 
The NECC, a prime mover in foste~ing teacher unity, took some direction from other 
groups within the democratic movement. "Until one [teachers'] union somehow subsumes 
these different bodies in accordanc£~ with COSATU policy," wrote Muller, "the NECC will 
have to find ways of achieving some measure of collaboration between the bodies perhaps 
by means of teacher workshops. "317 During 1985 and 1986, the UDF was also actively 
foregrounding teacher unity .318 
Such political groups were eager to strengthen their own positions by influencing 
teacher unity. With powerful social forces behind them, their task was easier than it had 
been before. 
Even so, the obstacles would prove insurmountable dur_ing 1985-1986. As a Western 
Cape NECC activist said of established-emergent unity, "In '84-'85 that would have been 
wishful thinking. "319 Stonier of SATA articulated an established attitude: "Progressive 
unions can shout and make the right noises to satisfy a very specific constituency,~ while 
traditional organisations fought wage negotiations with the departments. "320 The 
established bodies clearly considered themselves legitimate. On the other hand, relations 
were rendered even more intractable by a common emergent attitude, expressed by a 
WECTU executive member: "The CTPA was seen as evil. It was a moral response [from 
WECTU], not a strategic one. "321 
314 WECTU newsletter 5 (May 1986): 4. 
3t5 "Resolutions of the National Consultative Conference on the Crisis in Education, Durban, March 1986," 
in People's Education, 41. 
316 Obery, 10. 
317 Muller, 112. Emphasis added. 
318 Moll, "Towards one South African teachers' union," 67. 
319 Interview with informant E, 5 March 1990. 
320 Interview with John Stonier, 20 August 1990. 
321 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August 1990. 
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Such attitudes became further entrenched by separate unity initiatives attempted within 
both camps.n2 Progressive unity efforts were described above. Meanwhile, established 
bodies worked together. On 26 March 1985, for example, UTASA, ATASA, TASA and 
the TFC met with Botha over civil service austerity measures.J23 Also in 1985, the white, 
Afrikaans-speaking teacher body in the Western Cape, the SAOU, called a meeting of the 
established organisations at the Holiday Inn focussing on subject teaching.n4 
Conclusion 
Although a united grouping of teacher organisations would have greatly influenced the 
politics of teacher "professionalism", unity efforts remained tentative during 1985-1986. 
The emergent groups challenged the established groups' traditional "professionalism", and 
worked to relocate teachers in relation to their political and educational spheres. The 
established associations responded tentatively, emphasizing public stands to regain lost 
credibility. For all groups, however, a significant alteration of teacher politics had begun. 
Teacher unity would play an important role in institutionalizing and directing this alteration. 
The organisations and forces which influenced teacher politics, including the emergent 
groups, would eventually afford the limited success of the Harare initiative described in the 
next chapter. 
322 It should be noted that the constituencies were not identical, since established groups worked largely in 
primary schools, whereas the smaller emergent bodies did not. See, for example, "Primary Problems, • 
WECTU newsletter 3 (January 1986): 17. 
323 Cape Times, 26 and 27 March 1985. 
324 Interview with Kenny Ernest, 8 May 1990. 
CHAPTER SIX 
PLAClNG UNITY ON THE AGENDA, 1987-1988 
Events during 1985-1986 significantly intluenced teacher politics in the Western Cape, and 
in South Africa. The emergent unions, formed at that time, reclaimed legitimacy for 
teachers in a changed political context. The confrontational resistance movement no longer 
accepted the "professionalism" of established teacher organisations. The emergent teacher 
groups, with the support of broad sections of the liberation movement, changed the 
discourse within teacher politics as they redetined the "professional" locations of teachers in 
apartheid South Africa. 
It was a time of heightened tensions and antagonism within teacher politics as the new 
groups and new ideas confronted the old. It was also a time of intense political contlict in a 
broader societal context. This contlict lessened in the years which immediately followed, 
from 1986 to 1988. South Africa entered a period which historian Tom Lodge·has termed, 
"The rebellion disarmed. "1 During this relative lull in political struggle, as the state 
suppressed much resistance activity, teacher unity appeared as a firm, practical goal within 
teacher politics. 
The years 1987-1988 were thus significant because the goal of teacher unity entered 
the discourse and actions of teacher organisations. Teacher unity was a means to bolster 
particular teacher voices within teacher politics, as some organisations moved away from 
traditional "professionalism" and others upheld it. In 1987, two distinct unity initiatives 
began: Emergent teacher organisations in the Western Cape began unity efforts amongst 
themselves, and then joined a national, "progressive" unity initiative. This "progressive" 
unity articulated a new "professional II discourse in line with the liberation movement. 
Simultaneously, national unity talks began amongst established teacher associations 
maintaining conventional "professionalism II, even if in a slightly revised form. 
In 1988, however, historical forces allowed the beginning of unity across the 
emergent-established divide. Compromise, rather than mutual rejection, began to enter the 
discourse of teacher politics, largely intluenced by elements of the liberation movement. 
When the ANC, amongst others, called both emergent and established teacher organisations 
to Harare in April 1988, a process of compromise around a new "professionalism", 
involving new understandings of teachers' location in society and in schools, began. 
Sociopolitical forces, and the strength of certain liberation organisations, allowed the new 
teacher discourse to be intluenced primarily by the smaller, emergent teacher unions. 
Although their newer "professional II language was dominant, they also participated in a 
remarkable cooperation between the emergent and established groups. This cooperation 
was, not surprisingly, problematic, and will be fully explored in Chapter Seven. But the 
1 Lodge, 87. 
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unity born in 1987-1988 broke the template of divisiveness that was characteristic of the 
preceding two years, and marked substantial change in "professional" discourse amongst 
teacher organisations. 
This chapter will begin by exploring the political context which influenced teacher 
politics in 1987-1988. The tensions within Western Cape education will then be explored 
with reference to the emergent and established teacher groups in each education department, 
before focussing on the teacher unity initiatives begun within these separate groups. 
Finally, the Harare conference will be contextualised, and its implications for teacher 
politics will be discussed. 
The Political Context 
If 1985 was considered by many to be a year of political and educational promise, the years 
which immediately followed were disappointing to many activists. The 1986 return to 
school, bolstered by the ANC 's message to the SPCC conference, was a tactical retreat. As 
one student leader said: "It was a mistake to believe we could wage the struggle on our 
own. We had to adapt our tactics to be sure that our parents would be with us:"2 
. As the State of Emergency began, resistance organisations were forced back into 
tactics of surviva\.3 "The official state attitude was perceptibly hardening," wrote Johan 
Muller.4 The Emergency, bannings and detentions continued. In November 1986, for 
example, an Emergency amendment allowed police bannings of indoor gatherings without a 
magisterial order. s 
Since a primary focus of mass resistance continued to be the schools, teachers 
continued to be affected. Specifically, too, according to Hartshorne, there were "attempts 
to control and limit teachers' associations" .6 According to a teacher in Soweto, inspectors 
continued to blame teachers for the havoc in schools. A Soweto principal claimed, in 1986, 
"I have turned into something less than a whimpering puppy. "7 Michael Ashley, while 
discussing black respondents he had interviewed for his 1989 book Ideologies and 
Schooling in South Africa, wrote that they thought: "Teachers in particular needed to be 
reminded of the importance of their opinions. "s Teachers' credibility had deteriorated as a 
non-racial, working-class mass resistance movement rejected conventional 
"professionalism". The so-called "masses" demanded a certain role of teachers; the state 
applied countervailing pressure by continuing its strategy of cooption into a middle-class. 
However, teachers felt a social and political space opening up which allowed 
explorations of a changing "professionalism". There was, according to Glenda Kruss, "a 
2 Quoted in Zille, 5. 
3 Matiwana, Walters and Groener, 53: Hartshorne, "Education in the Eighties," 25-26. 
4 Muller, 109. 
5 Kruss, 1986. 
6 Hartshorne, "Education in the Ei~hties," 25-26. 
7 171e Weekly Mail, 17-23 October -1986. 
8 Ashley, 65. 
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mass rejection of apartheid domination in all spheres of life. "9 The Sunday Times declared 
that, "An important development in black politics recently is that even the moderate realists 
like Mr. Sonn are casting serious doubts on the value of negotiating with the 
government. "10 
Political influences on teacher politics 
Power relations, defined by social, political and economic forces, changed during 1986-
1988. The democratic movement, on the defensive, maintained a presence which 
maintained pressure on the state and the people. The state maintained an upper hand 
through "law" and "official violence", but the UDF and underground political activities 
continued, providing the kindling for the fire of 1989 and beyond. 
Of the various forces intluencing teacher politics in the years prior to April 1988, the 
state continued to wield considerable power. Detentions continued, and perhaps even more 
significantly continued to frighten teachers into an acceptance of the contemporary social 
order. According to the Cape Times. 147. DET teachers could not work between June 1986 
and June 1987 because of detentions. II In 1987, the same newspaper reported that thirty-
eight Cape teachers were detained.l2 While these figures were significantly lower than the 
approximately 8800 children detained from June to November 1986,IJ teachers felt 
threatened. 
In July 1986, "hard line instructions" were issued to black teachers concerning 
attendance and behaviour. 14 A new code of conduct for white teachers was gazetted on 31 
October: teachers in white schools had to "pledge themselves as teachers and honour and 
obey the laws of their country. "1s In 1987 the well-known acting principal of Glendale 
Senior Secondary, Peter Carelse, who had frequently associated himself with WECTU and 
the popular resistance movement, found himself demoted and transferred by the DEC 
(HoR).t6 Meanwhile, the same Coloured department had begun pressing misconduct 
charges against the seventy-two teachers for alleged complicity in the 1985 boycott.t7 Early 
in 1987, WECTU claimed that blacklisting, denial of housing subsidies, and refusal of 
leave were all tactics used against many teachers who refused to administer the 1985 
examinations. I8 Generally speaking. after 1985 the state introduced "the most stringent 
9 Kruss, 186. 
IO Sunday Times, 22 June 1986. 
II Cape Times, 17 June 1987. 
I2 Cape Times, 4 March 1988. 
IJ 77w Weekly Mail, 28 November-4 Det.:c:mhcr 1986. This tigure is according to the Detainees' Parents 
Support Committee. 
I4 Hartshorne, "Post-Apartheid Edut.:ation," 120. 
IS Star, 14 November 1986. 
I6 Argus, 19 October 1987. 
·I7 Cape Times, 1 January 1986, and 10, 14, and 18 April 1986, and 13 and 14 May 1986; Sunday Times, 13 
April 1986. 
I8 The Weekly Mail, 27 February- 5 March 1987. 
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security measures in South Africa's education history. "t'i The second Emergency, imposed 
in June 1986, particularly, heralded a successful disruption of the activities of resistance 
movements.2o The disruption began immediately as 119 organisations, including trade 
unions, had their activities banned. Those affected included WECTU, ED ASA and the 
PTSAs.21 
The heavy-handed education departments, endlessly asserting control over their 
employees, continued their threats. In an August 1987 budget vote, Piet Clase, the 
Minister of Education and Culture in the House of Assembly (HoA),22 hinted that graduates 
of "leftist tertiary institutions" could well be denied teaching posts.23 That same month, 
Carter Ebrahim claimed in Parliament that his department was reviewing the recognition it 
accorded five teachers' organisations. 2-+ Hendrickse had gone further in 1986 when he 
directly threatened to deny UTASA its vital stop-order facilities.2s 
A 1987 Act affecting DET teachers gave the minister of education and training the 
power to suspend activities at schools, and added a new misconduct rule for teachers: 
teachers could be dismissed if absent for two weeks without the director-general's 
permission. 26 
The state's dual strategy. involved tactics other than direct repression. It sought to 
control teachers by invoking fear on the one hand, and providing direct material benefits on 
the other. The government's reform program, discussed in previous chapters, including the 
new tri-cameral constitution and the upgrading of some townships, continued. As Jay 
Naidoo stated at a CTPA conference in 1988: teachers could struggle against repression or 
" ... be ensnared by the material benefits the system offers you in the form of house loans, 
pensions, promotions, etc. "27 
It is no coincidence that R45 million was allocated to increase the salaries of 81,000 
black teachers in mid-1986. There was also government talk of eliminating the "disparity 
in the salaries of teachers of different population groups" by 1 December.2s A twelve 
percent salary increase was effected in July 1987, though some teachers complained of 
actually receiving smaller cheques.2Y Female teachers in and above Grade 2 received 
increases in November 1987 to eliminate gender disparity, although this ignored the eighty 
19 Zille, 3. 
20 Fine and Webster, 264. 
21 Cape Times, 23 and 26 June 1986. The bannings were lifted on 30 July 1986. Cape Times, 31 July 1986; 
171e Weekly Mail, 1-7 August 1986. 
22 The HoA is the white chamber of the tri-cameral parliament. 
23 Cape Times, 10 August 1987. 
24 Cape Times, 6 August 1987. This account does not name the organisations in question. 
25 Cape Times, 19 and 27 August 1986; Sunday Times, 17 August 1986. 
26 SAIRR, Annual Survey 198711988, 145-146. 
27 Jay Naidoo, "Teacher Unity in the Context of the Broader Community Struggle," in Education for a 
Democratic Sourh Africa: 21st Annual Conference- June 1988- Conference Papers (Bellville: CTPA, 1988) 
28, 31. 
28 Cape Times, 4 August 1986. The salary increases also affected nurses and paramedics. 
29 Sunday Times, 2 August 1987. 
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percent of teachers in Grade l.Jo De Klerk was cited as offering typical promises in this 
regard: "I trust it will soon be possible, within the limits of available funds, to make further 
headway in eliminating the remaining problems as well. "JI 
The state remained committed, as de Klerk said in August 1987, to distinct education 
departments within the "own affairs" state policy.J2 However, the cooption of black 
educators. into the conventional framework of apartheid education continued. In July 1987, 
Gerrit Yiljoen, the minister of education and development aid, spoke in Parliament about 
the importance of revised syllabi which would be a greater relevance to African people: 
" ... the Department of Education and Training is actively promoting a change ... in the 
direction of a general revision of syllabuses towards greater relevance for all communities 
and the greater involvement of educationists from all population groups in the process. "33 
As the various arms of the state continued to assert control in this dual way, students 
also kept up pressure to intluence teacher politics. In 1986, The Weekly Mail published an 
article entitled, "The student web that spans South Africa," which spoke of "an intricate 
mesh of strands, some overlapping, some clashing, some loose. "34 This "web" continued 
to exist through 1987. The South African Youth Congress (SA YCO) was launched in 
March 1987, claiming a membership of more than half a million.3s In May, in the Western 
Cape, students at one school boycotted their classes, demanding that a teacher who 
"collaborated" with the police be removed.J6 In July, popular Western Cape stayaways 
were organised by WECSCO and others after the murder of Ashley Kriel.J7 WECSCO, in 
fact, warned of a possible repeat of the disturbances of 1985, citing the misconduct charges 
levelled against the seventy-two teachers, Ashley Kriel' s death, and turmoil at Langa High 
School_ over a sports trip to Durban as provocative incidents.3s So students maintained a 
popular force, asserting a popular power over teachers, influencing teachers' behaviour. 
Since student-youth rhetoric was more and more socialist in character, a class position was 
being hammered out for teachers in opposition to the bourgeois trappings proffered by the 
state. As Hartshorne wrote: " ... most of these new messages [emerging from the crises of 
1984-1986], particularly in rhe voices t?{ younger people, are rooted in perceptions of 
socialist principles. "39 
National resistance organisations also contained indices of this shift. As in 1985 and 
1986, the NECC wielded considerable influence over teachers, particularly when viewed in 
its MDM context. Foregrounding People's Education during 1986 and 1987, the NECC 
managed to "create unity between students and the wider community, and to give the 
30 Argus, 28 July 19887; Cape Times, 29 July 1987. 
31 Argus, 21 November 1987. 
32 SAIRR, Annual Survey 198711988, 144 . 
. 33 SAIRR, Annual Survey 198711988, !57. 
34 I11e Weeklv Mail, 13-19 June 1986. 
35 The Weekly Mail, 3-9 April 1987. 
36 The Weekly Mail, 22-28 May 1987. 
37 The Weekly Mail, 17-23 July 1987. and 24-30 July 1987. 
38 Sourh, 23 July 1987. 
39 Hartshorne, "Post-Apartheid Education." 121. Emphasis added. 
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students a practical political perspective. "4o As we have seen in Chapter Four, People's 
Education, with its elements of a socialist vision, comprised a political, "anti-professional" 
pressure on teachers. A political space for such "unprofessional" activities was being 
forged by a coincidence of social and economic forces. 
There were pressures which worked against the NECC's influence. Most NECC 
leaders were detained at the beginning of 1987, for example, events which followed 
closely on a banning of People's Education discussions held by the NECC.4t But despite 
such countervailing pressure, on 6 April 1987 more than 120 delegates formed the Western 
Cape region of the NECC. Its affiliates immediately included DETU, WECTU and 
EDASA, but not the CTPA.42 This regional NECC created an important space within 
which inter-organisational contact could take place, thus facilitating communication at the 
beginning of an extended process to build teacher unity. 
Interestingly, the state, both repressed and simultaneously lent credibility to the 
NECC: by asking them to comment on the Education Bill (the Education Laws [Education 
and Training] Amendment Act of 1987). The only response the NECC could offer was a 
hasty condemnation. 43 
Both the students and the NECC operated within the mass resistance movements, and 
as such they helped to detine the contemporary political terrain. This terrain determined to 
a large degree teachers' willingness to resist the state or to acquiesce. Various political 
groupings within this terrain sought influence over teacher "professionalism" and the 
unfolding processes of teacher unity. 
Teachers' Expedence in the Western Cape 
As the.above forces continued to intluence the political climate, teachers and teacher 
organisations continued to respond. The two years prior to Harare saw much shifting of 
ground. Established organisations, especially the CTPA, came more and more firmly into 
the ranks of resistance movement~, if gauged in terms of rhetoric. Emergent organisations 
mobilized around pressing issues. But as emergent organisations faced the realities of small 
and flagging memberships, they re-invigorated themselves around progressive unity efforts, 
which were quite advanced when they were overtaken by the Harare initiative. 
Coloured education 
This department's two contending teachers organisations continued to feud. Some 
"Concerned members of Western Cape Teachers' Union" wrote in a 1987 letter to Sotuh 
that, "Wectu's existence is effectively denying CTPA progressive respectability." Such 
40 Hyslop, "School Student Movements." 28. 
41 I11e Weekly Mail, 9-15 January 1987, anu 6-12 Fc:hruary 1987. 
42 Bloch, 119; "VIVA NECC!" NECC ramrhkt. May 1987; in People's Education, n.p. See also Report on 
CTPAfor NECC. 
43 The Weekly Mail, 18-24 September 1987. 
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respectability was clearly the order of the day in 1.987. Accusing the CTPA leadership of 
being "corrupt," these WECTU members further claimed: "Wectu must take full credit for 
the CTPA leadership's shift to the left. "-1-1 
Franklin Sonn, feeling the pressure, said publicly in June 1987: "I really can't see 
why people label us as conservative. It's a bloody unjust description." He continued, with 
obvious allusions to WECTU: "We are not a crisis-born organisation --the type which 
comes about every time there is a crisis. We are a professional body, with a solid 
foundation in the community, that responds to situations in a calm and rational way. "45 
Van den Heever at that time also emphasized the "difference" between the CTPA and 
"crisis-born" organisations from 1985.-16 
The CTPA's "professional" heritage-- premised on cooperation with the state--
remained intact during these years. A UTA SA delegation met de Klerk in April 1987, for 
example, and learned of a pay increase for teachers to be announced in June.47 In 1987 
Sonn illustrated where his organisation stood in relation to student activism by saying: "We 
do not condone school boycotts. "-1x Their 1987 Conference indicated a commitment to 
ethnic divisions by condemning white teachers' appointments in Coloured schools.49 And 
their so-called democratic modus opaandi remained suspect, as illustrated by General 
Secretary Paul Jordaan' s comment: "Franklin Sonn is a powerful name in the teaching 
fraternity. Our members will be prepared to follow the advice and direction he gives. "so 
These examples of the CTPA's traditional "professionalism" illustrate an increasingly 
uncomfortable position within a political context of popular resistance. The CTPA during 
the two years preceding the Harare conference, could be seen as self-consciously attempting 
to· move into the MOM. Sonn's "bloody unjust" comment hinted at the pressure the CTPA 
felt. It was a time when "conservative" was a very dirty word. 
At the CTPA'sJune 1986 Conference, it responded to the various pressures it felt as 
delegates voted in favour of withdrawing from all committees and structures of general and 
own-affairs education. The motion, proposed by van den Heever and described by Sonn as 
a "catch 22", won with at least eighty percent of delegates' votes. Sonn, however, offered 
a teacher-centered -- rather than a struggle-oriented -- reason: "Our decision to withdraw 
must be seen as a clear signal that things can't go on this way and that teachers take a dim 
view of the way they are being treated by the education authorities. "51 
44 Concerned Members ofWECTU. According to this letter, WECTU's problems with the CTPA included: 
1) its ethnic make-up, and its association with oppressive forces; 2) its leaders' undemocratic decision-making 
style; 3) its leaders'/memhers' links \Vith the LP; and 4) CTPA principals did not deliver WECTU literature to 
their teachers. 
45 Sundav Times, 21 June 1987 .. 
46 Argus~ 24 June 1987. 
47 Argus, 22 April 1987. 
48 Sunday Times, 21 June 1987. 
49 Argus, 18 June 1987. 
50 South, 14 April 1988. These comments concerned the adoption of the Freedom Charter. 
51 Suruiay Times, 22 June 1986; Cape Times. 20 and 23 June 1986. The withdrawal, agreed to by UTASA 
the following Jay, officially took place on 21 July 1986. Cape Tirnes, 22 July 1986. 
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The CTPA 's 1986 Conference was important in other ways as well. According to the 
NECC report on the CTPA, ".· .. 1986 has been seen by CTPA as their signal to broad 
sections of the democratic movement of their wanting to make a decisive break with the 
past." Apart from the decision to withdraw from "apartheid structures", other policy 
changes were reflected in Sonn 's speech. He spoke of a need to release political prisoners 
and of the necessity for negotiations between the government and the ANC. He also spoke 
of the importance of People's Education. The UTASA conference, held a day later, closed 
with the singing of Nkosi Sikc/el' iAji·iku for the first time.s2 
In December of that year, the CTPA paid its first official visit to the AN C. Sonn 
flew to New York for talks which van den Heever would claim were the root of the 
CTPA's strategic shift after 1985.53 Sonn, who requested the meeting to obtain ANC views 
on the school boycott, returned stating that the ANC promoted an end to the boycott, and 
that the ANC delegation had been nationalists rather than communists.54 Sonn and van den 
Reever later joined an IDASAss visit to Dakar in July 1987 forfurther discussions with the 
.. ANC, and returned, according to the NECC report, " ... with a publicly sympathetic 
attitude toward the ANC. "56 
This particular tactic of winning popular credibility found great favour among CTPA 
delegates to the June 1987 Conference in Port Elizabeth, which tacitly condoned the first 
visit and set the stage for Dakar. A unanimous resolution was passed urging continued 
contact with the ANC.s7 This, among other resolutions, allowed Sonn to later claim that 
1987 was the year the CTPA "took its place" within the MDM.ss According to the MOM-
aligned Sourh: 
The conference, among other things, supported calls for the release of 
Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the unbanning of the ANC 
[etc].... The conference is seen by the CTPA 's own members as a 
'watershed' and by many others as a 'turnabout' for an organisation 
accused in the past of serving the self-interests of 'coloured' teachers and 
being 'collaborationist'. s" 
The various pressures had taken their toll, as the CTPA moved to redefine its 
"professional" position and till a space created by a changed political climate. 
Other important aspects of the 1987 Conference concerned a stated commitment to 
developing and distributing alternative education ideas and literature. The CTPA thus 
decreased its "professional" investment in existing education. The CTPA held seminars on 
52 Report on CTPAjiJr NECC, 6-7. 
53 Argus, 24 Jun~ !987. 
54·Argus, 27 March 1987. 
55 Th~ Institut~ tor D~mocratic Alternatives in South Africa (IDASA) is a lib~ral organisation working for 
political chang~. 
56 Report on CTPAfor NECC, 7. 
57 Report on CTPAfor NECC, 7. 
58 F.A. Sonn, "Pr~sidcntial Address: Towan.ls a D~mocratic Futur~." in Educarionfor a Democratic South 
Africa, 6. 
59 South, 3 July 1987. 
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alternative education and prepared publications. It began training workshops on SRCs.6o 
Also, at the conference there were allegations made about LP interference in the 
appointment and promotion of teachers, thus distancing the CTPA ever further from the 
state.6I 
While continuing to distance itself from the state structures it had so recently 
embraced, the CTPA sought greater acceptance by MOM structures. Sonn claimed in mid-
1987 that the CTPA, in fact, had an obligation to have "more concrete" talks with 
organisations like the UDF, COSATU and the NECC.o2 A few months later van den 
Heever reiterated this desire in The Weekly Mail: " ... the priority at present is to establish 
solid relations with the U OF, NECC and COSATU. "oJ Also, while continuing with its 
activities -- such as its February Careers Month for matriculation students, its Spring 
School for about 3000 matric students, and its distribution of R 120,000 worth of bursaries 
to 360 pupils and students64 --the CTPA demonstrated its progressive community 
involvement by hosting a week-long seminar on the role of people's organisations in 
community and nation-building,6s and by donating R1416 to 600 striking Spekenam 
workers while condemning their sacking.66 
The CTPA, during these important years between the potent 1985 boycotts and the 
1988 Harare meeting, transformed itself in many ways. But, as the NECC report asserted, 
" ... The CTPA is an organisation tilled with many contradictions. There are a number of 
different forces at work within it. "67 These internal forces were directly influenced by 
external forces and organisations. As during 1985 and 1986, one important pressure group 
continued to be WECTU, which was experiencing its own difficulties and transformations 
during these years preceding Harare. 
During these years, WECTU 's ideology remained firmly rooted in a perception of teachers 
as workers, stressing the importance of working class solidarity. Yousuf Gabru reminded 
WECTU members in his 1988 Chairperson's Report. that one of WECTU's "fundamental 
points" made at its inception was, " ... that the best form of teacher organisation was a trade 
union which would align itself with the working class movement in South Africa. "68 From 
this standpoint, WECTU maintained great antagonism towards the CTPA's elitist 
"professionalism", even though some reports suggest that this attitude was being discussed 
60 Report on CTPAfor NECC, 9. 
61 South, 3 July 1987; Argus, 18 June 1987. The allegations against the LP were not new. In March of 1987, 
the CTPA called for a commission of inquiry into similar allegations that members of the House of 
Representatives were interfering with the education department. Argus, 28 March 1987. 
62 Sundav Time.i, 21 June 1987. 
63 The Weekly Mail, 6 Novemher 1987, quoted in Report m1 CTPAfor NECC, 8. 
64 Argus, 27 February 1987. and 11 June 1987 (the hursary money was largely from the private sector); Cape 
Times, 18 September 1987. 
65 Sundav Times, 16 Au~?ust 1987. 
66 Cape Times, 13 Octoher 1987. 
67 Report on CTPAfor NECC, 10. 
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and questioned during 1986-1987.6'1 Firmly engaged in political struggle, WECTU 
continued to resist-- albeit mainly rhetorically -- the South African overlay of race and 
class divisions. Its rejection of apartheid divisions continued to strengthen WECTU 
because its stance firmly allied WECTU with the popular resistance movement. "We are 
recognised and respected by the progressive movement," WECTU members wrote to Sowh, 
"so from here we must draw our strength. "7o Its membership was small and getting 
progressively smaller during the years following 1985. But its self-definition involved a 
vehement rejection of traditional "professionalism". Such tensions helped WECTU to 
retain a well-demarcated place for itself on the Western Cape map. It remained high 
protile, and maintained a commitment to mass action. 
WECTU' s flagging membership illustrated a continuing tension concerning teacher 
involvement in political action during times of repression. At its inception, WECTU was 
repeatedly referred to as "2000-strong". However, WECTU almost immediately began 
grappling with the crucial issue of decreasing membership, and decreasing involvement by 
those who continued to pay their dues. As Gabru admitted in his 1988 Report: 
there is no denying the fact that our membership has declined 
considerably .... This process started at the beginning of 1986, and we 
have not yet been able to reverse the trend. There is clearly still a large 
base of support, but this is not reflected in active participation by 
members.11 
Various other reports submitted to the same AGM contained similar remarks. "Once 
again," stated the "Recruitment Report", "people were too busy in their own regions and 
they could not find the time to do justice to recruitment. "72 A Cape Town regional report 
for 25 May- 10 September 1986 stated: "Our paper membership stands at 130 but only 25 
members are actively working and promoting WECTU. This is our major problem at 
present.. .. "73 The 1988 Cape Town Regional Report baldly reiterated: "Although our 
paper membership totals lOO, only 7-10 members attend meetings regularly. The Executive 
has diminished in number and it has been impossible to find replacements. "74 The Southern 
Suburbs region contended with the same problem. Its 1988 Report admitted that, "After 
the intense interest of members waned at the end of 1985, Southern Suburbs, like all the 
other regions of WECTU, suffered a loss of members. The region was kept going by a 
handful of concerned and committed members. During the 1986-1987 term of office, no 
regional meetings were held. "7.' The Athlone Central region's Chairperson, G.G. van 
Harte, was thought-provoking in his Report when he wrote: 
The general problem of dwindling membership is reflected in our own 
region. We have to pose the question: Why is this lethargy prevalent in 
69 Interview with Zubeida Desai, 12 August !990. 
70 Concerned Members of WECTU. 
71 "Chairperson's Report," 3. 
72 "Recruitment Report," WECTU, May !987 -July !988, !. 
73 "The CapeTown RegionofWECTU: Report 1986.05.25. -1986.09.10," n.d. 
74 "Cape Town Regional Report." WECTU, n.d. 
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WECTU? Could it be that the regional structure is not functioning 
correctly, or is the problem more deeply rooted than this?76 
As shall be seen, this problem was deeply-rooted in all the emergent organisations at 
this time. WECTU was able to maintain such a high protile within the context of 
diminishing membership in part because of generous donations. External organisations 
deemed WECTU worthy of support. so WECTU cannot be perceived in isolation from 
other elements of the democratic movement. For the financial year ending on 30 
November 1987, WECTU received R25,209.35 from Kagiso Trust, and Rl6, 159.50 from 
Entraide University.n 
The diminishing membership problem could not, however, be alleviate by such 
funding. WECTU asked teachers to perceive of themselves in a way antithetical to the 
state's perception, and to their historical, "professional" self-perceptions built up over 
years. The so-called ambiguity of teachers' class locations is not an ambiguity perceived by 
the teachers' themselves, most of whom are not theorists, but who enjoy cashing their 
salary checks at the end of each month. WECTU' s struggle to influence teachers and their 
terrain was primarily a struggle to influence teachers' attitudes about themselves. 
Repression, and the fear it induced, played a large role in maintaining traditional 
"professionalism", thus keeping teachers away from "political" organisations like WECTU. 
In mid-1986, Brigadier C.A. Swart, the Western Cape Divisional Commissioner of Police, 
banned 119 organisations, including WECTU, from holding meetings in the Western Cape. 
WECTU and the UDF responded by taking the matter to the Supreme Court.78 The 
regulations were subsequently withdrawn, and WECTU then published an "Emergency 
Newsletter". "At the time of writing," it stated, "WECTU is legally able to communicate 
with its members (although still subject to emergency regulations), but we do not know how 
long this state of affairs will last. We fully anticipate another clampdown, legally more 
watertight than the former regulations. "79 Also, detentions continued. Each issue of the 
WECTU Newsletrer from this period highlights the detentions of members. 
The victimisation which demanded most of WECTU's attention, however, was the 
continuing plight of the seventy-two teachers charged with misconduct after refusing to 
administer the 1985 year-end exams (see Chapter Five). The misconduct charges were left 
hanging by the DEC (HoR) for over a year. Then the department announced that the first 
hearing, involving the deputy principal of Crestway, Mr. Philip Tobias, would take place 
on 20 July 1987 .so WECTU engaged lawyers to combat the charges on the legal front,sl 
75 "Western Cape Teachers' Union Suuthern Suburbs Report 1988," n.d. 
76 "Chairperson's Report," WECTU Athlonc Central Branch, for the period 3.06.87 to 23.05.88. 
77 "The Western Cape Teachers Union Financial Statements at November 30, 1987," n.d. The statements 
include the report and balance sheds Jrawn up by A. K. Khatieb & Company, Chartered Accountants. 
78 Argus, l August 1986. 
79 "WECTU Emergency Newsletter," n.d. 
80 Argus, 20 July 1987. 
81 Argus, 17 July 1987; see "A Historic Victory," WECTU newslerrer lO (September 1987): 2, for a brief 
discussion of the legal argument presented. WECTU members themselves agreed to donate R25 each towards 
the legal costs. Cape Times, 24 July 1987. 
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and worked to mobilise community support. This latter campaign was particularly 
successful, as about 1500 people gathered at a support meeting held in the Samaj Centre on 
16 July, and the UDF, COSATU, SA YCO and the NECC, amongst others, supported the 
call to drop the charges. g2 
The show of strength continued on the day of the first hearing, 20 July, when 
hundreds of teachers gathered outside the Broad Street offices of the DEC in Wynberg 
where the hearing was to take place. As the numbers swelled to about 1500, the gathering 
of teachers and students moved to the nearby Luxerama Cinema in Park Road to listen to 
Gabru, Moosa Kaprey of the NECC, and Neville Alexander.s3 
A month later when the House of Representatives dropped all the charges, WECTU 
responded jubilantly. A spokesperson immediately stated: "This is a major victory .... It is 
a clear indication to teachers that by belonging to a progressive organisation like WECTU 
their rights will be defended. "x-1 A quarter-page advertisement which WECTU took out in 
South contained the following elated words: "To the Department of Education and Culture 
we say-- WECTU is here to stay .... WECTU commits itself to a future in which the 
people must have control over education. "x.'i For WECTU, drawing ever closer to 
COSATU, this victory was seen as a vindication of its working-class, trade union style. It 
was an affirmation of a new "professional" discourse in teacher politics. 
Part of this discourse involved continued commitment to broader community 
struggles. For example, in May of 1987, an emergency meeting of WECTU members 
decided to support the COSA TU call for a two-day stay-away. More than 500 teachers 
stayed away from schools.x6 As a result, WECTU again found itself in court defending the 
principal of Glendale, Mr. Carelse, who was demoted and transferred because of his and 
his staff's participation in the stay-away. This case, however, was lost.87 
During the years 1987-1988, WECTU, like the CTPA, attempted to remain involved 
in alternative educational activities, thus challenging traditional "professional" commitment 
to state education. A mathematics groups was formed, for example, a writing workshop 
was held, a high-school orientation course was run for Standard 6 students, and there was a 
teachers' "open day" These events took place alongside low-key or faltering campaigns 
against sexual harassment and abuse, and against the October 1987 elections (to which a 
special, confidential newsletter was devoted).xx So various WECTU regions continued to 
work towards the organisation's ideals despite the dwindling numbers. 
It was teacher unity, rather than alternative education or political campaigns, which 
gave WECTU an enhanced sense of purpose in 1987 and 1988. It could not exist in 
82 Sunday Times, 19 July 1987; Argus, l7 JuLy 1987. 
83 Argus, 20 and 21 July 1987; Cape Times, 21 July 1987; "A Historic Victory!" 2. 
84 Argus, 20 August 1987. 
85 Sourh, 3 Septemher 1987. 
86 South, 14 May 1987; "Secretarial Report," WECTU. 16 July 1988, l. This WECTU report also makes 
mention Of a second community call whil·h SUCCccJing in winning the support of OVer lQOQ teachers. 
87 "Secretarial Report," I . 
88 See WECTV newslerrers; Northern Echo, 13 January 1988. 
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isolation from other elements of the working class, nor from other like-minded teacher-
organisations. "Strength in unity" loomed larger on the horizon. This strength, in part, 
involved asserting a new "professional" place for teachers.· DETU, one of the organisations 
with which it sought to unify, shared WECTU's ideas about "professionalism". DETU 
experienced similar difficulties with repression and membership during 1987-1988, though 
maintained a different relationship with its established counter-part, PENATA. 
African Education 
Once the turmoil of 1985 passed into history, DETU, like WECTU, immediately began 
struggling with declining numbers of active members. PENATA, unlike the CTPA, also 
had few active members, and continued to rely on CATU and ATASA to lend it direction. 
Thus, PENATA could not afford to be patronising after the CTPA's fashion, and DETU 
did not need to defensively posture against huge numbers of the opposition. They struggled 
along more equally, with DETU maintaining a higher profile. DETU could thus assert its 
new conception of "professionalism" more easi I y amongst organised teachers in African 
schools. 
While DETU upheld commitments to non-racial and progressive ideals within the 
confines of one department of education, PENATA appeared to quietly stew in an untenable 
situation. It had lost the moral high-ground, and its members often suffered physical 
intimidation. But it could not move beyond its historically "professional" stance. Only 
when the re-registration crisis of 1988 hit Cape Town's African schools did PENATA fully 
emerge in active support of some progressive ideas. 
Both ideological and personal tensions remained between the two organisations 
between 1987 and 1988. Teacher politics in DET schools remained less significant than 
worker or community struggles (the PTSA, for example, not DETU or PENATA, played 
the central role in re-opening Langa High School in 1987 -- see below), or than gangsterism 
in a different arena. PENATA continued to detine itself self-consciously and defensively in 
the style of all "professional" groups; DETU defined itself as part of a broader struggle, but 
appeared to remain a nominal. repressed force until the process of teacher unity began in 
1987.89 
Students and teachers within DET schools felt great discontent in 1986 (see Chapter Four). 
This discontent, rather than dissipating as the year progressed, continued to manifest itself. 
The DET, acting in a heavy-handed way, did little to assuage it. By the beginning of the 
third term in July, for example, various new regulations were enacted which included 
mandatory identification cards and the compulsory re-registration of all students. In total, 
30,000 students did not re-register, and were then barred access to schools.9o The DET 
89 This may be because their activities did not enter the popular press, but members interviewed also had little 
to say about these years. 
90 Muller, 109. 
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continued to labour under the misconception that the school boycotts were a result of 
"outside" elements with a disruptive agenda, rather than a spontaneous expression of 
dissatisfaction. 
According to Muller, by the end of 1986, 230 of the DET's 328 secondary schools 
around the country were seriously disrupted. An estimated 250,000 students who began the 
year in schools had left or been forced out by the end.'~' 
The thorny issue of re-registration continued to haunt the DET and its students and 
teachers through 1987. One Western Cape event in particular highlighted this, and offered 
teachers an issue around which to mobilise: the closing of Langa High School. 
In 1987, the DET added Standard 6 to Langa High School, which resulted in a 
double-shift system being implemented with Standards 6 and 7. In April, ten new 
classrooms were provided wirhour furniture. The school had 1, 762 students, because, 
according to a teacher, "The community took a decision not to turn anyone away". A 
visiting UCT student-teacher group described Langa High School in July and August: "The 
shortage of teachers reduced the timetable to chaos. Teachers tried to rotate their time so 
that each class got some lessons a least some of the time. "92 By May, in fact, there had 
already been a one-day stayaway at two Gugulethu schools because of overcrowding and a 
shortage of textbooks. At Langa, the problem was compounded in May by an insensitive 
decision on the part of some staff members and the DET to send some Langa athletes to 
Durban to participate in an inter-racial, inter-provincial athletics event. Many people at the 
school were vehemently opposed to such "racially-mixed" events, and were further angered 
by the cost incurred. It was argued that the money could have been better spent. 93 
As the discontent spread within the school, the DET began threatening to close the 
school, a threat condemned by WECTU and EDASA in early June.94 The Department 
ignored all such objections, and ordered the school closed. According to the Joint-PTSAs 
chairperson, Lungile Daba, the strong PTSA there "overstepped its mark" in the eyes of the 
DET.95 
In a strong show of defiance, and with widespread support, the PTSA and the Langa 
community re-opened Langa High School on Monday, 6 July 1987. Simultaneously, the 
NECC and its affiliates launched a "Hands off Langa High I Hands off our Schools" 
campaign with 125,000 pamphlets and stickers. 96 The campaign attracted the support of 
Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak, along with a wide range of other dignitaries. 97 In the 
meantime, while the school remained ofticially "closed", students were writing their mid-
term examinations, and teachers were ignoring a request by the department to submit the 
·91 Muller, 109. 
92771eArgus, 15 August 1987, rc:proJu..:eJ in Ut){/ure 7 (n.d.): 11-12. 
93 111e Weekly Mail, 8-14 May 1987; CujW Times, 14 July 1987. 
94 Argus, 4 June 1987. 
95 Daba, 32. 
96 Cape Times, II July 1987. 
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names and addresses of all students. The PTSA viewed the request with suspicion; the 
DET had stated that all pupils must re-register before the school could be opened again. 98 
By 16July, the DET had acceded that the school could remain open, but only if three 
conditions were met: first, all students had to re-register; second, Standard lO pupils who 
had not passed Standard 9 had to be demoted; and third, in a direct rebuff to the PTSA, a 
statutory school committee hac! to be elected.'!'-~ But even then the DET backed down, 
offering the school a period of grace during which teachers were to explain to parents why 
re-registration was necessary .1oo 
The two Cape Town teacher organisations within the DET offered slightly different 
responses to this crisis, highlighting their differing ideas about proper teacher behaviour. 
PENATA carefully stated, after a mid-August, silent protest by one hundred mothers 
outside the DET offices, that parents should be listened to more closely.Iol DETU met 
with the DET about the re-registration issue, and asked that the re-registration be postponed 
until January 1988, and also asked the Department to meet with the parents.1o2 While 
DETU's response was more adamant, including its participation in the "Hands off Langa 
High" campaign, neither teacher organisation could claim a central role in the crisis-
management conducted largely by parents and the PTSA. Rather, both directed the. 
department's attention to the parents. WECTU would later write, "The struggles at Langa 
High against reactionary elements within the school' helped to consolidate the unity between 
the vast majority of parents, staff and students." While some sense of victory could be 
claimed, the crisis certainly continued, and the principal, Duke Ngcukana, declined a 
transfer order to Stutterheim by resigning. IOJ 
The responses by DETU and PENATA to the Langa High School crisis, while 
similar, showed continued tensions within teacher politics. But the two organisations 
cooperated during the following year's re-registration crisis. Even though the Black Sash's 
Sue Philcox would claim by September 1988 that the unity between DETU and PENA T A 
"has proved temporary", I04 it marked an important step forward for both groups towards a 
newly-defined "professionalism". 
In the plain words of one DETU executive member, "1988 started badly." I05 
According to another, the "big repression" in schools resulted from the state's desire to 
regain control of the schools which had been lost since 1985 ,I06 At the beginning of the 
school year, teachers were told to report to St. Francis for "educational courses", covering 
such topics as contlict and the budget. DETU teachers criticised the courses for being of 
98 Cape Times, 14 July 1987. 
99 The Weekly Mail, 10-16 July 1987. 
100 Argus, 19 August 1987. 
101 Argus, 19 August 1987. 
102 Cape Times, 17 July 1987. 
103 WECTU newslerrer II (February 1988): I. 
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"no educational value" .101 On 13 January. with the police and the army in schools, the 
DET informed students and parents that the contentious process of re-registration would 
occur at three venues. I ox The new comprehensive high schools were filled first, I09 and the 
quotas given other schools greatly reduced their enrollment: I. D. Mkhize, for example, 
was expected to enroll 600 students, exactly half the number for 1987.tto During the two-
week delay in opening schools, teachers were expected to produce identification cards when 
entering schools, and were given tasks such as counting text-books and furniture. til 
"Teachers," said DETU's Monde Mbekwa, "were very angry."112 
The registration deadline was 22 January. Before that time, students and parents were 
asked to sign the following document: 
Conditions of Registration in DET Schools 
1. by the PUPIL 
"I hereby declare that I will obey the rules and regulations of the school 
and that I will subject myself to disciplinary action against me should it be 
deemed necessary by the authorities concerned." 
2. by the PARENT/GUARDIAN 
"l hereby agree to disciplinary action against my child if it is deemed 
necessary, that I will undertake to pay all costs incurred for damages done 
or losses caused by my child to school property or books, and I undertake 
to ensure that my child attends school regularly." 113 
DET officials, including one Braam Olivier -- who played a role in counter-resistance in 
Alexandria -- were sent from Pretoria to facilitate the return to schools. Students who did 
not register by the 22 January deadline were barred from schools.ll4 According to a 
WECTU newsletter, the state went so far as to ban meetings "promoting the non-registration 
and non-attendance of pupils" in seven magisterial districts in the Western Cape.11s 
Teachers' "anger" found an organisational focus in both DETU and PENATA. "The 
atmosphere was created," said a DETU executive member, "where DETU had to meet 
PENATA." 116 A DETU informant said that meetings were held between the two groups.ll7 
One took place at the Uluntu Centre in Gugulethu on 2 February at a time when at least 
107 Interview with informant C, 18 October 1990: interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 August 1990; Argus, 2 
February 1988. 
108 Interview with Monde Mhekwa. 9 AuL!ust 1990. 
109 This was done, according to W ECTU .- " ... to gi w the Jepartment the opportunity to attempt breaking the 
unity of the organised high schools. Statl and studc:nt bodies have been split and relocated at the 'new' 
schools (comprehensives and others)." WECTU 1/elvslelfer 11 (February 1988): 2. 
110 Interview with MonJe Mbc:kwa. 9 AliL!Ust 1990. 
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ll2 Interview with Monde Mhek~a, 9 AuL!ust 1990. 
113 Quoted in WECTU newslelfer 11 (Fch;uary 1988): l. 
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February 1988. 
115 WECTU newsletter 11 (February 1988): 2. The Joint PTSAs challenged the ban in court. 
11 6 Interview with Monde Mbekwa, 9 August 1990. 
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five Peninsula DET schools were still not functioning. II& Both DETU and PENATA 
participated in a march of between fifty and 200 teachers on 11 February. Gathering at the 
DET's Foreshore offices to raise issues surrounding the barring of students who had not yet 
registered and the transfer of teachers. the group was told to return at the end of the week, 
for there were too many teachers for a discussion. But when they returned at the end of the 
week, Braam Olivier was not there as expected.IIY 
DETU and PENATA then mobilised around a three-day stay-away to highlight the 
issue of re-registration. Between 15 and 17 February, more than 200 teachers were absent 
from DET schools in the Peninsula.12o In the middle of the stay-away, on 16 February, 
around 150 teachers once again gathered at the DET offices on the Foreshore. The group 
sat in the building for four hours, and Minister of Education and Training Sam de Beer 
eventually saw a delegation of executive members from both organisations. De Beer met 
their demand; he extended the final date for re-registration to Saturday, 20 February.121 On 
17 Feb mary, more than 150 teachers met at the Uluntu Centre and decided to resume 
teaching. Of the stay-away de Beer said: "It is clearly my duty to draw to the attention of 
teachers concerned that their action is contrary to their conditions of service." 122 This was 
a feeble attempt to assert control in the face of shifting teacher conceptions of their 
"professional" locations within schools, ideas that now appeared to be generally acceptable 
in this time of crisis to both the emergent and established township organisations. 
These events increased the possibility for cooperation between the two organisations. 
The real crisis forced both to overlook past differences. A DETU executive member said, 
"It was the first time that we had that joint activity, and we saw there was a need." There 
was, in fact, talk of a single African teachers I organisation.l23 
The tensions caused by shifting ideas of teacher "professionalism" continued. DETU 
decided-- "unprofessionally", according to the DET -- not to participate in a multi-racial 
DET sporting event held at Green Point Stadium in March 1988. In total, eight teachers 
from Langa High School who were appointed to officiate did not appear, and only one of 
four appointed from I. D. Mkhize went. The department suspended three from the former 
and two from the latter, all executive members of DETU. The others simply had pay 
deducted from their salaries. Barred from entering schools, the five teachers were initially 
suspended without pay, a decision later reversed.IH The charges were initially unclear, but 
later appeared to include refusal to attend the sports meeting, refusal to carry out gate-order 
ll8 Cape Times, 2 Fehruary 1988. 
119 Cape Times, 12 Fchmary 1988; An:u1. II February 1988; interview with Monde Mhekwa, 9 August 
1990. 
120 This according to Gcrrit Vil.jcon in Parliament. CatJe.Tillles, 18 May 1988. 
121 Interview with informant D. 6 Mard1 1990; Argus, 16 February 1988. This Argus report falsely claims 
that DET officials refused to sec the Jdel!atton. 
122 Cape Times, 18 Febmary 1988; Argu~·. 18 February 1988. The De Beer quote is from the Cape Times. 
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H: Mbekwa. The tive were: Monde Mhckwa and Ernest Henda of I. D. Mkhize; and Vuyo Hlaba, Themikile 
Plaatjie and Zolile Fonya of Langa High School. 
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duties, and being absent without leave during the three-day stay-away.12s Their hearing, 
initially scheduled for 22 August, was postponed, and postponed again. The teachers were 
receiving pay, and were not replaced.I26 Students were angry, with some at I.D. Mkhize 
refusing to attend classes until the teachers were reinstated.I27 An abortive teachers' 
solidarity stay-away on 3 May failed because of intervention by the department: principals 
were warned, and inspectors visited schools the day before warning of repercussions.12s 
Fifteen months later, in July 1989, the DETU teachers were reinstated and returned to 
their schools.l29 
These events of 1988, along with DETU's restriction in the same year, impacted 
DETU's organisation. "Teachers," said a DETU executive member, "ran away even 
more. "uo This fear of organisational involvement would be overcome by some former 
members, as with WECTU, during the long process of teacher unity. Unity efforts would 
provide the structure for a reassert ion of new ideas about "professionalism" amongst 
organised teachers which waned during the two years following 1985. 
The Cocoon of White Sclzoo/sl.ll 
The militant atmosphere in black schools continued to leave white schools largely 
unaffected, although white schools maintained a politically repressive ethos. While 
EDASA experienced a declining commitment on the part of its members similar to that of 
WECTU and DETU, the SATA maintained a strong hold on white English-speaking 
teachers. The SAT A continued to reiterate its verbal stand against such apartheid 
legislation as the Group Areas Act, and to argue for open schools.I32 But its method 
remained "professional" in the traditional sense: motions passed at Conferences; and 
routine meetings with government ofticials. The SATA still did not perceive education as 
political, and teachers were held to have a duty to uphold conventional notions of 
"professional" ideals. 
The state, at this time, worked to maintain its firm hold over white teachers and white 
education. While this hold had never been threatened, the potential loss of control implied 
by developments in other education departments must have helped shape not only the tighter 
control asserted over teachers in schools, and the simultaneous "empowering" of white 
teachers via the creation of the TFC. It was these two typical strands of state policy --
repression and cooption --and EDASA and SAT A's responses to them which we will now 
examine. 
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The National Education Policy Amendment Act. No. 103 of 1986, contained two important 
provisions. First, it consolidated the control of white education in the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (HoA). Second, in keeping with the new tri-cameral Constitution it 
created the TFC. The former provision allowed a centralisation of control, while vesting 
power in the hands of Minister of Education and Culture Piet Clase. He wrote, at the time, 
that 1986 was "an historic year in education". Starting on 1 April 1986, "policy on 
education was no longer determined by various second-level authorities (the Provinces) but 
... the House of Assembly now had the final political power over own affairs education 
policy." 1JJ 
The Act also provided for the merging of the South African Teachers' Council (for 
whites) and the voluntary Federal Council into the TFC. The TFC became the central 
registering body for all teachers in white schools: "No person shall be appointed in a 
teaching post or teach in a school unless he [sic] has been registered or provisionally 
registered with that body .... " 134 Within the framework of the TFC, the "organised teaching 
profession" had to be consulted about educational planning.135 Further, the TFC, according 
to the Act, "has the object of promoting the prestige of the white teaching profession" .136 
The classic elements of state cooption were there, including the upholding of "professional" 
ideologies. In fact, this quasi-state structure, on which the state could count to uphold its 
apartheid policies, worked to suppress dissent from within its ranks. According to the 
Western Cape Section of the Black Sash: 
It defines the rules and conduct of teachers and how they shall be punished 
if these are contravened. Also, the proceedings of the disciplinary 
committee will no longer by public, and there will by no right of appeal. 
The code of conduct is awesome and based squarely on ruling ideology. 137 
Further, both the TFC and Minister Clase acknowledged their opposition to a single, 
national education department,1.1x a rallying cry for so many of the oppositional teacher 
bodies. 
The formation of the TFC, a perpetuation of aparrheid divisions, created some 
tensions within the SATA, which had been adopting an increasingly anti-aparrheid line. A 
motion was presented to its June 1987 Conference calling for a withdrawal from the TFC to 
symbolise a complete rejection of aparrheid structures. However, clearly defining 
themselves within the state's umbrella, the delegates voted to remain in the TFC by 145 to 
seventy .139 
EDASA had entered the Conference fray not from outside, but from within the 
SATA. There were a few EDASA members present as voting delegates from the Cape 
133 South African Teachers' Council Bulletin 28 (St:!ptemher 1986): 6, quoted in "The Black Sash: Cape 
Western Section, Comment on the Recent Legislation on Education," in Update 5 (n.d.): 8. 
134 Quoted in "The Black Sash," 8; Ashley, 16; interview with Alan Powell, 8 June 1990. 
!35 Ashley, 16. 
136 Quoted in "The Black Sash," 8. 
137 "The Black Sash," 8. 
138 "The Black Sash," 8. 
139 Argus, 29 June 1987. 
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Town branch. In fact, an EDASA member proposed the motion to reject TFC 
membership. When the vote went against them. as they had expected, an abortive walk-out 
was staged by those few members, who expected some support. This support did not 
materialise as expected from the Atlantic branch. The SATA leadership, expecting such a 
disturbance, had apparently planned the evening to end with that particular vote, after 
which the meeting was dismissed. In the words of an EDASA participant in the walk-out: 
"I got to the door just before the mob." 140 
The failed walk-out was indicative of ED ASA' s position during that year. It 
remained a small group confronted with great opposition. This single attempt to wrest 
some control from its established counter-part proved impossible. I:urther, the walk-out 
was done to "pander to WECTU". Some WECTU members had made the TFC withdrawal 
into an issue with some EDASA members, so EDASA had gone ahead in part to gain 
much-sought credibility in the eyes of a progressive ally. "Strategically," said EDASA's 
Pam van Dyk, who proposed the motion, "the walk-out was art exceptionally bad idea .... 
We lost members." 141 
For a very small group, the possibility of losing members was dire indeed. Like its 
progressive counter-parts, EDASA confronted the bleak reality of a dwindling active 
membership. According to one member active during 1987: "At one stage we virtually 
suspended meetings because our numbers had dwindled .... We considered disbanding .... 
We were only producing Upclare." 142 An issue of Updare published in the second half of 
1987 contained a large advertisement: "The working committee urges members to attend 
the AGM. Attendance at meetings has been very poor. We cannot organize meetings or 
invite speakers without your support. ED ASA' s future depends on you!" 143 
Part of the problem continued to be the government's second policy strand: 
repression. In February 1987, the Nationalist Party MP for Caledon, Lam pie Fick, 
requested a government investigation into EDASA at schools. In voicing this request, Fick 
claimed the EDASA promoted "protest politics" in white schools.144 Though no such 
investigation took place, this public pressure did little to render EDASA more attractive to 
its constituency. More generally, too, according to Update in 1987: "Principals have 
recently been instructed to collect and bring to the Cape Education Department offices any 
flyers, pamphlets, questionnaires or posters that they find in or near their schools." 145 
Also, the white education department set an example of political repression by suspending a 
Pinelands teacher for observing June 16 (see Chapter Five). The department-- in a move 
similar to that in the DET against the tive DETU teachers-- eventually dropped the charges 
after the teacher's temporary term of employment (until December) had expired, and paid 
140 Interview with Pam van Dyk, 2 August 1990. 
141 Interview with Pam van Dyk, 2 August 1990. 
142 Interview with Mike Adendorf, 7 August 1990. 
143 Update 7 (n.d.): 3. 
144 Argus, 24 February 1987. 
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her in full for those months .. She was not an ED ASA teacher, but her example made people 
aware of the risks run when engaging in "political" actions. "The implications for EDASA 
teachers are far-reaching," stated Updare. "The CEO [Cape Education Department] has 
indicated that it is prepared to go a long way to keep the bubble intact. "146 
So part of EDASA's waning membership had to do with state repression. There were 
other difficulties as well. Rossiter, for example, wrote that, "EDASA has not had the 
resources or support to operate as a teachers' union."I-17 EDASA's ideas about new 
"professionalism" found little favour within its constituency. In 1987, a year for difficult 
questions, EDASA asked the following in an Update editorial: 
Just by forming an organisation. making speeches, issuing statements, 
having meetings, we can create the illusion that we are having an impact. 
But in reality, are we just marking time, feeling good that we have added 
our name to a list of progressive teachers while conservative forces still 
intluence most teachers and pupils in our schools[?] 
The same editorial went on to admit that, "Many teachers who were initially mobilized by 
the events of 1985 have become apathetic and complacent. "148 According to an active 
member, hours were spent analyzing the waning membership: "We were forev~r having to 
contemplate our relevancy. "149 
Maintaining an organisational relevance involved two kinds of activity aimed at 
redefining "professionalism": working within its constituency, and reaching out to other 
progressive organisations. Engaged in the former, EDASA spoke out against Piet Clase's 
veiled threats about not hiring teachers from "left-leaning" universities and colleges. ISO 
EDASA also continued to support conscientious objection. ISI They co-operated with 
PAAG, educated about open schools, and participated in a School's Forum with ECC and 
PAAG.I52 They also continued to publish thoughtful issues of Update, highlighting 
educational and political issues. EDASA continued to foreground alternative teaching 
methods. 
Secondly, much of ED ASA' s organisational energy was devoted to being a relevant 
part of the broader extra-parliamentary opposition movement. EDASA participated in both 
the 1986 national launch of the NECC, and the 1987 Western Cape regionallaunch.I53 
This was important, according to one member, because the Western Cape NECC allowed 
more contact with other organisations, and EDASA became more accepted.IS4 It was also 
active in the Free the Children Alliance. 
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These activities were not enough to revive a flagging membership. It was, rather, the 
process of teacher unity which offered ED ASA renewed strength. Like WECTU and 
DETU, ED ASA found inspiration in the process of teacher unity which had essentially lain 
dormant for two years. Through unity efforts, EDASA participated in the assertion of a 
new "professional" ideology within teacher politics. 
TASA 
The final important player in the Western Cape teacher unity initiative, TASA, moved more 
slowly towards politicization than other teacher organisations. During 1987-1988, TASA 
maintained its "professional" position within teacher politics. For example, it remained 
involved with state education structures. It showed important signs, however, of movement 
away from traditional "professionalism" towards a new conception of teachers' locations. 
The Cape Town branch's handling of the dismissals and transferrals at Rylands High 
School (see Chapter Four), however, illustrated a shifting "professionalism" within that 
branch. Though TASA handled the Ryland events in a legal and "professional" way, 
including discussions with the department and a court case, the Cape Town branch was part 
of the student and community repulsion of the "scab" teachers. According to the branch 
chairperson in 1990, "The Western Cape branch is the most militant within the 
organisation. We've been pushing the organisation." For example, in 1987 the branch 
proposed Desmond Tutu or Alan Boesak for the speaker at TASA 1 s National Conference, a 
motion soundly defeated.I'i'i 
TASA 1 S "professional" hull thus showed progressive chinks. At the time the DEC 
(HoR) was threatening to end UTA SA's stop-order facilities, TASA sent telegrams to both 
Hendrickse and Minister of National Education de Klerk "expressing concern" .156 In the 
same year, T ASA tried to increase the participation of its teachers in organisational 
decision-making by paying subsidies to delegates attending branch meetings.l57 Outside of 
the educational arena, too, T ASA was active. For example, in August 1986, T ASA began 
a campaign to raise RlOO,OOO for the refugees from violence in Crossroads.l58 Also, in 
1987 it gave R305,000 to the Red Cross from its Natal Flood Disaster Relief Fund.l59 
While these moves remained tentative in the sense that they still fell within the realm 
of acceptable activities, such as charitable actions, for a recognised "professional" 
organisation, changes in teacher politics were clearly influencing TASA. Formerly an 
anathema, "political" behaviour was becoming more acceptable. TASA 1 s most pronounced 
break with state-defined "professionalism" was a growing antagonism towards its 
155 Interview with Kenny Emc::st, 8 May 1990. 
156 Argus, 25 August 1986. 
157 "NITS- TITA- SAlTA- TASA," n.p. 
158 Argus, 13 August 1986. A(,;coruing to a TASA photocopy, the campaign began in 1987, and a cheque for 
R65. 700 was presentcu to Crossroau Rei icf Aiu on 27 March 1989. "Teachers Association of South Africa," 
n.p. 
159 "Teachers Association of South Africa," n.p. 
199 
department. In the second half of 1986 and into 1987, TASA began organising around an 
issue of paramount importance: cut-backs in departmental spending on education. 
· TASA held a mass meeting in Merebank, in Natal, on 17 October 1986 in protest 
against education spending cutbacks and a proposed retrenchment of teachers. On 9 
·November 1986, TASA hosted a public meeting in Natal for delegates from many different 
community organisations to deal with the same issues.t6o On 19 January 1987, the DEC 
(HoD) publicly asked whether newly-qualified Indian teachers could be utilized in other 
education departments.I6I A meeting of "principals and management staff" was held by 
TASA on 21 January 1987 for continued discussion of the cutbacks and retrenchments.I62 
In April, the Indian HoD agreed to hire thousands of unemployed Indian teachers, 
overspending its education budget by R22 million in order to "take care" of the teachers.I63 
Another educational issue also pulled TASA into an open feud with its department: a 
new system of evaluation. In March 1987, TASA organised a mass meeting in Durban to 
protest against the new system. I<i-1 This campaign would continue over the next couple of 
years. These various campaigns seemed to come to a head around the beginning of 1988, 
when T ASA gave evidence against HoD control of education before the state-sponsored 
James Commission of Enquirx into corruption in the HoD. Earlier, in November of the 
previous year, TASA claimed to have conducted a survey in Tongaat concerning "irregular 
election practices" during a by-election for the HoD.t6s 
TASA pitted itself against its department in an increasingly militant way, redefining 
acceptable teacher behaviour. 
Teacher Unity Initiatives, 1986-1987 
While tensions continued to manifest themselves within teacher politics defined by separate 
education departments, there was a growing sense that unity was essential. Emergent 
teacher groups wanted to strengthen their challenge to traditional "professionalism", while 
traditionally "professional" associations sought a uni tied response to this challenge born of a 
shifting political climate. This brought about both progressive and established unity efforts 
which, though separate, indicate a growing readiness for unity. 
During the two-and-a-half years following the birth of the Western Cape emergent 
unions, teacher unity moved towards centre stage. Though as an ideal unity was embedded 
in their constitutions, in practice teacher unity received scant attention before 1987. As we 
have seen, the established organisations had a long history of attempted federal unity, but 
the changing terrain and their shifting positions in relation to the anti-apartheid struggle 
made cooperation difficult in 1985 and 1986. 
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By 1987, for reasons discussed below, both the emergent and established groupings 
were ready for teacher unity talks, albeit separately. 
The political context of unity 
More energy was put into teacher unity in part due to a more realistic assessment of state 
power and of what was necessary in order to effectively oppose it. As the government 
continued to clamp down on individual organisations and people, the vital necessity for 
employing the combined strength of teachers and others within the liberation movement 
became clear. 
Influential political groups external to the teaching profession sought to create a 
powerful political ally in a united teachers' body. In consequence, educational bodies 
sought to gain more tirm control over the educational terrain in order to affect change. 
Teachers in the democratically aligned organisations wanted to assert organisational control 
over their colleagues to more effectively challenge the established associations. 
Influential groupings external to the teaching profession included the ANC and the 
UDF, and it became clear in 1987 that teacher unity was on their agendas. Randall van den 
Heever, brought this message back from the CTPA' s Dakar meeting with ANC officials 
Thabo Mbeki, Penuel Maduna and Essop Pahad in mid-1987. The Cape Times reported on 
the meeting: "The ANC expressed concern about the division which still existed in the 
ranks of teacher corps in South Africa and were in favour of a 'much closer co-operation 
between the various teacher movements' in South Africa .... "166 The UDF, inside the 
country, called for teacher unity in the resolutions of its National Working Committee in 
March 1987. 167 These two linked organisations saw the potential for recruiting a powerful 
political ally, especially' if it could at the same time further the movement of conservative 
teachers away from the state's "professional" camp. 
Another powerful body which became increasingly involved was COSATU, especially 
through the work of its chief teacher unity proponent, General Secretary Jay Naidoo. 
COSATU, having strongly committed itself to "populist" unionism, engaged with teachers 
as an unorganised section of the working class. COSA TU clearly wanted a powerful 
national teachers' union within its fold; locating teachers within the working class and 
organising them would render a powerful threat to bourgeois professional groups and thus 
undermine the state's educational strategies which had often been associated with the reform 
of capitalism, as well as the transformation of the racial order.16S Naidoo, in a speech 
delivered to the April 1987 WECTU AGM, chastised teachers for not having learnt the 
lessons of unity from the factory floor. He explained that all sectors were organising 
nationally except teachers. According to Sourh, he claimed that teachers were "paralyzed" 
without such a national structure. Importantly, he added that the progressive organisations 
166 Cape Times, 6 Octoher 1987. 
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168 See, for example, Kallaway, "An Introduction"; Kallaway, ed.; Nkomo, cd.; Untcrhaltcr, ct al, eds. 
201 
needed to build an education relevant to the working class. In its report on the speech, a 
WECTU newsletter stated COSATU's readiness to become more involved: "COSATU 
strongly urged that WECTU committed [sic] itself to the ideal of a single national teachers' 
union and that that union situate itself firmly in the heart of the national liberation struggle. 
COSATU would willingly assist wherever possible with the realization of this goal." 169 
This sentiment was reinforced at COSATU's tirst Education Conference in October 1987, 
one recommendation of which stated: 
COSA TU should ... assist or strengthen were they do exist, the formation 
of democratic Parent-Teacher-Student-Associations .... The goal would be 
to encourage one single-constituency, national organisation for each sector 
(e.g.)- a democratic teachers' union.I?O 
An informant involved with the talks to promote a national progressive organisation later 
that year explained how COSATU "held out the possibility of a broad movement involving 
lots of teachers" which would be more powerful than disparate groups.I71 COSA TU, thus, 
in 1987 appeared not only to be calling for a powerful, natiomil, working-class teachers' 
body, but stood willing to lend essential assistance. 
Specifically education-related groups also increased pressure on organised teachers to 
unify. The NECC desired a single body under its auspices, for this would enable a more 
effective implementation of alternative education. Ian Moll claimed, in fact, that after the 
SPCC conference " ... a call for teacher unity from the mass democratic movement was now 
on the agenda" .172 In September 1987, the NECC reiterated these earlier calls for teacher 
unity.l73 
Students, too, influenced the movement towards teacher unity. As student 
organisations became more aware of a need to operate within a broader context, and not 
simply on their own, there was, according to activist Graeme Bloch, " ... the insistence by 
students on the need for teacher unity and their encouragement of processes underway" .174 
So those organisations closest to teachers in the workplace, and operating within their 
educational realm, pressured teacher organisations to join and cooperate against a common 
enemy. 
The above pressures intluenced teacher organisations to channel more energy into 
teacher unity processes. There were other factors within teacher politics which added to the 
pressure for unity. For the emergent groups, teacher unity had been an ideal since their 
inception. In a way, this ideal j ustitied their racially-bound groupings, and they struggled 
to divest themselves of their racial trappings. They recognised, too, that power to fully 
assert a redefined "professionalism" could only be gained by uniting all the emergent 
bodies. They could then more effectively confront not only state structures but also their 
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opponents in the established camp. Rossiter wrote of EDASA members: "General 
consensus amongst the interviewees is that only once a national non-racial teachers 
organisation is established will there be any potential to offer an alternative to the 
established teacher body."I75 EDASA's Updare claimed that state repression during 1986 
rendered unity imperative: " ... progressive organisations need to re-evaluate their tactical 
direction and work more along the lines of building and strengthening their organisations, 
as well as inter-organisational links." Thus EDASA 's 1987 theme was "building for 
unity" ,176 After a year-and-a-half of struggle, the emergent Western Cape unions 
recognised the increasing importance of "strength in unity". 
Importantly, too, the emergent organisations saw teacher unity as one way to prevent 
their own disintegration. As their numbers dramatically decreased, teacher unity became an 
important issue around which to organise. "Unity," admitted an ED ASA member, "revived 
ED ASA 's working committee. "177 This was also true to different degrees for WECTU and 
DETU. 
Established organisations also responded to the external pressures and held teacher 
unity meetings. They also needed to find strength in unity to oppose the emergent threat, 
and to present a non-racialistic front as an assertion of legitimacy. 
Emergent unity in the Western Cape 
Unity between WECTU, DETU and ED ASA in the Western Cape remained elusive during 
1985 and 1986, largely because of the turbulent struggles in black education -- including 
repressive state action which generally inhibited their activities-- and because of the 
difficulty EDASA had in gaining credibility, particularly with WECTU. Elements within 
. . 
WECTU did not trust the "white" union, but WECTU did, according to an EDASA 
member, need EDASA in order to present a public image of non-racialism.178 Other 
difficulties also existed. These represented continuing tensions within emergent teacher 
politics which led to the birth of these three separate organisations in the first place. As a 
WECTU newsletter stated in 1988: "DETU and EDASA represent attempts to organize 
constituencies. that are in socioeconomic and political terms so different that one struggles, 
on the surface, to find a common denominator."I79 In 1987, however, due to the pressures 
described above, these obstacles were overcome and the three emergent unions began to 
meet and discuss teacher unity. 
There was some limited contact prior to April 1987. For example, ED ASA was 
represented at a DETU meeting in February of that year. And all three organisations had 
attended the March 1986 NECC conference in Durban. But much closer cooperation began 
after April, with the launch of the Western Cape NECC. The Western Cape NECC 
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provided a forum for the three to meet, and also provided pressure by reiterating the 
national NECC policy which prioritized teacher unity. 
In May 1987, DETU and EDASA held a joint workshop on the Education Charter. 
That same month, DETU and ED ASA enjoyed a successful jazz evening at the University 
of Cape Town. Because of the rift between WECTU and EDASA, it was left to DETU to 
call and chair a meeting at St. Francis in Langa on the issue of progressive Western Cape 
unity. At the first meeting, WECTU accused ED ASA of being the stumbling block to 
unity, but DETU defended ED AS A, stating that it would not accept unity without 
EDASA.180 According to an ED ASA participant, "WECTU slowly started to accept us." 181 
By September 1987, WECTU was fully involved in enacting the resolution of its 
April 1987 AGM "to spearhead the building of a national teachers' organisation in South 
African under the guidance of COSATU" .1i!2 Although COSATU was not yet involved in 
the Western Cape, by September the three emergent organisations had met twice regarding 
unity, had exchanged constitutions, and had begun work on a joint newsletter.183 Although 
the newsletter was never completed. according to an EDASA informant, "The significance 
of the thing was greater than the actual merit of the content." 184 
Cooperation continued in October with a joint WECTU-DETU-EDASA-UWC 
conference on People's Education at UWC. According to a WECTU "Secretarial Report" 
of 16 July 1988, WECTU also " ... committed itself to working locally on joint projects 
with EDASA and DETU to effect unity amongst the progressive teachers' unions" .185 All 
three local emergent unions espoused such commitment, and their discussions on local unity 
appeared "quite advanced" 186 when they were overtaken by a national "progressive" teacher 
unity initiative. 
National unity for "progressive" 
teacher organisationsl87 
A national "progressive" teacher unity initiative got underway in October 1987. The 
Progressive Teachers' Union (PTU), operating in DEC (HoR) schools in the Transvaal, 
invited almost all of the progressive unions to a National Consultative Conference, hosted 
by the NECC, at the University of the Witwatersrand from 2-4 October.l88 All three 
Western Cape organisations attended. This conference aimed at removing obstacles to 
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national unity, and accepted that no preconditions should be set for joining the national 
organisation (for example, one did not need to adopt the Freedom Charter). Also, this 
conference compiled a list of ten aims and objectives (see Appendix B) to be discussed 
within organisations and ratitied at the next meeting. A steering committee was established 
to devise a programme of action, and to inform the NECC and COSATU of all decisions. 
Thus, this initiative was from the outset firmly aligned to the mass democratic movement, 
committed to the participation of COSA TU, and responsive to the various pressures these 
external groupings brought to bear. 
A second meeting was held at the University of the Witwatersrand on 7 November, 
comprising the same organisations -- though DETU sent apologies. Additional members 
were the Eastern Cape Teachers' Union (ECTU), the East London Progressive Teachers' 
Union (ELPTU) and the Mamelodi Teachers' Union (MATU).189 This meeting was a great 
success in that the ten aims and objectives were accepted, all the organisations re-committed 
themselves to national unity, various names for the national body were proposed, and an 
actual launch date was set for 5 April 1988. The meeting also established a committee to 
draw up a constitution. A press release announced that a national union "representing 
10,000 teachers" would be launched in the new year.190 
Though the draft constitution was indeed presented at the third meeting, held on 5 
December, the intended launch was postponed. More importantly, COSATU participated 
in this meeting and, according to a participant, "made an eloquent plea for including the 
moderate organisations" .191 There were strong objections, particularly from WECTU, 192 
but COSATU' s proposal that it host talks between the emergent unions and established 
groups (including the CTPA and ATASA) was accepted, and participants scheduled their 
next meeting for March 1988. It was a large step indeed for the emergent unions to agree 
to sit down with their "reactionary" counter-parts, and indicative in part of COSATU's 
persuasive powers. 
This national progressive unity initiative, which was in fact being derailed in favour 
of a single national body including all black teacher organisations, had achieved some 
success. There were, nevertheless, obstacles. Lack of finance remained a problem, as did 
the continued question of repression and organisational bannings. "Whole channels of 
communication were crushed," stated one participant from EDASA. "People couldn't 
contact their membership." Also, a leadership split in NEUSA developed and inhibited that 
organisation; s full engagement.193 But such difficulties did not stall the talks. Rather, 
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circumstances overtook this initiative, as COSATU's proposals were carried forward to 
Harare in a much more grand fashion than participants anticipated. 
Unity amongst established teacher organisations 
Across the emergent-established divide, similar events were occurring as the established 
groups gathered for discussions about teacher unity. Such talks occurred at a national level, 
for each Western Cape body, for example, was an affiliate of a national organisation. 
ATASA convened the meeting at the Victoria Hotel in Johannesburg one week after the 
second progressive unity meeting in November 1987. 
All of the established organisations participated except the Transvaal 
Onderwysunie.l94 Those present included: ATASA, UTASA, TASA, SATA, NTS, 
SAOU, the Natal Onderwysunie (NOU), the Onderwysunie van die Oranje Vrystaat (OOV) 
and the ITA. JOCTASA's 1983 Charter for Teacher Unity (see Appendix A), drawn up 
during an earlier attempt at teacher unity, was used as a basis for discussion.l95 In the end, 
participants established thirteen sub-committees -- at the request of the SATA -- which were 
to "hash out" various issues surrounding teacher unity .196 
In order to better understand the divide between the established and the emergent 
teacher unity initiatives, and thus better comprehend the task confronting facilitators of an 
all-inclusive initiative, the JOCTASA Charter provides a useful tool for assessing some 
differences between the two camps. 
The JOCTASA Charter, while upholding many principles respected by the emergent 
camp, contains ideas anathema to anyone allying themselves with a working-class, socialist 
struggle. While condemning aparrheid and requesting "the establishment of a non-racial 
society", the Charter further upheld class-conscious interests. It aimed at: 
A rationally planned educational system adapted to meet the challenges of 
the scientitic-technological age with specific reference to the manpower 
requirements of our country; and to this end, the provision of educational 
institutions to promote the acquisition of managerial, entrepreneurial, 
administrative, professional and technical skills.l97 
Such a "scientific" ideology fit in perfectly with the government reform initiatives of the 
eighties, embodied, for example, in the De Lange Commission report, so aptly described 
by Bill Nasson.J98 Further, after denouncing racially-based education systems, the Charter 
presented telling addenda: 
Given the essentially separate basis of education policy and practice m 
South Africa, we realistically recognise and appreciate: 
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the difficulties inherent in establishing and effectively organising and 
operating teachers I associations on a practical! y open basis 
that a fully open education system in South Africa is a function of an 
open society. 1 Y9 
Such caveats were not acceptable to the emergent groups, and highlighted the important 
differences between established and emergent styles of operation. 
Such a broad comparison does not imply homogeneity within each camp. Differences 
existed between emergent unions in the progressive camp, although their over-arching goals 
were very similar. Rifts existed within the established grouping as well as the traditional 
associations confronted challenges to their conceptions of "professionalism". The widest 
rift existed between the black and white groupings, since the established black organisations 
had experienced crisis and more intense pressures to change than their white counter-parts. 
At the meeting at the Victoria Hotel, very different organisations with very different 
agendas confronted each other. While joined by a common understanding of their 
"professional" status, the established organisations differed on ·a number of points. The 
black groups were essentially more political than their white counterparts. However 
"conservative" or "apolitical" ATASA might have been if seen within the context of black 
liberation politics, its location within the context of apartheid education meant that it 
represented the interests of teachers of the oppressed, as opposed to white teacher groups 
which represented the more privileged sectors of society. This had the effect of locating 
ATASA in an increasingly critical location regarding state education. 
ATASA had been involved with the NECC since its inception; ATASA's general 
secretary had been detained. Both ATASA and UTASA had withdrawn from apartheid 
education structures, and antagonisms had grown up between them and the state they 
served. They were outspokenly antagonistic to aparrheid and aparrheid education. 
ATASA had further retlected its leanings towards the emergent groups which had met one 
week earlier by inviting NEUSA to the Victoria Hotel meeting, an invitation NEUSA 
declined.2oo 
The growing disparity between the "professional" ideologies of different established 
groups was evident in the different forms of unity they suggested. The CTPA (through 
UTASA) took a public position in opposition to most other established bodies in response to 
political pressures and a rapidly changing political climate. A UTASA document released 
at the time of the Victoria Hotel meeting stated: " ... UT ASA believes that the ideal of 
teacher unity must be represented in a union structure and not in a federal structure based 
on racial sub-components. "2o1 UT ASA further distanced itself from the organisations it had 
agreed to meet by stating: "It is UTA SA Is view that (a) to re-open the discussions on 
Apartheid as embodied by the Afrikaner organizations and (b) tore-discuss the content of 
199 JOCTASA Charterj{n· Teacher Uniry. 
200 Moll, "Towards one South Afri~an tea~ hers' union." 69: TI1e Weekly Mail, 27 November to 3 December 
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the [JOCTASA charter on~teacher unity] would be both retrogressive and 'divisive." The 
same UTASA document expressed intermtional teacherbodies' approval of the CTPA talks 
with the ANC, COSATU and the U OF. and its adoption of the Freedom Charter.2o2 Such 
actions were considered anathema to the white organisations, particularly those representing 
Afrikaans-speaking constituencies. 
Contradictions therefore existed between the established bodies, and also within 
individual organisations. UTA SA's public stand on teacher unity, an attempt to gain 
legitimacy within the liberation movement, was not a fair retlection of its internal ideology. 
The Weekly Mail of 6 November 1987. for example. quoted van den Heever as saying: " ... 
we want to move towards a national union and know COSATU would like this too, but we 
realise each organisation has built up its bases [membership and resources] and would be 
wary of risking them unnecessarily. "2o3 This bears out the contradictions within the CTPA. 
COSATU, while undoubtedly aware of such contradictions, continued to attempt to 
gain support from the black established organisations. The Harare meeting in April 1988 
widened the rift between and within the e~tablished bodies. The second meeting of the 
established associations, scheduled for April 1988,204 failed; the CTPA sent a telegram 
explaining that they were now committed to the Harare initiative which excluded, for the 
time being, the established white organisations.2o-; 
Tlze Harare Conference 
The Harare conference facilitated unity across the previously intractable emergent-
established divide. The conference organisers. including COSATU and the ANC, took 
advantage of a historical moment vvhich allowed room for compromise amongst .teacher 
organisations. The discourse of a new "professionalism" had been growing for a number of 
years, and sociopolitical forces had been challenging the established organisations to 
distance themselves from their traditional "professionalism". This process was just 
beginning, and reflected more a public desire for credibility than fundamental shifts in 
ideology. But the teacher unity initiative begun in Harare took advantage of that process to 
assert a powerful influence on teacher politics and its "professional" discourse. 
The political context in 1988 
In 1988, the more than 250,000 tea~..·hers in South Africa taught in fourteen different 
education departments and were grouped separately into over thirty-two teachers' 
organisations.2oo The task of unification appeared little less than monumental. But there 
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continued to be good reason for certain groups to seek int1uence over a unified teaching 
corps, and pressures on teachers to unify remained. 
It was a year in which turmoil persisted, within schools and outside of them. In the 
Western Cape, DET high schools in Langa, Gugulethu and Nyanga experienced 
disturbances throughout the year, beginning with a problematic registration procedure. 
Altogether the DET excluded 1544 students due to late registration. The schools opened 
over five weeks late, at which time three schools remained just over half full. PTSAs were 
not permitted to meet to discuss the issue of registration.zo7 
Western Cape DEC schools also continued to experience unrest. In Athlone, 
Bonteheuwel and Mitchell's Plain, the army and police threatened schools because of 
student protests.2ox According to a WECTU document, teachers and students at Manenberg 
Senior Secondary School underwent severe harassment as police detained more than twenty-
six students and SRC members and six teachers (five of whom were WECTU members). 
Two WECTU teachers were barred from the school, and fourWECTU members' homes 
were raided. 209 
Apart from such "political" unrest, gang violence also continued to threaten school 
attendance.210 For whatever reasons, the Cape Times of 20 July 1988 reported that DET 
and DEC schools were operating with about half their usual numbers of students.211 
While militant, school-based action continued, the liberation struggle continued to 
move away from the "popular revolt" optimism of 1985. The aparrheid state would not 
collapse overnight. "While the state remains confronted by a number of serious weaknesses 
and threats," wrote Duncan Innes of 1988, " ... those who would engage it in battle would 
do well to look much more closely at the immense power it wields. "212 Such an 
examination of state power could only lead to a recognition of the immense importance of 
political unity in opposition to the state. Innes continued: 
The sober reality of South Africa in 1988 is of a country in which the 
popular organisations operate under massive restrictions, black trade 
unions tind themselves under increasing threat, treason trials and hangings 
proliferate, while some black townships are still under military occupation 
and other black areas are dominated by lawless vigilantes.213 
In light of all this, teacher unity could be seen as one aspect of the liberation movement's 
much broader solution to the problem of state power. Moll, while claiming that " ... 
teacher unity is taking place 1virhin the mass democratic movement for the tirst time ever", 
stated: "Clearly, the programme of the broad liberation movement to build national unity 
2°7 Philcox, 29; L.G. Daha. letter. CuJW Ti111cs. 2 Sc:ptemhc:r 1988. 
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has direct implications for teacher organisations. ".?.14 As the organisations and their struggles 
matured, the necessity of fighting on a unified front became clearer. 
The Teacher Uniry News, published by NEUSA, TASA and the Society of Natal 
Teachers (the UTASA Natal af(iliate) in late 1989. spoke of the teachers' plight in 1988 in 
exactly these terms: 
The political interference vvhich teachers presently face is directly related 
to the lack of cohesion in teacher organisation. Our inability to confront 
issues jointly, and to establish national positions, has eroded the possibility 
of teachers having an impact on their working conditions and on 
education. Salary deals are arranged via highly undemocratic practices, 
and our responses are diluted by a multiplicity of positions. Syllabi and 
calenders are handed down from above, and we are not equipped to 
respond as a single body of educators most concerned with the matter.21s 
Such a reality constituted a perennial pressure on teachers: they knew that unity would 
enhance their power, but that had to be set off against the knowledge that they were part of 
a wider world of politics in which other groups wanted to harness that power for their own 
agendas. The Harare conference was the culmination of this. As one participant stated: 
"It was all about power. Who was going to get us?"216 
There were also other pressures drawing teacher organisations to Harare. Firstly, the 
organisers (see below) comprised most of the heavy-weight list of South African liberation 
organisations. One participant claimed: "The ANC said, 'Get here.' "217 As the teachers 
wanterl to maintain credibility, to be accepted by these liberatory groups, so too did these 
groups seek to manoeuvre teachers into re-defining their "professionalism". Dullah Omar, 
a prominent MOM lawyer, illustrated this at the June 1988 CTPA conference. "Let us not 
becom~ part of an elitist class," he said. "After all, teachers though you are today, the vast 
majority of you are the sons and daughters of oppressed workers." Jay Naidoo gave a 
similar message to the conference.21x COSATU, as we have seen, had persuaded the 
emergent groups to include the "moderates", and had met separately with UTASA. 
Secondly, there was a good deal of pressure for unification on South African teachers' 
organisations from international teacher organisations. WCOTP was withholding 
recognition -- and threatening to stop supporting AT ASA if it did not participate in unity 
efforts-- for a unified body. WCOTP demonstrated its interest by donating Rl95,000 to 
the post-Harare teacher unity initiative.2J9 As a participant said, "International money is 
waiting for a single union. "22o 
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The Orgamsers 
One participant explained that WCOTP convened the meeting at Harare, and invited the 
ANC.nt Another said, "I felt the whole thing was an ANC thing", after initially believed 
that the Zimbabwe Teachers' Association had convened it.222 The CTPA, even, proudly 
took credit for the Harare initiative, pointing to their meetings with the ANC, WCOTP and 
COSATU.22J As one teacher stated: "No one knew who was behind it. "224 Ian Moll, 
active in NEUSA teacher politics, gave tina! credit to WCOTP and the All Africa Teachers' 
Organisation (AATO) for making the "decisive intervention". "Both these organisations 
were concerned that teacher unity in South Africa was not being realised, II he wrote. m 
When the South African delegates arrived, they discovered that the ANC, COSATU 
and WCOTP would be participating. Other participants included SACTU, AA TO, the 
Zimbabwean Teachers' Association (ZIMT A), the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions, 
the Kenyan National Union of Teachers,226 and the NECC. Attempting to explain the 
involvement of non-South African groups, Ambrose Adondgo of the AA TO said at the first 
session: "The anti-apartheid campaign is no longer a concern of the oppressed South 
African people alone. It is a concern of any democratic and progressive human being who 
believes in the upholding of the right to democratic freedom and human dignity .... "227 
Merry Dewar, writing in Sash, pointed out that there were "no representatives of the Pan 
Africanist or Black Consciousness traditions" .22x This was not surprising, since the 
contemporary teacher unity efforts were tirmly rooted in the MDM, and COSATU was 
playing a decisive role. As Dullah Omar said at the June 1988 CTPA conference, "We do 
not wish to interfere in the discussions which have been initiated towards establishing 
teacher unity wirhin rhe conrexr oj'rhe nmiono! Jemocroric srruggle. 11 229 Certainly there 
were many II ANC people" in Harare, during both the social and the formal settings.230 
COSATU and SACTU chaired the conference, presaging the essential facilitating role 
COSATU would play during the following two-and-a-half years while the initiative begun 
in Harare took the form of the South African Democratic Teachers' Union (SADTU). At 
this point, then, it will be useful to examine why COSATU had begun playing such an 
active role. 
Trade unions in South Africa, as they emerged and grew from the 1970s, fell 
essentially into two groups: those that believed unions should focus only on worker-
221 Interview with Kc::nny Ernc::st. 8 !'vlay 1990. 
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related, "shop-tloor" issues; and those "political" or "social movement" unions which 
believed that unions should also engage in wider struggles extending out of the factory. 
According to Lambert and Webster, "The launch of COSATU in December 1985 
represented a broad shift of key trade unions towards a more direct concern with non-
factory issues. "231 Still, COSATU embodied these two trends. This division would 
gradually be overcome during the next three years. 
COSA TU believed in the principle of "people's power", and during 1986 began 
attempting to initiate an alliance between different classes and different spheres of the South 
African struggle. No one section of "the struggle" could win in isolation.2J2 Massive state 
repression during 1987 and 1988 helped to lessen COSATU 's internal division regarding 
these issues. In particular, the banning of the UOF left a gap for COSATU to partially fill. 
COSATU therefore adopted the Freedom Charter in 1987 to enhance a sense of "common 
political direction" with other groups within the national liberation struggle. During 1987 
and 1~88, according to Fine and Webster, "A strategic compromise was forged on how 
transition to a post-apartheid society could take place through a broad anti-apartheid alliance 
based on grassroots organisation. "2JJ Teachers clearly constituted an important sphere of 
the struggle, and an important partner in an anti-aparrheid alliance across class and sector 
divides. Thus Jay Naidoo could speak to the CTPA of the importance of teacher unity in 
June 1988: 
We have reached a critical point in our history in which teachers' unity is 
of paramount importance in our struggle for an education in a social 
system that meets the needs of our people .... To this end, COSATU and 
the whole democratic movement will do all in its power to facilitate the 
establishment of such machinery. Let history judge those who have not 
contributed towards forging of the unity that is so desperately needed.234 
The strategy COSATU adopted to justify its involvement and to persuade teachers of 
their common cause focussed on detining the class location of teachers. In Britain, there 
were close connections between teachers, their organisations and the Labour Party and 
unions.235 COSATU sought similar connections, even pushing for the teachers' union, 
once created, to affiliate to COSA TU. This was partly because teachers were seen as 
connected to the working class. but also because in COSATU's vision all South African 
workers were intended to control education. In 1986, COSATU wrote that "the division 
between mental and manual labour" had to be broken down to end elitism. Workers needed 
to " ... play an important part in the planning of education in society and in controlling that 
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education" .236 Close cooperation with an organised national teacher union which 
recognised its working class origins would be a crucial way to orchestrate such control. 
17ze South African teacher organisation pwticipants 
A South African teacher who participated in the Harare talks stated plainly: "People were 
surprised when they saw who was there. "137 This was certainly not true for all the 
participants, but the sentiment was widespread: teachers with deeply-rooted antagonisms 
were surprisingly being asked to sit down and talk about unifying. At Jan Smuts Airport, 
the representatives from the established unions stood to one side, while those from the 
emergent bodies stood to the other. All were waiting for the same plane.238 
ATASA, UTASA and TASA had been invited from the established camp, while all of 
the established white groups -- all affiliates of the TFC -- had been excluded. Of the 
emergent unions, WECTU. DETU, ED AS A, NEUSA, PTU and PTL were invited.239 The 
TLSA, representing a Unity Movement legacy amongst some teachers, was conspicuously 
absent. All the groups in attendance felt the pressures to participate described above, but 
this did not preclude the mutual antagonism between some emergent and some established 
organisations. An organisation I ike WECTU had a great deal of trouble engaging in such 
discussions with organisations it identified as "collaborators". But an index of the changing 
times, and of the pressures brought to bear, was the fact that all invited bodies did attend, 
warily or not. 
Five days of the conference: 4 to 8 Apri/1988 
Discussion at the conference illustrated two important issues. First, significant differences 
between emergent and established teacher organisations remained. Second, despite these 
differences, a new spifit of unity was growing as the established groups shifted towards 
newer, "emergent" perspectives regarding "professionalism", class and race, and the 
emergent groups became more accepting of the conventionally "professional" associations. 
The conference consisted of open and closed sessions, the latter being the exclusive 
privilege of South African representatives. The Zimbabwean Secretary of Education 
formally opened the conference. and the following open sessions included a message of 
solidarity from the AA TO, and papers on the necessity of teachers' organisations, of 
teacher unity, and on Zimbabwe's experience. SACTU's general secretary delivered the 
keynote address, and the general secretary of ZIMT A also spoke. After the all-important 
closed sessions, the conference ended with an evening of singing, and a woman from Natal 
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spoke about life in a political context which included Inkatha. The Zimbabwean Minister 
of Labour formally ended the conference.2-10 
Throughout the conference, the tensions between the emergent and established 
organisations remained apparent. "It was a very problematic five days," said one 
participant, essentially because of the historical divides between the organisations. "There 
were times when it seemed those talks would fall apart, like there was no common ground." 
The conference room was organised in a big square, and at first all the established 
organisation representatives sat on one side, with their emergent colleagues on the other and 
the ANC in the middle. There were various tensions. "A guy from AT ASA called me 
'Madame'," said an ED ASA participant. "They were still struggling with 'comrade'." 
More seriously, the established organisations treated the ED ASA representatives as if they 
were ignorant, and TASA' s Pat Samuels asked the gathering what, in fact, EDASA was 
doing there. 2-11 The more vehement differences between the organisations operating in DEC 
(HoR) schools also emerged. According to one representative from another organisation, 
"There were big problems with the CTPA and WECTU. Yousuf [Gabru] and Franklin 
[Sonn] attacked each other like tigers. "242 
Contentious issues were raised to see whether common ground could be reached. 
According to the WECTU reportback in its newsletter, the conference dealt with several 
major issues which emphasised the divisions between established and emergent groups, and 
their differing conceptions of teachers' locations within society. The divisive issue of 
structure was debated: should the -organisation be a professional association or a trade 
union? This was held over for discussions within constituencies.243 The representatives 
also discussed ideology. "The issue," stated WECTU, "remained unresolved. It was 
agreed that in the quest for unity no preconditions should be laid down." Further, non-
collaboration was discussed without resolution. 
While these issues --class location, political affiliation and cooperation with the state 
--remained at the heart of differences within teacher.politics, and were not overcome at 
Harare, the conference marked a certain shifting of ground. Participants agreed on the 
need for a single, national teacher union. 24-1 In Harare, a "worker" was defined as any 
person receiving a wage.2-1s Further, the conference appointed COSATU to facilitate the 
follow-up unity process within South Africa by convening the next meeting. 
In the end, the fifteen points of the Harare Accord on Teacher Unity (see Appendix 
C) were drawn up to guide organisations through the difticult discussions that lay ahead.246 
This remarkable document, eventually agreed to by all the organisations which participated 
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at Harare, illustrated signiticant changes in the realm of teacher politics and in the accepted 
notion of teacher "professionalism". According to the Harare Accord, the proposed, 
unified teacher organisation would be "part of the national mass democratic movement", 
and would "protect and promote the rights of teachers as workers and professionals". The 
unified organisation "would abide by the principle and practice of non-collaboration with all 
structures of the Apartheid system". Participating organisations also committed themselves 
to the goals of People's Education. thus denying the sacrosanctity. of state education and the 
teacher's role within it. 
The Harare Accord, illustrating a new spirit of compromise around changing 
conceptions of "professionalism" despite its purposeful ambiguities, marked a victory for 
both the conference organisers and the participants. In 1990, Randall van den Heever, who 
attended the talks, would write: "The Harare talks between the democratic teachers' 
organisations in South Africa were frank and to the point. The cause of existing differences 
was direct and to the point. [sic] But through it all the importance of a formula for unity 
was the one thing which was recognised as being of the greatest importance. "247 To this 
end, the conference, according to a participant, " ... was incredibly well-planned, to break 
down all barriers". Those who had sat on opposite sides of the square began inixing: "The 
whole dynamics changed." "At the end," this participant continued, "there was an amazing 
comraderie, an amazing high. "2-1x 
This "high" came after clays of intense tensions and discussions, after which the 
Harare conference was deemed a great success. "When the Harare Declaration of Teacher 
Unity was ... finally sealed," wrote van den Heever, " ... all delegates rose to their feet 
spontaneously and emotionally applauded the remarkable breakthrough which had been 
achieved."2-l9 Another participant, interviewed in 1990, said: "You'd never say that two 
years later that we wouldn't have a union. I think we thought everybody would get home 
and sign up. "2so 
Con c lu sio n 
Everyone, of course, did not go home and sign up. "Back in South Africa we got into old 
familiar patterns," said one teacher. 251 But back in South Africa the long-awaited teacher 
unity was on the short-term agenda. Harare provided a starting point, a place where 
disagreements could be aired and discussed, where some pressure could be applied. Harare 
provided fifteen guidelines, illustrating the growing willingness of some organisations to 
compromise around contentious issues within teacher politics. And Harare provided a 
facilitator in the form of COSA TU. 
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In exactly two-and-a-half years. SADTU would be launched. The road between 
Harar~ and SADTU would be difticult. The Harare Conference got the organisations 
travelling, so it is to their journey we now turn in Chapter Seven. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
FROM HARARE TO SADTU: 
TWO YEARS OF TRANSITION, 1988-1990 
The end of the I 980s marked the high point of a new "professional" discourse within 
teacher politics that decade. The liberation movement, and increased political militancy in 
many spheres, profoundly intluenced both the discourse and activities of teacher 
organisations. The process of teacher un i tication moved to the heart of teacher politics, and 
teacher groups began compromising around new ideas about behaviour, identity and 
location. Not only did traditional "professionalism" remain largely absent from public 
discourse, as it had since I 985, but established organisations became more fully committed 
to newer "professional" ideas. The national teacher unity initiative born in Harare occurred 
within a rubric defined by the emergent organisations and their political allies within the 
MDM. Evolving ideas of "professionalism" shaped the unity process; the unity process 
detined acceptable discourse in teacher politics. In Harare, for the tirst time, emphasis lay 
on communalities; divisions were underplayed under the watchful eyes of COSA TU, the 
ANC and WCOTP. Back in South Africa, with its complex nexus of race and class, to 
what extent could a unity of ideas and behaviour be achieved? 
Of course, the movement towards a unity outside the sphere of traditional 
"professionalism" was marred by the tensions and conflict inherent in teacher politics. 
And, as events in 1990 and 1991 would show, some established organisations' political 
posturing within a "progressive" unity process proved temporary. By 1990, several of the 
participants in the national teacher unity talks opted to revert to an oyert acceptance of the 
status quo, and to maintain the barriers of race and class, of government-proscribed 
ethnicity and "professionalism". Real momentum away from traditional "professionalism" 
was built up during 1988-1990, however, and real changes occurred within teacher politics. 
This chapter will move from Harare back into South Africa, where the central 
tensions within the realm of teachers will be explored over the two years leading to the 
launch of SADTU in October 1990. Many pressures operated on teachers and on schooling 
to alter teachers' attitudes towards their work. More teachers than in the preceding years 
utilized the available space to resist imposed ideas of "professionalism", and to work 
against historical race and class divides. At the same time, the power of conservative 
teachers, the divided traditions of organisations and the power of the state contradicted the 
pressures for change. 
This chapter, then, will begin with an explication of the various forces working to 
both change teachers' ideologies and to entrench them. After thus situating teacher 
organisations within the political context of I 988-1990, the implications for Western Cape 
teacher organisations will be examined. Both tensions and growing cooperation between 
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organisations will be dealt with, before turning to a specific analysis of the process of 
teacher unity. After explicating the historical divisions which surfaced during teacher unity 
talks, specific tensions within the participating established teacher groups will be discussed. 
Finally, Western Cape strategies for unity, and their implications for a changing 
"professional" discourse, will be examined, before the chapter concludes with the launch of 
SADTU. 
SADTU represented a monumental step forward in the struggle for a non-racial 
teacher organisation and for a re-conceptualisation of teachers' locations in South Africa. 
But it emerged in reality a far cry from Harare's dream. 
Teachers' Evolving Attitudes about "Professionalism" 
The Harare conference occurred at a time when many teachers and their organisations were 
experiencing a shift in self-perceptions. This may in part have been an attempt to resolve 
what Neville Alexander terms the post-1976 "collective identity crisis" of teachers in black 
schools. I In some senses, organisations simply re-defined their rhetorical image for the 
sake of credibility and convenience. The CTPA, for example, emerged from the muddy 
waters of class location by referring to itself as a "professional association with trade union 
functions". These were times of ambiguity for some teacher organisations under pressure 
to change. 
Some teachers, however, experienced a changing attitude towards their work and their 
place within their "communities" which illustrated a more profound redefining of place in 
the race/class/professional nexus. During the late 1980s, teachers were asserting 
themselves; teachers took greater advantage of a space which is always open to them but 
which is only utilized when the contradictory balance of forces -- those which seek to 
discipline and control teachers as docile agents in the reproduction of the dominant 
ideology, and those which allow and expect teachers to resist or rebel against such docilityz 
-- weighs more heavily on the side of resistance. ~eachers also moved away from simply 
supporting resistance actioQ as part of national liberation initiatives,_ or even student calls, --- ... -- -- --- . 
and began to protest around their own conditions of work,_such_as worsening school 
...,____...._ - - -- ·- --------- ----------- - -·- - --
CE_ndi!ions and the presence of inspectors; A wave of teacher militancy swept across the 
country at the end of the eighties, articulated primarily in terms of unprecedented strike 
action. 
The Harare conference took place during this time of teachers' changing attitudes 
towards their work. The teacher unity initiative was therefore shaped in part by growing 
beliefs that the "profession" was not sacrosanct, that schooling was indeed political and was 
therefore subject to change, that educational "authorities" could be challenged, and that 
teachers were tied to their communities in opposition to race and class oppression. tylany 
teachers appeared to be gaining a greater sense of their own power to affect change in their 
1 Neville Alexander, "Educational stratc!!i<!s for a n<!w South Africa," in cds. Millar, et al, 280. 
2 See the discussion of Camoy anc..l Levi; in Chapter One. 
219 
working environment, thus moving more fully into line with union-worker ideology. Such 
changing attitudes caused changes in teachers' self-perceptions as regards "professionalism" 
and class location, and allowed SADTU to launch as a militant trade union. 
Political Influences on 
Teacher Politics, 1988-1990 
A variety of forces in South Africa worked to alter teachers' perceptions of their role and 
locations during 1988-1990. As in the preceding years of the decade, elements of the 
liberation movement impacted both teachers and their places of work. Student pressures, 
and heightened community militancy during the Defiance Campaign of 1989, continued to 
alter the discourse within teacher politics away from acceptance of traditional 
"professionalism". 
Students, youth and the atmosphere within schools 
During the end of the 1980s, schools rem.ained in a seemingly perpetual state of turmoil. 
Historically, as previous chapters have shown, students demanded that teachers reassess 
their behaviours and complacer.Jt participation in a system promoting apartheid ideologies. 
Because of continued student protest, and insensitive state responses, the entire structure of 
schooling continued to deteriorate. Physical dilapidation, recurrent boycotts and 
perennially lowering morale continued to plague the actual "sites of struggle" .3 Schools 
were a pressure point in a social system which both alienated and marginalised black youth. 
In part, the pressure point was a place where antagonisms between teachers and students 
became entrenched. As sociologist Mamphela Ramphele wrote in 1992: 
Once children were thrust 'onto the frontline', it became difficult to 
sustain traditional social relations between adults and children, and this 
had se[ious implications for family life. Children became used to power 
and cd'ntrol, and refused to yield to the authority of adults whom they 
despised -- their parents and teachers. Contlict became inevitable.4 
I 
Steve Mokwena stated more dramatically in the same year: "The youth have been 
socialised into a political culture uf defiance in which all forms of authority have been 
eroded. "s As the attitudes of '>tudents shifted, so then did the popular conceptions of 
schools; the connotations of "<,chuol" as a symbol changed. 
As a result, teachers' ideas about their place within schools also changed. For some 
this meant a complete acceptance of powerlessness in a political system now cast in the 
harsh light of opposition; for others it meant a renewed militancy to engender a spirit of 
3 For an interesting insight into the situatton in Sowcto schools in 1989, see Thandeka Gqubule, "Inside Our 
Chaotic Schools," Weeklv Mail, 2-8 June 1989. 
4 Mamphda Ramphde, ;,Social Disintegration in the Black Community: Implications for Social 
Transformation," in eLls. Daviu Everatt anLI Elinor Sisulu, Black Yourh in Crisis: Facing the Future 
(Braamfontein: Ravan Press, 1992) 17. 
5 Steve Mokwena, "Living on the Wrong SiLie of the Law: Marginalisation, Youth and Violence," in eds. 
Everatt anu Sisulu, 49. 
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change, to better the gross and seemingly unalterable situation of decay and stagnation. In 
general, though, the continuing disaffection of students sustained pressure on teachers to 
develop and maintain an awareness of their structural functions within schools. . 
Popular conceptions of schools, and thus teachers' self-perceptions within them, 
shifted partly in response to forces at play in the broader society. In a recent work on black 
politics in the 1980s, Tom Lodge asserts that two main factors prompted the upsurgence of 
political resistance in that decade: the severe recession, and the government's spate of 
reform measures. According to Lodge, "The contradictions and tensions tlowing from the 
interaction of these two forces helped to generate the black rebellion of the 1980s. "6 The 
state's attempts at reform, and the implications for teachers, will be discussed below. Here 
it will suffice to say that the state added depth to its usual policy of cooption by promising 
salary parity across departments, for example, and by beginning to elevate a few black 
educators to high-ranking administrative posts. The state, too, began coopting the 
resistance notion of "community control". 
Lodge's second key factor fueling resistance politics in the eighties, the recession, has 
been discussed in previous chapters. By the end of the decade, the slowed economic 
growth, continuing intlation and decreasing investment, among other factors -- especially 
the international "credit squeeze" -- had taken an unpleasant societal toll. In particular, for 
schools, endemic unemployment pinpointed continued pressure on institutions which 
increasingly became pools of discontented, structurally unemployable youth. The 
Development Bank of South Africa stated in 1991 that over the preceding five years only 
8.4 percent of nearly 400,000 people entering the job market had found work. Over the 
decade, as unemployment rose, the number of available jobs decreased. 7 What promises 
could schools make to its potential graduates, especially as the actual matriculation results 
remained low?s 
Colin Bundy argues that this massive unemployment problem, among the various 
other factors comprising the economic crisis in the eighties, was one of three structural 
factors which worked to alienate and marginalise black youth. Such alienation contributed 
greatly to the deterioration of schools. Bundy's second factor was demographic-- the 
expanding, youthful population would continue to put pressure on educational resources 
and, therefore, " ... schools will continue to be laboratories and strongholds of protest" --
and the third was urbanisation, which leads to increased demands on available resources, 
along with violence and crime. 9 Such socioeconomic pressures applied to black youth in 
6 Lodge, 30. 
7 Colin Bundy, "Introduction," in eds. Everatt and Sisulu, 2-5. . 
8 According to the SAIRR Race Relations Surveys, in 1988 the percentage pass-rate was 57.9% for African 
students, 66.1% for Coloured students and 95.1% for Indian students. In 1990 the comparable tigures were 
37% for Africans, 79% for Coloured school-leavers and 95% for Indians. Ken Hartshorne, howc::ver, makes 
the very interesting point that the calculation of results is shrouded in secrecy, which allows room for "the 
manipulation of results". Also, he affirms, the J M B has not been able to ensure that similar standarJs are kept 
across departments, which possibly led to hoostc::J African results in the years 1986-1988. Hartshorne, Crisis 
and Challenge, 83-84. 
9 Bundy, "Introduction," 2-5. 
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South Africa necessarily changed teachers' place of work, since one institution black youth 
are being alienated from was school. 
As the end of the decade approached, the by-now perpetual crisis in schools continued 
a fundamental alteration of relationships within schools: relations between teachers, 
students and administrative personnel; and relations between communities, schools and 
education departments. As these relationships within schools changed, so did teachers' 
attitudes to their work. Teachers vvere forced by students to reassess their "professional" 
position; students did this passively through the process of alienation and marginalisation 
described above, which put pressure on schools, and also by continuing to protest. On 9 
June 1988, for example, seven out of ten African high schools in the peninsula had to 
suspend teaching because of student participation in a national protest. Ia Later, from 25 to 
27 July 1988 up to 120,000 students from ninety schools in the Western Cape participated 
in a protest action organised, in part, by WECSCO. According to activist Graeme Bloch, 
this p[Otest action " ... brought to a head student grievances over harassment of student and 
teacher organisations; suspensions of teachers; student detentions; the blue-card system to 
check students as they entered school grounds in DET schools, following struggles around 
the non-registration of students; and the February restrictions on organisations including the 
NECC. II 11 (See Chapter Five.) 
A further example of continued student militancy occurred in January 1989, after the 
DET announced that the 20,000 or so students who had failed their matriculation 
examinations would not be re-admitted to DET secondary schools. The SAIRR Survey of 
Race Relarions for that year reported that students in Soweto affected by this policy II set 
cars alight and assaulted ·a number of t~achers", 11 a clear indication of continued student 
pressure on educators. In June and August 1989 significant "tlare-ups" occurred in 
Western Cape schools, with boycotts at Coloured and African township schools, detentions, 
security force occupations and protest action. Sourh reported a "Schools Siege" and "war in 
our schools" .13 When, in 1990, the DET again adopted a policy of excluding students who 
had failed, along with ru'les which allowed schools to expel unwanted students, young 
people in schools again protested. In February 1990 protest rallies and marches continued 
to disrupt schoo1s.l4 By March, according to Piet Marais, the Deputy Minister of 
Education and Development Aid, more than 72,000 DET students per day, on average, 
were involved in stayaways around the country. Is 
10 Cape Times, 9 June 1988. 
II Bloch, 120. 
12 SAIRR. Annual Sun·c'\' !9891!990. 831. 
13 SoUih, 17-23 August i989 ami 21-27 Sc:rtcmhc:r 1989; Cape Times, 9 August 1989; New Nation, 2-8 June 
1989. 
14 South, 8-14 February 1990. 
15 Cape Times, 9 Man.:h 1990. 
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Defiance 
Apart from school-related, student protest action, and the broader societal malaise being 
entrenched among black youth. teachers were intluenced by broader political shifts. Lodge 
asserts that: 
In contrast to the mid-1980s, when the insurrectionary movement was 
being pulled onto uncharted courses by cadres of youth in the streets of 
townships, the popular protest in the late 1980s was choreographed and 
coordinated and seemed much more under the command of its leaders.16 
Growing teacher militancy was thus part of a broader shift in the nature of resistance 
politics by the end of the decade. Teachers were, in a sense, "leaders". As the decade 
moved to a close, an upsurgance of public protest focussed around the 1989 Defiance 
Campaign. Teachers, as others, felt the massive support of a truly popular protest, and 
· were emboldened. This is not to imply that the state did not remain repressive, for, as will 
be seen below, retaliatory measures remained intense. In fact, two analysts have claimed 
that the regime's repressive measures led, by 1989, to a "vast reduction" of school-based 
struggles, and had changed the nature of the struggle for People's Education. n' But 
teachers participated in sweeping defiance and, indeed, held high expectations. By 1990, 
State President F. W. de Klerk signalled important shifts in state policy by unbanning the 
ANC and releasing political prisoners, such as Nelson Mandela, acts which signalled 
victories for the liberation movement. At the end of the decade, the situation was not 
dictated by state repression and the quelling of popular protest. The UDF and other 
elements of theliberation movement organised the 1989 Detiance Campaign; there were 
hunger strikes, which focussed international attention on the regime; and organisations 
"unbanned" themselves. The Defiance Campaign, according to Randall van den Heever, 
challenged teachers to· participate in protest actions to prove their "sincerity and 
commitment" .1s In the late 1980s, claimed Jeremy Baskin, an historian of COSATU, 
"People lost their fear. "19 Teachers at the end of the decade, as in 1985, saw scope within 
this broad resistance to assert themselves. Their vision of both the possible and acceptable 
was changing. 
A further factor in these changes was the changing composition of the ranks of 
teachers, who were younger and better qualified than their predecessors. Primary school 
teachers working in the African department were younger. In 1972, teachers aged thirty-to-
thirty-nine comprised 26.4% of the total, while in 1988 this percentage had increased to 
38.2%. The number of teachers aged twenty-nine and younger remained relatively stable 
(dropping slightly from 44.4% to 42.9%), while the number of those aged forty and over 
16 Lodgc, 114. 
17 Wo1pc and Unkrhalkr, 2. 
18 Randall van dcn Hccvcr, "The Role of the T ea~:her in the · Strugglc,'" in 777e People Shall Govern 
(Kassdsvlci: CTPA People's Euucatton Puhl icatton. Decem her 1989) 12. 
19 Pcrsonal notcs from: Jcremy Baskin, puhlic kdures, UCT Summer School, Cape Town, 18-22 January 
1993. 
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dropped from 29.2% to 18.9%. 20 Better qualitied teachers also enhanced confidence. In 
1990, fifty-three percent of DET teachers were qualitied, as opposed to forty-two percent in 
1988.21 
17ze unions 
The importance of COSA TU, and the leadership of the black trade union movement, also 
worked to shift teachers' attitudes about their work. It will be shown below how crucial 
COSA TU' s involvement was to the success at" the NTUF, but what of the other ways in 
which the trade unions shaped a newly emerging political discourse? By the mid-1980s, a 
class-based understanding of the South African struggle strongly motivated activists.22 At 
the beginning of the decade, according to Lodge, " ... the strongest forces for mobilizing 
black protest and resistance were more often in the factories than in the townships, in trade 
unions rather than in political organizations. "23 This affected the texture of the decade's 
protest, as discussed previously. Baskin suggests that as the decade progressed, and 
COSATU was launched, this large federation represented a movement rather than simply a 
group of unions. In light of the state's severe repressive actions, such as bannings of 
organisations like the UDF, Baskin stated that, "COSATU was so political because it could 
not have been otherwise." COSATU, he asserted, was left "holding the banner of the 
MOM". Teachers could also look at the various successes of the trade unions in winning 
gains for their members and be inspired about the efficacy of unionisation.24 
With this primacy of trade unions within the context of the liberation struggle, and the 
kind of anti-management, anti-professional sentiment espoused by the union movement, 
teachers within the liberation movement could not help but be effected. We have seen how 
workers within unions attempted to assert control over teachers, in particular by pressuring 
them to join the ranks of the working class. With COSATU as a major player within the 
broader community of liberation groups, teacher organisations which considered teachers as 
workers had a newly-powerful ally; this occurred alongside the continual public retreat of 
"professional" associations from their traditionally "professional" posturing. In particular, 
COSATU's central involvement in the Harare conference, and its mandate to facilitate the 
new unity initiative, gave it strength in relation to teachers as the Harare initiative 
subsumed all other unity drives. COSA TU was assigned its facilitating role because it had 
national resources and proven experience in merging disparate unions into one federation. 
It was, in the words of the Weekly Mail, "unity-conscious".:!-' But it was also chosen 
20 Hartshorne, Crisis and Challenge, .f5. 
21 SAIRR, Annual Survev 1991 I 1992. 
22 Lodge, 29. . 
23 Lodge, 28. · 
24 Personal notes from: Jeremy Baskin. puhli-: le-:tures, UCT Summer School, Cape Town, 18-22 January 
1993. He did make the important point that in the Western Cape COSATU was a "relatively weak partner" in 
the liberation alliance, and the region was thus unlike the rest of the country. 
25 Drew Forrest, "Unity-conscious COSA TU Comes of Age," Weekly Mail, 2-8 August 1991: 15. 
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because powerful elements of the liberation movement wanted to ensure a "workerist" 
texture within the teacher movement. 
The central contlicts between teachers' groups remained, and re-emerged strongly in 
1990. The tactics of the NTUF, however, between 1988 and 1990 illustrated the strength 
of the working-class ideology within the ranks of organised teachers, and the way in which 
teachers were being profoundly affected by a shift in their attitude to their work. 
The contradictory influences of state repression 
The changing attitude of teachers to their work, their place within "communities", and the 
scope then felt to engage in more militant activities, also came about in response to state 
action. Ken Hartshorne wrote in 1989, "If we are to understand what has happened to 
teachers in South Africa it is crucial that the power of the State over them should not be 
underestimated. "26 
State power had contradictory effects. The state continued to oppress teachers 
through both its security apparatus and education departments. The state also began to 
threaten and impose retrenchments on teachers towards the end of the eighties as cost-
cutting measures. These three· forms of repression served to weaken the position of "anti-
professional" teachers, but they also, as throughout the decade, exacerbated rebellion at a 
time when rebellious space was opening up. Hartshorne sets up a dichotomy between "two 
authorities" operating within schools. The state is one authority, utilizing repressive 
measures. At the same time, parents, students and teachers hold a "moral authority". 
Hartshorne believes that these distinct authorities reached a stalemate at the end of the 
decade.21 While a useful construct for understanding the contradictory nature of teachers' 
positions, such a dichotomy should not exclude the unintended consequences of repression. 
Repression can inflame passion, or create a moral dilemma which demands response. 
The first form of state repression which both retarded and enhanced the teachers' 
movement during the period under study involved the state's security forces. The security 
forces banned a meeting organised by the CTPA in Bellville South on 24 November 1988.28 
In late December 1988, thirty-t\vo liberation organisations were banned or restricted. 
When, on 29 December 1988. Law and Order Minister Vlok announced the restrictions 
placed on WECTU, DETU, WECSCO and the National Detainees Forum, it was clear that 
the more radical teacher organisations would be unable to confinue with their activities. 
Offering insight into the security forces' view of the more radical teachers' unions Vlok is 
reported to have said that DETU and WECTU were " ... politicising education and 
discrediting the education system. Both are involved in the broad revolutionary onslaught 
against South Africa, which could escalate into strikes, boycotts, terror and unrest 
26 Ken Hartshorne, "Liberation, Euw.:ation and the Teacher," 21. 
27 Hartshorne, "Liberation, Education and the Teacher," 15. 
28 Cape Times, 25 November 1988. 
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incidents. "29 The following February, police arrested seven executive members of WECTU 
and their office worker while investigating the possibility of contravention of the December 
1988 restrictions.Jo Andile Jonas, the chairperson of DETU, was detained on 12· May of 
the same year.3I 
The second form of state repression that affected teachers had its source in the 
education departments. The departments conti.nued to threaten teachers. A newspaper 
report illustrated the cooperation between DEC inspectors and the police at a time of school 
unrest.32 Nasson asserted at the end of the decade that "so-called radicals" were excluded 
from teaching posts.JJ 
The departments used other means to intimidate teachers. In November 1988 South 
claimed that "scores" of teachers had suffered because the education departments had 
refused to renew their appointments, had denied them promotions, had denied them study 
leave and had demoted them because of involvement in progressive organisations or having 
heeded a stay-away cali.J4 In December 1988, the department, principals or school 
committees refused to renew the posts of temporary teachers from at least four Cape 
schools under the DEC (HoR). Most of those affected were members of WECTU. Also in 
December, Yousuf Gabru received a letter from the department explicitly denying his 
application for work at a training college and stating that he would not be accepted for any 
post within the department.J5 In November 1988, a DETU executive member, Miss Naomi 
Lloyd, had been informed that her appointment would not be renewed for the following 
year, ostensibly because she did not hold a "professional" qualification.36 
T ASA' s leadership even accused its HoD administration of downgrading the status 
of schools to victimize teachers who had openly opposed the tri-cameral parliament. TASA 
claimed that Rylands Senior Secondary School had been downgraded to prevent the 
promotion of its headmaster, Mr. I. Waja. Bellmore Primary, also in the Cape, was 
downgraded, but restored to its initial category in an out of court settlement.J7 The 
departmental repression continued into 1990 when, for example, participants in the 6 
September 1989 stay-away who had not filled in "green forms" --explaining their absences 
from schools -- were reportedly to face, inrer alia, denial of promotions and a curtailment 
of leave benefits.3s 
The departments further alienated themselves from teachers in other ways. Franklin 
Sonn claimed in a June 1989 speech that the party-political interference with teachers 
continued in the DEC (HoR), and that the CTP A was alone in combatting the Labour 
29 Cape Times, 30 D~c~mb~r 1988; Argus, 30 D~c~mh~r 1988. 
30 Cape Times, 25 February 1989. 
31 Argus, 12 May 1989. 
32 Cape Times, 20 and 25 April 1988. 
33 Nasson, "Modernization as Legitimation," 173. 
34 South, 17 Nov~mh~r 1988. 
35 Plainsman, 14 D~c~mher 1988. 
36 Argus, 18 Novemh~r 1988. 
37 Argus, 2 S~pt~mb~r 1988. 
38 South, 1 March 1990. 
226 
Party's attempts to render teachers an "outgrowth" .J9 In March 1989, Dr. G. Nair, the 
Chief Director of the DEC (HoD) was suspended for irregularities_regarding, inter alia, the 
appointments of teachers. The Minister of Education and Culture for the same department 
was found by an external commission of enquiry (the James Commission), to have 
irregularly seen to his son's promotion.~o An athletics coaching programme within HoD 
schools begun at the start of 1989 was also attacked by sixteen organisations for making use 
of SADF personnel and bases.-+t 
State repression, as carried out by the security forces and the education departments, 
greatly impacted teacher politics. It repressed the activities of "anti-professional" teachers 
and their organisations, engendered fear within the teachers' realm and, at the same time, 
contradictorily bred discontent amongst some teachers. Such discontent enhanced the 
malaise being articulated into rebellion. 
The contradictory influences of retrenchment 
During 1988-1990, the state began to threaten retrenchment in .each of its education 
departments. This, like the repression described above, had contradictory effects on teacher 
politics. Retrenchment created fear, and was possibly part of a hidden state strategy of 
creating a docile teaching force. At the same time, retrenchment divested teachers of 
historical security, and added to the- erosion of traditional "professionalism" within the 
teachers' realm. If "professionalism" was meant to ensure some form of security, why, 
suddenly, were teachers losing their jobs, or finding it impossible to get jobs? It is this 
wave of retrenchments, at a time of increased enrollments at teacher-training institutions, to 
which-we now turn. 
Teachers in all three black departments were affected. In 1987, the DET dismissed 
4854 teachers-- including 1585 permanent teachers-- accounting for almost ten percent of 
its total.42 In 1988, according to the SAIRR, newly qualified teachers around Johannesburg 
could not find employment. There was "talk" of teachers losing temporary posts, along 
with a freezing of posts. In March of that year, Gerrit Yiljoen, the Minister of Education 
and Development Aid, said in Parliament that 465 primary school teachers and 440 
secondary school teachers with professional qLtalifications had been unable to find jobs at 
schools in that year. He went on to state that "no vacancies exist" in DET schools.43 At 
the end of that year, eleven DET teachers were retrenched to make room for recently-
qualified teachers who were contractually bound to the DET through their bursary 
schemes.44 
39 Argus, 20 June 1989. 
40 SAIRR, Annual Survev 198911990, 78!-782. 
41 SAIRR, Annual Sur\'l:V 198911990, 8!3. 
42 Hartshorne, "Liberati~n. Edw.;ation and the Teacher," 26. 
43 SAIRR, Annual Survey 198811989, 273-276. The Argus, 14 April 1988, reported that Ken Andrew, MP, 
PFP Gardens, made this claim. 
44 SAIRR, Annual Survey 1989/1990, 842. 
The situation facing teachers in the DEC (HoR) was also becoming severe. In 
January 1988, the DEC announced that additional teaching posts were being frozen to offset 
budget cuts. Allan Hendrickse, the minister of education and culture and chairman of the 
minister's council in the HoR, said in April that there were 1227 unemployed, qualified 
Coloured teachers (of which 492 were newly-qualified holders of DEC bursaries).45 He 
went further in August by stating that if the budget was not increased for 1989, 2300 
teachers would be dismissed.-+6 In November the threats continued when Hendrickse 
demanded from the government the full budgetary allocation for Coloured education., or 
either 2434 teachers would lose their jobs, or thirty-seven high schools or eighty-seven 
primary schools would be closed.-+7 
In January 1989, the Argus announced that, "Thousands of teachers at coloured 
schools could lose their jobs this year in cutbacks and streamlining. "48 Redundancy of 
teachers was also threatened by a departmental decree in February that all teachers would 
have to teach forty-two periods per week.4~ The unemployment of teachers continued to 
plague the newly-qualified, and the under-qualified, with accusations levelled at the 
department in January 1990 by teachers and principals that posts had been frozen to cut 
costs.so The DEC admitted in February 1990 that 1 000 newly-qualified teachers were 
unemployed. 51 
Teachers at Indian schools under the DEC (HoD) faced a similar crisis. In January 
1988, the DEC (HoD) claimed that, in relation to qualitied teachers, it was "reaching 
saturation point". Apparently, only eighty-seven of 287 recent teacher-graduates from the 
University of Durban-Westville had found work by April. By January 1989, it was claimed 
by the department, the number of qualified, unemployed Indian teachers could rise to 
365.52 TASA, and President Pat Samuels, announced their concern about the growing 
teacher unemployment in January of 1989. According to Samuels, most of the 1500 Indian 
teachers who qualified over the preceding three or four years were still without posts, or 
were working as temporary teachers.5J 
The growing teacher unemployment took place as more and more qualified teachers 
flooded the job market. Enrollments at teacher-training institutions had been increasing 
dramatically during the 1980s (except in Indian institutions). Enrollment at African 
teacher-training institutions rose from 12,908 in 1982 to 32,322 in 1989. The 
45 SAIRR, Annual Survev !9881!989, 277-278. 
46 Star, 16 August 1988: The Arhlone Ne1vs of 24 August 1988 reported that almost 2500 teachers could be 
dismissed because of a R38 million tcac:hcrs' salary shortfall. 
47 SAIRR, Annual Sun'n• !9881 /989. 2.t4. 
48 Argus, 28 January 19S9. 
49 Cape Times, 8 Fehruary 1989. 
50 South, 18 January 1990. 
51 South, 1-7 March 1990. 
52 SAIRR, Annual Survev !9881/989, 277-278. 
53 Argus, 19 January l9S9. 
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corresponding figures in Coloured institutions were 3525 and 8331.54 Many of those 
students enrolled at teacher-training institutions were contractually bound to their 
departments, which provided bursaries to be paid back over a number of years of 
departmental employment. This raises the interesting question, why did departments which 
were experiencing a surplus of teachers continue to offer bursaries for departmental service? 
One answer is that the departments were adopting a strategy of decreasing job security in 
order to assert greater control over teachers. It is a widely-known aspect of labour-market 
theory: unemployment promotes greater insecurity and a more docile work force. As 
Carnoy and Levin point out: "If workers are causing problems, the existence of a large 
number of unemployed and the threat of a 'runaway' shop convince those still holding jobs 
that they can be replaced quickly."-'-' Was it coincidental that departments began 
1 . . I t· I . t.. . h b 11· ? L'- 1 "f(!:7;...r_.._ t expenencmg an over-supp yo teac 1ers at a time o tncreasmg teac er re e 1on. ~ . c , 
4u,.,- ~ ,.. 
Of course the growing insecurity of teaching affected teachers' attitudes to their work. 
Looking around at crowded classrooms, and looking over at emptying white schools, 
teachers could not see the sense in departmental policies of exclusion and threatened 
retrenchment. Fighting the department became a fight for greater job security, a new facet 
of teachers' struggles. 
Continued state entrenchment of "professionalism" 
The sta~e, fu_ring the education crises of !988-l ~. exerted repressive force on teachers to 
uphold traditional "professionalism". "Unprofessional" behaviour was punished, and 
"-... -- ~-- ---
"unP.rofessiorral"teacher organisations suffered a siinilarly repressive fate. While 
~ _, .............__- -- . ----~- -·----
repressing "unprofessional" teacher politics -- with contradictory effect, as we have seen --
the state continued to engage in the second aspect of its dual-strategy: it continued a 
strategy of cooption. Hartshorne contends that the state's cooptive tactics involved offering 
black educators access to limited negotiation, increasing salaries, allowing access to more 
senior positions, increasing the power of principals and offering more in-service training. 56 
Finance, too, reflected state concerns as education received the largest portion of the 1990 
budget allocation, and spending on black education was increased by R510 million.57 
Behind these increasing "benefits" lurked a hidden agenda.ss 
In May of 1988, Mr. A. B. Fourie, the Director-General of Education and Training 
for the Cape, wrote a letter to the Cape Times outlining his department's attitude to 
teachers. In the letter he asked whether the more radical teachers, who claimed to be 
concerned about education, felt themselves to be concerned about, "Their firm belief in 
ideals which they cannot reconcile with Departmental policies?" If so, " ... then one must 
54 SAIRR, Annual Sun·eys. The figures t(>r African institutions exclud<:!s tho:! ind<:!pcnd<:!nt homelands. The 
corresponding tigures for Indian 1nstitut10ns were 2622 and 1235. 
55 Carnoy and Levin, 181. 
56 Hartshorne, "Liberation, Education and tho:! Teacher," 25. 
57 Cape Times, !5 March 1990. 
58 Hartshorne, "Lib<:!ration, Education anu the Teacher," 25. 
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respect their integrity but ask why they have not either aired their grievances through a 
recognized professional association to the Minister or, if they felt compelled to do so, 
resigned. "59 The departments continued to try to prompt teachers to behave 
"professionally" within an ideology constructed by the state. 
The state, for example, continued to uphold the ethnically-based ideology of own-
affairs. Hartshorne claims that the state continued to "constrain" teachers within their 
separate education departments.6o In other words, the state attempted to keep teachers 
divided into ethnically-detined groups, inhibiting the powerful unity across racial barriers 
which could challenge the state's education authority. In January 1990, the newly-
appointed Minister of Education and Development Aid, Stoffel van der Merwe, is reported 
to have said that a single education department would not improve the quality of education, 
and would, in fact, prove "chaotic" .ol 
State cooption of teachers thus took place within ethnically-defined departments, 
which continued to attempt to maintain their own standards of "professional" behaviour. 
The 1988 Education Affairs Act. affecting teachers in white schools, upheld 
"professionalism" by broadening the terms of teacher misconduct and restricting the 
political rights of teachers in s~hools.62 In May 1989, the DET found three teachers at 
Simon Hebe High School guilty of "unprofessional" conduct for refusing to turn their 
preparation books over to an inspector during a boycott concerning their white principal.63 
Two months later, in July, the DEC (HoR) asserted its "professional" authority by issuing a 
circular outlining the "political and civil rights" of teachers. In terms of these "rights", 
teachers could not advertise, in printed form, " ... support for, or opposition to a political 
party or relating [sic] to the election of a person as a member of parliament or a provincial 
council or committee. "M 
Salaries remained a crucial aspect of continued state pacification of the teaching 
corps. State President P. W. Both a created a lot of unhappiness after a meeting with 
representatives of the TFC, TASA. UTASA and ATASA, at which he refused to change his 
hard-line attitude about a pay-freeze for public sector workers. According to the SAIRR, 
teachers' salaries lagged eleven percent behind those of other public sector employees, and 
thirty percent behind wages in the private sector. Only two months later, however, F. W. 
de Klerk, then Minister of National Education, foreshadowed his later political style by 
offering conciliatory gestures to teachers. He said in April that teachers' salaries were a top 
government priority, and in 1 une he stated that R420 million would be allocated for 
adjustments in teachers' wages.os In December 1988, teachers received a seven percent pay 
59 Cape Times, 4 May 1988. 
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hike. In January 1989, they further reaped the benefits of a fifteen percent increase for all 
public workers.66 
Then, on 12 November 1989 Viljoen, as Minister of Constitutional Development and 
National Education, announced that· the disparity between teachers' salaries and those of 
other public sector workers would be eradicated by March 1990.67 A week before the 
announcement, the Cape Times had reported that the TFC had been putting a great deal of 
pressure on the government around salary issues.68 The pay increases in the first quarter of 
1990 would affect more than 200,000 teachers "of all race groups", stated the same 
newspaper.69 In due course, on I March 1990, teachers received an average increase of 
twelve percent. 70 The renewed government emphasis on salaries continued into the 
following month when an announcement was made that gender disparities in wages would 
be reduced when 75,600 low-qualified African, Coloured and Indian female teachers 
received an additional increase. 71 An immediate R 184 million was provided by the 
government for those teachers' salaries, with adjustments being retrospective to 1 April 
1990.72 In October, the government claimed to have allocated an additional R445 million 
for the equalization of all female teachers' salaries with those of similarly qualified men. 73 
An important aside within the context of teachers' salaries is," however, that the DET 
remained a notoriously bad financial manager, delaying payment of teachers' wages. A 
1988/1989 audit of the DET, the SAIRR states in an Annual Survey, proved that the DET 
was not fully controlling its own tinances, and that it was seriously delinquent in the 
payment of some teachers' salaries. 7-+ It remains unclear whether this was inefticiency or 
provocation. One aspect of "concessions" announced by the state in March 1990, aimed at 
alleviating the education crisis, was a procedure to prevent late salary payments. 75 
A second thrust of the state's persuasive strategy in favour of traditional 
"professionalism" involved the upgrading of teachers' qualifications and in-service training 
of teachers. This was essential for any policy aimed at enhancing notions of 
"professionalism". 
The third central element of the state's cooptive measures involved promotion of 
black educators, and limited "democratic" reforms within black education. In May 1988, 
Sam de Beer, the Deputy-Minister of Education, said that black educators would be 
afforded opportunity to shape syllabuses used in black schools; the following day Viljoen 
spoke of his department's work towards ensuring that syllabuses for African schools were 
of greater relevance. In November 1988, the DET enhanced the power of parents within 
66 Cape Times, 4 December 1989. 
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school management structures, upgrading existing school committees to the status of 
management councils after consulting parents and teachers. Parents would have greater 
influence over education at all levels. 76 These steps towards the limited democratization of 
edu~ationcontinued in May 1989 when Yiljoen implemented a national council for African 
education, the National Council for Education and Training. Although only a consultative 
body, it would comprise twenty-four members: tive ministerial appointments; eleven 
appointments by African teachers I and inspectors I associations and by tertiary institutions; 
and eight from the new school management councils. 77 
Promotions of "professional" educators took place and by the end of April 1989, four 
of the DET's eight regional deputy-directors were black; Mr. C. Tlale had become the first 
African deputy-director at the DET' s Pretoria head office in December 1988. In February 
1990, the newly appointed chief director of the DET's Natal region, Mr. E. Ndaba, became 
the highest ranking African civil servant in South Africa. 78 
Entrenched "professionalism" within the realm of teachers 
Along with these state attempts to promote the political docility of teachers, there were 
other formidable pressures working against the growing wave of teacher activism, and 
against the shift in teachers I perceptions of their "professional" work. These pressures 
strengthened the bid to render teachers docile state agents. The growing insecurity of the 
,.----..... -- --~-- -------- ·-
teaching profes~ion was one continuing pressure, particularly in light of the new policy of 
--..._ ----
post-freezing and retrenchments. The large numbers of still-underqualified teachers further ------- --- ... - - ·- .. 
-lent itself to teacher conservatism. since these teachers were particularlyJearful of 
dismis-sals. The large number of teachers working in rural areas, -outside the mainstream of 
mass public protest, added another dimension to teacher conservatism. Also, education 
bureaucracies stifled change in that entrenched, ethnically-defined managers, such as 
principals and inspectors, sought to maintain their position. 
Particularly, too, organisational histories influenced teachers by engendering desire 
for familiar identities based on style, ideology, assets and ideas. The fragile accord created 
in Harare met with both support and opposition in South Africa precisely because of the 
tensions within teachers I positions. Members of the established organisations, the largest 
teacher groups in the country, remained fundamentally conservative in relation to the 
popular resistance movement. 
It is clear that state pressure, particularly the continuing assertion of a "professional" 
ideology, helped to perpetuate race and class divisions. The NTUF was, essentially, a 
product of the growing strength of the movement for greater teacher militancy, a non-racial 
front and "anti-professional" sentiment. But the opposition to such a movement, in the 
76 SAIRR, Annual Sun·ev 1988/1989. 236. 256-257. 
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form of state coopt ion, an en trenched teacher conservatism, an en trenched "professional" 
ideology and an espousal of middle-class values kept some teachers' organisations from 
fully committing to this new, national unity initiative. 
Tensions and Cooperation in 
Westem Cape Teacher Politics 
The political context of 1988-1990, explained above, had significant implications for 
teacher politics in the Western Cape. As elements of the liberation movement and militant 
teachers pushed for a changed understanding of "professionalism", the state and 
conservative teachers upheld a more traditional teacher ideology. Conditions in schools, 
and in the teaching profession, both strengthened and weakened the impetus for change. 
These varying pressures affected teacher organisations in the Western Cape, as well as 
the process of teacher unity there. This section will examine the responses of Western Cape 
teachers and their organisations outside the process of teacher unity, which will be dealt 
with below. 
Teacher militancy 
A central teacher response to the political context of 1988-1990 involved a growing 
wave of teacher militancy. The various forces described above which fundamentally altered 
teachers' perceptions of their place within schools had dramatic effect on the nature of 
teacher protests. These protests, which began to be more teacher-specific, serve as a 
valuable index to the changing nature of teachers' relationship to their work. Many 
teachers began adopting a militant style. A brief over-view of the history of teacher 
militancy from 1988 to 1990 in the Western Cape will serve as a useful back-drop for our 
discussion of teachers' changing attitudes towards their work and for our later discussion on 
the shaping of the NTUF 
Two months after the Harare conference, approximately 1200 teachers in the Western 
Cape supported a general stay-away called for Monday, 6 June 1988.79 At the end of that 
year, after the banning of some teacher organisations, African teachers formed a committee 
to fill the space left by DETU. The committee's initial resolutions included the necessity of 
getting the charges levelled at five DET teachers dropped (see Chapter Six), a demand for 
the reinstatement of retrenched teachers and the end of appointing white verkrampte 
principals in black schools.xo On 13 October 1989, about 1500 DET teachers continued 
pressing their educational demands by marching to the department's Foreshore offices to 
deliver a petition concerning retrenchments and transfers, and such daily teaching concerns 
· as stationary, textbooks and the pupil-teacher ratio.8t 
79 Philcox, 30. 
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The year 1989 also saw increased teacher activity within the DEC (HoR) in the form 
of protest action, much of which took place within the context of the Defiance Campaign. 
In August, about 120 teachers from Bishop Lavis High School, John Ramsay High and 
Beauvallon High went to the Western Cape Divisional Commissioner of Police and 
submitted a petition requesting that students be left alone and that police leave high 
schools.s2 There were placards displaying such messages as "We have the Right to 
Protest", and "We Support Our Students. "xJ On 5 and 6 September, as part of an MOM 
call, van den Heever claims that around 5000 teachers stayed away from schools.s4 A flyer 
released under the heading, "Teacher Unity Talks: Statement of the National Coordinating 
Committee of Teachers, 19 & 20 August," claimed that the teacher organisations present at 
these unity talks -- essentially the participants in the NTUF8s -- " ... see ourselves as part of 
the MDM and its struggles for a post-Apartheid South Africa." "We condemn the racist 
elections to be held on the 6 September [sic]," the flyer continues, "and call on our 
members and society at large, to boycott these elections." On the reverse side, in poster 
form, the tlyer demands: "STRIKE against the racist election 5th & 6th Sept" .s6 South 
reported: "In the largest support ever shown for a stayaway call, a total stayaway was 
reported at most schools in the Peninsula, the West Coast, Boland and the Eastern Cape." 
The DEC (HoR) responded by threatening the teachers who participated with disciplinary 
action, and asked principals for lists of teachers who had stayed away, as well as "green 
forms" explaining the absences on the day of the election of each absent teacher. The 
majority of principals, it appears, decided not to submit the forms in consultation with the 
MOM-aligned Western Cape Education Front.x7 About two weeks later, over 500 teachers 
arid students arrived at the DEC (HoR) Mitchell's Plain office with a letter saying that 
teachers would not fill in the department's "green forms".88 Continuing police repression at 
schools led to teacher militancy. In one case, two teachers from Ravensmead Senior 
Secondary were arrested while "protecting pupils from police brutality". On 20 October, 
about 400 teachers and students, representing approximately nineteen schools in the 
northern areas, marched from the school to the police station with 2000 signatures on a 
petition demanding the dropping of charges against the two teachers and several students.89 
In 1990 there was further, more widespread teacher militancy on a national level. 
Thousands of teachers participated in major strikes and demonstrations, mainly in DET 
schools and in a few "homelands". The massive teacher protest actions have been described 
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in some detail elsewhere. 90 One of the most notable events of this period was the teachers' 
strike which began with around 6000 teachers in Soweto and Alexandra on 5 March 1990.9t 
The strike-- which eventually included teachers in the Northern Cape, Pretoria, the Vaal 
Triangle, the Highveld and the east Rand-- lasted for about a month and involved 11,600 
teachers. 
The teachers' "defiance campaign" in DET schools is signiticant in that its associated 
demands forthrightly asserted teachers' desire to control their conditions of work. 
According to the campaign, inspectors and advisers could not visit schools, principals could 
not visit classes, and teachers would not attend DET courses. Teachers would work 
between 8 a.m. and 2 p.m., and work only thirty-two periods a week (or, all teachers in 
one school would teach the same number of periods per week). Also, teachers took a step 
towards determining the content of schooling by deciding that they would not teach non-
examination subjects, like guidance. n While this decision was probably premised on a 
desire to make up for lost teaching time, it reflects a growing sense of teacher-control over 
broader aspects of school life -- not just over their presence in schools. 
Some Western Cape teachers participated in the teacher protest actions. Five hundred 
Cape Town teachers went on ~trike the week before the 6000-strong strike in Soweto and 
. Alexandra in March. \IJ Towards the end of March, DET teachers in Cape Town tired of 
their department's tardy salary payments. Twenty-seven of thirty-three teachers at Fezeka 
Senior Secondary in Guguletu began striking on 20 March because they had not yet been 
paid that year. Two DET ofticials tlew into Cape Town and hand-wrote checks for two 
hours at the DET Foreshore office on the night of 21 March. 94 A victory had been won. 
The following week, DET teachers "at most primary schools and some high schools," 
according to DETU's Mdladlana, "downed chalk" on 27.March. A combined DETU and 
PENATA meeting that evening resolved for teachers to return to work the following day.95 
On 17 April, teachers demonstrated a commitment to broader societal issues by 
participating in a march with students and principals in Mitchell's Plain to protest against 
gangsterism and drugs in that township. Y6 
After two Uitsig Senior Secondary teachers were arrested in August, about 200 
teachers went to the DEC (HoR) oftices in Roeland Street and attempted to stage a sit-in.97 
On 25 July, one hundred teachers were arrested outside the Cape Town magistrate's court 
after gathering to support two teachers who had been arrested for "illegally" picketing the 
previous month. 9R 
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Thus in Cape Town, as with other parts of the country, teachers found greater 
strength to protest and to strike. 
A continuing histo1y of disunity: 
Western Cape teacher organisations 
In the Western Cape during 1988-1990, much teacher organisational energy focussed on the 
process of teacher unity. The established organisations had the most to lose by joining a 
national, unitary organisation, for this would involve dissolution. The established 
organisations operated from a position of numerical strength within the unity process, and 
remained wedded to their organisational identities. The minutes of the first round of 
teacher unity talks, held on 27 August 1988, include a summary of organisational status 
reports. DETU had 155 paid-up members, eighty percent of whom were teachers; the 
CTPA had 22,198 members; WECTU had 300 "active members"; and ED ASA claimed to 
have 140 members, 110 being teachers. Nationally, TASA had a membership of around 
8600, and A TASA reported 60,000 paid-up members. 99 Such vast disparity in numbers 
created an structural tension, one which bolstered the maintenance of separate identities and 
continued cont1ict. 
The emergent groups, numerically weaker, but accorded a louder voice within the 
context of a the liberation movement, also sought to unify from a position of strength. 
WECTU, for example, suggested asserting organisational identity in a 1990 newsletter 
article: "The reluctance of UTASA (including the CTPA) and ATASA [to accept the need 
for a single, non-racial teachers' trade union] makes it more imperative for progressive 
teachers to be organized into WECTU." 100 
The tensions within teacher politics which played themselves out in the unity process 
also affected teacher organisations within separate departments outside of the process of 
teacher unity. 
The established organisations continued with their array of organisational activities. 
For PENATA this meant little except for joint crisis-management activity with DETU. 
The CTPA, like the SATA, ran its office as u·sual, responding to queries from its members, 
offering bursaries and workshops, holding meetings for members during these turbulent 
years, and organising its conferences. The TASA leadership in Durban, while gradually 
becoming more completely immersed in the teacher unity initiative, also continued with 
business as usual. 
The emergent unions, while suffering a great deal more than their established 
counterparts under state repression, also continued to engage in their separate, 
organisational activities. DETU's activities included campaigns for the release of mernbers 
in detention, and action to force the DET to drop the misconduct charges levelled against 
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five teachers.101 ED ASA held a joint meeting on education with the Cape Democrats on 14 
June 1989, at which a gagged dummy on the platform represented teachers.102 EDASA 
also ran a workshop on The Education Act, critical education and the contemporary 
situation in education.IOJ WECTU engaged in such activities as a joint open day with 
students in Mitchell's Plain, 10-1 public participation in a number of conferences, and 
participation in several campaigns. WECTU representatives visited Namibia and Tanzania, 
WECTU members also held a snack dance and a jazz dance, and, after being restricted, 
held a series of regional meetings. Also, towards the end of 1988, WECTU employed a 
full-time organiser. 10s 
Within each education department tensions continued to exist between teachers' 
groups. While claiming that DETU and PENATA were beginning to work well together, a 
DETU executive member explained in 1990 that, "The difficulty is persistent differences --
not ideological -- in leadership." The DETU executive member went on to suggest that 
PENATA was not entirely serious about the unity process, hav·ing arrived at an April 1989 
unity meeting claiming to have no mandate and no knowledge of the agenda.J06 Another 
member of the DETU executive pointed out in 1990 that PENATA's executive had 
ideological problems with DETU. The PENATA executive, he said was largely comprised 
of people from aBC or Pan African Congress tradition.I07 This sectarian conflict continued 
to present obstacles to unity between the two organisations. 
The tension between the CTPA and WECTU remained even more pronounced. In 
August 1988 Franklin Sonn said publicly: "We were disturbed when the Western Cape 
Teachers' Union was formed, but we did not go on the offensive after individual members 
of the _organisation publicly attacked us." 10s Interviewed in 1990, Randall van den Heever 
further expressed the on-going tension. "WECTU sees the school as a site of struggle," he 
said. "They are willing to subvert education needs to political needs." J09 On the other 
side, Yousuf Gabru, WECTU chairperson, said in 1990: "I do not believe the leadership of 
the CTPA is sincere."110 A back-page article in a 1990 WECTU newsletrercomprised a 
long, indirect attack on the CTPA's position within the NTUF.IIJ 
In September 1988, WECTU reiterated recurring concerns. "A very real problem 
many WECTU members are grappling with," stated a newsletter, "is the fear that the 
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progressive teacher presence [within the unity initiative] will be overwhelmed by the 
numerically stronger moderate bloc in a national teachers' union." 112 
Compromise and cooperation 
These historical tensions deterred but did not destroy the teacher unity initiative spawned in 
Harare. While people within teacher organisations recognised that inter-organisational 
cont1ict persisted around the most fundamental issues concerned with unity -- such as 
strategy, structure, assets, the involvement of COSATU -- this did not inhibit the over-
arching desire for a strong national organisation. An important element of this mutual 
desire displayed itself in increasing cooperation across the lines of historic division. A 
complete description of united activities will be given below. Here it will suffice to briet1y 
discuss the greater cooperation, external to teacher unity, within each of the separate 
departments. 
The rift between WECTU and the CTPA remained strong, but with the CTPA's 
growing involvement in the MOM, and its greater acceptance by the liberation movement--
for example, it joined the Western Cape Education Front in 1989 -- WECTU's'publicly 
vitriolic stand against the CTPA began to diminish. WECTU began to engage with the 
CTPA. For example, WECTU representatives agreed to attend a special CTPA meeting on 
8 February 1989 concerning party-political involvement in teachers' promotions.m Within 
the DEC (HoD), TASA and the PTL -- a rival "progressive" teacher union in Johannesburg 
-- experienced a greater degree of mutual acceptance, especially as TASA experienced a 
major shift in the direction of the progressive teachers' unions. Poobie Naicker, the newly-
installed president of TASA, spoke of this enhanced cooperation when he described a joint 
TASA-PTL unity rally in Lenasia in June 1989. He was also invited to address the 1989 
PTL AGM.114 
In the African townships of Cape Town, amidst the educational strife, DETU and 
PENATA worked more closely together. A DETU executive member said in 1990 that, 
" ... by now I thought we'd have one organisation in the townships." While clearly blaming 
PENATA inefficiency for inhibiting progress, the DETU informant described two 
successful joint marches held in !989. The first was dispersed by the police, he said, but 
the second climaxed with around 1000 teachers from both organisations occupying the DET 
building in Cape Town. Both executives were present, and participating teachers mandated 
the two executives to draw up a joint program of action for 1990.115 In October 1989, the 
Argus reported on a joint statement to the DET listing short-term demands, including 
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demands for stationary, timely salary payments. and study-leave for teachers.ll6 Monde 
Tulwana, another executive member of DETU, stated in 1990 that DETU was drawing 
PENATA into action it would never before have undertaken. PENATA was involved in 
campaigns " ... because of the situation in the townships". He spoke very optimistically of 
a closing of the historical divide: "We are no longer talking of progressive and non-
progressive. We are talking of teachers who are all progressive." 111 
Certainly not all participants agreed with Tulwana about an entirely progressive teaching 
corps, and for good reason. The history of teacher unity at this point was a history riven 
with divisions based on historical and ideological fault-lines. We will now turn to a closer 
analysis of the recurrent and problematic issues within the teacher unity talks. 
Yawning Divides: Historical Tensions within the Process of Teacher Unity 
Historical tensions within teacher politics, described above in terms of organisational 
activities outside the process of unity, manifested within the teacher unity initiative begun in 
Harare. In particular, the process of unifying established and emergent bodies became a 
multi-faceted debate around "professionalism". Traditional "professionalism", rooted in 
race and class divisions, was ardently challenged within the teacher unity process. Newer 
ideas about appropriate teacher behaviour and attitudes emerged more strongly than in the 
preceding years, as the emergent teacher groups asserted a dominant voice within the 
process. The contradictions which emerged centred on debates about the structure of the 
unified organisation, the style of its formation and the involvement of both COSATU and 
white teacher organisations. The established organisations experienced many internal 
contradictions as they balked at what was seen as an emergent "ganging up", under pressure 
from elements of the liberation movement to create an organisation within a new 
"professional" paradigm. 
A united spirit 
After the Harare conference in April 1988, the South African representatives were charged 
with the task of building a new, unified, national teacher organisation. The first point of 
the Harare Accord on Teacher Unity (see Appendix C) states that: 
All representatives of the teachers organisations present agreed on the need 
for the national unity of teachers and committed themselves to discuss this 
in their various organisations and to propagate the feasibility of one 
national teachers organisation. 
The discussion and propagation required by this point took on various complicated forms 
after the organisations had returned to South Africa. While, according to point fourteen of 
the Accord, "The representatives of organisations committed themselves to urge their 
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organisations to maintain the spirit of comradeship, mutual respect and common purpose 
which has characterised the Harare seminar on teacher unity as a necessary element in the 
process of achieving unity," such a spirit proved difficult to carry back onto South African 
soil where distinct institutional histories and ideologies had foiled previous unity attempts. 
The organisations cooperated as the unity efforts achieved a degree of success at both 
regional and national levels. But the "spirit of comradeship" appeared less accessible, less 
important when truly unifying activity was required. According to Randall van den 
Heever, " ... 1988 turned out to be more of a tentative period of maneuvering than a 
productive and progressive session of united campaigns." 118 Or, as an ED ASA delegate to 
the Harare conference later said, "Being out of the country was an advantage; but in South 
Africa we got into old familiar patterns. For example, PENATA did not pitch for 
meetings." 119 
Clearly, though, more than simple organisational constraints were involved in the 
"tentative period of maneuvering". Franklin Sonn illustrated the confusion of a rapidly 
changing teachers' terrain when he said to the PTU in 1989: "We must build a faith in our 
ability as teachers, workers, professionals and comrades in the struggle for liberation." 120 
He, like other active players ir) the teacher unity process, was not speaking of a broadly 
accepted, new definition of "professionalism", but was rather reflecting the various and 
conflicting pressures at work on teachers. The teacher unity initiative created a pressure of 
its own as the primary, evolving strategy was to under-emphasise differences rather than 
wait for all organisations to fundamentally change intractable ideological positions. 
WECTU' s report on the Harare conference retlected this position. "The issue [of 
ideology]," stated a WECTU news/errer, "remained unresolved. It was agreed that in the 
quest for unity no preconditions should be laid down." 121 
This particular style of unification, which emphasised agreement among leadership, 
consensus decision-making and "unity in action", and which underplayed crucial and 
divisive ideological distinctions. was further articulated by an EDASA report on the fourth 
round of national teacher unity talks held in Johannesburg in 1989. "This was a thoroughly 
well-run meeting," summarised the report, "where much business was done between 
disagreeing parties who were brought to consensus by skilful chairing and diplomatic 
lobbying." 122 
Professional association or union? 
The issue at the heart of divisions within the teacher unity process -- in light of the 
recurring tensions around "professionalism" -- was disagreement about whether the unified 
body would be a teacher association, or a union. This debate has been thoroughly 
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described in Chapter One. The issues, during 1988-1990, included the class location of 
teachers, and acceptable teacher behaviour within the "professional" construct. The more 
militant emergent unions regarded their members as workers, and were willing to engage in 
such "industrial actions" as strikes. The established associations, upholding the primary 
importance of "the child's education". could not condone disruptive actions in schools. 
Further, the established groups, having built up "professional" identities over many years, 
were loathe to relinquish such familiar identities rooted in race and class differentials. 
COSATU 
One contentious issue in terms of the contradictions of "professionalism" and class in the 
teacher unity process was the facilitating role of COSATU (see Chapter Six), which was 
mandated by the Harare Accord to convene "a negotiati0g machinery to pursue the 
objectives stated in this document". COSA TU was " ... further requested to consult with 
other sectors of the democratic movement to facilitate the unity process" .123 Ian Moll, in 
his paper on the unity process leading to SADTU, argues that COSATU was well-suited to 
the role of organising a sector with established and militant organisations. COSATU was 
the result of similar organisation. He further argues that COSATU was a more acceptable 
broker to teacher organisations than the UDF or NECC because each teacher organisation 
had explored the possibility of becoming a union.124 
However, Moll's argument neglects the most crucial aspect of COSATU' s position. 
Because of its primary place in the liberation movement, it had enormous credibility within 
the MDM. Organisations, such as the teacher groups, concerned with credibility could not 
reject COSATU, an informal ally of the ANC's, and a "tlag-bearer" in the liberation 
struggle. Whatever the reasons for its acceptability, COSATU' s facilitation was crucial, 
causing one ED ASA participant to claim, "It would not be working without COSA TU. "12s 
Also, Bot reports that COSATU "largely financed" the seven rounds of teacher unity talks 
between the Harare conference and the SADTU laun·ch.I26 
But COSATU's role was problematic in some ways. For example, COSATU's 
facilitation was rejected by the SAT A. 121 Its presence in the chair at unity meetings 
demanded a certain style of organisation, one which contradicted the "professional style" of 
some of the established participants. While there may have been short-term acceptance of 
COSATU's "unionist" and "militant" stance, its preferred "one industry, one union" goal 
fell foul of several of the participating established organisations. 
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Assets 
Another crucial aspect of the organisational class dichotomy within the teacher unity talks 
involved organisational assets. In the event of a unified, single, national organisation, what 
would happen to organisations' infrastructures? Who would get buildings, and bank 
accounts, and leadership expense accounts? Class is firmly rooted in wealth, for wealth 
maintains styles and "standards". The established organisations were far wealthier-- in part 
because they were "recognized" and were thus allowed stop-order facilities -- than the 
emergent unions, and were thus less eager to share their assets. 
This was partly due to organisational responsibilities. Bot writes of ATASA's 
contractual group schemes and its KaNgwane early learning centre, and the CTPA's 
bursaries and Saturday Schools. These organisations wanted proof that SADTU would 
handle their various responsibilities before they parted with their assets.12s Van den Heever 
stated in 1990 that: 
The CTPA delegates in the National Teacher Unity Forum (NTUF) must 
ensure that the CTPA administrative structures and assets remain viable in 
terms of continuing to provide in [sic] the union needs of at least those 
teachers who constitute the membership of the CTPA.I29 
Kenny Ernest, of Cape Town's TASA branch, said, "The woman who sweeps and makes 
tea, a place must be found for her. We are not going to see our staff on the streets. "130 
For T ASA this was more an organisational detail than a point of rhetorical class 
resistance, since at the second round of unity talks it committed its assets to "a new 
organisation at its formation" ,u 1 and later the NTUF decided to employ all the full-time 
personnel of affiliating organisations.u2 But the other established organisations were not so 
keen. -Alan Powell of the SATA, a peripheral organisation in the unity process but one 
which retlected a deeply-entrenched "professional" ideology, felt that asset-merging was 
"practically unnecessary" .JJJ The CTPA, apart from concerns expressed by Bot regarding 
responsibility for its infrastructure's continued existence, could not constitutionally merge 
its assets with those of other teacher groups. The minutes of the NTUF meeting in June 
1990 stated: 
It was noted that CTPA' s Constitution directed that in the event of 
dissolution, its assets be transferred to educational institutions. Hence its 
constitution would have to be amended .... This required six months notice 
to its membership prior to Conference in 1991.134 
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Such practical issues were largely dismissed by Yousuf Gabru in an attack on the CTPA. 
The professional body had " ... an entrenched leadership with perks", said Gabru, "like the 
status of the job, and tlying overseas. There is a price to be lost." He concluded: "I quite 
frankly don't think there's a lot of politics involved. "us 
The question of dissolution: a unitwy 
or federal structure 
The debate which retlected tensions around race and ethnicity within the process of teacher 
unification concerned the structure of the proposed national organisation. Illustrating the 
established organisations' attachment to their ethnic identities, at the outset of the unity 
talks none could fully support a unitary structure. UTASA endorsed a unitary structure in 
principle, but had " ... not yet canvassed [this position] within membership." TASA, for 
the same reason, could not endorse a unitary structure at all. ATASA had not reached a 
decision about structure. In contrast, all the Western Cape emergent bodies supported a 
unitary organisation.t36 
So began the unitary-federal debate. The emergent groups did not waver .from their 
position, but the contradictory ethnic location of the established groups showed clearly in 
their shifting, often ambiguous stands about structure. Bot presents arguments, based 
largely on interviews with leaders of teacher groups, in favour of a federation. First, some 
established groups felt regional unity should take precedence over national unity. Second, 
some groups did not see a single teacher body as necessary. These first two arguments are 
more to do with an organising focus, and neatly side-step the debate. The third argument in 
favour of federalism was that some organisations wished to preserve their identities, 
particularly in recognition of divergent ideological positions. This issue of identity was 
crucial, since established groups' identities could be clearly articulated in terms of race or 
ethnicity. Finally, in a separate section of her discussion, Bot states" ... that teachers' 
needs may vary along racial lines, both in respect of professional needs as well as broader 
sociopolitical aims."tJ7 Bot's final point, about differing "racial" needs because of 
historically different conditions within separate education departments, argues for a 
perpetuation of these historical divisions. Group identity and an investment in maintaining 
an accepted, "common-sense" identity are at the heart of federalism, since a unitary 
structure would require the dissolution of all participating organisations. 
Pressures from emergent unions and a powerful liberation movement emphasizing 
non-racialism caused great public ambiguity within the established camp, as these pressures 
heightened the racial contradictions within established groups. Fundamentally, the 
established groups remained wedded to their ethnically-defined identities. 
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This was illustrated in several ways, including their continuing quest for recognition 
by international teacher groupings. After its conditional acceptance of the principle of a 
unitary structure at the first talks, UTA SA proposed " ... an u!liunce of all teacher 
organisations as a foundation towards the objective [of a unitary structure]" at the second 
round in November !988.1Jx In January 1989, UTASA, ATASA and TASA met with 
WCOTP in Geneva to discuss a federation of the three joining WCOTP.I39 TASA claims 
to have attended as an "observer" to avoid the possibility of such international affiliation 
"fragmenting the teacher unity movement in South Africa" .1-+0 What does this imply about 
UTASA's desired, and ATASA's continuing, recognition by WCOTP? At the very least, it 
presents these organisations' interest in maintaining their own identities while striving to 
enhance their international prestige. 
It was in March 1989, at the third round of talks, that T ASA and UT ASA came out in 
full support of a federal structure, albeit as an intermediate measure. AT ASA still would 
not make a commitment, not having "canvassed" its members.141 Franklin Sonn asserted 
the federal option more strongly in a May 1989 speech, going so far as to uphold an 
established alliance. "The guiding principle," he said, "will always be to keep ones home 
and those of ones immediate relatives strong and intact while reaching out to broaden the 
common front." Sonn still gestured toward ambiguity: " ... UTASA is keen to retain its 
own internal strength and unity while seeking oneness with others. "142 
June 1989 was a signiticant month for the structures debate. The CTPA's annual 
conference retlected Sonn's position. The conference regarded" ... the question of 
dissolving the organisation as impractical and unacceptable to the CTPA at this point in 
time." 143 There could thus be no question of a unitary structure. In the same month, at 
TASA 's annual conference, Poobie Naicker took office as president. He immediately 
declared his support for the unitary position, and the organisation's National Council 
followed suit several months later.l4-+ Ernest reiterated this position in 1990 by affirming 
the principle, while claiming his organisation was still consulting with their membership: 
"We say the mechanics can come afterwards." 145 
The following year, 1990, in the months leading up to SADTU's launch, TASA 
moved fully behind the drive for a unitary structure. The minutes of the April 1990 NTUF 
meeting stated that TASA felt that a unitary structure should not be delayed, and proposed 
an interim unitary structure, marking a departure from Samuels' interim federal structure 
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position of the previous year.1-1n During this time, the CTPA remained firmly committed to 
the federal option, while offering a somewhat publicly ambiguous stand. In February, at 
the fifth national teacher unity talks. van den Heever " ... pointed out that it would be 
difficult for established teacher organisations to dis-integrate and fall in with new structures 
as mergers are often complex and difficult." He reiterated his organisation's support for an 
interim federal discussion forum. At the same meeting, according to a SATA participant, 
Sonn made "an impassioned case" for a federal structure.I47 The minutes of the April 1988 
NTUF meeting further illustrated the CTPA 's seemingly intractable position: "With the 
exception of UTASA -- AT ASA appeared to be flexible on the issue -- all participating 
organisations were in favour of an interim unitary structure. "148 Yousuf Gabru's 
"Chairperson's Report" to a WECTU AGM the following week reiterated the CTPA's 
seeming isolation: "Only UTASA of all the organizations involved insists on an interim 
federal structure." I-19 
But there were ambiguities regarding the CTPA's position. For example, Poobie 
Naicker claimed that a meeting of the established organisations was held in Johannesburg 
on 2 June 1990. The entire UTASA executive was present, as well as ten representatives 
from ATASA and three each (rom three white organisations. Naicker said that he gave an 
impromptu speech in favour of a unitary structure after which Sonn said, "I count myself 
with my brother Poobie Naicker," and committed himself to a unitary structure.1so Also, 
the CTPA's annual conference in June 1990, perhaps due to the pressure of isolation, 
reaffirmed its acceptance of a unitary body in principle (while explaining the necessity of an 
interim federation), and mandated its executive to investigate dissolution -- while asserting 
its support for federalism (see Appendix D). ISI In an address to that conference, van den 
Heever reflected the CTPA' s ambiguous public position. "It will be important," he said, 
"for the CTP A to be part of the in tended launch of a national teachers' organisation, and to 
participate in such a national organisation by virtue of a policy of dual membership." 1s2 
After a troubled relationship with SADTU, and an eventual disaffiliation, the 1991 CTPA 
congress maintained that federal unity should be the interim measure.1s3 
The CTPA was not entirely alone on this issue, despite WECTU's assertion to the 
contrary. The same minutes from the April I 990 NTUF meeting which stated that, 
"AT ASA appeared to be tlexibk on the issue", included an indication of AT ASA 's 
structural preference. The minutes stated: 
1
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AT ASA 's position was that while a unitary structure was the desired goal 
ultimately, it was not immediately practicable. ATASA suggested rather 
that a federal structure would be a more viable proposition in the 
intermediate phase, as it 'vvould also allow opportunity for the removal- of 
the remaining obstacles to national unity. Is-+ 
Certainly TUATA and CATU's withdrawal from SADTU indicated a degree of 
unhappiness with the unitary structure. So despite Ian Moll's assertion, in his work on the 
unity process, that" ... ATASA, UTASA [and] TASA ... all publicly indicated that they 
would disband once the new national organisation was launched", ISS the internal differences 
within these groups for the most part prevented support for anything but a structure which 
would allow for their continued existence. 
While the established organisations struggled within their contradictory positions, the 
emergent groups remained steadfast in their resolve to establish a unitary body. The April 
1990 NTUF meeting offered some insight into this. The emergent organisations, the 
minutes stated, II ••• maintained that constituted as it was the NTUF could make little or no 
impact on the process of educational transformation or for that matter in the national 
liberation struggle. "I 56 A unitary body would, according to this line of thinking, help to 
resolve historical tensions between organisations. Also, a unitary structure would help to 
overcome race divisions. IS? 
There were clearly more practical issues involved as well. The emergent 
organisations in the Western Cape which came into being during the crisis of 1985 
struggled to maintain membership numbers and organisational activities. Gareth Rossiter 
said in 1990 that, "Progressive organisations have been working with their hands tied 
behind their backs. II There was no longer any recruitment, he said. Iss This problem, 
exacerbated by the bannings at the end of 1988, were apparent at the first round of teacher 
unity talks following from the Harare conference. TASA wrote of the organisational 
reports presented at that August 1988 meeting: II A significant feature of the report [sic] 
was that the fledgling organisations were experiencin·g significant drops in membership. 11 159 
The minutes of the meeting reflected that DETU had dropped from 600 to 155 members, 
WECTU had 300 members and EDASA had 140.160 It was announced at EDASA's March 
1990 AGM that the organisation had only forty paid-up members.161 
Organisational troubles continued during the teacher unity process. A WECTU Cape 
Town branch executive member said that, in part because of top-heavy involvement in the 
MOM and the unity talks during I 988 and 1989, "We neglected other parts of what 
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teachers are interested in." By the middle of 1989, the Cape Town branch had three active 
members and had been reduced to purely administrative functions.Io2 Yousuf Gabru said 
that by February 1990 four WECTU regions had collapsed.I6J In his April 1990 
chairperson's report, Gabru was scathing. "Our regions," he said, "remain weak, poorly 
organized and badly administered." He spoke of WECTU's "failure to organize primary 
school teachers"; in terms of curriculum development he claimed that, " ... as an 
organization we have made very little contribution to the development of an alternative 
curriculum"; and as regards political education he said that, "WECTU came into being as 
an organization of' political' teachers, yet there has been a lack of political education and 
discussion in WECTU."IM A DETU executive member said that in 1989, the Defend 
DETU Committee-- an replacement organisation formed after DETU's restriction-- held 
only three meetings.l65 The emergent unions thus sought unity in order to strengthen their 
weakening organisations. 
Pespite such structural reasons for desiring unity, the emergent unions had some 
initial difficulty accepting the idea of a unitary organisation involving the established 
groups. This retlected another important tension in the unitary-federal debate. 
Immediately after the Harare conference, a WECTU newslerrer asked: "Would participation 
in a large union not result in WECTU and its principles being marginalised? How does one 
establish the bona fides of organizations/teachers that have erstwhile been seen to be from 
the co'lservative bloc, before going into a national union with them?"l66 The emergent 
groups had difficulties to overcome in terms of working with their established counter-
parts. The emergent groups vvere accorded the same representation as the established 
associO:,tions at the talks ancl could therefore assert a unionist, progressive position without 
fear of being marginalised or "swamped". The final form of SADTU bore witness to the 
dominant nature of the emergent organisations' positions. 
The debate on structure was resolved at the June 1990 NTUF meeting, four months prior to 
SADTU' s launch. Affiliated organisations, according to the minutes, would be given one 
year to dissolve after the launch on 6 October. This allowed one year of dual membership 
for teachers. The established position was acknowledged in an important addendum: "In 
the event that affiliates experience difficulties/problems in that regard, the NTUF would 
then be in a position to give direction in the matter."Io7 
A complete resolution of the tensions posed by racial divisions in apartheid South 
Africa thus proved impracticable vvithin the context of organisational structure. A more 
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striking example of the contradictions implied by race in South Africa focuses on the 
involvement of white organisations in the teacher unity initiative. 
The involvement of white organisations 
No white teachers' organisation from South Africa, apart from EDASA, was invited to 
attend the April 1988 conference in Harare. Throughout the following two-and-a-half years 
of talks, however, there was recognition that the "progressive" white bodies should be 
involved, and much discussion centred around this issue. The English-speaking Natal 
Teachers' Society (NTS) became the most involved white group, achieving observer status 
in the NTUF. The SATA, however, maintained a tirmly antagonistic position to the 
COSATU-convened talks. 
The SATA has been a self-proclaimed "professional" organisation. Also, SATA 
teachers were decidedly removed from the on-going crisis in black education, and never 
suffered the tremendous state and community pressures which led to the shift in attitude of 
teachers towards their work. Instead, the SATA attended some of the activities organised 
by the NTUF, but never considered joining, even if they had been welcome. They could 
not support the Harare Accord, for a start, and had grave difficulties with COSATU's role 
and the question of a trade union for teachers. 
The SATA, like the statutory federation to which it belonged, the TFC, continued to 
espouse entrenched "professional" values. The Annual Report of the Teachers' Federal 
Council, for example, contains a section entitled "Protection of the Prestige of the 
Profession". 168 And the TFC actual! y refused " ... its continued co-operation [with] the 
Minister of National Education and his Department" after the minister met a delegation 
from the "non-recognised" NTUF, " ... whose express aim is not to co-operate with 
government structures .... " 169 The SATA did, however, exhibit ambiguity in regards to the 
TFC's ideological and racial position. For example, SATA remained a member of the 
TFC, yet distanced itself for the aparrheid construction of the "own affairs" federation. 
Also, SATA continued to adopt a more political position, in word if not in deed. Its 1989 
conference, for example, adopted resolutions rejecting detention-without-trial, requesting an 
end to the Group Areas Act ancl the opening of schools to all races, and suggesting the 
creation of a Bill of Rights and a lifting of the State of Emergency. Further, in a gesture 
towards DETU and WECTU, it expressed " ... its opposition to any attempt by the 
authorities to restrict teachers' organisations .... " 110 Following from a 1988 resolution, a 
SATA Work Committee produced a document entitled "Educating for a Democratic Non-
Racial Society," which intended to describe South African society and suggest ways in 
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which students and teachers could better understand non-racial democracy .111 The 
pressures, working to overcome race and class divides, which prompted these organisational 
activities were also at work on the TFC which, at an extraordinary Pretoria meeting in 
September 1990, agreed in principle to open to all races.m 
In part because of these "progressive" positions, and because of a continuing 
commitment to teacher unity, the SATA felt snubbed after the Harare conference.17J It did, 
however, along with the NTS and the Transvaal Teachers' Association (TT A), ask to be 
included in the unity talks.17-+ 
Participants in the teacher unity initiative felt a need to involve the white bodies. At 
the first meeting, in August 1988, EDASA spoke on this issue in its report: "[EDASA] 
expressed the need to organise white teachers in the organisation. (EDASA is] currently 
talking to individuals within these organisations."I75 Participants also wanted to establish as 
broad an organisation as possible, to add weight to the pressures contradicting race 
divisions. In addition, non-involvement of the white groups allowed for the unwanted 
possibility of parallel unity talks.176 
It was a problematic decision to involve the white organisations. A special meeting 
was held the day before the second round of unity talks in November 1988 to achieve 
consensus on the presence of the SATA, NTS and TTA. In the event, these organisations 
were represented at the unity talks the following day.m The TASA report on the meeting 
stated that the three white groups " ... expressed the desire to be invited at the next meeting 
as they had common goals; they also requested that the Harare recommendations be 
discussed further with their Executives." I7x The meeting's response, as outlined in the 
mi·nutes, stipulated that in order to facilitate full involvement, the three white organisations 
were expected to adopt a publicly anti-aparrheid position and withdraw from both the TFC 
and all government structures.179 These conditions were extended at the fourth round of 
talks in August 1989. White organisations could participate in the teacher unity talks on the 
following conditions: 
* 
* 
* 
Acceptance of the Harare Declaration. 
Publicly condemn apartheid and CNE [Christian National Education]. 
Commitment to this National Coordinating Committee as the only forum 
for Teachers' Unity Talks. 
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* 
* 
Voluntary non-participation in government erected structures. 
Non-racial constitution.1xo 
This approach did not meet with much success. Therefore, at the tifth round of unity talks 
in February 1990, after regional structures were being built, it was decided that white 
organisations could " ... be brought in at regional level without pre-conditions and, on the 
recommendations of the regions, this body could by given observer status at National level 
and thereafter full status on acceptance of the Harare Declaration and other conditions as 
this forum may decide. "Ill! Even then, only the NTS, which was granted observer status at 
the same meeting, became officially involved. 
The national and regional unity forums did make some effort to involve white groups. 
A workshop in Cape Town on 18 February 1990 included discussion with white teachers' 
groups on their participation in the talks. The SA TA attended without putting forth a 
position.I82 Also, the reacher unity forum allowed white organisations' attendance at the 
early meetings. In the Western Cape, EDASA was asked by the forum to "bring in" 
SATA. But historical antipathy arose. One EDASA participant said, "I can tell you SATA 
is not going anywhere following ED AS A: "1xJ Another EDASA delegate, responding to the 
directive to involve white organisations, wondered " ... how we're going to do this since 
they won't talk to us?"IR4 Certainly SATA responded coldly to EDASA's attempts to meet 
with SATA to discuss the involvement of the established body. The SATA sent the 
following letter to EDASA on 23 April 1990: 
The S.A.T.A. has participated for many years in a variety of teacher unity 
discussions and negotiations. During the most recent initiatives, resulting 
in the establishment of the National Teacher Unity Forum, S.A. T.A. has 
liaised with COSATU and has been involved in a series of meetings in 
connection with the Forum and related issues. The S.A.T.A. is prepared 
to continue to operate in this way or with the Forum itself and does not 
believe that it would be appropriate to hold discussions with a member 
association of the Forum.1x' 
The SATA thus remained aloof from EDASA's attempts. 
In the end, entrenched organisational values led to SATA's non-participation. 
Flirting with the initiative, the SATA illustrated an aspect of its contradictory location 
between historical racialism and the current trend towards a non-racial ideology. Also, its 
"professional" ethic disallowed acceptance of COSATU's role. At the second round of 
talks, SATA raised the question of COSATU's position.I86 SATA, NTS and ITA further 
questioned COSATU at a Johannesburg meeting about whether it was "an honest broker". 
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"We got cagey answers," said John Stonier of SATA.Ill7 In addition, the SATA 1 S 
entrenched group identity left no room for dissolution into a unitary structure. "We would 
be most unhappy if the SATA simply disappeared," said Mike Reeler, the SATA organiser, 
"and simply became part of one massive organisation. "1ss Therefore, the Western Cape 
TUF operated without the involvement of the SATA. 
The SATA exemplified an extreme version of the established organisations I position, 
involving historical contradictions. The participants in the unity talks had vastly differing 
ideologies, but were brought together at a peculiar moment due to forces which upheld 
working-class, unionist, non-racial attitudes. The public cooperation which happened atop 
these contradictions was often ambiguous. Given the deeply-rooted divisions between 
participating organisations. it was hardly surprising that the teacher unity initiative in the 
Western Cape adopted a "unity in action" approach to facilitate unification. 
77ze Progressive Bloc and Established Contradictions 
Within Teacher Unitv 
The established and emergent teacher groupings often adopted antagonistic positions within 
the above debates about the structure and style of unity. The smaller emergent groups had 
the advantage of a political context sympathetic to their position in opposition to traditional 
"professionalism". In this context, it will be instructive to examine the progressive bloc 
within the unity initiative and then the reactions of two established bodies in the Western 
Cape. Such organisational case studies will highlight the tensions within the initiative. The 
CTPA, in particular, illustrated intense internal contradictions in the face of popular 
pressure to change. TASA, on the other hand, illustrated a remarkable transition from the 
established to the emergent camp, and by I 990 disavowed practical allegiance to its former 
established allies. 
A "ganging-up" 
There was an on-going sense that the emergent unions behaved as a bloc, which threatened 
the established organisations. Kenny Ernest, chair of Cape Town Is TASA branch. said 
while discussing hindrances to unity: "Some of the established organisations feel 
pressurized by the emergent organisations."l89 This also remained a question of tactical 
import to the emergent groups. WECTU, DETU and ED ASA offered a combined report-
back of the Harare conference to a meeting at the University of Cape Town,I9o signifying 
their cooperative stance. At several points during the unity talks, the idea of a union among 
the "progressive" groups was muted as a strategy to more easily facilitate complete unity.l91 
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As Ernest said in an interview in 1990: "It will save the talks if there is one progressive 
organisation. Then people won't feel like there's a ganging up." 192 The established groups 
thus sought to weaken the emergent voice by according them decreased representation at the 
talks. This illustrated their defensive positions in relation to the political context of the 
unity initiative. Such defensiveness led to heightened tension and ambiguity within 
individual organisations. 
The withdrawal of the CTPA 
The established organisations were not easily changed or challenged. The CTPA will serve 
as a case study of the organisational entrenchment of established "professional" values, and 
the place of such values within the teacher unity initiative. The CTPA rested on a 
"professional" foundation -- stemming largely from the nature of its rural, Afrikaans-
speaking, perire bourgeois membership -- which remained firmly in place throughout the 
teacher unity initiative, up to and beyond the launch of SADTU. The CTPA thus 
represented a victory for the forces seeking to entrench race and class divisions amongst 
teachers.19J There are several examples of the CTPA' s intransigence in this regard coming 
out of the NTUF, particularly its withdrawal from the talks in April 1990, and culminating 
with its disaffiliation from SADTU a few months after its launch. There were other 
indictors of the CTPA's lack of enthusiasm. Franklin Sonn, for example, did not attend a 
single Western Cape TUF meeting, according to an active participant.194 More generally, 
the CTP A's vacillating coni mi tmen t to this teacher unity process reflected its contradictory 
place within the liberation movement which was guided by working class interests and a 
militant ideology. An example of this general ambiguity is, according to WECTU, the 
CTPA's withdrawal from the Western Cape Education Front" ... on more than one 
occasion". t95 
Within the teacher unity initiative, the CTPA described its contradictory position in 
the following terms. In a "Report to Teacher Unity Forum Workshop", it details " ... the 
constraint against which an established organisation like the CTPA have [sic] to operate 
within the broader context of the teacher unity initiative." The CTPA under Sonn' s 
leadership clearly sought enhanced credibility within the national struggle for liberation. 
But, argues the report, the CTPA' s main concern was its own membership, and it would 
have to find credibility through its organisational work. Implying a perceived contradiction 
between these two areas of work, the report states: 
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The CTPA sees the Teacher Unity Forum as a co-ordinatory [sic] structure 
which seeks to direct the thrust of the organisational programmes to 
dovetail with the broader political programmes of the liberation 
movement. The CTPA, however, regards the main basis of the 
organisation's status in the broader liberation movement as the 
organisation's union programme of providing in [sic] the daily needs of 
the teachers who constitute the membership of the organisation. The 
CTPA' s challenge is therefore to continue supporting the initiatives of the 
Teacher Unity Forum without subverting the organisation's own union 
programme in the process.t'io 
The report offers two examples of the CTPA's "challenging" position. First, CTPA 
executive members were too busy with their own meetings to attend all teacher unity 
discussions. Second, unity forum (and NECC) meetings were often held on Sundays, 
which raised "serious concerns" for "most" CTPA executive members who were "deacons 
and elders in the church" .1 4 7 While these concerns present a picture of real organisa~ional 
concerns, particularly in regards to a reassertion of the CTPA's Christian character, the 
report does not cut to the heart of the CTPA's difficulties within the unity initiative. 
The true difficulties were varied, but each illustrates a crucial contradiction in the 
realm of teachers, a contradiction in terms of "professionalism", or of class, or. of race. 
Firstly, the CTPA never divested itself of its traditional "professional" trappings, although 
it chose to gloss over them at times. In June 1989, Franklin Sonn proclaimed that the 
CTPA would not be hurried towards unity by the other participants, and that his 
organisation needed a longer period than the emergent groups to decide on teacher unity. 19S 
Despite the 1988 conference resolution "to examine the possibilities of forming a trade 
union of teachers", t<,19 the CTPA never supported so-called militant action. It did not come 
out in support of the 5 and 6 September 1989 stay-away. And after the SADTU launch, the 
CTPA's "professional" values moved rapidly to the fore. In March 1991, a CTPA Focus 
offered the common e.uphemism for non-involvement in action which disrupted school days: 
"When the interests of the teacher [are] in contlict with those of the child, the latter takes 
[sic] precedence. "2oo In May of 1991, the president of the CTPA, Archie Vergotine, 
claimed that his organisation opposed SADTU 's trade union activities, which ran counter to 
the CTPA's professional principles.2•1t 
The CTPA 's other main di tliculties within the teacher unity initiative were clearly 
defined in a lengthy resolution adopted at its June 1990 annual conference (see Appendix 
D). One item of concern stated in the resolution dealt with the CTPA's unhappiness at the 
lack of proportional representation. " ... [A] fair and proper system of voting should be 
based on proportional representation based on membership of NTUF organisations," states 
the resolution. This was not a new concern for the CTPA. At the unity talks held in 
August 1989, a consensus decision vvas made to place two representatives-- one from an 
196 "R~port to T~achcr Unity Forum \Vurkshop," CTPA, n.d. [1990'!), 3-4. 
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established and one from an emergent organisation -- from each region on a newly-formed 
Feasibility Committee. The following day, according to a TASA report, UTASA 
(representing the CTPA at the ·national talks) " ... retracted its consent on the basis of 
unequal representation. UT ASA felt that there should be proportional representation --
proportion depending on the numerical strength of each organisation. "2o2 The CTPA 
resisted the much smaller emergent groups having the same representation at NTUF talks. 
According to Bot, it felt there to be a "ganging up" of emergent organisations.2oJ This 
complaint could not feasibly be heard by the NTUF, with the great numerical differences in 
organisational memberships. WECTU, for example, claimed 600 members to the CTPA Is 
22,000. There was too much power at stake, which is clearly what the CTPA wanted: a 
more dominant voice. This was political maneuvering, as well as an assertion of 
superiority over the emergent unions. \Vhatever the case, it smacked of professional pride. 
A second clear point of contention stated in the resolution revolved around the 
quickening movement towards a unitary. n<ltional organisation. The CTPA wanted a 
federal organisation. Franklin Sonn had always been a leading proponent of federalism 
within teacher unity. :?.o-t This particular stance may have had organisational ramifications, 
since the June 1990 change in leadership appeared linked to the unity initiative. When 
Sonn stepped down before the CTPA Is congress, and van den Heever became the next 
president, Sourh declared that, "Sonn Is decision is expected to have a significant impact on 
teacher unity. "2o.s It was this June 1990 congress which most significantly examined the 
possibility of a unitary structure, while still upholding Sonnls belief in federation.206 In 
fact, according to Alan Powell of the SATA, after UTASA 1 S April 1990 withdrawal from 
the NTUF, the CTPA approached the SATA and, raising issues of "professionalism", made 
gestures towards a national federation involving UTASA, ATASA, TASA and the four 
English-speaking white organisations.2o1 
At the CTPA 1 S June 1991 annual conference, it came out in full support of a 
federation of teacher organisations.:?.oH Some insight into this decision, and the 
organisation Is continued desire for a federal structure, can be gleaned from the 1990 
conference resolution, and can be understood in terms of race. The 1990 conference 
resolved "that the CTPA ... remains part of the NTUF on a federal basis". It further 
resolved "that the dissolution of organisations would be facilitated if the existing 
departments are scrapped and a single department of education comes about". Here again 
was the argument in favour of federalism amongst teacher bodies. It is underpined by an 
acceptance of racist departments requiring racist organisational behaviour, despite the 
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CTPA's articulated commitment to non-racialism. Non-racialism would occur gradually, 
according to the CTPA, after a single education department had been implemented. So 
while accepting "the principle of the establishment of a unitary teachers' organisation", it 
was clear that the CTPA had a different, more moderate agenda.2o<~ 
The CTPA also had specific, practical criticisms of the unity process. For example, it 
levelled criticism at the way in which the unity initiative was run. It objected to perceived 
undemocratic practices within the NTUf.:.to It also objected to the lack of proper 
organisation of regional structures. 211 This dissatisfaction with the organisational operations 
of the NTUF were the ostensible reasons for UT ASA' s temporary withdrawal from the 
NTUF beginning in April 1990, and its complete withdrawal from the Working Committee 
as stated in the 1990 conference resolution. In a letter addressed to TASA, as the NTUF 
interim secretariat, dated 24 April 1990, the UTASA Secretary, J.S.G. Strauss, stated: " ... 
UTASA is compelled to convene a special meeting to review its position. You are 
accordingly advised that UTASA will not further participate until the emergency meeting 
has been held .... " This letter sprang from discontent around two issues which arose at the 
national teacher unity discussions held on 21 and 22 April 1990 in Bellville. According to 
the letter, the "terms of refere.nce" of the NTU F Working Committee " ... are directly in 
conflict with the official and documented position of UTASA and a clear contradiction of 
all the arguments the UTASA delegation tried to convey at all unity meetings .... " 
Secondly, the letter expressed dissatisfaction about the handling of a memorandum 
submitted to the minister of national education. "Our affiliates," wrote Mr. Strauss, "asked 
me to convey to you their concern that their consistent insistence on democratic processes is 
often not heeded." The mechanisms decided on to ensure that the memorandum " ... would 
contain the representative and democratic viewpoint of the various organisations ... " were 
simply not followed, stated the letter.212 
This latter reason for its withdrawal is weakened when compared to UTASA's earlier 
behaviour within the NTUF. The minutes of the March 1989 unity talks reflect a certain 
hypocrisy. "Western Cape registered their objections" to a meeting between the CTPA and 
the Minister of Education, stated the minutes, "as the decision of the previous meeting was 
that consultation should take pla(e between organisations in the Western Cape before such a 
meeting took place." The CTPA deferred: "The CTPA acknowledged that it had made an 
omission in not first having that meeting. "2IJ 
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UTASA's --and thus the CTPA's --withdrawal, and its 15 May 1990 request that 
" ... tlfe name of UTASA and/or its affiliates are not to be used on any other letter, 
pamphlet or propaganda material. .. " related to the NTUF,214 overtly retlect organisational 
concerns. The withdrawal, however. speaks to the much bigger issue of the CTPA's 
contradictory placement within a "professional", classist and racist realm, and illustrates an 
acceptance of entrenched "professional", class and race divides. 
The about-face of TASA 
TASA presents a different picture within teacher unity than the CTPA. Like the CTPA, 
TASA entered the unity process from a traditionally "professional" background, as an 
ethnically-defined, status-oriented organisation. TASA, however, unlike the CTPA 
eventually rhetorically rejected its traditional location and agreed to dissolve into a new, 
national union of teachers. 
TASA had shown signs of such a remarkable transition in the years before 1988. The 
change in TASA's established, "professional" outlook and behaviour began in the second 
half of the eighties (see Chapter Six). This change continued .to be retlected in 1988 when, 
in September, TASA rejected municipal elections as an "extension of the tri-cameral system 
of government" .215 This bore witness to the increased "political" aspect of professionalism 
within the context of South African teachers, and the shift this implied for the established 
groups. The TASA president also visited the ANC in Lusaka in the same year.216 In 
March 1989, TASA' s National Council made the decision to withdraw from government 
structures such as SACE and departmental subject committees.211 It began a "Don't Vote" 
campai-gn against the August 1989 tri-cameral parliament elections, and argued against 
schools being used for polling stations. Further, according to a TASA document, it 
"Participated in MOM organised protest/peace marches throughout the country." And, in a 
practical demonstration of its "alliance" with the working class, TASA successfully 
campaigned --using a march to Malgate Building in Durban, for example-- against the 
retrenchment of school cleaning staff.21X For TASA, education was a more highly_ 
politicized terrain than t had been a few years previously, and it began shifting ideological 
ground. 
During this time, T ASA also underwent a significant shift in its involvement in -the 
teacher unity process. Its own report on the third round of teacher unity talks convened by 
COSATU in March 1989 stated that, "TASA saw a complete political, economic and social 
restructuring as a precondition for a unitary organisation. TASA' s view was that it was 
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unlikely that a unitary organisation could be operative before the turn of the century. "219 It 
was effectively arguing for a federation and a maintenance of its "professional" identity. 
By the tifth round of talks in February 1990, T ASA was appointed to be the interim 
secretariat for the NTUF.22o demonstrating a commitment to the process towards unionism 
that was unfolding. In May 1990, Kenny Ernest would claim of TASA 's shifting attitudes 
and behaviours: "Our role has been such that we have shed the mantle of conservatism and 
are now seen by the so-called 'progressive' grouping as part of them. "221 In April 1992, 
Monica Bot reported that T ASA " ... took the formal decision to disband in favour of 
SADTU at its 1990 annual congress. Since then, it has given attention to various aspects 
needing consideration for dissolution (assets, legal commitments, investments such as 
medical aid, implications for its staff, etc), and determined how these could be carried over 
into SADTU. "222 The transition was not entirely easy, nor could it be absolute. As late as 
September 1990, South reported a "crisis of confidence" in TASA's national executive. 
The issue, which caused the Cape Town branch to withdraw from the NTUF, concerned 
decreased Cape Town branch representation at SADTU's launch. The decision came from 
TASA's National Council, and disregarded an NTUF decision on regional representation.223 
There were several factors which prompted this behavioural and -- to a degree --
ideological shift. While it would be fallacious to assume that TASA and its entire 
membership underwent a change in classist and racist values over the period of two years, 
the changed nature of their engagement with other organisations and their commitment to a 
teachers' union worked against race and class divisions, and lent more weight to the 
resistant aspect of teachers' contradictory locations. 
The first reason for TASA's shift concerned continuing dissatisfaction with its 
department. Three relevant points of dissatisfaction were articulated at TASA 's National 
Council meeting in March 1988. First, TASA felt there to be a lack of consultation 
between it and the department. Second, the organisation felt the evaluation of teachers 
within the department was inadequate. Finally, TASA once again spoke out against party-
political interference in education.224 
Other reasons for TASA 's dissatisfaction with the DEC (HoD) became clear during 
1988-1990. At the beginning of 1989, T ASA reiterated its growing concern about the 
qualified teachers who were unable to tind work.22s Then, in that same year, the 
department snubbed TASA when the HoD Minister of Education and Culture, Dr. Kristen 
Rajoo, created a new "think-tank" for grappling with educational concerns. Although 
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TASA represented approximately eighty percent of teachers in Indian schools, the minister 
excluded it from representation on the new advisory body. 226 When it subsequently was 
invited to serve on the new Ministerial Advisory Council, TASA refused.227 The changing 
political climate, which was vociferously against the tri-cameral system of government, 
further prompted TASA into an antagonistic position in relation to its "own affairs" 
department. 
The political climate affected TASA 1 S ideological stands in other ways as well, adding 
to the pressures for change within the organisation. The Cape Town branch chairperson, 
Kenny Ernest, believed that T ASA Is shift was due in large part to the political movements 
in South Africa. "There is more political awareness," he said. "People are realizing you 
cannot live in a vacuum. "228 An organiser in the Durban head office concurred. "Teachers 
as an educated elite saw that the writing was on the wall for the Nationalist government," 
said the organiser. "Since Harare, teachers realized that they had a role to play." The 
TASA informant went on to explain that younger teachers were playing a bigger role in 
branch and regional structures, which helped to accelenite change within the organisation 
since these teachers had been more politicized than their parents.229 
Most importantly for our case study of TASA within the professional-unionist 
dichotomy -- with class as a central tenet -- was the coincidence of TASA Is organisational 
and leadership change. Poobie Naicker replaced Pat Samuels as president in June. 1989. 
Samuels believed that a unitied organisation would be possible only by the turn of the 
century. Naicker, a participant in the Harare talks, had a more short-term vision. Naicker 
was a TASA stalwart, having served on its National Council for twenty years. A primary 
school headmaster, he had been chairperson of TASA Is English Society, a vice-president of 
the organisation and a deputy president.Do Thus he was not a dark-horse candidate, nor did 
he have a history of militancy. Importantly, Naicker had spent his early years as a sugar 
cane worker, said Ernest, who concluded this statement with, "We are workers first." 
Ernest admitted that part of the organisation Is shift was due to Naicker: " ... Part of it was 
top-down. "231 Another TASA informant was less direct, implying that Naickerls 
ascendency was part of a larger process. "The change in leadership," said the informant, 
"made the transition easier. "2J2 Naicker himself admits the crucial role of leaders during 
that time of transition: "The pace at which events have moved [within TASA] has been 
somewhat decided by the stance of the leadership. "2JJ 
The fundamental! y undemocratic heritage of the established organisations, in the sense 
that large numbers within each organisation existed as "paper members" only, helped to 
226 SAIRR, Annual Survev /9891!990. 781-782. 
227 Cape Times, 2 Nov~1~hc::r 1989. 
228 Interview with K~nny Emc::st, 8 i\:lay 1990. 
229 Int~rview with informant B. 16 July 1990. 
230 Argus, 20 June 1989. 
231 Interview with Kenny Em~st, 8 May 1990. 
232 Interview with informant B, 16 July 1990. 
233 Interview with Poobie Naick~r. 17 July 1990. 
258 
concretise TASA Is shift under a more progressive leadership. Ernest spoke honestly of this 
when he said of the shift: "I will not say that all our membership agrees, but it is the vast 
majority." And, within a discussion of organisational assets and dissolution, he further 
admitted that, "We are not confusing our membership by talking about these things 
now. "234 While such admissions are easily criticized, the importance of leadership positions 
within organisations cannot be underestimated. Do organisations choose appropriate leaders 
to reflect a certain historical mood among their members, or do the leaders adopt policies 
which influence organisational mood? Certainly the hierarchical nature of the established 
organisations and their members I deference to authority cannot be denied, and the change in 
T ASA 1 s position under Naicker was retlected to a lesser extent in the CTPA which saw 
Franklin Sonn withdrawing from the presidency in favour of Randall van den Heever at a 
time when the CTPA 1S ambiguity regarding the NTUF needed resolution. 
TASA 1S movement away from a traditional "professional" stance had repercussions 
for the teacher unity initiative. TASAis shift not only put greater pressure on its established 
former allies, but its movement towards the progressive camp allowed it to take up a public 
position in the middle of the class dichotomy within the initiative. TASA became the 
interim secretariat for the initiative -- a power-grabbing exercise, according to an EDASA 
participant235 -- and it was T ASA that drew up an important draft-structure document for 
the national talks.236 Naicker also claims to have been "assigned the role of meeting with 
Sonn by the NTUF and COSATU" to facilitate greater commitment by Sonn to the kind of 
organisation envisaged by the Harare Accord.237 A report from the vice-president for 
external matters to the 1990 Annual Conference proclaimed that, "It is now common 
knowledge that the Association enjoys great popularity among many of the participants of 
the teacher unity movement in national circles. "13~ Ernest, in a self-congratulatory way, 
announced at the May 1990 AGM of TASA Is Cape Regional Council that, "It is an open 
secret that our Association is proving the catalyst at this most crucial period in the unity 
process. Well done, Comrade Poobie! "13~ Ernest, in fact, claimed that, "TASA went for 
the role of an honest broker because \Ve could see the impasse, ... [and] we wanted to keep 
things going. "240 Naicker also believes that, "We have helped to resolve differences. "241 
The progressive group within the initiative had its own ideas about TASA. "We are 
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hoping," said Monde Tulwana of DETU, "to use TASA to challenge the other established 
organisations. "242 
TASA, thus, illustrated the changing dynamics of teacher politics towards the end of 
the eighties within the context of teacher unity. While TASA' s transition was based on 
leadership decisions, and while its members remained within ethnically-defined locations, 
this established organisation demonstrated the possibility inherent in the process of teacher 
unity for a fundamental redefining of "professionalism", and T ASA also demonstrated just 
how far-reaching the changes in teacher politics had become. 
Western Cape Strategies {or Unitv: Unity in Action 
Given the variety of tensions described in this chapter, Western Cape teacher groups found 
unity through joint action, rather than through resolution of debates concerning structure 
and style. The unity process, actually, swept major, divisive issues under the carpet in 
favour of unity built on united action against a common enemy. 
In reporting on the teacher unity talks after the fifth round in February 1990 in Port 
Elizabeth, WECTU observed: "A resolution that has been formulated at each National 
Teacher Unity Forum (NTUF) over the last two years is that teacher organizations must 
begin to forge unity in action and that the obvious starting place is in the regions. "243 The 
efficacy of this premise was asserted by Randall van den Heever just prior to the CTPA's 
June 1990 congress. "The CTPA's involvement in the campaigns of the NTUF," he said to 
South, "has been based on the premise that unity between teachers organisations will only 
be cemented through political action and solidarity initiatives. "244 A commonly-asserted 
strategy within the liberation movement, unity-in-action was lauded by COSATU's Chris 
Seoposengwe at a mass meeting of the Western Cape regional teacher unity forum in April 
1990. "Unity," he said, "is born of the struggles waged on the ground. "245 
What most participants in the teacher .unity process seemed to understand was that 
active cooperation around mutual concerns was the way to cut across the contradictions of 
teachers' positions, and to work against the forces which kept race, class and "professional" 
divisions in place. Therefore, teachers' organisations in the Western Cape opted to focus 
their attention on the general crisis in education, and the unhappy plight of teachers in their 
reg10n. 
This tactic was illustrated by a 12 September 1988 meeting of "all" Western Cape 
teacher organisations at which threatened retrenchments, victimization, school closures and 
the suspension of five DETU teachers were discussed.246 A month later a mass meeting of 
Western Cape teachers' organisations-- TASA, CTPA, DETU, EDASA, PENATA and 
WECTU -- resolved to reject municipal elections, fight against the closure of two teacher 
242 Interview with MonJe Tulwana. 7 i\1an:h 1990. 
243 "Teacher Unity Talks Update ... ," 2. 
244 South, 14-20 June 1990. 
245 Personal notes, TUF Mass Mc:ding, Hanover Park, 10 April 1990. 
246 "Minutes of Teachers' Unity Talks Held on the 6th November 1988. in Cape Town." 
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training colleges, work for the establishment of a unitary teachers' organisation and work 
for th·e release of detainees and the reinstatement of the DETU teachers.247 
In 1989, the formation of the Western Cape Education Front (WCEF) serv.ed to 
promote greater cooperation between teacher organisations. While suspicion about the 
established groups still existed within this MDM education front, it was agreed on 20 June 
that the CTPA had to be drawn in as an affiliate due to its participation in the unity talks 
and its "present progressive actions", and that PENATA would need to practically involve 
itself in educational struggle before aftiliating. 248 Ultimately, according to WECTU, the 
CTPA, DETU, EDASA and WECTU affiliated, while PENATA and TASA participated in 
WCEF campaigns.249 The Western Cape regional report at the fourth national teacher unity 
talks in August 1989 indicated that while teachers' groups had been involved in WCEF 
activities, such as meetings and demonstrations, the regional teacher unity forum had not 
yet evolved.2so 
It was in November 1989 that a regional teacher unity forum began operating. Like 
the national initiative, it was convened by COSA TU, and two meetings were held in that 
month. Guided in part by a COSA TU program of action for teacher organisations for 
1990, the new forum directed itself towards a campaign against the looming 1990 education 
crisis. From this meeting, an advertisement threatening action against departments which 
retrenched or victimised teachers was placed in Sollfh and the Cape Times. Following a 5 
Febru:1ry 1990 meeting of all the participating organisations' executives, a pamphlet about 
teacher unemployment and retrenchment was released, and another advertisement was 
produced which called for unemployed teachers to identify themselves. A further activity 
of the regional forum was an 18 February workshop, attended by more than one hundred 
delegates, dealing with central aspects of the unity process.251 
The activities of the regional teacher unity forum continued to center on specific 
educational grievances, particular! y those concerning teachers. In March 1990, the Sunday 
Times reported the launching of a campaign " ... against the retrenchment, unemployment 
and alleged victimisation" of members of Western Cape teacher organisations. 252 The 
following month, on 10 April, an important mass meeting was held in Hanover Park by the 
regional forum. The meeting passed a resolution on "Organizing teachers in action" which 
stressed the need for "common purpose" to override organisational differences. Other 
resolutions concerned the plight of temporary teachers, service conditions, the fu'ture 
education system and policy against the potential victimization of teachers who would 
247 TASA, "Progress Report on Tc::a~.:hc::r Unity for the Period October 1988 to 160389." 
248 Personal notes; meeting of WCEF, UWC. 23 June 1989. This was not a trouble-free alliance for teachers, 
since antagonisms between teachers' groups still remained. At this meeting, for example, van den Heever 
complained that WECTU had not rc~.:iprocated the CTPA's invitation to its AGM. 
249 "Teacher Unity Talks U pdatc ... ," 2. 
250 T ASA, "Report on Fourth Round of National T ea~.:her Unity Talks Convened by COSATU, Held from 19 
to 20 August 1989, At the St. Barnabas College, Bosmont, Johannesburg." 
251 "Teacher Unity Talks Update ... ," 2. 
252 Sunday Times, 11 March 1990. 
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participate in the stayaway on 5 and 6 September 1990. The meeting was significant in that 
it also reflected various pressures at work on teachers. Dullah Omar, representing the 
ANC, said, "The view of the ANC is that teacher unity is absolutely essential and nothing 
must stand in its way." His message to teachers from "headquarters" was that teachers 
must "unify quickly". A COSATU speaker, Chris Seoposengwe, claimed that, "This is a 
very difficult sector to organise." "Take your rightful political place and lead the nation," 
he said, "but please, in a unified way. "253 Such pressures, according to the tone of the 
meeting, sought to help build unity through combined action. 
Another Western Cape teacher mass meeting, held under the auspices of the regional 
teacher unity forum on 18 May 1990 in the Cape Town City Hall, called teachers together 
by publishing a question which retlected the unity forum's strategy: "What do teachers 
want?" Those of teachers rallied around that question and attended the meeting. Speakers 
from the floor highlighted teachers' continuing concerns about salaries and harassment.254 
~A further, significant example of continuing, combined action took place on 5 June 
1990 when representatives of the NTUF spoke with the new Minister of National 
Education, Gene Louw, at a watershed meeting in Cape Town. Originally sch~duled for 28 
May, Louw refused to see the delegation because of a march scheduled by the regional 
forum to coincide with the meeting. In a media release, Louw offered an explanation for 
his refusal: 
The NTUF is not a recognized education body to which an interview has 
ever been granted before. Nevertheless, I granted the Forum a two-hour 
appointment to discuss education problems and not to indulge in 
premeditated politicking as things eventually turned out.255 
The march itself was very successful, involving approximately 5000 people. Western Cape 
teachers were united before a common enemy: the state. Speaking in front of the City Hall 
at the culmination of the demonstration, Shepherd Mdladlana recognized the importance of 
teacher unity. "The eighteen departments in this country will not dissolve on its [sic] own," 
he said. "It will have to be removed by the combined force of all our teachers." A 
teacher, Celeste Louw, demanded a minimum wage and improved facilities. The NECC's 
Ihron Rensburg proclaimed: "Not once in the last three decades have teachers been as 
unified as they are today. We stand at the beginning of a new era for teachers' 
organisations." And Jay Naidoo reaffirmed COSATU's support for teachers and teacher 
unity .256 
The "unconditional" meeting between Louw and the NTUF delegation was deemed 
"historic" by the Cape Times and the Argus, and went ahead despite simultaneous placard 
demonstrations around the peninsula. A joint statement committed the participants to 
finding a solution to the education crisis. Among other things, Louw agreed to "look into" 
253 Personal nott!S, TU F mass meetint!. Hanover Park, l 0 April !990. 
25 4 Personal notes, TUF mass meeting. City Hall. Clpe Town, 18 May 1990. 
255 "Media Rdease Issued hy Mr G"cne Louw. MP. Ministt!r of National Education," 28 May 1990. 
256 Personal notes, TUF mass meeting, City Hail, Cape Town, 28 May 1990. Set! the Weekly Mail, 25-31 
May 1990, 4; and Cape Ti111es, 29 May 1990. 
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recognition for the NTUF, to "look into" a mit1imum wage for teachers, and work for the 
elimination of wage disparities between men and women. Further, the principle of job 
security for qualified teachers was agreed upon, and Louw said that he would try to find the 
required money to alleviated the crisis conditions in schools.257 Primarily, however, it 
asserted the role of the NTUF in the education struggle, and suggested that such a group, 
unified through constructive action, could indeed assume a position of primacy in the 
ongoing education debates. 
Specific issues affecting teachers continued to attract teachers to unified activities. 
Prior to the launch of SADTU, on 24 July, the NTUF called for a "national day of. 
teachers' action against victimisation and harassment". Over 400 teachers attended a 
meeting in Guguletu that day. 2sx On 27 July, seventeen members of the Western Cape TUF 
met with DET ofticials to present grievances concerning victimization, transferals, salary 
deductions and teachers who had been arrested.25Y 
Randall van den Heever put the combined action in bold perspective in the middle of 
1990. " ... [T]he fundamental challenge now facing the whole teacher unity movement," he 
wrote in Educario, "is to progress from joint initiatives between teachers' organisations to a 
unitary organisational structure representing all teachers in the Western Cape. "260 This 
challenge, in the end, could not be successfully met. 
Conclusion 
The strategy of "unity in action" adopted by the national and regional teacher unity forums 
was successful in the short term. Teachers from different organisations rallied together 
around issues concerning all teachers as the militant spirit which brought certairi changes in 
teachers' attitudes to their work moved through South Africa. That such unity was 
temporary, and could.not hope to immediately overcome deeply entrenched divisions or to 
solve the structural contradictions of teachers' work, became apparent as SADTU ~as 
finally launched in October. 
When looking at the history of Western Cape teachers' organisations during the last 
years of the eighties, it would be incorrect to assume that teacher unity efforts ultimately 
failed. The history presented here. rather, hopes to document how remarkable changes in 
teachers' ideas about their work came about as a result of varied pressures from the state 
and the liberation movement. Contradictory pressures concerning race and class also 
continued to influence teachers' behaviour and thinking. The history of teacher unity 
during this period is thus a reflection of these inherent contradictions, and of a changing 
teacher "professionalism". 
257 Cape Times, 5 and 6 June 1990; Argus, 5 and 6 June 1990. 
258 Cape Times, 25 July 1990. 
259 Cape Times, 28 July 1990. 
260 Randall van den Hcevcr, "Teacher Unity in the Western Cape," Educatio 2nd Quarter (1990): 20. 
CONCLUSION 
The year 1990, in which SADTU was launched, marked the end of a remarkable decade for 
teacher politics in South Africa's history. It was a period of significant changes in the 
teachers' realm as many teachers found a political home within the popular resistance 
movement. The changes were clearly illustrated by shifting understandings of teacher 
"professionalism". 
"Professionalism" remains at the heart of teacher politics. "Professionalism" reflects 
the ways in which teachers understand their position in relation to schooling and society. In 
South Africa, an acceptance of conventional "professionalism" has meant a tacit acceptance 
of apartheid divisions. "Professional" teachers have grouped into ethnically-detined 
associations. "Profession~l'·~~e-thuseiijoyed status withi~ communiTies. 
'The status 'of teachers, partially premised on myths about teacher autonomy, has been built 
within a framework of class distinctions. "Professionalism" implies an elitist understanding 
of teachers' class location, placing teachers in a social stratum "above" the working class. 
Conventional "professionalism" with its "racist" and "classist" foundation was 
fundamentally challenged during the 1980s. At the beginning of the decade, students 
asserted a rebellious authority within schools. The social order within which teachers 
worked was altered. Many teachers felt caught between the new student authority and the 
authority of the state. Many teachers remained fundamentally conservative, distancing 
themselves from "political" involvement. "Professionalism", as defined by the state, had 
been accepted by many within the teaching corps. The student rebellion, however, 
problematised "professional" attitudes and behaviour. by rejecting them. The morale of 
many teachers dropped as they found themselves between a familiar world of apartheid 
education, and a world of resistance. 
The challenge to teachers' acceptance of their familiar locations and identities 
continued as the decade matured. Student rebellion flared once again in the middle of the 
1980s. This time, however, the challenge from students was strengthened through the 
growth of alliance politics. The trade union movement, adding a socialist tenet to 
resistance politics, and community organisations rejected teacher quiescence during a time 
of optimistic rebellion. The liberation movement grew in strength as the end of the decade 
approached. Many specific groups within the movement, such as the ANC and COSATU, 
focussed on teacher politics, increasing pressure and enhancing the tensions inherent in 
teachers' realm. 
During this time, both in response to external pressures and through a desire to act as 
agents in their own world, organised teachers manifested change. The established 
·l 
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associations manifested tensions within teacher politics by distancing themselves from 
education departments, overtly rejecting oporrheiJ. and engaging in limited "political" 
activity. As Randall Petini said in 1985, "Teachers have been at pains to leave political 
issues alone, but as Franklin Sonn often says, politics will not leave them alone. "t 
Other teachers organised outside of the established groups. The emergent unions 
manifested the changes within teacher politics by espousing non-racialism, by militantly 
engaging in political acts as part of the broader resistance movement, and by declaring 
themselves to be unions, as opposed to associations. The emergent teacher groups thus 
embodied fundamental challenges to conventional "professionalism" premised on race and 
class divides. 
After three years of political in-fighting between the emergent and established 
organisations, teacher unity appeared as a priority on the agendas of these organisations and 
of powerful components of the national liberation struggle. The ANC, the NECC and 
COSATU demonstrated this priority by beginning a process of coopting the established 
groups into the emergent camp. Teacher groups and others adopted a spirit of compromise 
during and after the Harare conference in April 1988. As Oppenheimer has written: "To 
achieve a goal we need unity [within a group] but to achieve unity it is sometimes necessary 
to compromise, to gloss over some important issues ... which shall it be?"2 The 
compromise amongst teacher organisations, within the context of political defiance, took 
the form of "unity in action". Teacher militancy burgeoned as the decade ended. Many 
teachers more completely rejected traditional "professionalism", thus heightening tensions 
within teacher politics. 
These tensions were articulated during the two years between the Harare conference 
and the launch of SADTU as continued debates about organisational structure and style. 
There was much ambiguity during the years of the NTUF within the established groups as 
they attempted to come to terms with a political climate which found their conventional 
ideologies unacceptable. 
The changed climate, the heightened militancy, the desires of many teachers to 
redetine their conventional roles within schools and societies facilitated the launching of 
SADTU. It was a union of teachers. It was grateful to COSA TU for facilitating the unity 
talks. A TUF spokesperson said in May 1990, for example, that COSATU had "really kept 
us together in the past two years. "J SADTU immediately foregrounded wage issues.4 
The launch occurred, however, at a time of quietening popular resistance. Many of 
the pressures from organisations during the period of popular resistance diminished. This 
allowed a public re-emergence of conventional "professionalism" within teacher politics. 
Many teacher organisations-- CATU, NATU, TUATA, and the NTS, for example-- did 
not participate in SADTU's launch. The SATA, marginal to the process, went so far as to 
I Petini, "The contribution," 34. 
2 Quoted in Matiwana, Walters and Gruener, 19. 
3 South, 30 May to 6 June 1990. 
4 New Nation, 12-18 Octoher 1990. 
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purchase a half-page advertisement in the Cape Times on the eve of SADTU's formation 
declaring its decision not to participate.-' Established associations perceived SADTU to be 
overly "political", and thus "unprofessional". 
This conservative retrenchment created space for the launch of a rival "professional" 
federation comprised of ethnically-defined teacher groups. NAPTOSA represented a 
victory for those teacher organisations wedded to their ethnic and "professional" identities .. 
It also represented the serious nature of continuing divisions within teacher politics. In July 
1991, just prior to NAPTOSA's launch, the federation accused SADTU of "moving away 
from a professional stance" .6 
Such divisions have historically bred discontent. Unity affords empowerment. 
Teachers in South Africa have needed such empowerment as they lived and worked in 
difficult circumstances. In an article entitled "In the undervaluing of teachers lies the 
undoing of society", Peter Yale, a senior lecturer in international relations, wrote of 
teachers in 1989: 
The state-run education system has been unable to cope with the demands 
placed upon it and has simply capitulated (some would say even 
encourages) a deterioration in standards. This has demoralised and 
embittered the teaching community. Resentment and frustration, coupled 
with steadily declining incomes as more and more schools have had to be 
staffed and run on less and less money per pupil, have done the rest. 7 
Growing teacher militancy and the process of teacher unity were two examples of teachers' 
responses to such circumstances. Teachers have remained active, not simply reactive. 
It would be beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the way in which the 
contradictory nature of teachers' terrain continued to influence the two newly-formed 
nationc;tl bodies. The difficulties faced by SADTU have been examined elsewhere.s Here it 
will suffice to say that the historical contradictions within the complicated realm of race, 
class and "professionalism" have continued to plague SADTU, particularly regarding its 
militant, "trade union" behaviour. 
This dissertation has attempted to explore the highly complex realm of teacher politics 
in the 1980s. It has suggested a variety of reasons why teacher disunity has been so 
resilient. Certainly, not all of the reasons could be adequately dealt with. The TLSA, for 
example, an important group within the Western Cape, and an organisation which provided 
the soil on which WECTU grew, has been slighted since it did not play a role in the teacher 
unity initiatives of the eighties. Also. the important story of international organisations' 
role in the teacher unity initiative at the end of the decade has been left untold.9 Further, 
5 Cape Times, 5 Octoher 1990. 
6 The Weekly Mail, 28Junc;:- 4July 1991. 
7 BusinessDav, 7 Decc;:mhcr 1989. 
8 Bot, "The P~litics of Teachc;:r Unity"; Portia Maurice, "Dehate rages over teacher unionism," Weekly Mail, 
28 June- 4 July 1991: 13. 
9 One extremely significant aspect of inkmational involvement in the NTUF was related by EDASA-member 
Lynette Farager at a special gc;:neral meeting of EDASA held after SADTU's launch. She reported that tension 
existed between WCOTP and the International Federation of Teachers' Unions (IFTU). The IFTU had been 
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this dissertation has dealt with organised teachers, thus excluding the majority of teachers 
outside of teacher groups. 
This dissertation has highlighted the power of teachers, and the urgent tasks which 
confront them. "What role," asked Gareth Rossiter in 1990, "are teachers going to play in 
establishing unity and in breaking down aparrheid structures?" to A DETU executive 
member involved in the unity process partially answered Rossiter's question: "In Coloured 
areas, like Heideveld, there are people who still call me a Bantu. When they see you, they 
call you 'boy'. Teachers can change that. That is our belief." 11 
The process of teacher unity was concerned with political change in opposition to the 
apartheid state. But it was also concerned with the empowerment of an embattled teaching 
corps. Wilson and Ramphele wrote at the end of the decade: 
There can be few more urgent and immediate political tasks in South 
Africa than rethinking the role of teachers in an oppressive structure so 
that they may play their full part, with integrity and perseverance in the 
long march to liberation.t2 
Teachers had indeed begun this political task in earnest during the 1980s. The history of 
teacher politics in that decade demonstrates the complexity and difficulty faced in 
accomplishing such a goal. The history also illustrates the potential for teachers to engage 
with changing social and political circumstances and empower themselves. 
kept out of the South Afril:an unity initiative: ti1r fear of alienating the established associations. EDASA, 
special general meeting, Rondc:hosl:h, 18 Ol:tohc:r 1990. 
10 Interview with Gareth Rossiter, 5 March !990. 
II Interview with informant D, 6 March 1990. 
12 Wilson and Ramphde. 144. 
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APPENDIX A 
17ze JOCTASA Chmter for Teacher Unity 
We believe that the following aspects are vital and relevant elements to be incorporated in a 
charter to form the basis of teacher unity in South Africa. UT ASA furthermore believes that 
all associations who are prepared to pledge themselves to these principles may be joined 
together in one union. 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
the eradication of race as a criterion for the appointment of teachers to teaching posts, 
and to membership of a single national teachers' body 
the establishment of a single central educational authority 
equal salaries for equal qualifications and service regardless of sex 
the equalisation of service benefits 
the raising of educational standards in general and the improvement of teachers' 
qualifications in particular. 
We consider the following broader principles to be vital for the upliftment of children and 
will therefore actively seek ways and means to attain them: 
* 
* 
the condemnation of Apartheid as detrimental to education and society at large 
the establishment of a non-racial society based on respect for human dignity and 
repugnance for measures intrinsic in the policy of Apartheid, which serve to offend 
the basic humanity of o~tr children, our members and our parent community. 
We deem the following educational aims and principles to be an integral part of our concept 
of a democratic educational system: 
1. The welfare of all South Africa's people. 
2. Equal educational opportunities for all, regardless of race, religion, social or 
economic status, creed or sex. 
3. Equal standards of education for all, under a single education system, administered by 
a single, national department of education. 
4. A democratic system of education in which all people have the right to share in 
determining the purposes and policies of education. This right cannot be separated 
from the inalienable right of all people to share in the central decision-making process 
in our country. 
5. Respect for civil liberties. 
6. A rationally planned educational system adapted to meet the challenges of the 
scientific-technological age with specific reference to the manpower requirements of 
our country; and to this end, the provision of educational institutions to promote the 
acquisition of managerial, entrepreneurial, administrative, professional and technical 
skills. , 
7. Free and compulsory education for all children to the age of sixteen years. 
8. A system of differentiated education to direct pupils to their choice of subjects and 
educational institutions according to their ability, aptitude and interest. 
With these objectives in mind, we undertake to enter into discussions with the existing 
educational authorities on matters requiring immediate and urgent attention: 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
the establishment of a single educational authority 
equal monetary grants to all state schools 
adequate teacher-training facilities 
realistic salaries to prevent the present drain to commerce and industry 
non-discriminatory admission to all educational institutions based on a policy of non-
interference by the state. 
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APPENDIX A (continued) 
Given the essentially separate basis of education policy and practice in South Africa, we 
realistically recognise and appreciate: 
* 
* 
the difficulties inherent in establishing and effectively organising and operating 
teachers' associations on a practically open basis 
that a fully open education system in South Africa is a function of an open society. 
We nevertheless: 
PLEDGE OURSEL YES TO MOVE WITH URGENCY FROM THE BASIS OF 
EXISTING TEACHERS' ASSOCIATIONS TOWARDS ONE, NATIONAL AND NON-
RACIAL ASSOCIATION FOR TEACHERS, THAT WE MAY THEREBY MAKE 
MANIFEST, AND GIVE PRACTICAL EFFECT TO THE PRINCIPLES TO WHICH WE 
ARE DEEPLY COMMITTED. 
(Source: CTP A photocopy.) 
271 
APPENDIX 8 
Ten Aims and Objectives Accepted at National Progressive Teacher Unity Meeting, 
7 November 1987 
1. To unite. mobilise and organise all teachers. 
2. To struggle for a unitary, non-racial, non-sexist, democratic, compulsory and 
free education system on all levels. as part of our struggle for a non-racial and 
democratic South Africa free from oppression and exploitation. 
3. To clarify, implement and promote people's education. 
4. To work jointly with parents and students for the democratic control of 
education. 
5. to educate teachers about their rights and to fight for the rights and interests of 
all teachers in the schools. 
6. To work towards eradicating all sexist practices in schools. 
7. To involve ourselves as teachers in the progressive struggles of our people. 
8. To reject participation in reactionary structures which have been created by the 
state to perpetuate the status quo. 
9. To develop and promote a national, people's culture. 
10. To work towards the principles and practices of non-racial sport. 
(Source: WECTU newslerrer ll [February 1988]: 3.) 
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APPE:\DIX C 
The Harare Accord on Teacher Unity 
I. All representatives of the teachers organisations present agreed on the need for the 
national unity of teachers and committed themselves to discuss this in their various 
organisations and to propagate the feasibility of one national teachers organisation. 
2. The representatives of teachers organisations agreed that they should get together to 
negotiate and decide on the form which the envisaged organisation should take. 
3. Such an organisation should be committed to a unitary, non-racial, democratic 
South Africa. 
4. The organisation should commit itself to be part of the national mass democratic 
movement. 
5. The organisation should commit itself to a free, non-racial, non-sexist, compulsory 
democratic education in a single education system. 
6. The organisation should protect and promote the rights of teachers as workers and 
professionals. 
7. The organisation should implement as a matter of urgency a programme of political 
and professional education of teachers for them to play an effective role within the 
cqmmunity. 
8. Ideology should not be a precondition for unity. 
9. The representatives of organisations agreed to urge their organisations that they, as 
well as the envisaged organisation, would abide by the principle and practice of 
non-collaboration with all structures of the Apartheid system. 
10. Negotiations with respective authorities should only be conducted with the mandate 
of the constituencies concerned. · 
11. The organisation will commit itself to the realisation of the ideals of people's 
education in our country. 
12. In the interim, the representatives of organisations will urge their organisations to 
consult on ways to co-ordinate the various attempts and work together in 
formulating and implementing people's education projects. 
13. Organisations are encouraged to organise joint projects which will facilitate 
national unity. 
14. The _rep_resentative~ of organisations committed themselves to urge their 
orgamsat10ns to mamtain the spirit of comradeship, mutual respect and common 
purpose which has characterised the Harare seminar on teacher unity as a necessary 
element in the process of achieving unity. 
15. The representatives of organisations agreed to urge their organisations to establish a 
negotiating machinery to pursue the objectives stated in this document. They 
request that as a niatter of urgency, COSA TU should convene such a machinery 
having consulted and agreed with the organisations about the composition and 
powers of such machinery. COSA TU is further requested to consult with other 
sectors of the democratic movement to facilitate the unity process. 
Agreed to by: UTASA, ATASA, TASA, NECC, NEUSA, WECTU, PTU, DETU, 
EDASA, PTL 
Harare: 7 April 1988 
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A PPEI\TI IX D 
Cape Teachers' Professional Association 
1990 Conference Resolution on Teacher Unity 
This 23rd Annual Conference of the CTPA noting: 
(a) that the CTPA is committed to the process of teacher unity, particularly by virtue 
of its acceptance of the Harare Teacher Unity Accord; 
(b) that a proposal is to be tabled by the Working Committee of the National Teacher 
Unity Forum (NTUF) for the launch of a national teachers' organisation in 
September 1990; 
(c) that UTASA withdrew its representatives from this NTUF Working Committee due 
to the principle ofconsensus decision-making not being consistently applied within 
the NTUF; 
(d) that a fair and proper system of voting should be based on proportional 
representation based on membership of NTUF membership organisations; 
(e) that many regions of the NTUF have not yet been properly organised; 
(t) that the CTPA cannot forsake its obligations to its members in terms of the union 
facilities it provides to teachers, until an effective alternative can be established. 
(g) that the pace of political events in the country is fast overtaking the teacher unity 
initiative; 
(h) that the escalating crisis in education need to be urgently facilitated by a recognised 
non-racial, national teachers' organisation; 
hereby resolves: 
1. that the conference accepts the principle of the establishment of a unitary teachers' 
organisation; 
2. that the CTPA for the interim remains part of the NTUF on a federal basis. 
3. that the CTPA regional structures should, together with other teachers' 
organisations in the region and under the convenorship of COSATU, organise TUF 
regional structures as a matter of the utmost urgency; 
4. that the NTUF should strictly abide by the principles of democracy in all aspects of 
decision-making; 
5. that the launch of a national teachers' structure takes place once all democratic 
requirements have been met; 
6. that the time-table towards the launch of a national teachers' organisation be 
determined by the following factors: 
6.1 that such a launch takes place after all NTUF regions have been organised, and 
progressive-thinking white teachers' organisations have all been incorporated in the 
unity process; 
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APPENDIX D (continued) 
6.2 that a launch can only take place when all constitutional requirements dealing with 
dissolutions within the various organisations have been met; 
7. that the dissolution of organisations would be facilitated if the existing departments 
are scrapped and a single department of education comes about. 
8. that the CTPA Executive be mandated to investigate and report to the 
Representative Council on the following: 
8.1 Dissolution Procedures 
8.2 Retention of Employees 
8.3 A Deed of Trust with regard to Assets 
8.4 Changes to the CTPA Constitution. 
21 June 1990 
(Source: CTPA photocopy) 
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